The study of the causes of many, if not all, crisis situations in postcolonial Indonesia shows that they are most often rooted in the archaic relations between the citizen, society, on the one hand, and the government, the state, on the other, and, what is of particular importance, in the archaic approach of both sides to these relations. The process of democratization, which is developing with great difficulties in modern Indonesia, is primarily a change in the essence of relations in the triangle of citizen-society-power.

Perhaps only in the anti - colonial war of 1945-1949 did the Indonesian people act as a genuine subject of political action, and in some cases as a source of political initiative. But this was a struggle against alien domination, and the experience gained was not directly projected onto the Javanese and, to a large extent, Indonesian culture's idea of power as an extraterrestrial substance, akin to heavenly grace, and therefore independent of the will of ordinary mortals who were not marked by this grace.

Further changes in the political system and political course of the country were ultimately determined by the struggle and correlation of forces and groups in the military and bureaucratic elite, which periodically appealed to the masses for support, and more often manipulated their consciousness, using, depending on the needs of the moment, nationalist, egalitarian, confessional or xenophobic instincts of the population (in everyday political behavior in humans, these instincts are so fused together that it is often impossible to separate them). Apart from the particulars, throughout Indonesian history-pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial-power remained alienated from the population, and this became the primary basis of the political culture of society. At the same time, alienation does not always exclude the popularity of a particular regime and even a certain sacralization of power and individual leaders; it only assumes that the real source of power and its focus are outside the limits of the will of the population. Hence the two extremes in the political behavior of the masses: thoughtless submission and unrestrained violence.

Sukarno's rule was somewhat specific in this regard, especially in the period from 1957 to 1965, with its anti-imperialist populism, constant stimulation of skillfully directed activity of the population and simulation of mass initiative. But it was during this period, beginning in the mid-1950s, that a layer of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie emerged in the country, formed from among the officers and civil bureaucracy, which was enriched by looting the public sector of the economy and nationalized foreign property, as well as direct and mass corruption.

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The specific genesis of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, whose initial accumulation of capital was carried out by semi-and directly criminal methods and often did not depend on the entrepreneurial abilities of the individual, the direct proximity of this stratum to the levers of state power, and the organic aversion to the very idea of political and economic competition and publicity, predetermined the nature of the regime ("new order") that Indonesia's army, which became a de facto monopoly power carrier as a result of the 1966-1967 coup d'etat. Indonesia's traditional autonomy of the State from society was further strengthened during this period. The state, military and civil bureaucracy have acquired almost dictatorial powers in relation to society, and the element of violence that is more or less inherent in any state has grown enormously, becoming self-sufficient and not always based on the law.

Under the slogan of "stability for economic development", the new regime used draconian methods to limit political activity in the country, first destroying at least (and in all likelihood, more than) half a million of its real and imaginary opponents and throwing over a million people into prisons and concentration camps ^.1 All political activity was strictly limited by the state ideology under the control of special services. As stated in the decision of the session of the supreme state authority of Indonesia, the People's Consultative Congress (NCC) on August 18, 2000, "the authorities gave a unilateral interpretation of the state ideology and abused it in the interests of maintaining their positions... The law became an instrument of power, and its execution was distorted in such a way that it contradicted the principle of justice, i.e., the equality of citizens in the face of the law "[Putusan Majelis..., 2000, p. 61]. The alienation of the people from power and the state became almost absolute, and this fact was not obscured by the fact that the party in power - the Organization of Functional Groups (Golkar) - received up to 70 percent or more of the vote in elections every five years with active and shameless use of "administrative resources".

The period 1966-1997 was generally characterized by steady economic growth, not only in terms of quantity, but also in terms of quality: an increase in the share of manufacturing industries and the share of their products in the country's GDP and exports. This growth took place mainly in the private sector, and, theoretically speaking, this should have led to the formation of an entrepreneurial class that needed to liberalize the regime and could become a driving force for political modernization. But in the context of Indonesia, this class was formed from two main sources-the officers with their authoritarian tradition and privileges, and the Chinese ethnic minority, surrounded by the hostility of the indigenous population and therefore doubly dependent on the favor and protection of the authorities. Singapore Correspondent for the Asian Wall Street Journal Richard Borsuk wrote that in Indonesia, "too often the entrepreneur is considered someone who knows how to get exclusive rights to import or sell goods, and not how to create new services and products" [Borsuk R., 1999, p. 140]. But this was a direct product of the ruling regime, which can most accurately be described as a military-bureaucratic one.

Russian political scientist R. E. Sevortyan writes that "the objective historical role of the bureaucratic state consists in a sharp acceleration of capitalist transformation, the price for which is political degradation and regression, which is expressed primarily in the exclusion of the broadest social forces from participation in real political life" [Sevortyan, 1997, p. 223].

¹ Data on the number of people killed in mass killings in 1965-1968 vary according to various sources from 78,000 to three million people [Against Impunity, p. 26].

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The wording is fully applicable to the processes in Indonesia, where the negative features of the bureaucratic state were repeatedly compounded by its repressive nature, and the army was the center of power of all three branches of government and the only real source of political initiative.

The specific nature of the genesis of entrepreneurship and the middle class in Indonesia was reflected in the formation of the political elite. Progress in the economy has not led to any commensurate process in the political culture, in the views on the relationship between the citizen and the authorities. The brutal and cynical authoritarianism of the regime led by General Suharto and based on undisguised violence, including outside the framework of official legislation, inevitably gave rise to nepotism, corruption and arbitrariness at all levels and in all strata. Delinquency became a common phenomenon, but the only difference was that for the upper classes, flouting the law was a means of maintaining power and getting rich, while for the lower classes, it was a means of survival. The latter is especially dangerous for the spiritual and moral health of the nation: the moral justification of violating the law contributes to the formation of a reflex in the national psychology, which can only be overcome with difficulty by subsequent generations. Note, by the way, that in Indonesian society, as is often found in the East, there are several legal systems. State laws not only co-exist with traditional law and religious norms, but they are often less effective.

From time to time, opposition groups emerged in the country, including retired military and civilian officials, and dissident sentiments were also manifested among the creative intelligentsia. But even when some members of the elite sympathized with the oppositionists in their hearts, almost no one spoke out in their defense if they were attacked by the special services. This was a consequence of the combination of regime-generated reptilianism with the priority of personal and group interests. Yes, and the very opposition in some (not all!) These cases reflected dissidents ' dissatisfaction not so much with the regime as with their position under it. The unprecedented depth of social stratification in the period of the "new order" aroused in some wealthy people such a fear of the lower classes, which overcame indignation at the excesses of the authorities in power.

The arbitrariness of the authorities created in the masses not only fear, but also legal nihilism, the consciousness that they could not protect their interests within the framework of legality. This led, in particular, to numerous acts of violence by the urban and rural lower classes against ethnic Chinese, who are the traditional lightning rod of social discontent, and in some cases directly against government officials. The performances of the poor were characterized by extreme cruelty, far from always being adequate in their scale and orientation to the causes that directly caused them, but in any case, in their own way, they reflected a dangerous level of social tension (we note in this connection this point: some psychiatrists consider aggressiveness, cruelty of a person as a delayed and misdirected reaction to the feeling of fear experienced by). Only once, in January 1974, was an attempt made by one of the political groups fighting for influence in President Suharto's entourage to appeal to the people of Jakarta. The latter reacted so readily and with such devastating consequences that General Sumitro, who sought and received this support, immediately abandoned his supporters to their fate, and these events themselves went down in official history as the "January catastrophe".

After the ruthless elimination of the left-wing part of the political spectrum in 1965-1967, the army saw the main potential source of irreconcilable opposition among fundamentalist Islamists, political Islam. It is from this flank, from

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from the mouths of theologians and preachers came alternative, orthodox Islamic views on domestic and foreign policy problems, on the social policy of the regime. The extreme Muslim opposition in some cases resorted to terror, although many researchers already believed that, in any case, some terrorist attacks were provoked by the special services in order to get a convincing reason for reprisals against Islamists.

The main organic weakness of the military-authoritarian "new order", like many similar regimes, was the inability to adapt to the changes in society that its own economic course objectively led to: an increase in the educational level and awareness of the population, activation of external relations, and, most importantly, an increase in economic independence and independence of citizens. By the early 1990s, the regime's leaders ' methods of governance, peremptory, imperative tone of speech, authoritarian decision-making, and a sense of their own impunity and lack of accountability to the population were not much different from the way they and their predecessors behaved in the late 1960s. The logical consequence of this was the growing lack of confidence in the current government, which reached its peak during the financial and economic crisis of 1997-1998, which accelerated the fall of the"new order". In other countries in the region, the impact of the crisis has not been so devastating.

The events that led directly to the removal of General Suharto from power in May 1998 were not a revolution in the sense that the change of main actors was generally controlled by the military and civilian elite. The role of the masses in them was very limited, and at the first hint of the possibility of the population taking to the streets of the capital in May 1998 under the leadership of Muslim leaders, the military immediately and successfully stopped this possibility. Students of Jakarta universities were the driving force, the direct instrument of Suharto's displacement. American researcher James T. Siegel writes :" If students did not act earlier, it is because, despite individual differences, most tacitly supported the regime that did so much to establish the class to which they belonged (or aspired to belong, we may add). - A.D.). It was only when the financial crisis worsened that they began to take effect" (Siegel, 2001, p. 92). It is noteworthy that the students ' slogans against Suharto and the regime were not specified by demands to respect human rights in East Timor and Aceh, or to rehabilitate those illegally repressed during the "new order" period. The absence of radical Islamist slogans in the student ranks was also characteristic.

There may be two explanations for this, which are not mutually exclusive. Even then, it was suggested that the students were backed by military structures that hoped to save the regime at the cost of Suharto's resignation and therefore were not interested in excessive radicalization of the social movement. At the same time, as already noted, the Indonesian middle class put up with the excesses of the repressive regime, until the policy of the "new order" threatened the existence of the entire establishment, its economic and social interests. But there is a third explanation. Students are the flesh and blood of Indonesian society, with its predominantly nationalistic and generally great-power consciousness. The idea of the integrity of the country was clearly a priority for young people, and those who opposed this idea, including the Aceh and Timor separatists, appeared to be outside the universal law.

The pogroms, looting and violence committed against the Chinese population by the Jakarta grassroots in May 1998 with the connivance, if not encouragement, of the military authorities, indicating a high level of social tension, were nevertheless not a political movement in their goals. Speaking of probability by-

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In view of the growing suspicion of looting and looting on the part of the army, we mean that the demonstration effect of these actions in the view of the generals was intended to keep the reformist part of the elite and the wealthy strata from too radically curbing the security forces and the army as a whole. It is noteworthy that the discontent of the lower classes, the urban lumpens with their traditional mentality, was not directed against the figure of Suharto as the highest bearer of power. In their eyes, it still remained somewhat sacred, and the urban poor did not have popular leaders who could destroy this sacredness. The real dichotomies "society-regime (power)" and "poor-propertied strata" were transformed into the more familiar "indigenous people - Chinese" ("Muslims - gentiles").

Having severely restricted political activity in the country at the time, the" new order " came to the point that the party system it had created, which gave the regime formal legitimacy in elections, turned out to be absolutely fruitless as a source of initiative. This was clearly evident in the crisis of the "new order", when the regime was left without any significant support. And even after the fall of Suharto, most of the numerous parties that emerged were patron-client associations that acted in the interests of one or a small group of leaders.

After the fall of the authoritarian "new order", the Indonesian elite failed to feel the full measure of responsibility to the population and for the most part retained a patriarchal self-esteem, seeing society primarily as the object of their leadership and care, which did not prevent them from using democratic phraseology. Ruslan Abdulgani, an elder of Indonesian politics who has been involved in all major events in the country since the mid-1950s, frankly admitted: "Something is wrong with the Indonesian political elite and its feudal tendencies. And this feudalism is not only Javanese, but also Aceh and Celebes. Higher classes... they think only of honor and profit" [Far Eastern..., p. 49]. Here is also the opinion of prominent Indonesian political scientist Yusuf Vanandi: "After the fall of President Suharto (1967 - 1998), the elite paid little attention to the problems of unity and national interests, because the Suharto government, with its authoritarian methods, abused these categories. Instead, the pendulum swung in the other direction, and group or personal interests came into focus" [Washington Quarterly, p.135].

The military and civilian elite took a generally great-power stance on such a burning issue of the late 1990s as the situation in East Timor, which was illegally annexed by the Suharto regime in 1975, and the responsibility of the Indonesian army for human rights violations in suppressing resistance in this territory for almost 25 years. B. Y. Habibi, who took the post of President after Suharto, made, in our opinion, the only possible and reasonable decision in those conditions, ultimately agreeing to the secession of East Timor, but this step in the first place cost him the presidency: in the next elections in 1999, the military and civilian bureaucracy joined forces against him with the Muslim and secular nationalist opposition. This bloc won a majority in the People's Consultative Congress, which, according to the constitution, until recently elected the President of Indonesia (since 2004, the elections will be direct).

The election in 1999 of the prominent Muslim figure Abdurrahman Wahid, a half-blind and half-paralyzed man whose own National Revival Party won just over 10% of the vote in the general election, looked like a direct challenge to the supporters of the Democratic Party of Indonesia (fighting), who made up a third of the electorate. But this was not a challenge, but something much worse - an arrogant disregard for the opinion of the population, especially

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that the leader of the former ruling party was running for the post of vice-president. Payback was immediate: supporters of the DPI (b) took to the streets of Java and Bali. By arson and rioting, they succeeded in getting party leader Megawati Sukarnoputri elected vice-president the next day. Society, and above all its poorest strata, which made up the bulk of the DP(b) electorate, got a new opportunity to make sure that the authorities understand the language of force best.

A. Vahid is a controversial and tragic figure in his own way. Undoubtedly an outstanding politician, despite his illness, he showed the ability to make bold and far-reaching decisions. It was he who, on behalf of the Union of Muslim Theologians (Nahdatul Ulama, NU), apologized to the victims of the bloody right-wing terror in the late 1960s and their relatives, apologized to the victims of the anti-Chinese pogroms in May 1998, and declared the need to repeal the 1966 law banning Marxist-Leninist ideology. The argument is that ideas cannot be combated by violence. In a sense, this Muslim leader saw better than many other political figures the need for national reconciliation in post-Suharto Indonesia and the ways to achieve it. He has long and consistently opposed the idea of turning Indonesia into an Islamic state, rightly seeing this as a threat to the integrity of the country. Under him, the foundations of the omnipotence and political autonomy of the army were seriously undermined. Congress Decision of August 18, 2000 it ordered the armed forces to take a neutral position on political issues and not participate in practical politics, to promote the establishment of democracy, and to respect the rule of law and human rights. Military personnel on active duty are prohibited from holding positions in the civil service [Putusan Majelis..., pp. 84-85]. This was an important step in reforming and modernizing the entire system of relations between the government and society.

But in the methods of conducting his policies, A. Wahid showed such a tendency to messianic self-esteem, such authoritarianism, mixed with a tendency to outrage and outright disregard for public opinion, as if he was not ruling a country that had not yet cooled down after the fall of a regime that had neglected the public for more than 30 years. This largely predetermined the vulnerability of his position, when, unexpectedly feeling that the president was less manageable than expected, various elite groups launched a new wave of power struggles. The most active role in this struggle was played by NCC speaker Amin Rais, a leader of the modernist trend in the Muslim movement. The short - lived bloc between the Muhammadya organization headed by him and the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama, created during the election of A. Wahid, collapsed, putting the country in serious danger of intra-communal conflict (each of the two organizations estimated the number of its supporters at 35-40 million people).

Scheming against A. Wahid and leading to his removal, the elite willingly or unwittingly dealt a blow to the traditionally Javanese moderate wing of the Muslim community, which he represented. By undermining A.'s moral authority. Wahid and his followers, opponents of the president, have strengthened the position of radical Islamists. The main charges leveled against the President by his outspoken opponents, led by A. Rais, with the support of the former ruling party and sympathetic neutrality of the army, were slowness in implementing reforms, as well as nepotism and corruption (the latter two were officially denied by the Indonesian Prosecutor General's Office). In fact, there was a banal struggle for power. The campaign launched by A. Vahid's opponents was so massive and effective that even his own organization Nahdatul Ulama was unable to provide him with real support.

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support and prevent its removal in July 2001. The post of head of state was transferred to M. Sukarnoputri in accordance with the Constitution.

What did the daughter of the country's first president, whose charisma still accompanies her, inherit as the head of the Indonesian state? In the context of this article, we are primarily interested in the state of the political culture of the population and not only the middle class, but also the lower classes of the city and village. The bloody terror of the late 1960s, the humiliating harassment and overthrow of President Sukarno in 1967, the cynical arbitrariness of the army and its security services that took power in 1966-1998, the top-level, often covert struggle for power, and the three - time change of the head of state over the course of three years (1998-2001) were seriously discredited in the United States. in the eyes of Indonesians, the holders of secular power and the law it embodies.

Equally, we can talk about discrediting the state ideology, the five principles of which ("pancha sila") are laid down in the preamble of the Indonesian constitution and include faith in the One God Almighty, just and civilized humanity, unity of Indonesia, democracy based on consultation and representation, and social justice. During the period of the "new order", the authorities appropriated the monopoly right to interpret these generally rather democratic universal principles, turning this symbol of national unity into a tool for combating any manifestations of dissent, suppressing opponents of the regime, regardless of their ideological orientation. It will take a lot of time and effort to overcome this inherited from the period of authoritarianism perception of "pancha sila" in the public consciousness.

In our opinion, a very dangerous thing has happened. There is no reason to say that the majority of Indonesians have found a new paradigm of power that differs from the traditional one. The failures that have accompanied power in recent years, the greed and cruelty that distinguished the rule of Suharto and his entourage, according to Indonesian, primarily Javanese ideas, are incompatible with the role and image of a true ruler, and the social crisis that engulfed the country in the last years of the "new order" clearly demonstrated that its leaders "are not marked by grace". After all, the main function of political power in accordance with autochthonous ideas is to maintain the harmony of the universe, of which society and the state are an organic part, and to preserve the natural order in the micro-and macrocosm [Efimova, 1992, p. 16]. The same generally applies to the board of B. Y. Habibi and A. Vahid.

Under these conditions, the process that was observed during the "new order" period has intensified: people, especially the lower classes, seek solutions to their problems independently, without resorting to protection from the authorities or the law, and often outside the framework of this law. This phenomenon has resulted in two distinct, though internally interrelated, processes. On the one hand, there is the desire of the crowd to take the protection of their interests, social status, and property rights into their own hands. This is reflected in increasingly frequent cases of mob justice, barbaric mob killings of real or suspected criminals, as the local press reports with horrifying details. This also includes reprisals against thieves, which often end in the burning of the guilty person alive, and those manifestations of violence and looting that marked the May days of 1998. It must be said that during the "new order" period, the authorities themselves demonstrated the permissibility of violence outside the framework established by law, when they resorted to such tactics to suppress political opponents. so-called State violence, in particular to the services of semi-criminal groups created by it, as was the case in the summer of 1996. during the defeat of the headquarters of the Democratic Party of Indonesia, headed by M. Sukarnoputri.

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The same applies to the analysis of sources of interethnic and interfaith conflicts in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Moluccas, and Papua. The indigenous population feels that their interests are somehow violated as a result of insufficiently thought-out migration policy of the authorities, which leads to a violation of the natural, ethno-religious and social balance. Naturally, indigenous people do not seek protection from the authorities that they consider to be responsible for their troubles, but take the protection of their interests into their own hands and solve problems in their own way, that is, often with barbaric cruelty, meeting an adequate response from the settlers. A vicious cycle of violence is being created. The fact that the law enforcement system is corrupt undoubtedly plays an important role, but what is more significant is that for decades it has been the government that has been the source of the most acute social problems that the population has had to face. In those cases where the army and law enforcement agencies intervened in conflicts, the results of this intervention were no less destructive than the reason for it.

The ongoing struggle between centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in Indonesia bears a significant imprint of the Suharto period, although it was born much earlier, in the mid-1950s. Economic growth, which had as one of its most important consequences the development of the national market, undoubtedly contributed to the creation of a material base for strengthening national unity. However, the specifics of the" new order " with its all-conquering corruption and nepotism contributed to the concentration of all privileges and rights to distribute them in the hands of the president and his inner circle. In the eyes of entrepreneurs and the political elite of the "outer islands", this created the impression of" javanocentrism "and, accordingly, aggravated the well-known" Javanophobia " that existed for the same reason of uneven economic development back in the time of Sukarno. The military regime of the "new order"managed to force this disease into the depths. With the fall of Suharto, it became all the more pronounced because the local elite in terms of its moral and political parameters is not much different from Jakarta, with the only difference being that the latter's own interests extended to the whole of Indonesia, while local leaders are geographically more localized.

Since in some regions of Indonesia (especially outside Java), administrative borders completely or partially coincide with ethnic ones, there is a very real danger of ethnocentrism. Indonesian political scientists point out that this danger has four aspects: the opposition of the idea of regional independence to the idea of a strong center, the desire of the local elite to take control of everything that is not under the unequivocal authority of the central government, its claims to take over all the property of the center in the region, ignoring the rights and prerogatives that central government [Kompas, 21.12.2002]. Local elites, who have gained wider and less controlled access to the resources of their region (province) as a result of post-Suharto reforms, often use the opportunities that have opened up without regard not only to national interests, but also to the urgent needs of their own region. According to press reports, 85% of local budgets are spent on maintaining the bureaucracy and deputies of legislative assemblies [Kompas, 21.12.2002]. Speaking in Moscow on April 22, 2003 at the ceremony of awarding her the honorary degree of Doctor of Political Science, Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri complained that the new politicians who came to power in the regions "are not very familiar with the principles of public responsibility and good governance", and allow abuses in the use of budget funds, but attributed this to diseases "transition period" [State Secretariat..., p. 9].

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Despite all the vices of the new order regime, the ruling army was a supra-ethnic and supra-regional force that, without stopping at direct violence, more or less effectively suppressed centrifugal tendencies. However, due to the very nature of the authoritarian regime, the army trampled everything around it that could become an alternative to military-bureaucratic power, create a healthy, self-regulating balance of interests between the center and the regions. Therefore, when the Sukhartov regime, and with it the army, exhausted their power potential, there was no force in the country that, independently or in alliance with other parties and movements, could replace the army as a national ruling organization on a new, more modern basis.

Having done much to modernize the economic basis of Indonesian society (we leave aside the question of whether an optimal economic development strategy was appropriate), the new order did almost nothing to modernize the political superstructure, the political culture of Indonesians, and, moreover, contributed to the growth of some of its inherent negative features.

Anarchy, mob violence, and legal nihilism are only one part of the consequences of discrediting existing institutions of power. The second trend, which is becoming more and more obvious, is the search for a new model of power, which is carried out in the sphere of religion and is embodied in the slogans of creating a state based on Sharia law. And the point, apparently, is not only and not so much in the purely religious motives that drive orthodox Muslims. In the opinion of a fairly broad segment of believers, including those who adhere to syncretic views, Sharia can be a means of overcoming contradictions in society, mitigating socio-economic differences, reviving traditional moral and ethical values, eliminating corruption and nepotism, and establishing state and social discipline.

Opponents of this idea point out with good reason that in a country where confessional differences often coincide with ethnic and territorial borders, where the degree of adherence to the canons of Islam differs significantly even among the supporters of this religion themselves, legislative, and, consequently, forced approval of Sharia norms as state ones will strengthen the centrifugal tendencies in this archipelago country. Moreover, local conflicts within the Muslim community itself may escalate between Orthodox believers (santri) and Muslims belonging to the Priya and Abangan cultural groups, whose religious beliefs bear a significant imprint of pre-Islamic beliefs. Sharing this point of view, we will point out one more aspect of the problem. The introduction of legal norms that, like the Koran, have a sacred source in the minds of the population, would slow down the much-needed process of modernizing relations between the authorities and citizens, and would prevent the growth of political participation of the latter.

A session of the People's Consultative Assembly in August 2002 rejected a proposal by several Islamic parties to establish a constitutional obligation for Muslims to comply with sharia law, and the most influential Muslim parties also opposed this proposal. Nevertheless, some polls show that the number of supporters of the Islamic state is growing at the grassroots level, and if the secular authorities fail to convince the population of their ability to effectively solve the problems facing the country, a widely organized movement of fanatically minded people, supporters of such a state, may arise. Meanwhile, since 1955 and until now, no election in this country with the world's largest Muslim population has given an advantage to Islamic parties.

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Thus, the tendency to strengthen the role of political Islam in the country is primarily caused by the lack of effectiveness of the secular authorities in solving social, economic and cultural problems on a national scale and in individual regions. But this trend should also be seen as a reaction to what should be called American-centered globalization, which the authorities, for various political and economic reasons, are unable to consistently resist, although they understand the dangers involved. Back in 2000, a session of the People's Consultative Assembly stated in one of its decisions that "globalization in the political, economic, social and cultural fields can benefit the Indonesian nation, but if not properly vigilant, (this process) can have negative consequences for the existence of the nation." In another document, the same session pointed out that globalization poses a threat to the unity of the country [Putusan Majelis..., p. 56, 62]. One should also keep in mind such a specific factor as the control of the ethnic Chinese diaspora over 70-80% of business activity in the country. With their experience, capital, and international connections, it is ethnic Chinese who benefit most from the process of globalization, which is negatively (not always reasonably) perceived by Indonesians. We can say that the very idea of modernizing relations between government and society, political participation of the population and, ultimately, democracy is discredited, which is identified in the public consciousness with globalization, which in turn is understood as the undivided rule of one civilization, one power and therefore rejected.

The situation became particularly acute after the September 11, 2001 bombings in New York, with the US administration launching a global anti-terrorist campaign. Whatever Washington's real motives (this is a matter for separate consideration), this campaign was clearly considered by the Muslim community of Indonesia as anti-Islamic, since in the eyes of Muslims, Islam is now the main obstacle on the path of the United States to gain world domination. Mass demonstrations against the invasion of Iraq by the United States and Great Britain, which took place in European countries and other countries of Christian culture, contributed to the fact that the condemnation of this operation was at least partially removed from the plane of confrontation between religions and civilizations.

Anti-American feelings have always been latently or explicitly present in the fundamentally nationalistic consciousness of Indonesians, but after September 11, 2001, the United States and the United States did not respond. they have acquired a more pronounced religious design. The government of M. Sukarnoputri, and first of all she herself, understand that they are between Scylla and Charybdis: the more actively they oppose Islamism, the more power becomes a hostage of the army generals, because no matter what restrictions are imposed on the political activity of the army, it remains the only organized force capable of resisting Islamism in a critical situation. In addition, as is most often the case, once in the position of the persecuted, radical Islamists gain additional popularity in the eyes of the population, especially the disadvantaged grassroots.

The Bali entertainment center bombings on October 12, 2002, whoever was behind them, benefited political antagonists-Islamist fundamentalists who received additional political publicity for their capabilities, and supporters of a return to authoritarian forms of government in the military environment and in the former party in power. A strong catalyst for this controversial process is the great-power policy of the United States. Indonesian society seems to go back 100 years, when nationalism and Islam were almost synonymous and the liberation movement developed under religious slogans.

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In the second half of 2002, a series of statements by American and Australian officials showed that Washington and Melbourne were ready to forget the Indonesian army's not-so-favorable record of human rights violations and promote its independent role in internal affairs. The US-British operation in Iraq may be a heavy blow to the very idea of democratizing public relations in the countries of the East. Democracy turned to the East as an impudent and cynical hypostasis with the right of the strong instead of morality and legality. There is no more convincing argument in favor of both radical Islamists and their secular opponents in Indonesia.

Summing up the above, we can conclude that the most difficult problem associated with the beginning of the process of modernization and democratization of the political system in Indonesia has two interrelated aspects. One of them is to transform the political culture of society in such a way as to achieve the demand for the proposed reforms, to convince the population or at least its most active segments that the government is a carrier of ideas that, when implemented, can improve people's lives and give it a new quality. The second is the expansion of political participation of the population, freeing the holders of power from the rudiments of an authoritarian-Messianic attitude towards citizens as "subjects", getting rid of the subject - object dichotomy that still permeates the political psychology of the military and civilian bureaucracy, and the majority of Indonesians. There is no reason to hope that this process will be quick and painless, because we are talking about overcoming centuries-old traditions and ideas.

list of literature

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