In 2013, the number of international migrants in Europe and Asia was almost equal: 72 and 71 million, respectively. Although Western countries remained the largest destinations at the country/regional level (USA + Canada = 53 million migrants, Germany + Great Britain + France = 24 million), two Asian countries (Saudi Arabia + UAE = 17 million) and a Euro-Asian country, Russia (11 million), were among the top ten.¹. If we group migration flows not by parts of the world, but by the "East-West" dichotomy, which is repeated, despite all the attempts of "universalists", starting with Said, to cancel it, then the flow of international migration from the countries forming the first member of the dichotomy will be even greater due to the multiplication of places of departure. After all, in this case, along with migrants from Asia, it will also include very numerous migrants from North Africa.

Simplifying things a bit - ignoring, for example, refugees from Syria to Turkey - we can say that international migration from the East moves through three cultural addresses: a) to Russia, b) to the West, and c) to two segments of the East itself - the oil-producing Arab monarchies and the newly industrialized countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia. Each of the streams has its own peculiarities of adaptation of migrants, their interaction with the host population, and changes in the identity of the parties. Identifying and comparing such features and correlating them with processes inherent in international migration, regardless of external circumstances, is the main goal of a research project launched in 2014 at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences by the Center for Research on General Problems of the Modern East (CIOPSV).

The initial stage of the project was the International Seminar "East in the East, East in the West, and East in Russia: Migration-Adaptation-Identity", organized by CIOPSW and supported by the Ebert Foundation. It was held from November 18 to 20, 2014 in Suzdal, which for the third time hosts the author's teams of projects developed in the CIOPSV. 17 researchers (from undergraduates to professors) from Russia, Mongolia and Italy, specializing in various fields of the humanities and social sciences, presented their reports in person at the seminar. Three more reports of Russian project participants who were unable to attend the seminar were read out and discussed. Most of the participants were from Moscow and St. Petersburg: from the Institute of Oriental Studies (IV RAS) and the Institute of National Economic Forecasting (INHP RAS), from the Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow State University (ISAA), from the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), from the Higher School of Economics Research University in Moscow and St. Petersburg (HSE) and the European University in St. Petersburg (EU). The seminar was attended by representatives of Kazan Federal University (KFU) and Altai State University (Alt.The Institute of Mongolian Studies, Buddhology and Tibetology of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMBT SB RAS), the Mongolian State University of Science and Technology (MGUNT), and the University of Bologna (UB).

The presentations were grouped into four problem-related blocks. The first block was made up of reports that can be called strokes to the picture of migration from the East, emerging at the regional and country levels: O. P. Bibikova (Institute of International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences) "Migration processes in the Middle East: new trends"; D. S. Eremeev (ISAA) "Chinese migration to the countries of Southeast Asia"; A. A. Pinigina (ISAA) "Migration to the Republic of Korea"; V. I. Dyatlov (ISU) "East in the East of Russia: cross-border migrations in the resettled society".

The second block included a set of messages with an emphasis on preserving / changing the linguistic and cultural identity of migrants in their new living environment and on their perception by host societies: I. B. Bochkareva (Alt. GU) " Cross-border migrants in the perception of Russian students (based on the materials of an express survey at the Altai University-

¹ See: UN News Center. 11.09.2013. URL: http://www.un.org/russian/news/story.asp?NewsID=20179#.Um QEdXCLiGM (accessed: 24.10.2014).

te)"; D. V. Poletaev (Institute of Economic Policy of the Russian Academy of Sciences) "Construction of a" situational" identity by labor migrants from Central Asia in response to the peculiarities of their perception by the host Russian society"; M. Perotto (UB)" Language and identity: Russian-speaking migrants in Italy"; R.N. Akifyeva (EU) "Families of cross-border labor migrants". migrant workers in St. Petersburg: Identities, Language, Parenting practices"; Ts.-A. Batzeren (MSUNT) "The impact of cross-border labor migration on the upbringing of children"; I. S. Savin (IB RAS) "Cultural distance and identity of migrants from Uzbekistan in Kazakhstan and Russia".

The third block included presentations on the integration and adaptation of migrants: E. A. Varshaver, A. L. Rocheva (RANEPA) "Integration of migrants at the local level: Western and Russian experience"; P. K. Varnavsky (IMBT SB RAS) "Migrants from Central Asia in Buryatia: the formation of "Diaspora" institutions"; E. V. Shishkin (Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration). B. Demintseva (Higher School of Economics) "Study to stay: the African elite in France"; A. A. Sokolov (IB RAS)"Adaptation of Vietnamese migrants in Russia".

The last block combined reports on topics that are largely unusual for migrationists, such as religious practices of migrants, the attitude of the dominant church towards them and work with them, discourses on migration in places of departure: G. N. Yusupova (KFU) "Allah to help": transformation of religious practices of labor migrants from Central Asia"; S. B. Filatov (IB RAS) "Labor migration to Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church"; N. I. Steblin-Kamenskii (EU) " Discourse on Labor Migration and Migrants in South Wollo (Ethiopia)"; N. Galimaa (MGUNT) "Causes of External Migration: the experience of post-socialist Mongolia".

Based on the reports made at the seminar, it is planned to prepare a collection of articles in 2015 and publish it in 2016. This review is intended to attract the attention of all those interested in migration issues to the future collection. Therefore, in order not to weaken the reader's interest prematurely, we will limit ourselves to presenting the content of only six reports out of twenty.

A. A. Pinigina focused on the "field", which is not often visited by domestic migration researchers, but has experienced a radical transformation in such important characteristics as the direction and composition of migration flows. Indeed, while more than 2 million South Koreans were looking for temporary work abroad in the 1960s and 1970s, since the early 1980s their labor migration has been rapidly declining and the country is becoming an importer of labor resources. In 2012, the number of migrants who arrived there exceeded 1 million people. At the same time, 69% are male and over 50% are from China, among which the majority are ethnic Koreans. The second largest group of foreign citizens is Americans; also, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and India migrate to South Korea.

57% of all migrants are low-skilled workers. Highly qualified employees are divided by Korean statistics into several categories. The largest number of foreign language teachers (foreign language instructors - 22.5 thousand people in 2011), followed by migrants with special employment status (14.4 thousand). China and India are the main donors of highly skilled labor. The former certainly leads in the category of special employment, while those from India hold the first place in the category of researchers. In the field of professional employment, US citizens are in the lead; employees in the technology transfer category are mostly from the United States and Canada; most foreign language teachers come from English-speaking countries.

The increase in the number of migrants also occurred at the expense of people who married a Korean/Korean woman. International marriages in Korea are especially common in rural areas, where up to a third of men now marry foreign women. In the mid-2000s, local governments even provided grants to rural Koreans who could not find wives at home and used these grants to find, through intermediaries, foreign brides. In terms of the number of marriages made to Koreans living in rural areas, Vietnamese women are in the first place; they were ahead of Korean women from China, who for a long time held the lead.

A significant part of the migrants are foreign students, arriving mainly from China, Japan, Mongolia, and on exchange-from the United States, Russia, and France. They can study in Korean universities in both Korean and English. Although foreign students do not have the legal right to work in Korea, their participation rate in the country's economy was 20% in 2012.

Of the total number of Chinese people in the Republic of Korea, 24 thousand. they are available on a permanent basis. In Korea, they began to appear in the second half of the XIX century, when the Chinese began to come for seasonal work, and some managed to gain a foothold in Korea. Most of the immigrants from China moved to Korea in 1945-1950, fleeing the civil war. The peak of the number of Chinese in Korea occurred in the early 1970s, when there were about 100 thousand of them, then repatriation to China began, and one of the main reasons was restrictions on employment, as well as on land ownership, which seriously complicated the lives of Chinese people.

A special, numerically insignificant, but very rapidly growing group of migrants to South Korea is made up of refugees from North Korea. Now there are about one and a half thousand of them. In the near future, the flow of refugees is likely to increase, but even at the current rate of growth, when the number of refugees doubles every year, the "North Korean community" will become a significant factor in the social, economic and political life of South Korea in a few years. Moreover, it is a problematic factor, because its members for the most part do not know English and hieroglyphics, do not know how to handle modern equipment, many do not have an education according to the standards of the South, and certain cultural and dialect differences between Northerners and southerners remain. All this means that the vast majority of former residents of the DPRK can only count on unskilled work. In other words, if the flow of defectors from the DPRK continues to increase, the northerners will fill the "social niche" that currently belongs to numerous foreign workers from China, South and Southeast Asian countries.

In his report, V. I. Dyatlov tried to show what should be the focus of research on the mutual adaptation of cross-border migrants from the East - in this case, from Central Asia, Transcaucasia and China-and the host society of Russian Eastern Siberia and the Far East. This society is formed historically by recent migrations and therefore can demonstrate significant specifics when faced with modern migration processes. To capture it and correctly interpret its impact on the process of adaptation, on the dynamics of identities, it is necessary to proceed from the following circumstances.

First, it is necessary to take into account the special nature of the host society of the East of Russia as a resettlement society - the emerging and developing, changing and changing in the interaction of the so-called old-timers and new waves of migrants. At the same time, we must not forget that (not to mention the social heterogeneity of the old-timers ' society) it is deeply heterogeneous in its origin. Its composition still traces the dividing lines between the descendants of Aboriginal and alien populations, as well as between the descendants of various groups of aborigines, on the one hand, and different ethno - religious waves - "newcomers" on the other. Migrants of the post-Soviet era are even more diverse; diversity is evident in their initial socio-cultural characteristics, in the motives, strategies and practices of migration itself, and in their preferred adaptation models. The interaction of all these factions of the population took place and continues to take place in the context of a strong central government based on the Russian language and culture, introduced from the Urals by economic structures and technologies in extreme living conditions, in the absence of reliable communications and generally weak population of the Russian East.

Secondly, the stadium-historical context is critically important. The resettlement society was formed in the conditions of a traditionalist society that entered the period of modernization. The various modernization strategies that dominated the late Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and post-Soviet transformations gave it many essential characteristics, sometimes calling into question its migration character.

Third, the field of research attention should include the concept that has become an ideologeme: "Siberia - the territory of consent". Its critical analysis is necessary, but it does not exclude that the migration character of the host society can actually form a habit of the presence of migrants, special practices and special stereotypes. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the long interruption of the cross-border migration process during the Soviet period. The Soviet decades formed a generation of people who did not know foreigners at all, who had never encountered them. Such a break in historical memory has the consequence of the need to re-form attitudes towards migrants.

Fourth, the acute demand for human resources and the need for migrants for life support and development of the Russian East have always remained unchanged in each of the UPR-

the epochs mentioned above. It is fundamentally important to find out to what extent there is an awareness of dependence on migrants in society, to what extent it affects the formation of attitudes towards them. It is also important that migration was and still is perceived as part of the border problem. For the population of Eastern Siberia (to a lesser extent) and the Far East (to a greater extent), the perception of their region as an outpost of Russia is characteristic, which cannot but affect the attitude towards cross-border migrants. In particular, the foreign policy context affects the attitude towards Chinese migrants. After all, their perception is often inseparable from the awareness of the growing power of China, the understanding that the neighboring power is increasingly becoming a factor in the development of the migrant society in Eastern Russia. In this regard, we need a comparative analysis of the concepts of the beginning of the XX century ("yellow danger") and the XXI century ("Chinese threat"), their similarities and differences.

I. B. Bochkareva spoke about the results of a pilot rapid survey of students of Altai State University, conducted in the format of focus groups in two stages. The purpose of the first stage was to determine the nomenclature and hierarchy of respondents ' identities, and to try to assess which identities are most relevant. At the second stage, the task was to find out the range of ideas that students associate with the concept of "migrant", and then, using the example of individual national groups, determine the sign of attitude towards migrants.

25 third-and fifth-year students of the specialty "Foreign Regional Studies (China)"participated in the survey. All of them can be attributed to representatives of the host community, but there were no external migrants among them. Due to their specialization, they had experience communicating with foreign students, primarily from China, which could affect their perception of non-ethnic migrants in Russia.

During the survey, students worked in mini-groups. The results of the first stage of the survey showed that the lists of types of identity of all mini-groups contain four types of identity: national, ethnic, religious and political. Students chose the identity that they considered to be the most relevant at the present time and the most important in principle, and justified their choice. The choice revealed the phenomenon of confused identity, which is typical for Russian respondents, when ethnic identity is identified with national identity and transferred in national categories. And this is how the understood national identity was evaluated by the majority of students as the most updated in the system of their personal " I " and the most important in principle. However, cross-border migration did not appear in the students ' arguments as a factor actualizing their national identity; the events in Ukraine turned out to be such a factor for them. The general tone of the students ' speeches does not suggest that their national identity is perceived as under threat; therefore, there is no clear reason to talk about securitization.

The second stage of the survey showed that in students ' perceptions, the term "migrant" refers to an external-cross-border, foreign-labor migrant, who is generally perceived neutrally. The picture changes somewhat when it comes to individual groups of migrants who differ ethnically; here, representations become objective and emotional, the sign of attitude towards representatives of different ethnic groups changes, and perceptions are selective. Thus, the image of the Chinese migrant in the students ' perceptions has a neutral-positive character, was conveyed by them through highlighting such qualities as friendliness, sociability, hard work, sincerity, emotionality. The students stressed that they do not share the stereotypes of the "yellow danger" or "Chinese threat" for Russia.

Unlike the Chinese, the image of the Tajik migrant is rather negative and neutral. Its dominant component is religion. The students demonstrated a very common stereotype of perception of any natives of Central Asia as carriers of the ideas of radical Islam, which causes fear and unwillingness to interact. The same stereotypes can be attributed to the respondents ' belief in the fundamental discrepancy between the norms of Islam and the traditions and norms of life of the host community and in the unwillingness of migrants to adapt to local conditions at the cultural and value level. At the same time, the unambiguously negative image of a migrant worker - an illegal migrant from Tajikistan - acquired a certain positive connotation in the survey: cheap = profitable labor. It can be assumed that the attitude towards external labor migration as such is changing.

Clearly, students perceive the image of a "Caucasian" negatively. It is formed by them from stable stereotypes, supported by personal experience, and is endowed with the following features:,

such as aggressiveness, disrespectful attitude to women and to the culture of the local population. At the same time, the perception of this group of Islamic subjects sounded weak, and the norms of behavior that were too obsessively demonstrated, in the opinion of respondents, came to the fore.

According to the author of the report, the survey results show that cross-border migration as such is not perceived by students as a problem that causes an identity crisis. However, when it comes to specific ethnic groups of migrants with whom respondents had some experience of interaction, the picture changes. It is obvious that, according to students, the behavior of migrants contradicts the norms of behavior derived from the culture of the host society, it is perceived negatively and causes a desire to isolate oneself. It can be said that the students did not demonstrate an integration model of interaction with migrants.

E. A. Varshaver and A. L. Rocheva presented preliminary results of the implementation of a project for local integration of migrants in the Kapotnya district of Moscow in the summer of 2014. There are three dimensions of social integration. This is the integration of interaction, when people of different backgrounds and cultural backgrounds begin to interact with each other, make friends, enter into marriages, etc. This is symbolic integration, during which they gradually begin to share the same symbols, values, and norms. This is positional integration, when a person is integrated into specific and more or less protected positions in the labor market, in the real estate market, etc.

The authors prefaced the practical results of their work with a generalization of Western experience. Examples of integration practices in the United States, Germany, Hungary, Finland, and Denmark show that, despite their different forms, their essence is the same-to create a constructive situation in which people "newcomers" and "locals" could interact and break down stereotypical ideas about each other. As an example, the Living Library project was first launched in Denmark. "Living library" is a metaphor: some people are books that have negative stereotypes about them, others are readers who share stereotypes, and librarians are those who arrange practices aimed at overcoming stereotypes. People-readers come to people-books and start asking them questions, including uncomfortable ones, and as a result, the level of negative stereotyping of people-books and the groups they represent decreases.

Western and Russian experience shows that integration promotion activities should be carried out within specific locations. Integration is a counter process, and at the same time as integration of migrants, it is necessary to engage in the integration of the local community. When there is no local community or any relatively cohesive group within it, integration is impossible. Effective integration efforts imply, as a prerequisite, a coalition of different organizations that will work in separate areas within the framework of a common integration agenda. At the same time, none of the tested practices can be considered universal and completely successful.When implementing one or another of them, you must constantly take into account the specifics of the local environment.

These conclusions became the methodological basis for the integration project in the Moscow district of Kapotnya. A profile of the district and the so-called concept of integration were compiled using long-term included observation, interviews with local residents and migrants. Such concepts define the main target groups, program objectives, and activities aimed at somehow integrating vulnerable groups, in this case migrants, into the life of the city. It turned out that in terms of integration, migrant children are not a problem group, they are quite successfully integrated through schools and extracurricular activities - they go to classes in educational and sports clubs in the district. The problem group turned out to be migrant women who are engaged in household chores and children. Many of them do not speak Russian well, some of them wear hijabs, and this makes it very difficult for them to interact with local residents. So, interviews with local residents showed that they a priori perceive quarrels on the playground as ethnic conflicts and believe that migrant women incite their children to aggression against Russian children.

Two integration practices were developed and partially tested for Kapotni: cooking workshops and a video contest. The first practice is aimed at integrating a group of migrant women working in the household, including them in the process

interactions with local women. The second practice was aimed at creating a more voluminous, informative and positive image of all residents of Kapotnya. The videos were made by teams of schoolchildren, each of whom made four videos-both about old-timers and about recent migrants. Discussion of the videos was held at the award ceremony for their authors, all participants in the filming and residents of the district were invited to it.

The experience gained confirms the thesis that the introduction of any integration practices should be preceded by studying the local environment. You need to understand what is happening in the area, what kind of people live there, what they might be interested in, and what they can participate in. Equally important is that in order for the planned practices to be implemented, it is necessary that there is at least one interested agent at the local level. This can be a district council, a house of culture, or active residents of the district. And of course, the effectiveness of practices largely depends on the degree of their consistency and regularity.

Filatov began his speech by stating that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has been simultaneously defending the national interests of the Russian people and the imperial interests of the multinational Russian state ("Russian civilization") for the past two decades, which is not only the position of the church leadership. These two value orientations are present in the minds of Orthodox believers and the general public. The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church is able to smooth out the contradictions that arise from following these not always and not always combined ideological guidelines. The massive influx of guest workers causes precisely such contradictory reactions, and it is not easy to coordinate them.

Surveys show that the average Orthodox believer is more hostile to Muslims than the average Russian citizen. This increased hostility is expressed in two ways. First, the demands to stop migration from Central Asia and Azerbaijan and expel immigrants who have already arrived from there. Secondly, in the idea of rallying on the basis of the Orthodox faith to repel non-religious expansion and, accordingly, in the promotion of romantic military values; both are characteristic of numerous military sports clubs and other security organizations.

The main defender of Russian national interests among the numerous institutions of the Russian Orthodox Church is the World Russian People's Council (VRNS). It is at its meetings that calls are periodically made for the protection of the Russian Orthodox people from aggressive newcomers from the south. But in the bosom of the Russian Orthodox Church, another trend has also crystallized, which aims to promote the inclusion of guest workers in Russian life. It is represented by the Missionary Commission under the Diocesan Council of Moscow. Its goal is to involve migrants in the cultural life of Russians in every possible way. In parishes, with the organizational and financial assistance of this commission, migrants are taught Russian, guided tours are arranged for them, and material assistance is provided. Missionary efforts are being made, but they are not very active - for example, the Gospels are being distributed in the native languages of guest workers.

The so-called "imperial" reaction, which is embodied in the activities of the Missionary Commission, but is not limited to it alone, can take two extreme directions. The first one is humanitarian; it consists in supporting migrants regardless of their religious identity. For people belonging to this trend, Orthodoxy is a humanistic worldview that opposes both Islamic and Christian fundamentalism. The second direction is missionary, which aims to convert migrants to Orthodoxy. Its representative was Archpriest Daniil Sysoev, who was killed by an Islamic terrorist.

It is reasonable to assume that for the most part, migrants from Central Asia are in too difficult a domestic and economic situation to clearly define their religious identity, much less radically change it. Most of them are passive Muslims, and they show their religiosity to a minimal extent. Naturally, the religiously active minority of migrants is clearly visible in mosques, where conflicts between "newcomers" - Uzbeks, Tajiks, and to a lesser extent Kyrgyz - and native Russian Muslims have become commonplace. Occasionally, however, migrants achieve recognition and even become imams, who often turn out to be radicals. There are also many migrants who consciously choose to assimilate - they switch to Russian in their families, seek social ties with Russians, find and capitalize on them. However, they rarely convert to Christianity, remaining nominal Muslims. It is difficult to estimate their numbers, but this is a notable group.

G. N. Yusupova's report echoed Filatov's. The HSE study " Labor Migration and Incorporation of Migrants from Central Asia "(2010, St. Petersburg) identified three strategies for adapting migrants from Central Asia (CA): alienation; integration into the migrant community; and integration into Russian society. The first two strategies are more common. The author set out to find out how religious identities and practices of migrants are transformed within the framework of these strategies and affect the state of migrants ' social networks. Field material was collected in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kazan.

Labor migrants from the SA are conventionally divided into groups: non-religious, low-religious, and religious. The group of non-religious migrants includes those who do not observe rituals, except for those concerning deceased relatives. The defining characteristics of this group are not ethnic, but social: these migrants came either from large cities or from small settlements, but with a mixed population. Accordingly, they have a good command of the Russian language, and many have received higher education in it. They seek to integrate into Russian society, gain citizenship, and expand their social connections through collegiate, neighborhood, and leisure networks. Islam does not play a role in expanding their networks.

Low-religious migrants include people who observe certain rituals, celebrate major holidays, sometimes pray and visit a mosque. This category is the most extensive. It is divided into those who have become more religious and those who have become less religious as a result of migration. The first group includes those for whom turning to religion is an adaptation strategy. These are usually migrants who are set up only for temporary residence in Russia for the purpose of earning money and are alienated from both the Russian and migrant environment by the very conditions of employment. Returning periodically to their homeland, they conduct missionary work among relatives, but in Russia, living separately, they do not engage in it. The second and larger subgroup consists of migrants who continue to observe rituals and pray when they return to their homeland; in Russia, although they use the services of local clergy and visit the mosque on major holidays, religious practices are more often performed in a family or family-neighborly circle, and Muslim networks do not play for them big roles. They explain their less religious nature by the fact that there is no time and conditions for observing rituals, and following traditions in clothing and behavior hinders, in their opinion, integration into Russian society. Because they tend to think about obtaining Russian citizenship, although they usually do not take concrete steps.

Religious migrants perform daily prayer, observe fasting, celebrate all Muslim holidays and often visit the mosque. Many of them came to Russia from small villages and villages, but there are also citizens. Young people are more likely to be found in this group than in others, and there are also many who speak excellent Russian. Migrants of this group, wherever they work, set up small rooms for themselves, where they go several times a day for prayer. As a rule, they are united in groups that work together to resolve issues that arise during migration, they have their own imams, even their own apartments-mosques. Interviews with migrants of this category show that they are partially integrated into Russian society on the basis of a common religious identity with Russian Muslims.

The situation in Kazan is somewhat different. True, even in this city, migrants are divided into three groups according to the degree of religiosity. And the first two groups do not differ from the first two in St. Petersburg and Moscow. But in practice, religious migrants are affected by the well-developed Muslim infrastructure, primarily educational. It attracts young people from the SA not so much for theological education, but as a convenient platform for integration into the host community, since religious educational institutions provide temporary residence permits for migrants, legalizing them. In addition, Kazan mosques are points of primary accommodation for some migrants. Mosques need labor and find a way out by providing temporary shelter for two or three migrants in exchange for keeping their mosques clean.

We hope that the summary of only one-third of the workshop's reports convincingly proves the richness of content achieved at the initial stage of the workshop. It seems that this quality of the migration project of the Institute of Information Technologies of the Russian Academy of Sciences will be enhanced as it is deployed, attracting new participants, and with them - new research stories.

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