On the eve of the First World War, the world of Islam was looking for ways to unite. This quest was embodied in the pan-Islamic movement, which sought to unite all Muslims in the fight against the colonial expansion of European powers, to respond to the cultural and ideological challenge of the West, and to overcome ideological differences among Muslims. The latter was quite difficult, because in addition to Sunnism, Shiism and its varieties were widespread in the world of Islam (in Iran, Yemen and Iraq, in the Caucasus and Pamirs), including Ismailism with its numerous branches (from Lebanon to India). At that time, Wahhabism (in Arabia), Babism and Baha'ism (in Iran and Central Asia) were less prominent. All these numerous movements had not only different views and rituals, but also their own organization, which sought to isolate their wards from the influence of other, even if confessionally close, communities. The situation was complicated by the huge number (up to 325) of Sufi (Dervish) orders (fraternities), which also differed in their practice and sometimes political attitudes (Triningham, 1989, p. 209).

The first attempts to achieve Muslim unity were made by Khudoyar Khan of Kokand (1845-1875), who advocated an alliance of Arabs and Kurds with the Muslims of Central Asia, Afghanistan and India based on the declaration of jihad ("holy war") against the British, who then invaded Afghanistan, and Russian troops fighting in Central Asia. But the idea of pan-Islamism was most successfully used by the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909). Since 1517, the caliphs who bore the title of Khadim al-Haramein ("the servant of both holy cities", vol.E. Mecca and Medina), the sultans were recognized by the majority of Muslims (at least Sunnis) as the leaders of the entire Islamic world. However, in the XIX century. this was met with stronger resistance than before, especially by the Christian powers, who sought to neutralize the influence of Istanbul on their Muslim subjects. After all, if in the Ottoman Empire in the 80s of the XIX century. there were 16-18 million. Muslims, then there were 18 million of them in Russia, and 82, 22, and 30 million in the colonial empires of England, France, and Holland, respectively [Fadeeva, 1985, pp. 135-142]. In addition, the sultans were increasingly confronted in the 19th century with the disobedience of Muslims within the Ottoman Empire, not to mention the denial of their rights to the caliphate in Iran, Morocco and some other countries.

In order to establish his authority in all parts of the Muslim world, the Sultan encouraged the condemnation of everything "Western" and the promotion of the achievements of Muslims and medieval Arab-Islamic civilization. He awarded orders and titles to heralds of pan-Islamism outside the empire. The work of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who advocated a decisive renewal of Islam and the refusal to replace ijtihad (personal opinion as a result of free discussion) with the recognition of only one opinion, received a particularly high resonance in all countries of the Islamic world.-

page 57

for salafiyya, i.e. a return to the original origins of Islam1 . Al-Afghani strongly condemned the strife between Muslims, especially between Sunnis and Shiites, called for their unity and was confident that "religious and tribal discord can be overcome by patriotic education of young people" (Keddy, 1971, p.309). Characteristically, al-Afghani was an "anti-nationalist" and claimed: "Muslims do not know any other true nationality than their religion" (Kegg, 1966, p. 138). As early as in the 60s of the XIX century, he expressed the idea of the need for religious and political unity of Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Kashgar, Bukhara and Kokand, with the approval of the Ottoman Sultan and monetary assistance from the Muslims of India [Stepanyants, 1982, p.119]. Under his influence and with his assistance, parties, societies and secret organizations emerged in various countries of Islam, primarily in Egypt. The pan-Islamic movement began to develop gradually, covering a huge territory: from Southeast Asia to Algeria.

There were differences in the situation of different Muslim countries, most of which at that time became colonies. Their interests did not always and everywhere coincide with the policy of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the main ideologue of pan-Islamism, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and many of its adherents, such as the Mufti of Egypt, Mohammed Abdo, used the ideas of renewal and reformation of Islam, which was rejected by Muslim traditionalists. Abdo wanted to "reconcile Islam with science", rejected taqlid (the medieval tradition of commentary on the Qur'an), advocated merging all the interpretations and sects of Islam, finding in the Qur'an equivalents of the scientific ideas of his time (Masse, 1962, p. 199). The renewal of Islam that he preached and the assimilation of the achievements of Western culture by Muslims met with understanding among intellectuals and young people in many countries.

However, by the beginning of the second decade of the 20th century, the majority of Muslims remained traditionalists who rejected any innovations (bid'ah) not only because of their Taqlid condemnation, but also because everything that came from the West was perceived by them as alien and hostile. Therefore, even the advanced people of the Muslim East did not want to appear Westerners. "Islam is the religion of my homeland, and it is my duty to protect it." This belief of Salama Moussa, a prominent philosopher and publicist, one of the first socialists in Egypt, was an axiom in the world of Islam. Even further, the founder of pan-Arabism, the Lebanese Emir Shakib Arslan, believed that "the Ottoman caliphate is a guarantee for the East" (Levin, 1972, p. 64; Rosenthal, 1965, p. 112). Of course, such conservatism threw pan-Islamists into positions of stagnation, archaism and stagnation, and deprived them of the support of the most progressive-minded Muslims. The inability of pan-Islamism to effectively resist the ideological influence of the West led to its decline, which contributed to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and the removal of the Sultan-Caliph as a political figure. Later, pan-Islamism degenerated into a powerless caliphate movement.

To a certain extent, the Ottoman empire's dependence on foreigners contributed to its decline. English and French companies have long dominated the country's economy, building a foothold among non-Muslim minorities. However, since the beginning of the twentieth century, they have been pushed back by an increasingly strong Germany. Kaiser Wilhelm II "wanted to expel the British from India, and the Russians from the Caucasus and Central Asia... The King's Intelligence Services (UK. - RL.), the kaiser, Sultan and tsar launched the battle from the Straits of Constantinople in the west to Kabul and Kashgar in the east." The Germans spread rumors that the Kaiser "secretly made a pilgrimage to Mecca", and "the entire German nation followed the example of its emperor and en masse

1 In this connection, Western Islamic scholars even called him a "revolutionary" (Masset, 1962, p.199).

page 58

I converted to Islam." Specially trained groups of German scouts flooded the East under the guise of archaeologists, doctors, travelers, engineers, teachers. German generals and officers as advisers led the Ottoman army. This process was particularly rapid after the Kaiser's visits to Istanbul, Jerusalem and Damascus. "Where is the future of Germany? - asked the leading German geopolitician Paul Rohrbach. "It's in the East. In Turkey..., in Mesopotamia..., in Syria." From Ottoman-controlled territory, German missions, sabotage groups, and individual agents were sent to Iran, Afghanistan, Balochistan, and Muslim regions in northern India. There is evidence that they were also involved in anti-Russian actions in Central Asia [Hopkirk, 1994, pp. 2-7, 230].

It was largely thanks to Berlin's efforts that the Ottoman Empire was drawn into the war as if "on equal terms" with the great Powers. This flattered the vanity of the Young Turk rulers of the empire, fed their pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist illusions, satisfied both the nationalist and militaristic claims of the military caste, which had grown stronger under the Young Turks, and the great-power expansionist habits of the Old Ottoman elite. However, the empire did not have the opportunity to implement all these plans. Therefore, by entering the war, it took a step towards its own demise.

In the First World War, the world of Islam participated in different ways. Most notable was the participation of the Ottoman Empire, Russian Muslims, and Muslim-minded residents of the British and French colonies. In the British troops on various fronts in 1914-1918. served 1.5 million natives of India, mainly Muslims and Sikhs. The military expenditures of the British authorities in India in 1914-1918 amounted to more than 212 million pounds. st. The Egyptian army was much smaller (17 thousand people in 1914, 50 thousand - by 1918) and its participation in the war was insignificant. But hundreds of thousands of Egyptians served in the "labor corps", engaged in defense and construction work, serving the needs of the 275-thousandth British (2/3 - Indian) army. For the same purpose, 10,000 Egyptians were sent to France, and eight thousand to Mesopotamia. France received 545,000 soldiers from the colony (mostly Muslims from Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal and other African countries). From all these countries, hundreds of thousands of workers were sent to the mother country, replacing the French in industry and agriculture. In Algeria, France placed war loans for 1,768 million francs, in the rest of its possessions-for 600 million francs. The British directly used the gold reserve of the National Bank of Egypt to reimburse military expenses [Goldobin, 1989, p. 25; Awakening..., 1968, p. 9-10].

155 thousand Algerian Europeans and 173 thousand Algerian Muslims were mobilized to the French army. Of these, 22 thousand Europeans and 25 thousand (and according to other sources - up to 50 thousand) Muslims were killed. It is known that it was against the Algerian units of the French army that the Germans first used gases near Ypres in Belgium. Subsequently, the merits of the Algerians on the battlefield became their political trump card in the anti-colonial struggle. 82,000 Algerians were wounded. In addition, 119 thousand Algerians (including 89 thousand forced) were sent to work in France. Obviously, it was supposed to mobilize much more Algerians for the army and the "labor front", since about 120 thousand people, evading mobilization, fled to the mountains [Bernard, 1929, p. 299; Lacoste Y., 1960, p. 346; Spielmann, 1923, p. 20] 2 .

Other possessions of France with Muslim populations were less involved in the events related to the war. So, in France in 1914-1918. work-

2 Subsequently, Arab authors estimated that there were between 250,000 and 400,000 Algerians in the French army, of whom 80,000 died. In their opinion, a total of 500,000 Algerians were exported to France (as soldiers and workers) [Al-Akkad, 1962, p. 313; Abbas, 1931, p. 16; Abbas, 1962, p.113].

page 59

almost 30 thousand Tunisians, and out of 63 thousand Tunisian soldiers of the French army, 10.5 thousand people died at the front. At the same time, 25 thousand (according to other sources - over 35 thousand) Moroccans were sent to France for military work, while half as many of them were in the ranks of the French army. This was explained by the relatively recent (just three years before the war) establishment of French power over Morocco and the open reluctance of many influential Moroccan feudal lords to help France [Ivanov, 1971, p. 35; Menteshashvili, 1988, p. 52; Rager, 1950, p.64].

Some of the conflicts that occurred during the war in the territories where Muslims lived were inherited from the pre-war period and at first glance had nothing to do with the struggle of opposing coalitions. However, they logically "integrated" into the global conflict, as their participants were forced to look for allies either on one side or on the other.

Thus, the patriots of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (the territories that later formed Libya) continued their resistance to Italy, which began in 1911. And since the latter joined the Entente, the local Arabs and Berbers sided with Germany and the Ottoman Empire. These powers provided assistance to various groups of local nobility until 1914, and after 1914 they sent them weapons, ammunition and money, as well as sent a mission of military instructors led by General Nuri Bey (brother of the Ottoman Minister of War Enver Pasha) and a representative of the German General Staff K. Mannesman. Until 1916-1917, these efforts were quite effective: the Italians were driven out of the main part of the territory, and in neighboring Egypt, the British were forced to repel attacks by Arab-Ottoman detachments from the west.

The situation was different in Arabia, which at that time was divided into many emirates, formally vassals of the Ottoman Empire. England energetically urged them to ally and fight the Ottomans. But they either remained loyal to Istanbul (Yemen, Jabal Shammar), or maintained a wait-and-see neutrality, using, like the emirs of Asir and Nejd, the money and weapons received from London for their own purposes. The only ruler who became an ally of England was the sheriff of Mecca, Husayn ibn Ali al-Hashimi, under whose influence (and jurisdiction) the tribes of the Hejaz were located. The British High Commissioner to Egypt, MacMahon, held long negotiations with him, promising Hussein, finally, in October 1915, to recognize him as the king of the future state of all the Arabs of Asia (with the exception of Lebanon, western Syria, southern and eastern Arabia). After that, Hussein raised the famous "desert uprising"in June 1916. The rebels were led by Hussein's son, Emir Faisal, and a British intelligence officer, Colonel Lawrence. As a result of their actions, the Ottomans were forced out of the Hejaz by July 1917.

During the First World War, the Ottoman Empire - the leading and most powerful power in Islam-was completely defeated. The Young Turk triumvirs who ruled under the virtually powerless Sultan-Enver Pasha, Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff, Chairman of the Central Committee of the ruling Ittifak ve Terakki (Unity and Progress) party, Talaat Pasha, Minister of the Interior, and Jemal Pasha, Minister of the Sea - oppressed non-Turkic peoples in every possible way-Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs At the same time, they tried to unite all the Turkic speakers, including those who lived in Russia, Iran and other countries. Poorly equipped and with outdated equipment, consisting largely of representatives of the oppressed ethnic communities of the empire, and placed under the control of German officers, the Ottoman army was forced to simultaneously fight in the Caucasus and the Sinai Peninsula, in Iraq and the Balkans.

Despite some successes in the Balkans and Iraq, the Ottoman army suffered constant defeats, losing more than 2.6 million people killed and wounded, leaving the Ottoman army in a state of complete disarray.

page 60

a vast territory from Sinai to Basra and Erzerum. The Ottomans "compensated" for their failures by cracking down on the country's most significant non - Muslim communities - Armenians and Greeks, and later on Muslims (for example, the Arabs of Syria and Lebanon in 1915-1916). The Empire was ruined, crops and production were sharply reduced, and the monstrous enrichment of a corrupt bureaucracy contrasted with the famine and impoverishment of the lower classes. All this led to disintegrating progress in the empire, the desire of non-Turkish peoples to separate from it, especially since the Ottoman troops retreating through their lands were engaged in looting, pogroms and violence. In October 1918, after signing an armistice, the Ottoman Empire surrendered to the victors who occupied its capital. The leaders of the Young Turks fled to Germany, and the Sultan became a puppet of England and France. It was the end of the empire [Petrosyan, 1990, pp. 248-261].

The backward semi-feudal power turned out to be neither economically, nor politically, nor technically ready to fulfill its role as the hegemon of world Islam. As the experience of the war of 1914-1918 showed, it did not have the military, material, or spiritual forces to do this. Only a shadow of its former greatness remained. All the subjects of the Ottomans, including primarily Muslims, knew that the official propaganda of the empire's omnipotence was combined with its complete dependence on the West (before 1908, mainly from England and France, after that - mainly from Germany), that pan-Islamism and Ottomanism were being replaced by militant chauvinistic pan-Turkism, which was directly directed not only to the West, but also to the West. against neighboring countries, but also their own subjects of non-Turkish origin. The arbitrariness, corruption, cruelty, arrogance and adventurism of the Young Turk elite and its entourage, whose immorality and self-interest had nothing in common with the Islamic ideas of social justice, did not fit in with the proclaimed principles of the Koran and Sharia.

All of this has eroded the empire far more than military failures. The Empire, and especially the Sultan-caliph, who retained not so much power after the Young Turk revolution of 1908-1909, did not enjoy authority in the eyes of Muslims around the world, at least not as much as in the middle of the XIX century. Muslims did not believe in the sincerity of Istanbul's pan-Islamic slogans, and the repressive policies of the Young Turks pitted various communities and groups, including Muslim ones, against each other. The Young Turks were opposed not only by non-confessional, but also by non-national subjects, in particular, the Arabs (the revolts in Syria and Lebanon in 1915-1916, the "desert uprising" in the Hejaz in 1916). In the ranks of the British troops, many Muslims fought against the Ottomans, especially from India.

The same applies to Muslims-subjects of France and Russia, which can be demonstrated by concrete examples, in particular in the Maghreb countries, where earlier, in 1905 - 1906, the French noted the great influence of the "pan-Islamic agitation" of Istanbul. It is also worth considering the service in the French army of many Muslims from Senegal and other African colonies, on which pan-Islamism did not have the slightest impact.

* * *

During the war, France did not have to send soldiers to Algeria to "maintain order." The Algerian Marabouts, i.e. Sufi leaders, and a significant part of the Muslim clergy took a position of loyal support for the mother country. They did not respond to the call for jihad-the" holy war " proclaimed in October 1914 by the Ottoman Sultan as the religious head of all Sunni Muslims and took the side of France against Germany and the Ottoman power (the only one in the world).

page 61

French Army lieutenant Colonel-Algerian Cadi and eight other Algerian officers were sent to Egypt in 1916 to help organize the anti-Ottoman uprising in the Hejaz, and from 1918 they participated in battles against the Turks in Arabia). Many representatives of prominent Muslim families joined the ranks of the French army. The grandson of the Algerian national hero Abd al-Qadir, Emir Khalid, who retired in 1913 in protest of discrimination against Algerians in the French army, but returned to military service at the beginning of the war, fought as a captain of the Spaga (irregular "native" cavalry) units. Other Young Algerians, i.e. "Muslim Frenchmen" who have adopted the French culture, mostly also supported France, hoping for concessions on its part. But even during the war, many of them "protested against recruitment", demanded equal rights for Algerian and French officials, and representation in the French Parliament (Depont, 1928, p. 119).

Only a small group of traditionalists in Algeria and Tunisia pinned their hopes on the victory of Germany and the Ottoman Empire. They distributed pan-Islamic leaflets calling for a "holy war", sabotaged the French military efforts, and agitated for the refusal of military service. But their activity gradually waned after the start of the anti-Ottoman uprising in 1916. The appeal of the Sherif of Mecca, Hussein, in which he accused the Turks of "disregard and hostility to the noble and pious Emir Abd al-Qadir of Algeria", had a certain echo in Algeria. The same can be said about the proclamation of Emir Khalid, who declared in 1915 that all Arabs oppose the Turks as their oppressors [Landa, 1976, p. 244-246].

In fact, this was not entirely true. One of Abd al-Qadir's sons, Emir Abd al-Malik, who rose to the rank of colonel in the Ottoman army in Syria, acted in Morocco as an ally of the Ottomans from December 1914. His 15,000-strong army threatened the cities of Taza and Casablanca. Receiving weapons and money from Germany and Spain, Abd al-Malik in March 1915 even declared war on the French administration in Morocco, which managed to cope with it only in 1924.

The Algerians knew about Abd al-Malik's struggle. They also sympathized with the Senusiya brotherhood's anti-Italian movement in neighboring Libya. In 1914, Germany made a demagogic appeal to the Seine-Sith to "liberate Muslims from slavery" and restore their "honor". Under the influence of the Senussi sheikhs of Khogtar (Southern Sahara), Ahmed Sultan and Abd al-Salam declared jihad against France in 1915 and began besieging French bases in February 1916. France was forced to send the corps of General Laperrin against them, who pacified the Tuaregs until the end of 1917. [Nouschi, 1962, p. 27] Open actions against the French took place in Algeria in 1914 in the Beni Shugran (near Mascara) and Miliana regions. The rebels were led by tribal sheikhs who did not want to obey orders to mobilize. One of them said: "You can increase taxes and take away our property, but we will not give up our children." At the same time, many peasants, not limited to this, since December 1914 began to demand the return of land confiscated from them by the French after the uprising of 1871 [Nouschi, 1962, p. 25; Al-Khatib, 1958, p. 76]. However, the general uprising of the Maghreb Muslims, which the German-Turkish command hoped for, so and it did not happen, although partisan raids in 1915-1917 were noted throughout the east of the country-from Tebessa to Bougie, as well as in Tenes in the west, where the revolt of Algerian soldiers was supported by workers - according to Belkacem Saadallah, "as in Russia in 1917" [Saadallah, 1969, p. 76, 251; Ohneck, 1967, p. 32]. In 1916-1918, up to nine thousand attacks, assassinations, and acts of sabotage were recorded in Algeria [L'Afrique/ranfalse, p. 241-242].

page 62

During the war, pro - German and pan-Islamic propaganda still had some influence on the Maghrebins and other Muslim subjects of France: legends were spread about Haj Guillaume (i.e. Kaiser Wilhelm), who was praised as "fighting with the stars" and openly wished him victory; pan-Islamists in Constantine claimed that the Caliph (i.e. Ottoman Sultan) can burn the whole world if he "only raises the banner of the Prophet" (Saadallah, 1969, p. 236; Bennabi, 1965, p. 30-35). The Committee for the Independence of Algeria and Tunisia, formed in Berlin in January 1916, headed by Tunisian sheikhs Salah al-Sharif and Ismail al-Sufayhi, was also active. Algeria included Abd al-Qadir's son, Emir Ali Pasha, and Abd al-Qadir's grandson, Emir Said. The Committee conducted patriotic agitation among captured soldiers of the French army (Maghrebians and Muslims in general), many of whom were then secretly thrown into their homeland for sabotage purposes or joined the Ottoman army [Bernard, 1927, p.8].

In the first proclamation on behalf of the committee (1916), al-Sharif accused the Entente countries of "intending to subjugate other peoples by stealing their independence and personal freedom." Al-Sufayhi i al-Sharif described in detail the hardships of life for Algerians and Tunisians under French rule: tax oppression, legal disenfranchisement, land robbery, forced labor, suppression of all freedoms and national culture. It was proposed to thwart the" diabolical plans "of the Entente by mobilizing the" material and spiritual forces of the Islamic countries" and the "fraternal alliance of the Turkish state" with Germany and Austria - Hungary. In the same year, in 1916, Emir Ali Pasha published in Berlin in Arabic "An appeal to Muslims serving in the Allied armies to stand up for the Caliphate, save Islam and the holy cities, liberate Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco" [Tunisien..., 1916, s. 7, 21-30].

Despite the small number of Maghrebins in Germany and Turkey, as well as their limited influence (mainly among prisoners of war), their activities marked the beginning of an important process of politicization of Muslim emigration in Europe, which largely influenced the political and social life of the continent throughout the 20th century and the pace of modernization of the Muslim East. Before the First World War, immigrants from Islamic countries were mainly engaged in economic activities in Europe, to a lesser extent - religious: in England, where the first mosque was built in 1889, until 1914, Muslims were mainly merchants and sailors from Aden, Somalia, India, in France - dockworkers, builders, soap makers and the miners from Algeria are usually illiterate and unskilled. The war led to a sharp increase in Muslim emigration, as well as to its subsequent involvement in the workers ' and socialist movement, primarily in France [Belloula, 1965, p. 13-16, 27-28; Berque, 1962, p. 15-16; Islam..., 1994, p. 340].

During the war years, emigrants in Germany and Turkey (mostly traditionalists) established contacts with like - minded Tunisians and Morocco hiding in Switzerland and Spain, planning the creation of a United North African Republic consisting of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Tripolitania and Barca (Cyrenaica). At international conferences, delegates from the Maghreb countries usually spoke in solidarity, appealing to Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire for help "against the regime of oppression" and in support of independence demands. In 1915, Lieutenant Haj Abdullah's pamphlets "The Holy War and the Role of the Black Army in Algeria" and "Islam in the French Army"were published in Istanbul. They described the" Arabophobia "of French officers, their hostility to "young turbans", "darkies" and "Nazs" (from Arabic. al-nas - "the people"), as they insultingly called all competent Algerian military personnel, as well as the constant surveillance of Algerians by police agents. From January 1917, Bou Kabouya, who lived in Zurich, campaigned among Algerians.-

page 63

py. In the same year, many other anti-French pamphlets and leaflets were sent from Istanbul to Algeria. Some of them - mostly Islamist content - were thrown into trenches in front-line positions occupied by Algerian riflemen. Through Seville, Algeria also received an underground leaflet " Devoir "("Duty"), which was published by a deserter from the French army,"Mehmet - an Algerian who went to Turkey to fight the persecutors of Islam."

Under the leadership of the former Egyptian Khedive Abbas II Hilmi, the Unity and Progress Party Committee in Istanbul established a branch in Lausanne, the International Muslim Society, which began publishing a bulletin in 1916, which soon became the monthly magazine Revue du Maghreb. The magazine's editor, Mohammed Bash-Hanba, his brother Ali, and other Young Tunisians (i.e., liberals and nationalists close to the Young Algerians) constantly wrote about the oppression of the Tunisian and Algerian peoples. In September 1917, the Revue du Maghreb published the "Charter of the Algerian People", in which it demanded the abolition of the colonial "native code" and repressive tribunals, guarantees of respect for the person, property, freedom, language and religion of Algerians, the restoration of justice and the rule of law, tax reform and equality "in expenditures and revenues of the budget", the provision of civil and political rights up to representation in the French Parliament [Said, p. 78-80; Ageron, 1968, p. 1177-1182].

Some of the Algerian emigrants maintained ties with the former Moroccan Sultan Moulay Abd al-Hafiz (Hafid), who, while in Barcelona, tried to raise an anti - French uprising in North Africa, and also supported the demand of the Committee for the Independence of Algeria and Tunisia to grant independence to the "Algerian-Tunisian people". This committee, which brought together Tunisian and Algerian traditionalists who had emigrated to Geneva, was headed by Mohammed Mezian al-Telimsani, Biraz al-Jazairi, and Hamdan Ben Ali Al-Jazairi. However, all these activities of the Algerian emigration, cut off from the homeland and its everyday problems, did not pose a great danger to the colonial regime. French counter-propaganda services, which published a number of special Arabic-language newspapers in the Maghreb, including Akhbar al-Harb (Military News) and Al-Mustaqbal (Future), easily neutralized the agitation of the emigrants.

The most far-sighted representatives of the French ruling circles considered it necessary, especially in difficult war conditions, to meet at least some of the demands of the Maghreb Muslims, not without reason believing that the long-suffering of those who served in the army or worked in the mother country could come to an end after their return to their homeland. "The experience of the Algerian troops mobilized in 1914-1918 in the service of France," wrote the German historian Thomas Oppermann later, " opened up new political horizons for the country's most advanced minds... Having become acquainted with Europe, they began to take a more critical view of the situation in their homeland" [Opperman, 1961, p. 62-63; Les revendications..., 1919]. Many French parliamentarians began to align themselves with the position of Jean-Claude Juncker. Clemenceau, who already in 1915 demanded reforms in Algeria. And although he became head of the French government in the autumn of 1917, he was able to carry out his plans only after the end of the war because of the fierce resistance of the top European colonists of Algeria. Senator Gaston Thomson, an exponent of the latter's sentiments, for example, stated that in all reform projects "there is nothing but German propaganda" (Ohneck, 1967, p. 48).

The First World War brought the Maghrebins and other Muslim subjects of France, along with human losses and material hardships, some economic development, the growth of modern social strata and classes, including the bourgeoisie (mainly commercial), a general change in the socio-psychological climate (this was influenced by the participation of many Maghrebins and Africans in military operations and their lives in Europe for several years), increased ranks and a revival

page 64

the activities of the political elite in opposition to the authorities from those who moved to Europe or the Arab East and those who served in France in the military, studied or were labor emigrants. Having aggravated and deepened many of the pre-war contradictions of the colonial system, the wartime situation contributed to the strengthening of anti-colonial sentiments.

The Germans and Turks ' bet on pan-Islamism, on the hostility of Muslims to France and the authority of the Sultan-Caliph was not justified both because of the negative features of the Ottoman Empire and its rulers, and because of the neutralization of the influence of the Ottomans and local traditionalists (including those who emigrated) by the political, economic and cultural influence of France and all its local supporters-from Tunisia to Senegal.

Britain has strengthened its position in Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. But having received a mandate to govern Iraq and Palestine, while retaining its influence in Egypt and Iran, it was forced to make concessions, creating a system of local self-government in India (1919), establishing Arab monarchies in Iraq and Transjordan (1921), formally recognizing the independence of Egypt (1922). At the same time, Britain kept its troops in most countries of the Middle East for a long time, including Turkey and Iran, unleashed another war against Afghanistan in 1919, and sought to penetrate the Caucasus and Central Asia, which was facilitated by the situation in southern Russia.

* * *

By the end of the war, a very difficult situation had developed in the Muslim regions of Russia. Here, representatives of the mood of adherents of tradition (Kadimists) emphasized loyalty to the tsarist administration and personally to the White King (Ak Padishah). The renovationist liberals (Jadids) who opposed them were oriented towards the liberal and partly moderate left-wing circles of Russian society, which were sympathetic to the national and religious demands of Muslims. Seeking to modernize the Muslim environment, the Jadids advocated the development of contacts with Russian culture and science, and the perception of the latest trends from Europe through Russia. After the Russian Revolution of 1905 - 1907, mutual understanding between Orthodox and Muslims increased, especially in the Volga region, Siberia and the Urals, and to a lesser extent in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The First World War changed everything. The loyalty of Muslims to Ak Padishah was not immediately but gradually called into question, especially after the defeats at the front in 1915.Doubts about the strength of tsarism led, starting in 1916, to unrest and open discontent, to the spread of nationalism and separatism. However, this was not due to the influence of the Ottoman Empire or its propaganda, and not to any religious or ethnic factors. The main ones were the political and social upheavals that occurred in Russia during and after the First World War.

After the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war (October 1914), there were no protests in Russia in favor of the Sultan-caliph and the leading power of Islam. Muslim soldiers of the Russian army (mostly natives of the Volga region and the North Caucasus) honestly performed their military duty. The military failure of the Ottoman Empire was quickly revealed, as the army of which was already defeated by the Russians at Sarikamysh in late 1914 and early 1915, losing 70,000 men out of 90,000 soldiers and officers killed and wounded [Petrosyan, 1990, p.257]. After that, the Russian army on the Caucasian Front constantly won, taking in 1916. Erzerum and Trabzon and reaching Hanekin in northern Iraq.

page 65

However, as the war dragged on, wartime losses and hardships increased, and the economic situation worsened, social tensions began to increase, which affected Russian-Muslim relations. It should be borne in mind that in the Muslim regions, in addition to the general discontent with the incompetent rule of Nicholas II, there was also a factor in the decline in the prestige of the White Tsar, who was unable to win the war (Russia never recovered from the heavy defeats of 1915 on the Eastern Front, despite its constant successes on the Caucasian Front and the famous Brusilov breakthrough of 1916 in Galicia) and, most importantly, fulfill their promises.

One of these promises was the government's commitment not to enlist Central Asian Muslims in the army (the Muslim cavalry division, later called "Wild", numbering only 1,350 people, consisted mainly of Chechens, Kabardins, Ingush and Circassians) [Landa, 1995, p.172]. However, the difficult situation of the empire forced the Russian government, on the one hand, to sharply increase the amount of taxes, taxes, requisitions and various other fees, and on the other hand, to issue a decree of June 25, 1916 on the forced recruitment of 250 thousand Muslims from the Turkestan region and 230 thousand from the Steppe region for rear work in the front - line areas. This caused widespread discontent. On July 4, 1916, a crowd of 10,000 people in Khojent demanded the cancellation of the tsar's decree. Anti-government protests quickly spread across a vast territory from the Amu Darya to the Urals with a multiethnic, predominantly Muslim population. In July 1916, there were 25 demonstrations in the Samarkand region, 20 and 86 in the Syrdarya and Ferghana regions. Their forms ranged from mass abandonment of enterprises and fleeing to the steppes, mountains, and abroad to armed attacks on officials, troops, and police. It was then that the concept of basmachi (from the Turkic basmak - "to attack, to attack") was revived, which first appeared in the late 60s of the XIX century. to refer to Muslim partisans who attacked tsarist troops in Turkestan and Khorezm.

Due to the strong resistance of the rebels (their number reached 50 thousand people by the end of November 1916), the tsarist authorities managed to send no more than 123 thousand people from Turkestan to work in the front line. With brutal repression and political maneuvers, tsarism managed to suppress this spontaneous, disorganized and largely diverse uprising, which involved steppe pastoralists and dehkans who usually did not leave their nomadic villages and villages, small groups of partisans in the mountains and steppes, workers and artisans in the cities (especially in Tashkent). The Muslim elite remained loyal to the tsar and, with the exception of some mullahs and ulema, did not support the uprising. So did the local traditionalists, the Jadids, and the Kazakh nationalist organization Alash, created in 1905 by a group of cadets. It turned out to be without a single leadership, divided by natural conditions and ethnic diversity of participants (Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghizs, Uyghurs, etc.), and different goals (some opposed the war and the tsar's decree, others opposed feudal lords, Bais, and kulak elements among Russian migrants, and still others opposed Russian domination in general and in defense of the traditional way of life). the uprising was crushed by January 1917 (Kastelskaya, 1972, pp. 35-115). Only a small part of the rebels managed to escape to the steppes and mountains. Three thousand rebels were put on trial, 300 of them were sentenced to death (50 of them were pardoned). However, according to some researchers, the echoes of this movement in Central Asia were felt until 1941 (Avtorkhanov, 1991, p. 56; Kastelskaya, 1972, p.91-93, 101; Polyakov, 1993, p. 45).

The British believed that the German mission, which had recently left Kabul, was involved in organizing the uprising. "In six months," writes Peter Hopkirk, " more Russian blood was shed than during the entire conquest of the region in the previous decade.-

page 66

in the past century." Indeed, during the uprising, along with tens of thousands of Muslims, 200 Russian military and government officials were killed, as well as up to four thousand civilians. Many Muslims were forced to flee to Kashgar (Xinjiang) [Hopkirk, 1944, pp. 230-235].

The February Revolution of 1917 was a bolt from the blue for the majority of Muslims in Russia. Traditionalists-Kadimists and Muslim nobles (Emir of Bukhara, Khan of Nakhichevan) - naturally regretted the fall of the monarchy. "Many people," said General Khalilov (a representative of the top Dagestani leadership), " call the Russian (February) revolution Great. But I will never call it that: I would rather call it the Great Anarchy that we need to get rid of." A little later, in 1919, the Prime Minister of the North Caucasus Emirate Arsanukaev-Dyshninsky wrote: "There can be no republic in a Muslim country, because in the essence of our holy Book, the presence of a caliph is necessary, because to deny him is to deny the Prophet, which would mean nothing more than to deny God. Any judgment about the republic or the constitution... this is nothing but turmoil, since this idea cannot be implemented among Muslims" [Abdullaev, 1987, p. 46, 57].

Such extreme views were not common to all Muslims, especially Jadids. However, this statement largely helps to understand the logic of not only ultra-clerical Kadimists, but also Muslim believers in general, in whose eyes the overthrow of the monarch, especially the Ak Padishah exalted by the historical tradition, certainly undermined the authority of Russia, and, most importantly, confidence in its ability to fulfill its obligations to Muslims, to serve as a support and protection for them, including including from the encroachments of neighboring States, mainly Great Britain. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the overthrow of the monarchy in Russia called into question the existing model of relations between Imperial St. Petersburg and the elite of Russian Muslims. In short, the whole complex of problems created by the seething unpredictability of Russian reality after February 1917 should have caused astonishment, rage, doubt and uncertainty among Muslims and, as a consequence, increased centrifugal autonomist and separatist nationalist tendencies.

But this did not happen everywhere. The Musavat party, which emerged in Azerbaijan in 1914, abandoned its orientation towards Istanbul and supported Russia in the war "to the bitter end". After February 1917 It supported the creation of a unified Russian democratic republic and did not even demand official autonomy for Azerbaijan. In July 1917, the Musavatists united with the Turkic Federalist Party and began to advocate a federal structure of the future Russia "on the basis of national-territorial autonomy", while at the same time preaching class peace within the Azerbaijani nation. The party's position was largely determined by the influence of Muslim workers who worked (mainly in the oil fields) together with non-Muslims. Musavatists, along with representatives of other parties (including leftists), even joined the Council of Workers ' Deputies of Baku. The example of neighboring Iran, where the Shah's regime brutally oppressed Azerbaijanis, also had a deterrent effect on Musavatists.

The party's position changed as a result of the sharp aggravation of the political struggle in Azerbaijan after October 1917 and the bitter experience of the Turkish and British occupation of 1918. The subsequent policy of the Musavatists was not anti-Russian, but anti-Bolshevik, although at the same time they did not get along with Denikin.

Muslim nationalists of the Volga region and the Urals took a similar position. The dispersal of the population that supported them (mainly Tatar and Bashkir) over large areas among the non-Muslim majority itself contributed to their loyalty to Russia and their desire to cooperate with any country.

page 67

by the Russian authorities. At the same time, pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist sentiments, which had always been current in the circles of the Tatar-Bashkir bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, noticeably intensified after February 1917. They dominated, in particular, the First Congress of Muslims of Russia (Moscow, April 1917) and the Second Congress (Kazan, June 1917), where they put forward demands for the autonomy of the "Turkic-Tatar Muslims of inner Russia and Siberia", the creation of a National Assembly as an expression of the will of the "Turkic-Tatar nation". Later, after November 1917, the Volga - Ural Muslims were separated and Bashkir nationalists led by Akhmet-Zaki Validov were separated from them [Iskhaki, 1991, p.47-52; Togan, 1997, p. 105-187].

One of the results of February 1917 was a "parade of sovereignties" in Muslim regions. In May 1917, Imam Uzun Haji (once exiled to Siberia for promoting Muridism and agitating against the tsar's rule) proclaimed the creation of the North Caucasus Emirate. At the same time, he received from the Ottoman Sultan, as caliph, an official firman, declaring him the head of secular and spiritual power in the North Caucasus. The level of this "supreme leader," as his adherents called him, can be judged by the following statement:"I am making a rope to hang all engineers, students, and writers in general from left to right." However, he later caught himself, saying that "a nation cannot flourish and develop without knowledge, medicine, technology, military art and other things." However, when the campaign for elections to the Constituent Assembly of Russia was being held in 1917, the imam's associates based their polemic with the socialists who were growing stronger in Dagestan solely on accusing them of deviating from Islam: "They do not believe..., do not pray, do not fast, they have gone so far as to completely deny the existence of God." Socialists of Dagestan were accused of rejecting Sharia law and adat, in an effort to seize the lands, pastures and forests of the Khans and Beks.

It is characteristic that in Dagestan (and in some other Muslim regions of Russia) the question of Sharia and Muslim dogma in general was raised by different political trends in a very peculiar way. The comparison with the politicians of medieval Europe, who clothed their ideas in the most understandable religious form for the masses, is quite applicable to them. It was in this form that the struggle between the feudal - clerical bloc led by Uzun Haji and Najmutdin of Gozo (Najmutdin of Gotsin), on the one hand, and the Socialist Group, on the other, took place. Najmutdin, who in the eyes of some Muslims was "a bearer of Shamil's traditions, a guardian of the faith, a champion of the rights of the people" (which was facilitated by the fact that he was in tsarist prison and the statement that he "did not study in Russian schools in order to remain faithful to Sharia"), wanted to refer the important issue of land for Dagestan to the " congress alimov from Bukhara, Kazan, Crimea, Turkey", and declared any opponent of this decision "deviated from the true path and a rapist who incurred God's wrath and punishment".

However, the socialists were able to counter the religious arguments of Najmutdin and other clerics with religious arguments both during the peasant Congress of Dagestan in August 1917 and during the election campaign for the Constituent Assembly. "The sharia law at the congress," wrote the prominent revolutionary A. Takho-Godi in 1927, " was turned upside down, because special quotations from Sharia books were prepared for the congress, which stated that the land belongs to the one who "revives" it, i.e., to the peasant, since the landlords themselves do not know what to do. they plow. Water was also declared a common property, so that in the end the shari'ahists and their shari'ah were beaten by the Shari'ah of the socialist group and by the hungry, land-hungry stomach of the assembled peasants" (Abdullayev, 1987, p. 4). 17 - 18, 50 - 55, 57 - 62; Russia..., 1994, pp. 45, 49; Bennigsen, 1986, p. 72-75].

page 68

Najmutdin and Uzun Haji established a direct link with the Young Turks through Said Bey (Shamil's grandson) and established it in May 1917. The United Highlanders Union, which demanded the establishment of an "Islamic state". In August 1917, Najmutdin was proclaimed Imam of Chechnya and Dagestan with the support of Sufi Sheikh Ali Mitayev and his six thousand Chechen and Ingush armed supporters. Competing with them was Akhmetkhan Mutushev, chairman of the Chechen National Council, who relied on the Sufi group Kunta-Haji. The struggle between Najmutdin and Mutushev did not allow the Turks to effectively influence the situation in the North Caucasus [Russia..., 1994, p. 46].

In Crimea, after February 1917, Muslim separatists also came to life, putting forward the slogan: "Crimea is for the Crimean people." An All-Crimean Muslim Congress was held, which elected Chelebidzhan Chelebeyev as the supreme Mufti, who established close contacts with like-minded people (the Shuro Party) in Kazan and Ufa. Having created the Milli-Firka party in July 1917, Chelebeyev sent delegations to Turkey on its behalf. Chelebeyev was briefly arrested by the Provisional Government for calling out against the participation of Muslim soldiers in the war with the Turks. The Milli-Firm party created a Temporary Muslim Executive Committee, which tried to lead the Tatar peasantry (demanding, in particular, the withdrawal of waqf lands in their favor) and young people united around the Union of Tatar Students. The Milliyet newspaper became the organ of the executive committee. In Bakhchisarai and Yevpatoria millifirkovtsy created associations Zia and the Union of Youth, in Bakhchisarai opened an art industrial school and a teacher's gymnasium. The pre-existing religious school was transformed into the Mengli-Giray Institute (in honor of the famous Khan of the Crimea). At the Kurultai convened in November 1917, a National Directory of five ministers was created, headed by Chelebeyev. Director of Military Affairs Jafer Seidamet began to form from the squadrons of the Crimean Tatar cavalry regiment loyal to the Directory of the unit. The "Crimean Tatar laws" adopted by the Kurultai in the future were purely nationalistic in nature.

However, due to the demographic situation, the Directory failed to monopolize power in Crimea. In 1917, in the Crimea, Russians made up the absolute majority of townspeople (60.4%) and a significant proportion of rural residents (35.9%); Tatars were in second place (11.3% and 36.6%, respectively); there were also many Jews (14.5% of townspeople), Greeks (4.7% and 2.4%), Armenians, Bulgarians and others who are completely disinclined to support the Milli-Firk dictatorship. In addition, military power was in the hands of Governor-General Ebelov and Vice-Admiral Kolchak, who recognized the Provisional Government of Russia. Therefore, the further course of events in Crimea was determined not by the Milli-Firm and the Directory, but by the growing element of the revolution in Russia [Krym..., 1988, pp. 49-58].

In Central Asia and Kazakhstan, in the Volga region, Siberia and the Caucasus, after February 1917, there was a social upsurge, which was expressed in the activation of existing political, trade union and other mass organizations or in the creation of new ones. However, it should be emphasized that unlike the Crimean Milli-Firka, which took a pan-Turkist and pan-Islamic position due to its pro-Turkish orientation, the nationalists of Tatarstan, Bashkiria (Shuro party) and Azerbaijan (Musavat) adhered to the principle of "federalism".

Established in March 1917. The Executive Committee of public organizations in Baku and in April 1917 the Turkestan Committee (which replaced the abolished power of the Governor-General in Tashkent) supported the Provisional Government. Small groups of Jadids in Bukhara and Khiva (Young Bukharians and Young Khivites) also became active. This forced the Emir of Bukhara to issue a manifesto with promises of democratic freedoms, which generally remained on paper. Jadid parties emerged in Turkestan

page 69

Shura-i-Islam) and traditionalists (Shura-i-Ulama), Muslim trade unions (Ittifaq), as well as Muslim Workers 'Councils (along with the Councils of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies operating among the non-Muslim population). The Kazakh organization Alash-Orda was politically formed at the First All-Kyrgyz Congress in Orenburg in August 1917, taking the position of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism and simultaneously joining forces with the Russian authorities in the struggle against the popular revolutionaries (A. Imanov, A. Dzhangildin), who emerged from the Muslim insurgents of 1916.

All these organizations maintained ties with the Provisional Government, which for them, although unreliable and truly "temporary", was nevertheless an ally in the struggle, on the one hand, against the old bureaucracy (or rather, against the colonialist and military-bureaucratic methods of government), and on the other, against the growing workers ' and socialist movement, which, being mostly non-Muslim, began to actively involve Muslim workers in its ranks, and in some places also the democratic Muslim intelligentsia (the Socialist Group in Dagestan, the Muslim Socialist Committee in Kazan).

In general, by the end of the First World War, the Muslims of Russia were characterized by an increase in nationalism and a softening of the contradictions between traditionalists and Jadids, caused by the inept policy of tsarism (on the right) and the pressure of socialism and communism (on the left). February 1917, having changed the political system of Russia, has not yet destroyed Russian society with its historical, administrative, economic and socio-cultural ties, in the system of which Islam occupied its place. But the course of events in Russia gradually led to October 1917, when the explosion of all the old social structures radically changed the situation in the country, including the position of Islam.

It was the events of the First World War that led to two revolutions in Russia in 1917, which were like two stages of a cardinal socio-political and ideological revolution in the life of the country. Many Muslims, primarily in the relatively recently annexed Central Asia, did not accept this coup, which led to the anti-Soviet resistance of the Basmachi in Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s and the less prolonged partisanship in the North Caucasus in the 1920s. However, Russia's mostly Muslim population eventually embraced the revolution and supported it. This was largely due to the outstanding Tatar revolutionaries Mullanur Vakhitov and Mirsaid Sultan-Galiyev, as well as a direct consequence of the miscalculations and blunders of Kolchak, Denikin and other white generals, whose primitive great power and disregard for the interests of Muslims decided a lot [Landa, 1999, pp. 53-70; Sultan-Galiyev, 1992; Togan, 1997, pp. 190-258; Bennigsen, 1968, pp. 147-155]. "The political blindness of the white leaders," wrote the American Sovietologist Alexander Bennigsen and the French Turkologist Chantal Lemercier - Kelkezh in this connection," their inability to understand the true nature of the revolution and correctly choose the main opponent were the main reasons for their final collapse " [Bennigsen, 1986, pp. 87-89].

* * *

The First World War significantly changed the face of the world of Islam. It has become even more fragmented and dependent. It strengthened the positions of England and France at the expense of defeated Germany and the Ottoman Empire that ceased to exist. The entire world of Islam was influenced by the" Sovietization "of Muslims in the USSR, not to mention the threat of" exporting the revolution", especially through the relevant sections of the Comintern. The ideological and political isolation of Soviet Muslims from the world of Islam, which arose as a result of the "cordon sanitaire" policy implemented in the Soviet Union, also affected the situation.

page 70

the Soviet Union's attitude towards the Western powers, and the Soviet Union's own desire to sever ties between the Central Asian Basmachi and their foreign patrons.

The mass participation of Muslims in military operations in Asia, Africa and Europe, the losses and casualties they suffered, the destruction in vast territories inhabited by Muslims from Morocco to Central Asia, the acquaintance of Muslim soldiers and workers with social protest movements and revolutionary actions in Europe, the collapse of the main political stronghold of Islam-the Ottoman Empire-all this contributed to an unprecedented expanding the horizons and politicization of Muslims, strengthening their desire for national and social liberation, freedom and independence. Therefore, quite naturally, the results of the First World War were anti-colonial uprisings after 1918 in almost all the countries of Islam.

In Afghanistan and Iran in the 1920s, it was time for reform. The Republic of Turkey, which was formed on the site of the Ottoman Empire, defended its independence in 1918-1923 in the struggle against the imperialists of the West. One of the results of the 1920 uprising in Iraq was the emergence of an Iraqi state headed by a king. The Egyptian uprising of 1919 was the main reason for Britain's recognition of Egypt's independence in 1922. The national liberation war of 1925-1927 in Syria led to the drafting of a constitution and the beginning of the movement towards independence. In Libya and Morocco, the liberation struggle that began before 1914 flared up after the war with renewed vigor and continued until the early 1930s. Especially vivid was the epic of the Rif Republic in northern Morocco, which in 1921-1926 opposed Spain and France. At the same time, freedom fighters in Morocco, Egypt, Syria and Iraq pointed to Russia as a role model.

The First World War dramatically intensified the liberation struggle of Muslims, revealed new social forces and reserves of this struggle, and strengthened it by multiplying their political and military-technical experience. Having aggravated socio-economic and other problems in almost all Muslim countries, the war brought to the fore the socio-political content of the struggle, somewhat muffling its actual religious aspect. That is why Pan-Islamism, Ottomanism and other ideological equipment of the dilapidated Ottoman Empire have sunk into oblivion. But the ideas of freedom, nationalism, democracy, and socialism, which have been present in one way or another in the ideological armament of almost all political forces in the world of Islam, have come to the forefront.

list of literature

Abdullaev M. A. Socio-political thought in Dagestan at the beginning of the XX century. Moscow, 1987. Avtorkhanov A. Empire of the Kremlin. Moscow, 1991.

Al-Akkad Salah. Al-Maghrib al-arabiyyah (Arabic Maghrib). Cairo, 1962. Al-Khatib Ahmad. Al-Thawra al-jazairiyya (The Algerian Revolution). Beirut, 1958. Goldobin A.M. National liberation struggle of the people of Egypt. 1918-1936 Moscow, 1989. Ivanov N. A. The crisis of the French protectorate in Tunis, Moscow, 1971. Iskhaki City Of Idel-Ural. Kazan, 1991.

Kastelskaya Z. D. Osnovnye predposylki vosstaniya 1916 goda v Uzbekistanii [Basic prerequisites for the 1916 uprising in Uzbekistan]. Moscow, 1972. Crimea, past and present, Moscow, 1988.

Landa R. G. The struggle of the Algerian people against European colonization (1830-1918). Moscow, 1976. Landa R. G. Islam v istorii Rossii [Islam in the History of Russia]. Moscow, 1995. Landa R. G. Mirsaid Sultan-Galiyev / / Voprosy istorii. 1999. N 8.

Levin Z. I. Razvitie osnovnykh treneniy sotsial'no-politicheskoy mysli v Syrie i Egipte (novoe vremya) [Development of the main trends of socio-political thought in Syria and Egypt (new time)].

Masset A. Islam, Moscow, 1962.

Menteshashvili Z. A. Social development of independent Morocco, Moscow, 1988.

page 71

Petrosyan Yu. A. Osmanskaya imperiya: moghestvo i gibel ' [The Ottoman Empire: Power and Destruction]. Moscow, 1990.

Polyakov S. P. Istoricheskaya etnografiya Srednoi Azii i problemy areal'noi tipologizatsii i periodizatsii [Historical ethnography of Central Asia and problems of areal typology and periodization].

The Awakening of the Oppressed, Moscow, 1968.

Russia, the West and the Muslim East in modern times. St. Petersburg, 1994.

Saadallah Abu'l-Qasim. Al-harraka al-wataniyya al-jazairiyya (Algerian National Movement). Beirut, 1969.

Said Amin. Ad-dawla al-Arabiya al-muttahida (The United Arab Power). Part 3. B. M., B. G.

Stepanyants M. T. Muslim concepts in philosophy and politics of the XIX-XX centuries. Moscow, 1982.

Sultan-Galiyev Mirsaid. Articles. Performances. Documents. Kazan, 1992.

Togan Z. V. Memoirs, Moscow, 1997.

Triningham, J. S. Sufi Orders in Islam, Moscow, 1989.

Fadeeva I. L. Official doctrines in the ideology and politics of the Ottoman Empire (Osmanism-Pan-Islamism). XIX-early XX centuries. Moscow, 1985.

Abbas F. Le Jeune Algerien. P., 1931.

Abbas F. La nuit coloniale. P., 1962.

L'Afrique francaise. N 7 - 8. P., 1919.

Ageron Ch. -R. Les Algeriens musulmans et la France (1871 - 1919). P., 1968.

Belloula T. Les Algeriens en France. Alger, 1965.

Bennabi M. Memoires d'un temoin du siecle. Alger, 1965.

Bennigsen A., Lemercier-Quelquejay Ch. L'Islam en Union Sovietique. P., 1968.

Bennigsen A., Lemercier-Quelquejay Ch. Sultan Galiev. Le pere de la revolution tiers- mondiste. P., 1986.

Bernard A. L'Afrique du Nord pendant la guerre. P., 1927.

Bernard A. L'Algerie. P., 1929.

Berque J. Le Maghreb entre deux guerres. P., 1962.

Depont O. L'Algerie du Centenaire. P., 1928.

Hopkirk P. On Secret Service East of Constantinopole. The Plot of Bring Down the British Empire. L., 1994.

Islam, Muslims and the Modern State. N.Y. 1994.

Keddi N. Sayyid Jamal ad-Din Afghani. A Political Biography. Berkeley, 1971.

Ken M.H. Islamic Reform. The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1966.

Lacoste Y., Nouschi A., Prenant A. L'Algerie. Passe et present. P., 1960.

Nouschi A. La naissance du nationalisme algerien. P., 1962.

Ohneck W. Die franzosische Algerienpolitik von 1919 - 1939. Koln-Opladen, 1967.

Opperman T. Le probleme algerien. P., 1961.

Rager J. -J. Les musulmans algeriens en France et dans les pays islamiques. P., 1950.

Les revendications du peuple algero-tunisien. Memoire presente au Congres de la paix par le Comite algero-tunisien. Geneve, 1919.

Rosenthal E. Islam in the Modern National State. Cambridge, 1965.

Spielmann V. Critiques et commentaries de l'entente et de la cooperation des races. Alger, 1923.

Tunisien und Algerien. Ein Protest gegen franzosische Gewaltherschaft. В., 1916.

Permanent link to this publication: