According to Toynbee, civilizations are born (or regenerate themselves) in response to formidable historical challenges. The ultimate meaning of the question that they answer at such moments to themselves and others is to be or not to be a given community of people as a subject of history. In the second half of the twentieth century, the countries of Southeast Asia (SE) faced similar challenges at least twice: first during the era of decolonization and the Cold War, then after the collapse of the bipolar world, in the midst of processes and changes called globalization. I see my task in outlining two pairs of" challenges and responses " that determine the fate of the current Southeast Asian region as a special regional and civilizational entity. But if the first pair deals with what has happened, then the second pair deals with a challenge whose drama is not yet fully understood, and the answer is still only a first approximation. In addition, based on my own understanding of the problems of Southeast Asia, I would like to clarify some of the guidelines used by the IMEMO project coordinators for the study of civilizations.

SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE MID-20TH CENTURY: A REGION WITH A MINUS SIGN?

Just half a century ago, the phrase "Southeast Asia" was synonymous with political turmoil, economic turmoil, and the turning of the Cold War into a hot one. It was, so to speak, a region with a "minus" sign: the countries assigned to it accumulated similar and largely negative (and therefore rather divided than united them) historical experience. Along with national liberation movements and revolutions, its elements included acts of aggression by extra-regional Powers, crises of governance systems created in imitation of Western democracies, attacks by separatists and religious extremists.

Although almost everywhere in Southeast Asia the two-pronged task of building a nation-state and accelerating social modernization was recognized as an imperative of the independence era, signs of a productive and even more coordinated response to this challenge did not immediately appear. The palette of political regimes and state structures that emerged in Southeast Asia with the departure of the colonialists looked no less whimsical than the regional map of ethnic groups and confessions. There were monarchies for every taste-constitutional in Thailand, also constitutional, but also elective (and even built as a federation of states-principalities) in Malaysia, absolute in Brunei; military-bureaucratic dictatorships of the right (Indonesia), and where and left orientation (Burma); parties-states without special features. a country where freedom of speech was worshipped no less than in the United States (the Philippines). In political culture, as well as in cultural and religious life, it was easy to connect things that did not look very connected from the outside. In this sense, the image of the leaders of that time, their behavior and destinies are indicative. Think of a king who abdicated to become a populist leader (Norodom Sihanouk); a tribune of the people who could also appear as a celestial king (Sukarno); a field marshal who once became a Buddhist monk (Tan Kittikachon); a prince who converted to Marxism (Sufannuvong). And on such a cultural and political environment, which was as strange as it was heterogeneous, the influence of external forces was projected, the composition of which was more impressive and diverse than ever. Against the background of the retreat of the" Old European " colonial powers, the United States increased and expanded its presence. At the same time, China, Japan (although only in the trade and economic sphere) and for the first time in history-our country developed high activity. At times, it seemed that YUVA was being torn apart, and was about to be torn apart. The Cold War did indeed split the region, even to the point of dividing one of its countries,

Viktor V. SUMSKY, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Head of the IMEMO Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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Vietnam, for political and ideological reasons. The passions aroused by the "confrontation of the two systems" boiled up so that the preachers of the "Burmese path to socialism", like a Buddhist hermit, distanced themselves from their neighbors and from the outside world in general. But it was precisely at that time that other peoples and elites of the region showed both the will and the ability to take active historical action.

TERMS OF VIETNAM'S MILITARY VICTORIES

What Vietnam achieved in military and political terms, after decades of defending its integrity and independence-first from France, then from the United States, and even later from China - surprised opponents over whom it prevailed, and admired friends. It was obvious that, in addition to the strength of weapons and wise strategy, these victories have other components. Perhaps only people with centuries-old skills in irrigation rice farming and communal mutual aid could have waged a protracted guerrilla war as prudently, amicably and steadfastly as the Vietnamese. The ability to borrow from overseas what might be useful at home, which has long been characteristic of the inhabitants of Southeast Asia, was reflected in the construction of Soviet-style party-state structures, which were required by total war (and which, in turn, did not seem so alien in the light of the principles of hierarchical obedience instilled by Confucianism). Probably, someone will say that the real reason for the triumph of Hanoi over Saigon and Washington is in the material and technical support of military operations at the expense of the Soviet Union and the PRC, as well as in political support from there. But didn't an alliance with both Moscow and Beijing, at a time when they were themselves bitterly at odds, require the flexibility inherent in the political culture of Southeast Asia-a flexibility that allows for compromise and can even reach the convergence of opposites? I would like to emphasize, however, that another manifestation of cultural flexibility was the ability to "not get hung up" on this attitude, because the Vietnamese, at least the Northerners, said an uncompromising "no"to any invader.

True, for obvious reasons, Vietnam did not have any economic breakthroughs at that time. But in those parts of Southeast Asia where they took place, success was achieved not without the indirect influence of the "Indochina factor". At the height of the war in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the superpowers developed such rivalry and isolation in this zone that, in fact, they isolated the hotbed of permanent instability from the rest of the region. The acceleration of modernization in the areas of Southeast Asia, the Malacca Peninsula and Thailand was also favored by another factor. Impressed by the erosion of the Saigon regime in the second half of the 1960s, Washington concluded that there was no stopping communism with puppets. Therefore, he not only did not object to his regional partners-Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines-solving their problems more vigorously and independently, but encouraged them to do so. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 1967), which united the above-mentioned States, has made positive changes.

ASEAN AND ITS MODERNIZATION MODEL

Declaring a policy of intensifying economic and cultural cooperation, turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and neutrality, the founders of ASEAN cared about nothing more than joint containment of the "communist expansion" from Indochina and China. However, the Asean elites were also drawn closer by something more than relentless anti-communism and the resulting strategy of military and political alignment with the West. After the events that shook Indonesia in 1965-1966, all five countries developed a model of capitalist modernization, which, with inevitable coarsening, could be reduced to three components.

First, political stability was always at the forefront, provided by right-wing authoritarian regimes - sometimes more, sometimes less rigid, but somehow falling under the concept of "managed democracy" (so popular today in our country, but with the light hand of Sukarno entered the world political lexicon in the late 50s). The truncated versions allowed for party-political pluralism, non-governmental election campaigning, and parliamentary discussions, but the real power remained with the security forces and the administrative elite, who were always ready to use tools such as laws on combating subversive activities (not to mention special forces to curb urban unrest) if the opposition "overreacted".

Second, in the economic sphere, systems of a "mixed", export-oriented economy were established, within which, much like in Japan or South Korea, the optimal combination of market freedoms and state regulation was sought. If at the government level, technocrats who were educated in the West but generally did not sin with liberal doctrinaire attitudes were responsible for economic dynamism, then in the private sector, businessmen of Chinese origin set the tone-magnates who owed success not only to fortune or labor-

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love, but also the guardianship of official patrons. The largest of them wove regional partner networks, relying on clan and inter-clan connections, long before arguments about "network culture" became part of mass culture.

Third, the ideological front was dominated by official nationalism, which was unfriendly to any manifestations of" leftism", but rather moderate and uncritical so as not to alienate foreign investors.

The main result of the course chosen by ASEAN members, and an indicator of their success (with the possible exception of the Philippines), is considered to be impressive economic growth, which lasted at short intervals for three decades. But I think it was no less significant that countries with an exceptionally complex ethnic and confessional composition, with many painful social problems and a predisposition to politicization managed to rise to a level of manageability that is not characteristic of the Third World, put the "economy ahead of politics" and strengthen national statehood (without blocking, among other things, the emergence of elements of democracy). civil society organizations). And all this is happening with the strengthening of their common desire for regional cooperation, with a clear trend towards overcoming long-standing conflicts in Southeast Asia and the growing authority of the Association as a subject of international relations.

In all of this history - as in the history of Vietnam's military victories - the significance of cultural reflexes and ancestral values was undeniable. By building their modernization model on the basis of ideological impulses, elements of social engineering and management that came to them from the developed West and from the rapidly growing countries of the Asian Northeast, not disdaining the experience of their fellow Third World countries, not interfering with the Chinese diaspora to do their job with the involvement of Japanese capital and learning from each other, the ASEAN, surprising even for Southeast Asia. But it is even more important that this situation was corrected by the selective nature of borrowing, the attitude to search for compromise, situationally justified, and not sinning with one-sidedness solutions in politics, economics, and ideology. As a result, the acceleration of modernization not only did not threaten to lose the historically formed civilizational and cultural image, but also gave it more and more definite features.

The region's uniqueness was also reflected in the way ASEAN worked. Trying not to expose disagreements (which, by the way, were not so rare) to outsiders, trying to resolve them gently, behind the scenes, without touching on each other's internal problems, the polished Asean representatives, whose right to be called civilized people was not in doubt, vividly resembled community peasants. After all, even for them, caring for a smooth, smiling relationship with a neighbor, sustained in the spirit of constant exchange of services, is the first thing, because, whatever the neighbor is, there is nowhere to go from him, and his help will never be superfluous when harvesting together or building a barn.

Finally, the "brand" sense of proportion, the ability to maneuver and maintain political balance was also shown in the fact that, having taken a feasible part in the cold war, the ruling elites of the Association countries did not get too deeply involved in it. Clearly on the side of the West, but without entering into official block relations with it, they supported it only enough to push the processes of internal modernization and, as a result of the cold war, be among its beneficiaries.

BACKGROUND, STYLE AND MEANING OF ASEAN EXPANSION

If we assume that in the thirty-year standoff within Southeast Asia, ASEAN members won, then who lost? Definitely Cambodia (where the Polpot "experiment" severely shook the basic foundations of society and the state), as well as Myanmar (also known as Burma, which turned away from everyone and paid for self - isolation with deep stagnation), but, I think, to a lesser extent Laos and certainly not Vietnam. Since the second half of the 80s, he has been asserting himself as a subject of history no longer on the battlefield, but in the cause of socio-economic renewal. In the years when the Soviet Union was beginning to "perestroika", and Vietnam's lag behind the leaders of regional development literally pricked the eyes, its leaders received the "go-ahead" from Moscow for reforms, cheerfully took up them (which the south of the country with its market management skills was just waiting for), but they were not inspired by the example of Gorbachev. Having followed a path much like Deng Xiaoping's, Vietnam, unlike the Soviet Union, did not lose its state structure as such on the way out of the totalitarian rut-perhaps not only because of a well-chosen, successful reform strategy, but also because in the minds of the people this structure was identified with the triumph in the Soviet Union. recent events, a fair war, and with all its flaws, it didn't deserve an inglorious end. With a Confucian pragmatism (and a Confucian reverence for what their fathers fought and died for), without losing their internal political stability, in some ways imitating China, and in some ways adapting the Asean model to local conditions, the Vietnamese taught a lesson in modernization to their former co-workers.-

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Russian teachers-and successful neighbors-were shown that they are also worthy children of Southeast Asia.

All of this definitely aroused the sympathy, respect, and even gratitude of the ASEAN people (for if the collapse of "real socialism" had happened in Vietnam, its consequences would have been felt by the entire region). Perhaps this (and, of course, the joint and not fruitless efforts to unblock the conflict in Cambodia) is one of the main reasons why Vietnam was admitted to ASEAN in 1995. However, not only the fact of the reception is characteristic, but also the way it happened - without demands to renounce the communist ideology, which retained official status in Vietnam, without compulsion to repent for the mistakes of the past, dismantle monuments to Ho Chi Minh, remove his body from the mausoleum, etc. This is the way to treat only those who feel the power of the spirit and who knowingly will not give in to pressure. But those who do so deserve to be praised for their self-control, tolerance, understanding of other people's problems, and unwillingness to humiliate others - if you will, for their civilized behavior. And the expanding ASEAN (which was joined, however, in 1984 by Brunei) behaved in a similar way not only in relation to Vietnam, but also to those who joined it after - Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia.

Along with other factors, the circumstances surrounding the expansion of ASEAN have sometimes indirectly and sometimes directly confirmed that at the end of the 20th century, a regional and civilizational community is consolidating in Southeast Asia-the result of a similar and largely successful response to the Cold War challenge. However, times had already changed, and the challenge of globalization was already making itself felt.

APPLYING FOR THE ROLE OF A GLOBAL PLAYER

As the elites and leaders of the ASEAN member States moved from one era to another, they had mixed feelings. On the one hand, there was a sense of fulfilled historical duty and optimism, supported in each case by the success not only of their own country, but also of their neighboring partners, and their common expectations that economic growth will continue, working for peace, stability and prosperity in the entire region. But there were also fears that with the advent of peace in Cambodia, other quarrels would break out between the Southeast Asian countries and their neighbors (in particular, over the ownership of island territories in the South China Sea, supposedly rich in hydrocarbons and subject to claims by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei). They were also afraid that without the "Soviet threat" factor, there would be no serious grounds for maintaining an American military presence in Southeast Asia. For many years, it was considered a guarantee against the deterioration of the regional situation (for example, from any unfriendly encroachments on the part of Japan or China, as well as from the aggravation of the struggle between them for influence in Asia). The need to "keep" the United States in this part of the world is not the last reason that prompted the ASEAN countries to join the Organization of Asia - Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, 1989), where America tried in every possible way to fix its primacy and its own "rules of the game".

But whatever the preoccupation with the new challenges, there was no confusion in the ranks of ASEAN. During the information and propaganda boom around APEC, projects to deepen and diversify economic ties within ASEAN-from so - called growth triangles to plans for the transition to free trade-were no less enthusiastically advertised. And when it became clear that a multilateral security dialogue was ripe in the Pacific, ASEAN had both the necessary reputation to initiate it and the skill of a player who could take advantage of the first move. The main one was the right to determine the format of the dialogue in accordance with the" Asean style", which was presented as the quintessence of the civilizational and cultural advantages of Southeast Asia. It was suggested that discussions should be conducted without protocol formalities, without rushing to make binding decisions and patiently waiting for a consensus to be born during the gradual convergence of positions. Since 1994, the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) has been operating on these principles, which grew out of the annual consultations of the Association's Foreign Ministers with colleagues from the United States, the EU, Japan, China, Russia, and others.

It must be assumed that the activation of external relations encouraged ASEAN to increase its political weight. The expansion that followed the ARF presentation reflected - in addition to the desire to extend the tried-and-true modernization model to the entire region-this need as well.

The first Asia-Europe Summit (ASEM, 1996), at which the Old World was represented by the States of the European Union, and Asia - members of the Association together with China, Japan and South Korea, also spoke about the desire of ASEAN to join in the search for a new global balance. From the outside, it looked as if both sides had decided to find out if something could be done together without the participation of a country that did not belong geographically to either Europe or Asia, but was a military-political hegemon here and there.

The policy of diversifying contacts also led to a certain rapprochement between ASEAN and Russia.-

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The Russian Federation, which received the status of a full-fledged dialogue partner and member of the ARF in the 1990s. The admission of recent Soviet Indochina allies to ASEAN did not evoke anything like the emotions aroused by NATO expansion in Moscow. On the contrary, Russian foreign policy institutions hoped that it would be easier to talk and cooperate with the expanded Association. By inviting the Russian Federation to the sessions of its Forum, it has consistently and deliberately pushed it to become more aware of Russia's actual interests in Southeast and East Asia. It seems that Russia was "enlightened" in this way in order to keep it from becoming a passive "appendage" of the United States or China (which, according to the concepts of the first half of the 90s, did not seem impossible). Despite the confusion of yesterday's superpower, the size of such a "surplus" would be too great, and the one who would get it would gain too much - with all the unhealthy consequences for the regional balance of power. On the contrary, Russia, which is gradually but independently "fitting" into the East Asian "equation", could eventually partially moderate the influence of other Pacific giants.

While clearly of interest to international relations theorists and practitioners, these elaborate, interconnected, elegant maneuvers also earned the attention of cultural scientists. After all, in this case, the features of the regional mentality and behavior-openness to external influences, willingness to filter and process them, the ability to maneuver between external partners in order to force them to compromise-no longer declared themselves within Southeast Asia or Pacific Asia, but, in fact, at the global level.

"ASIAN VALUES" AND THE ASIAN CRISIS

Although the United States clearly disliked such actions, the tensions between it and the ASEAN members, which became suspiciously frequent in the first half of the 1990s, had deeper causes. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the world socialist system, the former need for ASEAN as a strategic ally has weakened. The demand for right-wing authoritarian regimes as guarantors of capitalist modernization has fallen, but the demand for radical market reforms without any admixture of official nationalism-and, of course, with full respect for human rights - has increased dramatically. The American interpretation of globalization was full of anti-etatist, transnationalist pathos, incompatible in its uncompromising nature with anything else - and certainly not with the policy of strengthening national statehood and not with the desire for compromise typical of ASEAN members. In fact, they were asked to dismantle (and the sooner the better) the development model, which proved to be very good, and even at a time when the work on national-state integration is far from finished. Is it any wonder that they not only did not show submission to America and the West in general, but also put forward an ideological justification for their intractability-the concept of "Asian values"?

According to it, the primary task of modernization was to improve the people's welfare, and not to introduce civil liberties in a directive manner, which promises only bad instability to Eastern societies in their current form. At the same time, these freedoms were not rejected as something completely "un-Asian". It was just that they should be mastered in the usual style and pace for Asians-in stages, with an eye, and not "swallowing as much as you can swallow", and at the risk of choking. And it was also noted that the end result of such development will still not be a "photocopy" of Western democracy, and the West should be ready for this.

The stock market and investment boom of the mid-1990s proved to be the" smoke screen " that prevented the ASEAN people from fully understanding what kind of animals they were teasing and what surprises globalization was preparing for them. But the same boom, generated by almost the only concession to the "globalizers" - the hasty liberalization of financial systems in a number of Southeast Asian countries-" warmed up " the social contradictions and political and economic imbalances accumulated there over three decades of growth. The moment of truth came in 1997-1998, when, using the situation for profit, transnational speculative capital-with the blessing of international financial institutions and the "sole superpower" -not only collapsed the economies of several countries at once, but, if we take into account the full amount of objective consequences, hit Southeast Asia as a regional and civilizational community. The Western media, which until recently had lauded Southeast Asia for its economic dynamism, now castigated the evils of its own" friendly capitalism " - a system that encourages bureaucracy to merge with big business, excludes fair competition, and is inseparable from managerial mistakes, paternalism, and gross corruption.

NEW CHALLENGE

Today, the passions aroused by this breakdown have partially subsided. The majority of the affected countries are improving their macroeconomic indicators, and experts are increasingly speaking in this spirit,

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that the Asian crisis is over. If we consider it as a period of dangerous instability of a number of national currencies and banking systems, then this is probably the case. But if we assume that any serious crisis is overcome as the complex of its causes and consequences - not only economic, but also social, cultural, ideological and psychological, domestic and foreign policy-becomes obsolete, then other conclusions can be drawn. Is it reasonable, when assessing the overall state of affairs in Southeast Asia, not to notice that ASEAN as a regional organization (together with subsidiaries such as ARF and ASEM, which gave it the qualities of a global player) has been knocked down, from which it has not yet recovered? How can we not take into account that in the key country of the region, the crisis brought down not only the Suharto dictatorship, but in fact the entire national-state building that has been erected since independence, and it is permissible to talk about Indonesia's governability at this stage only with certain reservations? Is it possible not to take into account that it is precisely after the Asian crisis that the wave of terrorism in Southeast Asia is rising (and so far it has not subsided)? Should we lose sight of the fact that this crisis has significantly worsened the attitude towards America in the region and for the better - no matter what anyone claims at the official level - has not changed since then? Finally, what about the fact that this crisis is followed by a chain of events of global significance (Kosovo, September 11, Afghanistan, Iraq) that destabilize the current world order and are unlikely to help boost the economy anywhere, including in Southeast Asia?

It seems that both individual Southeast Asian countries and this entire regional and civilizational community are now facing no less serious challenges than in the second half of the twentieth century. Its essence is to do everything possible to achieve these goals in conditions that are obviously unfavorable for the continuation of nation-building and modernization.that means the impossible.

RESPONSE FORMULA...

To the credit of the Southeast Asian countries, they do not give up and are actively looking for a way out of this situation, and not for the first year. Among all the Asean figures, Mahathir Mohammad, the Prime Minister of Malaysia from 1981 to 2003, who managed to lead his country out of the Asian crisis with minimal losses, stands out sharply in this regard. Throughout his work, Mahathir proves that today, as perhaps never before, the success of modernization (of course, unrealistic without familiarizing oneself with the civilizational and cultural wealth of the West) not only does not depend directly on an economic and political alliance with Western powers, but it can be called into question precisely if the alliance is too close.

Back in the early 90s, Mahathir put forward, in contrast to the Australian-American concept of APEC, a grouping project called the "East Asian Economic Conference" without the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The idea, which was rejected in the euphoria of the Cold War send-offs and celebrations of the start of globalization, turned out to be in demand as soon as the Asian crisis broke out. Already in December 1997, an informal meeting of ASEAN leaders with the heads of State and Government of Northeast Asia-China, Japan, and South Korea-was held in Kuala Lumpur. A year later, they met in Hanoi, in 1999 they adopted the "Joint Statement on Cooperation in East Asia" in Manila, and in 2000 they expressed their intention to establish a free trade zone in Singapore. Although both the aforementioned and subsequent meetings in this composition were outwardly focused on issues of multilateral economic cooperation, some decisions (in particular, those adopted in Chiang Mai in 2000 and aimed at creating an East Asian currency exchange network, freeing the countries of the region from strict binding to the IMF) had a clear political connotation. Moreover, it was visible in the entire structure, now known as "ASEAN + 3", and so clearly that in the summer of 2001, a well-known Russian expert D. V. Mosyakov stated:: East Asia is integrating not only "without us "(i.e., without Russia), but also "without the Americans"^.1

Although the desire to distance themselves from the United States must have emerged after the events of 1997 - 1998, cautious and pragmatic ASEAN members (as well as the Chinese, Japanese and Koreans) would never have taken revenge on the mighty America for revenge, to the detriment of themselves and succumbing to an emotional impulse. It was not resentment, but a sober assessment of what was happening, that prompted and encourages appropriate maneuvers.

It seems that, having lost Indonesia as an "internal core" and realized the essence of the American position, ASEAN has felt the need to compensate through a special kind of external partnership. In order to really help overcome the crisis and insure against its recurrence, such partnerships should also contain an element of challenge that does not allow the members of the Association to "relax", move away from each other and violate the community that is defined here as "regional and civilizational". At the end of the 1990s, the best candidates for participation in such interactions seemed to be economic heavyweights from the "near Asian abroad" - China, Japan and the United States.

¹ Diplomatic courier-NG. 21.06.2001.

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South Korea. The former showed a commendable immunity to stock market fevers and, at the most difficult moment for his neighbors, did not devalue the yuan, which earned their gratitude. The latter, despite the stagnation of its own economy, remained the most important source of investment and financial assistance for ASEAN members. The third, which suffered very heavy losses in 1997, managed to accumulate such productive power and showed itself so actively in the ASEAN area that it would be the height of folly to discount it.

In political and diplomatic terms, ASEAN tried to" court "these three in much the same way that Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines" courted " Indonesia during the Association's inception. Then, taking into account her size, potential and ambitions, she was offered the role of the actual leader of the five and the stage for performing this role on the condition that the leadership would be non-aggressive, not infringing on the rights and dignity of the "wingmen". Now, as you can see, similar proposals were received from ASEAN's closest neighbors-primarily China and Japan. The presence in the "10 + 3" configuration of two such large participants, far from agreeing with each other in everything, but doomed to cooperation, was of fundamental importance and opened up considerable opportunities for finding a balance of interests. Alone with any of them, ASEAN could easily feel uncomfortable. But being in the same structure with both of them allowed you to appeal to one if there were disagreements with the other, mediate between them when they argue themselves, and use the new forum as a shell inside which the problems that interfere with the main thing for which all this was invented are mitigated. The overall goal seems to have been to restore economic dynamism and political governance at the regional level, with beneficial consequences for each individual country. Or, for that matter, in restoring the priority of economics over politics that was characteristic (or seemed to be characteristic) of East Asia until very recently.

Why is it that, despite the ambiguity of views on China that exist south and east of its borders, up to fears of "sinification" of Southeast Asia in the indefinite future, it is still considered today as a desirable partner? I think the fact is that the current PRC is almost the main force supporting the" economic contour " of the region, and therefore hopes for its great future. But in this case, it is also an objective contender for the position of" benevolent hegemon", which until recently belonged to the United States, but is now"almost vacant". Isn't this the reality behind the talk in recent years that Beijing's influence in Southeast Asia is greater than ever, and there is a tendency to further strengthen it?

...AND ITS PROBLEMATIC NATURE

This does not mean that the "ASEAN + 3" scheme consists solely of advantages and strengths-especially from the point of view of the ASEAN people themselves. Too much of the fate of this project does not depend on them. Can the current generation of the Japanese elite, for example, bring their country out of a prolonged economic stupor? Will China be able to minimize the increase in tension in society, which, as a rule, accompanies rapid modernization and, with the slightest miscalculation of the political leadership, is resolved by a social explosion? Will Korea unite in the foreseeable future? The answers to such questions are of fundamental importance for the ASEAN + 3 project, but they will not be given by the Southeast Asian countries.

On the other hand, the problems that they have to deal with themselves, and without which the ASEAN + 3 will not bring them much joy, are extremely complex and will not be solved soon. In the first place in this series are the crises of national statehood, which have been going on for decades in Cambodia and Myanmar, but are also becoming alarmingly chronic in the "old" ASEAN countries that have passed the instructive school of modernization-in Indonesia and the Philippines. And even where things are not so bad, the ASEAN model will have to be adjusted-for example, by building up state partnerships with elements of civil society.

If we look at ASEAN + 3 as a possible "union of civilizations", then the question of questions is the mutual compatibility of the economically rising" greater China", including the Chinese diasporas as the most successful minorities in Southeast Asia, with the Islamic communities of the region, angry that so far they have received only a small fraction of the fruits of economic growth.

Trying to imagine what awaits Southeast Asia as a regional and civilizational community in the context of globalization, we will also think about the relationship of this latter not only with local civilizations, but with civilization as such, that is, with a phenomenon that replaces savagery and barbarism.

It is in this sense that Engels uses this concept in "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State", and he uses it systematically and not accidentally. His work in general could be called "The Origin of Civilization", because in the classical view, the family, private property and the state are closely related to each other supporting structures of civilization, defined as " society

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commodity production", marked by the antithesis of the city and the countryside and permeated by relations of exploitation.

Given that absolutely all the local civilizations to be considered in our project demonstrate these characteristics, and bearing in mind Engels ' constructions, it is difficult to refrain from concluding that globalization, with its inherent anti-etatist tendencies, is a phenomenon that is fundamentally incompatible with civilization, because by shaking the state, globalization cannot but deform the family and private property as a whole. two other pillars of a single civilizational framework. By the way, societies that are" at the forefront " of globalization confirm this no less than societies that are "at the tail".

It also becomes clear that the struggle for national statehood that has unfolded in Southeast Asia over the past half-century is essentially a struggle for the right of civilization and civilizations to live, and success in it at the current stage requires some kind of radical transformation of global processes. The strength of one YUVA, no matter what she achieved, is clearly not enough. Hence the question of the necessity of alliances with other civilizations - but also the question of their fundamental possibility.

"We proceed not from the idea of confrontation of civilizations (which is typical for S. Huntington and a number of other authors), but from the principle of constructive coexistence, cooperation and mutual development (complementary co-development) of various civilizational communities. This is how we see a truly humanistic perspective on the evolution of humanity, " the methodological preamble of our project says.

While I agree that there is nothing better to come up with than this perspective, I am forced to note that reaching at least two or three civilizations with such cooperation is a very difficult task. And the point here, in my opinion, is not so much in the differences of religions and value inconsistencies, but in the relations of exploitation. After all, they - not just according to Engels, but according to everything that is known about the past and present life of people - are immanent both to civilization as a whole and to all local civilizations, determine the nature of their communication with each other, and will persist for as long as the "society of commodity production"lasts.

At the same time, the challenge of globalization - like the challenge of the "golden billion" to the rest of humanity - is so serious that a partial overcoming of the barriers that prevent civilizations from cooperating and are rooted in their very nature should not be ruled out. I think it is from this point of view that we should consider the prospects of interaction of Southeast Asia as a regional and civilizational community with other civilizations.

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