The question raised by V. I. Maksimenko in his theses, and even earlier in polemical articles published on the pages of the magazine "Vostok (Oriens)", attracts with its relevance. After the events of September 2001 and the campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which ended with its defeat, the former Soviet Central Asia was once again in the spotlight. The topic of defining the main content of Russia's foreign policy has not lost its relevance. Although after Moscow joined the Western antiterrorist coalition, he

(c) 2003

page 113

it stands in a slightly different plane, in terms of developing alternative options, taking into account the possible correction or revision of the current exchange rate in the future.

If we approach the discussion material presented by V. I. Maksimenko in this way, we must admit that the author, with his inherent erudition, inner conviction and refined style, is trying, as it seems to me, to prove several interrelated theses of a political and practical nature. This is, first of all, a statement about the key geopolitical role of Central Asia in current international relations. Secondly, the idea of the ability of modern Russia to play the role in Eurasian and world politics that was assigned to it in the geopolitical constructions of famous Russian authors of the beginning and middle of the last century. Third, the perception of the aggressiveness of the US intentions towards Central Asia is caused by its weakness (if not actual, then potential), by trends that do not favor the balance of comparative advantages in the global, primarily energy, market. Needless to say, these three theses claim to make serious adjustments to the very philosophy of Russia's foreign policy and, if adopted, lead to a revision of the course that it has mostly followed over the past ten years.

I will immediately note that the productivity of the super-task that V. I. Maksimenko has set for himself causes me great doubts. It also seems that there are not enough arguments to prove these propositions, and it is often difficult to agree with the very logic of his reasoning.

Let's take the first postulate about the new "centrality" of Central Asia, which came a decade after the disappearance of the USSR. According to V. I. Maksimenko, it is determined by three main factors: the" discovery " of the Caspian Sea as the largest oil and gas region, the formation of the North-South corridor, and the emergence of the US armed forces in the former Soviet Central Asian republics.

The first of these factors is by no means new. If we can talk about the sudden opening of the Caspian oil and gas basin, it occurred shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union with the appearance of eight new Asian states on the political map of the world. Moreover, in the early 1990s, the importance of this oil and gas province and the prospects for its development seemed significantly greater than they actually are. At that time, it was estimated that oil reserves in the Caspian region were about 30 billion tons and only slightly inferior to those in Saudi Arabia (35 billion tons). Later, experts came to the conclusion that the initial estimates were repeatedly overstated, and the proven reserves amount to 3-5 billion tons (maximum - 7, minimum - 2 billion). Moreover, their concentration is noted mainly in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea basin. There are no words, deposits have been discovered and at the same time very significant, for example, they are twice as large as the oil resources of the North Sea. But they make up only 2-5% of the global total and are not comparable to the reserves of the Middle East region, where up to 65% of the world's confirmed oil reserves are concentrated.

V. I. Maksimenko rightly draws attention to the trend of exponential growth of energy consumption in the world. It is accompanied by another trend-the exponential growth of the global economy. With an average annual increase of three per cent in global income as the sum of gross national income, it is estimated that energy consumption will increase by 2 per cent per year and increase energy consumption by about 60 per cent over the next 20 years, with oil, gas and coal expected to account for 95 per cent of it. Under these conditions, the riches of the Caspian basin will undoubtedly be in demand, but there is no reason to think that they can play a decisive role in solving the world's energy and economic problems.

page 114

It should be borne in mind that this area is far from the only promising one in terms of developing oil and natural gas fields. These include West Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America, which reflects the truly planetary nature of the global economy and its energy base. It should be noted that in comparison with these areas located closer to the sea routes, the export of oil and gas from the Caspian region is more difficult and expensive. The already revealed dynamics of the development of its subsurface resources also speaks volumes in this sense. Oil Eldorado's expectations are being realized slowly. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, despite significant efforts by national governments and foreign investors, oil production in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan combined reaches only 50 million tons, of which only 10% is exported. The Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline project remains in limbo, and so many copies have been broken in the disputes over it, and precisely because of its high cost and uneconomical nature. At the same time, due to the more favorable location of the fields in the Near and Middle East from a transport point of view, the share of OPEC countries in this zone in world production is expected to increase from the current 40% to 52% in 2010.

The second factor that makes Central Asia, according to V. I. Maksimenko, "the center of international political struggle and global strategic balance"is also relatively insignificant. We are talking about the formation of transport ("intermodal") the North-South corridor, which should connect Northern Europe with the Persian Gulf. South and further East Asia. In addition to Russia, Iran is expected to play a key role in this project. A natural question arises whether modern Iran is capable of implementing such grandiose plans as the construction of a "shipping channel" between the Caspian Sea and the Gulf, and at first at least create conditions for expanded transit of goods along a truly shortest route connecting the Caspian region with the world (Indian) Ocean.

Iran's capabilities seem very limited to me. The country, which developed rapidly in the 1950s and 1970s, found itself in a severe crisis after the victory of the theocratic revolution, which was aggravated by the bloody war with Iraq in 1980-1988.In the 1990s, Iran managed to achieve some economic success, but in terms of growth it was inferior to most neighboring states. In addition, its dependence on oil exports and low openness to the outside world, the autarkic nature of the national economy, and its self-isolation remained the strongest. Between 1965 and 1999, the annual growth rate of Iran's GDP was 1.7%, and per capita it tended to decline by an average of 1% per year. The dynamics of investment in fixed assets and exports of goods and services also showed a downward trend.

As for the North-South corridor, talks about its creation began in the very beginning of the 1990s and were initiated, apparently, by both sides, the Russian and Iranian ones. The idea of a combined method of cargo transportation seems to have emerged from the project stage by 2000, when in St. Petersburg, official representatives of Russia, Iran and India signed an agreement on the transportation of cargo by river vessels along the Volga, then by sea along the Caspian Sea, by railway trains through Iran and again by sea to India. However, such agreements often remain only protocols of intent of the parties. Apparently, no breakthrough has yet occurred thanks to the signed documents. Russia's trade with Iran and India, according to the latest data, remains at the same very modest level, about $ 1 and $ 1.5 billion, respectively. As a transit corridor (for European and Asian countries), this new route "from the Varangians to the Greeks" has little appeal and cannot attach special importance to the geopolitics of the Eurasian space.

page 115

Only the third factor mentioned by V. I. Maksimenko, the US military presence in the former Soviet Central Asia, can be considered new. It is known to be connected with the military campaign in Afghanistan, which was launched by the United States and its closest allies (Britain) in order to eliminate the power of the Taliban. The very limited presence of the US military, supplemented by the deployment of military units from countries that are US allies in NATO in a number of former Soviet Central Asian republics, is explained by the need to fight the extremists who have taken refuge in Afghanistan and neighboring countries that have not been completely destroyed.

Since Moscow supported the campaign against international terrorism as early as September 2001 and approved US military actions in Afghanistan, it has no reason to protest against the temporary and targeted deployment of US-NATO troops in Central Asia. But it is clear that it is not happy about this, would like to ensure the security of the Central Asian region itself, and is concerned about the danger of losing even more of its influence there.

If these sentiments are understandable, and to a large extent justified, can we assume that they make the situation in the Central Asian region a key one, central to the entire system of international political relations? V. I. Maksimenko obviously believes that this is the case and that Russia is capable, as in the XIX century, of resisting a geopolitical offensive "forces of the sea", which were then represented by Great Britain, and now by the United States. This kind of reasoning seems scholastic to me, as does the whole hoax based on the "unity of the sea" and "unity of the land", on the eternal laws of geopolitics in the form of, for example, Mackinder's unchangeable "geographical axis of history".

By the way, in connection with the famous article of Sir Halford Mackinder, it is worth recalling that it was prepared as a report read in 1904 to the members of the Royal Geographical Society at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war. The report reflected the expectations then widespread in the British ruling class of the inevitable and imminent victory of tsarist Russia over Japan. Hence the geographer's assumptions about the geopolitical significance of the vast Eurasian continental space, its broad historical and geographical reminiscences (which later were difficult to surprise so much), theses about the end of the Columbian era, etc. Reflecting and developing anti-Russian sentiments, Mackinder helped justify the favorable policy towards Japan that Great Britain pursued during its war with Russia, the policy of which largely predetermined the defeat of the Russians at Tsushima (making it difficult to replenish the holds of the ships of the Rozhestvensky flotilla with coal) and their general failure in the war. The loss to Russia opened the way for an alliance with Britain, and it seemed to refute Mackinder's theory about the growing threat that the former posed to the latter as a harsh continental giant. But unfulfilled forecasts tend to persist and reproduce, and fulfilled ones tend to disappear. This is probably why the idea of the power of the Eurasian geopolitical space turned out to be so tenacious.

Meanwhile, the history of the XX century. as if she had repeatedly laughed at the prophecies of geopolitics. The power of Germany, warmed up by the illusions of the redistribution of "territorial and political power", was broken twice as a result of the first and Second World Wars, the mastery of the Pacific Space did not save Japan from defeat, the vast continental expanses of imperial Russia and the USSR also did not help.

When discussing the possibilities of modern Russia, we should not forget that if geographically it is still the largest country in the world, then its demographic weight has radically decreased over the XX century. Early in the past

page 116

For centuries, the population of tsarist Russia was about 10% of the global population and about a third of the European population. The population of modern Russia is now equal to 2.5% of the world and 20% of the European population. Although demography is not the only factor that determines the economic and military-political parameters of a state, its dynamics, together with other characteristics, have a noticeable impact on them.

Russia's geopolitical importance has declined since the beginning of the 20th century, both by itself and because of the diminishing role of Europe in the global political system. If during the first half of the last century Europe together with Russia/If the USSR played an absolutely dominant role in it, then in the future it will gradually move from the "hot" to the "cold" zone of international politics and to its periphery. This was facilitated by the pacification of the division line in Europe (symbolized by the Helsinki Conference, and the" forerunner " of which was the Berlin Wall), the progressive unification of Western Europe, the weakening of the spirit of power in Germany, England, and France, and the disintegration and disappearance of the former rivalry between them. The collapse of the Eastern European bloc and the USSR completed the transition of Europe to the "rear" of geopolitics.

The time has come to speak about the attitude to the central concept of "territorial-political power"in the theses under discussion. It seems to me to be only one aspect of modern international politics. Power over a territory with its population and resources has historically been unquestionably central. But in the current era, its place is largely taken by power over the minds and actions of people, direct control (aggressive, colonial) is replaced by indirect, "hard", absolute power is replaced by "soft", relative. When applied, for example, to the same energy resources, this means that it is not at all necessary to directly own the territory where oil or gas reserves are found. It is enough to have equipment and technologies, qualified personnel and free capital to benefit from the exploitation of deposits. Moreover, we are talking not only about the profits of "their" companies, but also about geopolitical benefits (from the point of view of national and state interests).

As a consequence of the changing correlation between" hard "and" soft " power, we should consider changes in the nature of interaction between players on the world stage. Direct conflict of interests and uncompromising struggle (like a zero-sum game) gives way to more flexible behavioral strategies that ensure that benefits, albeit small and unequal, are received by all participants in the game. These strategies increase the importance of associations and alliances (temporary and permanent) that allow achieving mutually consistent goals, the number of which increases in the presence of common threats.

It is from these positions that I think it is appropriate to assess the current geopolitical position of Russia and its policy towards both the former Soviet Central Asia and the expanded region of Central Asia or the Middle East. I note that the theses under discussion do not mention a single word about the threat of extremism and terrorism that is common to almost all participants in international relations. Meanwhile, it creates a foundation for cooperation between the efforts of leading members of the Western community, primarily the United States, with the main states of the Arab world (Saudi Arabia, Egypt), as well as with Russia, China, and to a certain extent, with Iran.

Geopolitically, this threat is linked to the Middle East, where two factors are at play : the presence of the richest hydrocarbon reserves there, which has created conditions for turning the region into the largest oil exporter and owner of untold petrodollars, and the persistence of the most acute and significant international conflict of our time between Israelis and Palestinians, Israel and Musul-

page 117

may countries. Growing beyond the borders of a narrow region, the conflict engulfs the entire system of international relations, countering, in particular, the tendencies to resolve the complex of relations between Iran and the United States and the West, and giving additional urgency to the problem of Iraq. The Middle East with its oil, the Israeli-Palestinian hub, radical Islamism and anti-Westernism (anti-Americanism) is the main nerve of modern international politics. From it radiate rays of tension, spreading mainly in the eastern and north-eastern directions. And they really turn the entire area of South, West and Central Asia into a geopolitically extremely important zone.

It is in this perspective that the role of Afghanistan should be considered. Attention to it from the United States, the West and the international community greatly weakened after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from there and the victory of the Mujahideen over the "communists". The problem of Afghanistan has moved into the category of regional, although significant, but not central. This continued even after the Taliban came to power there, despite their rabid anti-modernist domestic policies. The attitude towards him changed only after the Taliban gave freedom of hands to the Arab brigade of Osama bin Laden. This circumstance first forced some circles in the United States to abandon the bet on the Taliban, and since 1998, after the terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda in Kenya and Tanzania, it has transferred the problem of Afghanistan to the category of the highest importance. Therefore, I repeat, geopolitically, Afghanistan should primarily be considered as an offshoot of the Middle East, and through the Middle East prism, the importance of Central Asia should also be assessed.

In conclusion, I will touch upon the last of V. I. Maksimenko's theses on the offensive intentions of the United States in relation to Central Asia. Not only does this postulate itself raise doubts, but also its justification. Namely, the statement that the United States faces the threat of losing its comparative competitive advantages in the world market and may be on the verge of a "rapid rollback" from the position of a "global" superpower to the position of "one of many industrial states".

It seems that America's leadership in the global economy is quite strong, as well as trends towards further globalization, as evidenced by the volume of gross income of the United States, which accounts for 40% of the income of all highly developed economies, their superiority (by a third) over the total parameters of the "euro zone" countries and three times over Japanese indicators. Prospects for maintaining a leading position are provided, in particular, by prevailing positions in the most" long-playing " information and innovation field. In 2000, out of 110,000 reliable Internet servers, 73,000 were located in America, accounting for half of the world's royalties (i.e., various royalties).

In terms of energy supply, the United States is 80% dependent on its own energy consumption (compared to 1980, its dependence on imports has increased by 6%). Oil and gas occupy a modest place as a source of electricity (20%). Thus, even the "rapid depletion of its own oil and gas resources" is unlikely to seriously undermine the American economy. Unfavorable trends will also be hindered by the close integration of the US economy with the world economy. At the same time, corporations and the US government are undoubtedly deeply and strongly interested in expanding the geography of oil and gas production, in diversifying the sources of raw hydrocarbons entering the world market. It is from this point of view that they are interested in developing the fields of the Caspian region and Central Asia.

page 118

However, the geography and remoteness of North America from the most important oil and gas fields hardly gives significant competitive advantages to Western Europe and East Asia. And the very idea of a "global three-centeredness" in the context of globalization, the closest connection of the American stock exchange, financial and corporate system with the Western European and East Asian (Japanese, Singapore, Hong Kong-Chinese) seems far-fetched.

At the same time, the significance of the regularities identified by V. I. Maksimenko cannot be completely denied. Russia's" middle " position on the Eurasian continent undoubtedly opens up certain prospects for it. If its economy and geopolitics are integrated into a common context with the developed world, geographical realities could bring considerable dividends. In particular, Russia has good opportunities to establish close and mutually beneficial economic contacts with the former Soviet Central Asia, if only for the reason that the latter is located in the same latitude zone as it. It should be noted that the structure of the relief of Eurasia is such that it is more favorable for latitudinal transport and communication corridors. The chain of mountains stretching along the entire continent (from the Balkans to the Sayan Mountains) physically hinders the construction of meridian corridors. It is no coincidence that one of the most successful commercial and transport arteries was the Trans-Siberian Railway with its continuation in the Far East in the form of the CER. And if you look into the depths of time, then the Great Silk Road, which is often mentioned today, was mostly latitudinal.

In general, without hoping that the Eurasian continental space can ever challenge the cost-effectiveness of the sea, Russian firms should focus on the implementation of specific projects, based primarily on their profitability. As for the State, its task should include creating conditions favorable for individual and joint activities of national companies. This would also be the geopolitical component of its international policy, since ensuring such conditions is associated with a tough confrontation on the world stage.

Permanent link to this publication: