Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010, 670 p. (Istoriya stran Vostoka. XX century)

The reviewed monograph continues a series of scientific publications devoted to the genesis and modern development of the states of Southeast Asia. Among specialists, the authors of this book are well known for their works published in different years, as well as for their teaching activities in leading Oriental studies training centers.

In chapter I, "The Conquest of Malaya and North Kalimantan," I find of particular interest the section dealing with the social and political structure of Malay society before and during the early stages of the expansion of British colonialism. The authors provide interesting data on the peculiarities of the feudal power structure in the sultanates of the Malacca Peninsula. Noting the paucity of data on the organization of the Malay village, they draw a fairly complete picture of the stratification of the rural community, distinguish the rural elite, the categories of communal peasants, the layer of dependent peasants and slaves. However, speaking about the development of crafts, the authors of the monograph come into some contradiction: on page 48, they write, on the one hand, that "little is known about the craft in Malaya"; on the other, in the paragraph below, they state that " far beyond the borders of Malaya, the works of goldsmiths were valued. The products of the jewelers of Pahang and Terengganu were known in Sumatra and Java" (p.48).

In chapter II, " The Formation of the British colonial regime (late 19th century-1918)", the authors note that London, having abandoned the idea of turning the Malay principalities into a Straits Settlement colony, developed a "resident management system", formally preserving the former feudal shell of local government. By the beginning of the 20th century, the resident system was transformed into "a rather rigid and centralized structure of direct administration, since the Malay elite had no power left..." (p.67). It is interesting to describe the actions of the British crown to join the northern Malay sultanates, the maneuvers of London's representatives in Malaya in a diplomatic game tied to Siam. As a result, in March 1909, Great Britain concluded an agreement with Siam, under which Bangkok ceded the rights to Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Terengganu. A year later, the local feudal rulers signed an agreement that turned their possessions into British protectorates.

Of particular importance is the authors ' thesis that the foundation of a multi - ethnic society was laid in Malaya in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Its formation was influenced by the rapid development of plantation farming, concentrated in the production of natural rubber, and tin mining in industry. The development of the colonial economy, focused on export, caused the need to import labor from China and India. Using the mobility of immigrants, their entrepreneurship and ability to adapt to local conditions, the British colonial authorities deliberately, as the authors emphasize, set a course for " assigning each ethnic group its own economic, political, social and territorial niche. A society began to develop with serious contradictions, which were fully reflected after independence " (p. 85).

The presentation in chapter III, " Between the Two World Wars, "is preceded by the statement that this period was" the classic era of British Malaya and British rule in North Kalimantan, the time of the unquestionable authority of the Pax Britanica " (p.107). The authors focus on the process of the emergence of the national liberation movement, which initially developed at a slow pace, but accelerated in the 1930s under the influence of the global economic crisis. It is rightly noted that from the very first steps this movement was divided along ethnic lines.

Malay nationalism gradually freed itself from the religious shell and took on secular forms, which was associated with the emergence of an urban middle class. A certain influence was exerted by the Indonesian left-wing nationalists, under whose influence in the second half of the 1920s the ideas of uniting British Malaya and Dutch India into a "Greater Indonesia" after independence began to grow. As a result, in the 1930s, the Malay national movement was represented by three trends: a religious and reformist trend, organizations of the Malay aristocracy and official elite, and a movement of various Malay intelligentsia, which was anti-colonial and anti-feudal in nature.

Much more radical at that time were the sentiments of the Chinese population of Malaya, which was primarily due to the growing revolutionary upsurge in China. It was associated with the emergence of a new factor of the national movement in Malaya - the communist one, although its first steps, as noted by V. A. Tyurin and V. A. Tsyganov, were associated with the creation of a communist party in neighboring Netherlands India. In April 1930, the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was established at a meeting held in Singapore under the leadership of the representative of the Comintern, Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh).

Chapter IV, "The Years of World War II (1939-1945)," states that on December 8, 1941, simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong, and the Philippines, units of the Japanese Army landed in Malaya. The blitzkrieg, which lasted less than two and a half months, ended on February 15, 1942 with the surrender of the British garrison in Singapore. During the years of occupation, the KPM was virtually the only force that managed to organize armed resistance. In 1943, on the basis of partisan detachments, the Anti-Japanese Malay Peoples ' Army (AANM) was created, which by the end of the war had become a serious force that not only the Japanese occupation administration, but also the command of the British forces in the Far East, had to reckon with. In terms of its composition, the AANM was mainly Chinese. The majority of the Malay peasantry, following their feudal rulers, remained loyal to the Japanese military authorities. In this regard, the authors of the monograph emphasize that the CPM failed to take the resistance movement beyond narrow ethnic boundaries. Moreover, the activities of the Communist Party leadership, which tends to view the Malays as collaborators, have exacerbated the national issue.

Chapter V, Post-war Malaya (1945-1957), is divided into sections: the path from the failed Union of Malaya to the Federation of Malaya, the introduction and duration of the state of emergency, and the political development of Malaya on the eve of independence.

Under the influence of changes in the international environment after the end of World War II, including the accelerated erosion of the colonial system, London set out to reform the system of governance in Malaya. At the end of January 1946, the British government published a White Paper with provisions for the reform of colonial administration, according to which Singapore was separated from Malaya and became a separate colony. Malaya also became a separate colony, consisting of nine sultanates, as well as Penang and Malacca. The new entity was named the Malay Union. The authors of the monograph note that while the draft constitution of the Malay Union on citizenship was approved by the Chinese and Indian communities and caused a negative reaction from the top of the Malay majority, on the contrary, the provision on the separation of Singapore was met with hostility among the immigrant communities, but with satisfaction by the Malay community, which did not want to further increase the total number of ethnic Chinese in Malaya. Convened in March 1946. The Himalayan Congress of Malays called for a boycott of the Malay Union, and also decided to create the United Malay National Organization (UMNO).

After a long period of maneuvering, the British authorities had to abandon the project of the Malay Union and go for the creation of the Malay Federation in early 1948. The sultans retained their pre-war prerogatives, and the Federation was now based on the agreement of each of them with the British monarch on the basis of a joint treaty of the sultans with the British crown.

The authors divide the decade that separated the creation of the Malay Federation to the proclamation of a sovereign State into three periods. During the first period (1948-1951), the colonial authorities focused on combating the "communist threat", paying relatively little attention to the promotion of Malaya to self - government. During the second period (1952-1955), the propertied strata of the three main ethnic communities, represented by OMNO, the Chinese Association of Malaya (CAM) and the Indian Congress of Malaya (ICM), completed the formation of a political bloc,

called an Alliance. The culmination of this period was the elections to the Colonial Legislative Council, held in 1955. During the third period (1955-1957), the structure of political forces was formed, their relations with the mother country were determined on the eve of independence. The 1957 Constitution reflected a "social contract" under which the Chinese and Indian populations received the right of residence and guarantees of property preservation in exchange for securing the special rights of indigenous Malays. On August 31, 1957, Abdul Rahman, the leader of the Alliance, won an absolute majority in the local parliament, and declared the independence of the Federation of Malaya.

Chapter VI, "From Malaya to Malaysia (1957-1963)" focuses on the political and socio - economic development of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the territories of North Kalimantan, as well as the emergence and practical progress towards the implementation of the idea of creating a Federation of Malaysia. It is noted that perhaps the most difficult problem in Malaya was the sharp disproportions in the distribution of productive forces and the socio-economic situation of the main ethnic groups. More than 70% of Malays lived in agricultural states. On the contrary, the majority of Chinese were concentrated in urbanized states, the centers of modern industries at that time. Local Chinese capital occupied, after the British metropolis, the second place in plantation farming and tin mining, and controlled domestic trade.

Turning to the topic of the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, the authors point out that the idea was first publicly voiced by the Prime Minister of Malaya, Abdul Rahman, in May 1961. The ruling circles of Kuala Lumpur hoped to create a strong state through the creation of a federation that included Singapore with its developed economic structure, in which they would retain their commanding heights. At the same time, the Malay elite did not want to unite only with Singapore, fearing the transformation of the Chinese ethnic element into a dominant force. For its part, Singapore's ruling People's Action Party (MHP) saw the creation of a Federation as an opportunity to extend its influence to Peninsular Malaya in the future. On September 16, 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was born. It did not include Brunei, whose rulers failed to reach a consensus with the Malay elite regarding their place in the power structures of the future state.

In chapter VII, " The First steps of an independent Malaysia. National Crisis (1963-1969) " the sections devoted to the period of confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as the reasons for Singapore's withdrawal from the Federation, attracted particular interest. Focusing on the policy of "confrontation" of Malaysia announced by Indonesian President Sukarno, the authors quite reasonably note that, dressed in the form of a struggle against modern neo-colonialism, it, in fact, served as a lightning rod designed to defuse the accumulated social and class contradictions in Indonesian society. The "confrontation "has done a" disservice " to the left-wing nationalist wing of the Malaysian political system. The alliance, which fought against "confrontation" under the slogan of uniting all patriotic forces, accused the left-wing opposition of betraying national interests and ties with a hostile power.

As for Singapore's withdrawal (or rather expulsion) from the Federation, V. A. Tyurin and V. A. Tsyganov, in my opinion, do not fully disclose its underlying causes. In fact, even at first, there were fundamental differences between the ruling elites of Singapore and Malaysia on issues of nation-building and nation-building. The Singapore HDP and its leader Lee Kuan Yew adhered to the concept of "Malaysian Malaysia" and the principle of meritocracy, which provided for the formal equality of all citizens regardless of nationality, access to material and spiritual benefits based on natural talents, acquired professional skills and knowledge. For its part, OMNO, the de facto ruling party, was firmly committed to "Malay Malaysia" and the principle of preserving the special rights and privileges of indigenous Malays. The inability to find a compromise was the main reason for Singapore's withdrawal from Malaysia in August 1965 at the initiative of the central government.

Chapter VIII "Overcoming the intercommunal crisis. Prime Minister X's Board Onna (1969-1981) " opens with the dramatic events of May 13, 1969, when a wave of ethnic clashes swept through the capital and a number of states, resulting in numerous human casualties and becoming one of the darkest pages in the recent history of Malaysia. The immediate reason for the sharp aggravation of interethnic antagonism was the defeat of the Alliance in the parliamentary elections. Celebrating the victory of the opposition, Chinese in composition, the Party

Democratic Action (DAP) and Gerakan were targeted by nationalist Malay youth, which turned violent.

Realizing the danger of polarizing society along ethnic lines, Malaysia's ruling establishment has developed a development strategy-the New Economic Policy (NEP), designed for 20 years. Its main goal was to gradually reduce and then completely eliminate poverty, especially in the Malay society. The next task was to accelerate the restructuring of society in order to correct the deep inequality in the income levels of various communities, eliminate the existing identification of race with the economic function. In fact, as the authors of the monograph point out, both of these trends were aimed at accelerating the formation of the Malay middle class.

Chapter IX " The reign "of the early" Mahathir Mohammad before the split of OMNO " the authors write that for the first time the helm of power was not a hereditary aristocrat, but a representative of various intelligentsia, a doctor by profession. Mahathir came out as a social reformer who saw his task in eliminating patriarchal and feudal remnants, in a comprehensive modernization of Malaysia. Under the patronage of the state, it was supposed to create a strong entrepreneurial class of the titular nation. Mahathir proclaimed a policy of "Alignment to the East", adopting the economic development strategy of Japan and South Korea as a model. "Dr. M", as the prime Minister was called in the country, managed to successfully overcome the constitutional crisis caused by the conflict between the executive branch and the feudal elite. Although it ended in a compromise, OMNO for the first time clearly demonstrated to its fellow citizens who determines the political climate in the country. At the same time, Mahathir rejected the proposal to switch to a republican system. He recognized that hereditary rulers were still symbols and guarantors of the dominance of the Malay ethnic group. The authors describe the complex vicissitudes of the split in OMNO in 1987. They note that the victory of Mahathir and his supporters went to the limit of possibilities. At the same time, the withdrawal of a significant number of members from the OMNO meant that it was increasingly dependent on the votes of Chinese and Indian voters in the next general election.

In chapter X, " The Federation in the years of the "Malaysian economic miracle". New Master Development Plans (1988-1997) " the reader gets acquainted with the results of the implementation of the NEP, during which Malaysia was transformed into an industrial and agricultural country. However, not all installations were implemented. Most importantly, by 1990, a "strong, aggressive and competitive entrepreneurial class" had not emerged from the Malay milieu (p. 389). The concept of further development was outlined in 1991 in the general strategy "Perspective 2020", designed for 30 years. A smooth transition to knowledge-intensive industries and high technologies was planned for the next decade. The poverty eradication course was re-identified, but at the new stage it was mentioned without regard to ethnicity. Although it was not intended to abolish the system of special rights of indigenous Malays, the demands on them from the State increased in terms of increasing entrepreneurial initiative.

Chapter XI, "Financial, Economic and Political Crises in Malaysia (1997-2000)," examines Dr. M's extraordinary approach to overcoming the monetary and financial crisis that broke out in East Asia in 1997-1998. The economic crisis has been supplemented by a political one. Mahathir was opposed by opponents both within the OMNO and in the ranks of the legal opposition. He was accused of creating a system of corruption, nepotism and favoritism, of being passionate about megaprojects. At the congress of the OMNO, the internal party opposition, backed by Anwar Ibrahim, tried to openly challenge the patron, but was defeated. Having won, the head of government launched a decisive offensive in the economy and politics. Rejecting the recommendations of the IMF and its local apologists, Mahathir opted for selective currency controls. The country's inefficient banking system was reconstructed. However, at the same time, the government had to make urgent financial injections in order to save from bankruptcy a number of large corporations belonging to close to the top Malay entrepreneurs ("OMNO-putra"). At the end of September 1998 Ibrahim was arrested and then removed from the party leadership. In March of the following year, he appeared in court on charges of corruption and homosexuality.

In the wake of these events, which served as a signal for mass street demonstrations, the opposition Alternative Front (AF) was formed, consisting of the PACE, the SDA and the newly formed National Justice Party (NPS). With all the internal ideological

contradictions (from the concept of creating an Islamic theocratic state to moderate social democracy) For the first time in the political life of Malaysia, the AF has become an association representing an active part of the three main ethnic groups. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the AF confirmed that it was followed by a significant part of the electorate that was disillusioned with the National Front parties led by the UMNO. The de facto ruling party itself has acknowledged the existence in its ranks of such phenomena as the" politics of money", i.e., the bribery of ordinary members when nominating managers of various levels, the practice of manipulating votes during national election campaigns. Unfortunately, the authors of the monograph do not fully address these phenomena. It is only noted that the forum of OMNO held in May 2000 "reflected the acute concern of the leadership about the emerging separation of the party elite from the working people, petty-bourgeois strata, and especially from young people of all classes" (p.433).

In chapter XII, " Post-crisis economic recovery. Malaysia's Fight against Terrorism (2000-2003) " analyzes the events related to the last years of Mahathir's tenure in power and the initial period of A. Badawi's premiership. On the one hand, realizing its importance as an electoral force, the Association of Chinese Cultural and educational organizations Siqui made demands to provide local Huaqiao with equal rights in politics, culture, education and language, which in fact coincided with the concept of "Malaysian Malaysia", on the other hand, the activity of the APA, which took the position of a leader in the world, significantly increased. AF and relying on the control of Kelantan and Terengganu. But while the authorities were quite easily able to shrug off the demands of Chinese NGOs that were not supported by their own ethnic parties, it took a whole series of consecutive operations to counter the PACE: the defeat of the Al-Mauna organization, whose members were charged with attacking army weapons depots, seizing and executing hostages; refusal to further pay the Terengganu government in kind rents for the exploitation of oil and gas fields on the state's offshore; the defeat of the Mujahideen Union of Malaysia (SMM), the association of veterans of the war in Afghanistan on the side of the irreconcilable opposition and the Taliban.

Analyzing these events, the authors tend to consider them well-founded steps taken by the Mahathir government in the fight against sectarianism, terry obscurantism and religious extremism aimed at the violent overthrow of the legitimate government and the creation of a theocratic state. However, there are other points of view. In particular, few people in Malaysia doubted that the events surrounding Al-Mauna were purely staged by the local security services. The decision to withdraw the rent, which contradicted the federal law on the development of the oil and gas industry, was aimed at financially stifling the socio-economic initiatives of the Terengganu Government. The state government has accused the ruling NF of failing to do anything for Malaysia's poorest people during its rule. As for the SMM's defeat, the presence of PACE members in its ranks, including the son of its spiritual leader, gave the authorities grounds to accuse the party of involvement in anti-State activities. Malaysia's role and place in the US-initiated global campaign against international terrorism also needs a more balanced analysis. Without going into too much detail, I will give an assessment of the events of September 11, 2001., given by Mahathir, who expressed doubt that the attack on the World Trade Center in New York and other facilities in the United States was carried out by Islamic terrorists.¹

In chapter XIII, "Abdullah Badawi is in power. Mahathir and Badawi: continuity and Innovations of the course (2003-2006) "states that A. Badawi, as the official successor, established himself in power in an atmosphere of" fatigue " of society from the 20-year era of Mahathir's rule and the expectation of positive changes. This allowed the NF to secure a brilliant victory in the 2004 general elections, but the end of his tenure as head of the OMNO and the government turned out to be inglorious, which determined the disastrous results of the 2008 elections. Abdullah turned out to be a weak politician who allowed himself to be manipulated, positive initiatives were mired in the nomenclature struggle in the OMNO. Last but not least, this was a reflection of the conflict that arose between him and "Doctor M" due to disagreements over determining the main course of the country and the redistribution of power within the ruling elite.

In the last (XIV) chapter, " The Foreign Policy of the Mahathir and A. Badawi Governments (1988-2006)", I believe that the overall priority directions of Malaysia's foreign policy for this period are determined. However, it appears that the authors have reviewed

¹ Dr M persists with 9/11 conspiracy theories // http://www.themalaysianinsider.com, 22.01.2010

such a leading element of diplomacy of Mahathir and his successor as pure pragmatism. During this period, the ruling elite of Malaysia discarded political and ideological stereotypes and firmly established a policy of fully attracting investment from all possible external sources and at the same time aggressively promoting the interests of national business abroad. The foreign policy arena has become a field for nurturing and strengthening the national entrepreneurial class. This explained, for example, the increased interest in the countries of the "northern belt" of ASEAN, in Russia and the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, i.e. potentially capacious markets for goods and profitable capital applications.

Upon further acquaintance with the content of the chapter, it should be noted that in the description of a number of events and facts, annoying errors in terms and titles are often made. Unfortunately, there is a lack of awareness in some places. In particular, this applies to issues of military cooperation between Malaysia and the United States. The reasons for this become quite clear when referring to the list of sources and literature used, which does not include a number of works by foreign authors published in recent years. But this is rather the misfortune of modern Russian political science, and not the fault of the authors. Instead, the section on Malaysian-Russian relations is read with great interest.

Summing up, we can say with sufficient justification that the reviewed work enriches and complements the knowledge about the unique and diverse country of Southeast Asia. A considerable amount of new data concerning the political and socio-economic development of East Malaysia, the "late Mahathir" stage and the initial period of A. Badawi's premiership is being introduced into scientific circulation. Original, sometimes controversial, interpretations of political events and the activities of individual parties are offered, which provide a basis for reflection and a perspective for further research.

Permanent link to this publication: