ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL COST OF DEVELOPMENT

The economic breakthrough of China and India is admirable for some, alarming for others, but, like almost everything else in the world, it has its price. And for super-large countries, it can, of course, be considerable. Let's start, however, with one clarification. The energy intensity of GDP in China, which is undergoing rapid industrialization and urbanization, is actually not as high as it is sometimes written about.

Energy output in China (in 2003, $ 4.5 in 2000 PPP per kilogram of energy consumption in oil equivalent) is not much lower, and in India ($5.3) it is higher than the global average ($4.7). And this indicator is not decreasing at all in the two countries under consideration, but rather in the United States. it is growing, as they say, at a faster pace. If the world average in 1980-2003 increased by 1.3 - 1.4%, then in India-by 2.1-2.2%, and in China - by at least 3.4-3.5% per year. At the same time, we should not ignore the fact that the average annual growth rate of energy consumption in China and India in the 1980s and 1990s was very high. (respectively 3.9 - 4.0% and 4.2 - 4.3%) 1.6-1.7 times, and in 1990-2003 (3.6 - 3.8 and 3.2 - 3.3%) was already two to two and a half times higher than the global average (in 1980-1990 2.4-2.5% and in 1990-2003, 1.4-1.6%). As a result, if in the 1980s India accounted for 6-7%, and China for 14-15%, then in 1990-2003 it was already 9 - 11 and 28 - 29% of the increase in world energy consumption, respectively [calculated from: World Development Indicators, 2003, p. 144-146, 186 - 188; 2006, p. 154-156, 158-160; World Development Report, 2007, p. 288 - 289, 294 - 295].

The share of net imports in energy consumption in China is still not so large (2% in 2003) compared, for example, with India (where it increased from 9% in 1990 to 18% in 2003), the United States (the indicator increased from 14 to 28%), Germany (from 48 up to 61%; in France it is now 50%, in Italy and Japan-over 80%) [World Development Indicators, 2006, p. 154-156]. But China's share in global consumption of oil and a number of other resources is growing rapidly: in 2003-2005, it accounted for more than a third of the increase in world oil demand, half of the increase in world consumption of copper and aluminum, and the entire world increase in demand for nickel, tin, zinc and lead. This, as is known, affects the growth of world prices for raw materials, including hydrocarbons, and has undoubtedly important but ambiguous consequences for exporters and importers of raw materials, as well as, of course, very significant geopolitical consequences [Reisen, 2005, Slide 25; More of Everything, 2006; Dancing with Giants..., 2007, p. 14].

The acceleration of economic growth with the prevalence of extensive components was accompanied by a significant deterioration in the environmental situation. In principle, there is nothing extraordinary here - this was the case in Western countries and Japan.

Ending. For the beginning, see: Vostok (Oriens), 2007, N 4, pp. 113-128.

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appropriate stages of their development. However, the fact is that today accelerated modernization is taking place in huge, extremely overpopulated countries. Their level of technological excellence is low, and their infrastructure capabilities are still relatively limited. So all this, against the background of almost daily reports of various environmental incidents, cannot but cause serious concerns.

The combined share of the world's two largest countries in global population growth began to decline, from about 37-39% in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1990-2005, the rate fell to 34-36% (in China, which implements a stricter policy of birth control, the rate decreased from 18-19% to 14-15%; in India, it increased, but only slightly - from 19-20% to 20-21%). At the same time, their rapid and environmentally costly economic growth has led to the fact that their total share in the increase in global carbon dioxide emissions has almost tripled - from 15-17% in 1980-1990 to 52-54% in 1990-2002. (in India - from 4 - 5 to 17-18%, in China - from 11-12 to 35-36%). According to the calculations of the well-known British economist N. Stern, in 2002-2025 they will already account for about two-thirds of the increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the world [calculated from: World Development Indicators, 1998, p. 42, 44, 146 - 148; 2004, p. 38-40; 2006, p. 46-48, 158-160; Stern, 2006, p. 3; Stern Review..., 2006].

Per capita carbon dioxide emissions in India (1.2 tons per year in 2003) and China (3.2 tons) It is still 10-11 times smaller and about four times smaller than the average for the group of developed countries1. But the situation is changing rapidly. The fact is that over the past two or three decades, the indicator under consideration in the two Asian giants has grown on average an order of magnitude faster annually (in China by 3.3 - 3.4%, in India-by 3.8 - 3.9%) than in the developed countries as a whole (0.3 - 0.4% per year). [calculated from: UNDP..., 2006, p. 353-356]. According to surveys conducted in 1995 - 2001, the content of sulfur dioxide in the air of the largest cities in India and Japan2 was approximately twice, in South Korea - three times, and in China and Turkey - 4 - 5 times higher than the average for the largest cities in the United States and Western Europe [calculated by: World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2004, p. 146 - 148].

In China, a sharp deterioration in the state of three habitats [see also: Vermander, 2006, p. 24-27; Berger, 2005, ch. 8; Ushakov, 2005, p. 76-85], which, according to experts, can become a detonator of a serious socio-ecological crisis, as well as have serious consequences for many countries of the world, is characterized by the following. The average annual rate of land" desertification " has doubled in the last 10-15 years compared to the 1970s. Deserts already make up a quarter of the territory of the PRC. More than 75% of the water in rivers flowing through Chinese cities is unsuitable for drinking and fishing. A third of the country's territory suffers from acid rain. Six of the ten most polluted cities in the world are located in China. According to Peng Yue, Deputy Minister of Ecology of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese "economic miracle", which causes an incredible overload of the environment, may soon end [Friedman, 2005]. According to the State Councilor of the People's Republic of China, Professor of the Chinese Academy of Sciences N. Wenyuan, over the past two to three decades, the average annual growth rate of China's environmentally adjusted GDP has been 2.8 percentage points, or almost a third, lower than the official one (The Greening of China, 2005). According to more stringent estimates, in China, the annual economic losses from environmental degradation can reach from 3-5 to 8-12% of GDP, and its impact on the environment is very high.

1 In the United States, this "bar" is one and a half times higher than in the designated group of countries.

2 The level of pollution in Tokyo and Osaka practically does not differ from the "Western" standard by this criterion, but in Yokohama, according to the survey data, it is 4-5 times higher. (Comparative characteristics of the ecological component of the development of Eastern and Western countries are well presented in a series of works by N. G. Rogozhina.)

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The human cost is at least 300,000 deaths per year [China's Environmental Challenge, 2005, p. 278-279; Saltmarsh, 2006; Bremmer, 2006; China: Boom Today..., 2007] 3.

The social cost of developing two Asian giants is no less controversial. The data published in world statistics on the number of beggars and poor people in the world is a subject of wide discussion. They will probably be updated more than once, as well as the criteria used for calculating them. At the same time, there is little doubt that over the years of reform, China has managed to significantly reduce the absolute and relative proportion of extremely poor people. According to the World Bank, the number of people in China whose daily consumption in PPP terms did not exceed $ 1 in 1993 decreased from 630 million to 180 million in 1981-2003, or from 63-64% to 13-15% of the population. In South Asia as a whole, this indicator remained virtually unchanged, remaining at an extremely high level - 470-480 million people. At the same time, since economic growth in the countries of the region has led to an improvement in the living conditions of a part of the population, the share of the critically poor among the inhabitants of the region has decreased from half to a third (in India, according to the survey of 1999-2000, up to 34-35% of the population).4
According to updated estimates, in 2006, the proportion of critically poor people in India may even be higher - about two-fifths of the population. For China, the data is more contradictory. There is an estimate that this indicator has been reduced to one tenth. But a number of experts, including the World Bank's chief economist for China, B. Hoffman, believe that both the poverty criterion and the given estimate for China are underestimated.5 At the same time, it should be noted that China has been responsible for a large-scale reduction in global poverty. Excluding the impact of this globally significant achievement, the number of poor people in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries has increased from about 850 million. in 1981 to 890 million in 2003.

If we apply a more stringent criterion (up to $ 2 per day per person), the number of poor people in the PRC also significantly decreased in these years (from about 870-880 million to 530-540 million people), and their share in the country's population decreased from 87-89% to 41-42%. In South Asian countries, this indicator, unlike in China, has not decreased, but has grown by more than a third (from 820-830 million to 1,130 - 1,140 million people), and the share of poor people in the total population has decreased by only 10 percentage points - from 89-90 to 79-80%. It should be clarified that, according to surveys conducted in 2000-2002, according to slightly different criteria, in India this indicator, while remaining very high (52-53%), was still much lower than in Pakistan (73-74%) and Bangladesh (82-83%). Returning again to the very significant role of China on a global scale, we emphasize that without it, the number of poor people in the world increased sharply in 1981-2003 by almost two - fifths - from 1.5 - 1.6 billion to 2.1 - 2.2 billion. man [see: World Development Indicators, 2006, p. 70-73; World Bank. Global Economic Prospects..., 2006, p. 60].

Based on the values of the usual Human development index (HDI, the geometric unweighted average of relative indicators of per capita GDP, life expectancy, and the quality-reduced number of years of adult education) of the two countries, over the past two or three decades, the most dynamic-

3 In 2002, environmental losses in Shanxi, the center of coal production, were equivalent to a third of the province's GDP. Currently, Beijing has a relative indicator of the content of unhealthy particles in the air three times higher than in the whole of China or the United States (The Greening of China, 2005).

4 The following figures clearly indicate the difference in the achieved levels of development of the two countries under consideration. According to surveys, in 1995 - 2004, one in ten children in China was hungry (or underweight), and in India - almost one in two children under the age of five. The infant mortality rate in India (62 ppm in 2004) is almost two and a half times higher than in China (26 ppm) [see: World Development Indicators, 2006, p. 112 - 113, 120 - 121].

5 According to Hoffman, in 2001-2003, the real income of the poorest 10 percent of China's population fell by 2.4%, while the real income of the richest 10 percent of the country's population grew by more than 16%. [see: Kurtenbach, 2006; McGregor, 2006].

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Table 1

Dynamics of the regular and extended development index in China, India and a number of other countries of the world

A country

1950

1980

2005

A

B

C

D1

A

B

C

D

A

B

C

D

T2

N3

G4

H5

China

690

35

1.7

9

1510

67

4.7

19

6600

72

8.4

39

11

18

14

26

India

930

35

1.4

9

1330

54

3.4

16

3500

64

6.7

28

6

36

15

22

Brazil

2060

44

2.1

14

6420

63

4.5

30

8200

72

9.2

44

14

40

24

34

Russia

3230

55

5.4

25

7980

67

10.0

43

10600

66

12.9

52

18

14

16

32

Yu. Korea

1000

47

3.4

13

5330

67

8.7

36

21850

77

15.8

74

78

73

75

75

Taiwan

1190

54

3.6

15

7580

72

9.3

43

24200

77

16.2

77

68

79

73

75

Germany

5410

67

10.4

39

19680

73

12.0

64

29200

79

15.7

82

78

106

91

85

Japan

2720

63

9.1

29

19010

76

13.1

66

31400

81

16.6

87

95

92

93

90

USA

12390

68

11.3

53

24000

74

15.8

76

42000

78

19.9

100

100

100

100

100

Notes:

1. The usual development index (D) is calculated by the formula:

, where aij, bij, cij for each (i) country and for each (j) year, respectively, means the per capita GDP in PPP 2005, dollars, the average life expectancy from birth, and the average number of years of adult education, adjusted for quality. A x, B x, C x - similar figures for the United States in 2005.;

2. T is an indicator of the level of technological development. It is roughly estimated as the unweighted average of two indicators (population internetization and per capita R & D spending) assigned to the US level;

3. N is the quality index of institutions calculated as the arithmetic mean of six components (see the initial data of D. Kaufman, A. Cray, M. Mastruzi), including indicators of political stability, the degree of compliance with the rule of law, the effectiveness of the state, the quality of regulation, control over corruption, and state accountability to society;

4.

5. The modified development index is calculated using the formula . Ax ... N x - corresponding figures for the United States in 2005

Calculated from: IMF. World Economic Outlook, 2006, p. 190, 197, 198; World Bank. World Development Indicators..., 2004, 2006; World Development Report..., 2007, p. 288 - 289; UNDP. Human Development Report..., 1991 - 2006; Maddison, 2003, p. 62 - 65, 134, 144; Meliantsev, 2004, p. 64; Heston, Summers, Aten, 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2006, p. 90 - 107; National Statistics. Republic of China (Taiwan).

China was making steady progress (see Table 1). In 1980-2005, China's HDI doubled, or by 20 percentage points (from 19 to 39% of the US figure for 2005), while, for example, India's growth did not exceed 12 points (from 16 to 28% of the US figure for 2005, respectively). for the US indicator), for Brazil-14 points (from 30 to 44%). In Russia, its growth was only 9 points (the indicator increased from 43 to 52%). Let us emphasize, however, that this indicator has also increased relatively rapidly in more "advanced" countries. HDI growth was 18 percentage points in Germany, 21 percentage points in Japan, and 24 percentage points in the United States. But most of all, the usual human development index increased in Asian NIS-Taiwan by 34 points (from 43 to 77% of the US indicator) and in South Korea - by 38 points (from 36 to 74% of the US HDI).

Despite a number of significant achievements in macroeconomics (high economic growth rates, low inflation), China occupies a very average position in the World Economic Forum's 2006 composite Index of International Competitiveness (54th out of 125), significantly behind India (43rd) and the Asian NIS of the first and second echelons (Singapore - 5th place, Hong Kong-11th, Taiwan-13th, South Korea-24th, Malaysia-26th, Thailand-35th place). For the PRC, in which the state's position is still very strong, it is characterized by a low rating of economic (and one of the lowest ratings of political) freedom [The

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Heritage Foundation..., 2006, p. 13-16, 143-145; Fraser Institute..., 2006, p. 13, 15 - 17, 19 - 21, 69; Freedom House..., 2006], extremely low quality of public institutions (80th place out of 109, in India - 34, in the Russian Federation). Taiwan - 32nd place) [World Economic Forum..., 2006. p. XVII-XVIII]. This is largely why the expanded human development index, which includes, among others, an indicator of the quality of institutions, in China, in contrast to India and a number of other countries of the world, turned out to be much lower than the usual development index (see Table 1) . Moreover, according to our calculations, in contrast to, for example, India, the indicator of the quality of state institutions in China over the past decade has had a clear downward trend (see graph 2).
Schedule 2

Note. The quality index of institutions is an unweighted average for six characteristics (see the initial data of D. Kaufman, A. Kray, M. Mastruzi), which includes indicators of political stability, the degree of compliance with the rule of law, state efficiency, quality of regulation, control over corruption, and state accountability to society. Using a massive database of reviews and surveys, the authors ranked the world's countries by the above indicators in the range from minus 2 (low quality of institutions) to plus 2 (high quality).

Calculated from: [Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastuzzi, 2006, p. 90-107].

In India and China, many social problems and disparities remain unresolved and are becoming more acute. The scale of these problems can be estimated to some extent, for example, by the indicator of relative productivity of the agricultural sector ((Y a/L a)/(Y/L)). For China, where the share of people employed in agriculture decreased by almost two-thirds during the post-reform period, but still accounts for at least two-fifths of the country's self-employed population, this indicator fell from 0.39 - 0.40 in 1978 to 0.30 - 0.31 in 2005. In India, where in 1980-2005 the dynamics of labor productivity in the agricultural sector was significantly lower than in China, and the proportion of people employed in this sector decreased by barely one-sixth (this indicator, as already noted, is still not much lower than three-fifths of the active population), the relative productivity of the agricultural sector decreased much more more - from 0.59 - 0.60 in 1980 to 0.32 - 0.33 in 2005. In China, labor productivity in agriculture is 3.6 and 7 times lower, respectively,than in services and industry; in India, the same gap is 6 and 5.6 times 6.

6 Calculated on the basis of relative prices in 2005 according to: [World Bank. World Development Report, 2006, p. 294; ADB. Key Indicators.... 2005, p. 214, 237; Bolotin and Sheinis, 1988, p. 292; Xy Angan, 2005, p. 52-53].

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These disparities, as well as income gaps between rich and poor regions, cities and rural peripheries, and increasing social and class contrasts (see Roach, 2006; Kochhar, Kumar, Rajan, Subramanian, Tokatlidis, 2006, p. 39-40; Purfield, 2006, p. 4, 21), The spread of the sweatshop labor system, especially in rapidly industrializing China7, has led to an increase in generalizing measures of income inequality. In the last two or three decades, the Gini coefficient 8 has tended to increase in a number of countries in East, South-East and South Asia: in India from 0.38 - 0.39 in 1977-1978 to 0.42 - 0.43 in 1999, in Indonesia - from 0.41 in 1976 to 0.44 in 2002, in Thailand - from 0.44 - 0.45 in 1981 to 0.49-0.50 in 2000 [see: World Development Report, 1983, p. 200-201; 2005, p. 258-259; 2006, p. 280-281; World Development Indicators, 1997, p. 54-57; 1998, p. 68-71; 2003, p. 64-67; 2004, p. 60-63; UNDP..., 2005, p. 271-272; Melyantsev, 1998, p. 39-40].

As you know, some growth in inequality is not always counterproductive. But in China, which began its reforms with a very moderate level of inequality and, according to the country's leadership, continues to build socialism, there was a very sharp increase in the Gini coefficient. The index increased from 0.26 - 0.26 in 1975-1976 to 0.31 - 0.32 in 1980-1981, 0.37 in 1992, 0.40 in 1998, 0.45 - 0.46 in 2002, and now, according to available data, has reached or even exceeded the 0.5 mark (on average for Tropical Africa and Latin America). America - 0.5 - 0.6) 9. These data indicate serious distortions in social development, increasing polarization in a giant, overpopulated country, whose people are deprived of many political rights. Since the second half of the 1990s, the number of social protests among the population has been growing rapidly in the country10. Only according to official data, it increased from 10 thousand in 1993 to 58 thousand in 2003, 74 thousand in 2004, and 87 thousand in 2005 [Li Lianjiang, 2006, p. 250], i.e. at a rate (19-20% per year) almost three times higher than the rate of economic growth.

In India, as we have seen, income differentiation is also deepening, and the poverty rate is higher than in China. So far, particularly acute social conflicts have been avoided, partly due to the significant socio-cultural fragmentation of Indian society, but most importantly, of course, due to the fact that the country has long been divided into two groups.-

7 According to recent surveys, in China, as a result of the widespread practice of overtime work, including primarily in export-oriented and subcontracting firms, the length of the working week often reaches 70-90 hours. Intense competition in the labor market due to the massive influx of migrants from villages and backward regions leads to the fact that workers are forced to accept earnings that do not exceed two-thirds of the minimum wage. Independent trade unions are prohibited. The mortality rate in Chinese mines is ten times higher than, for example, in the United States [see: Roberts and Engardi, 2006].

8 is calculated by the formula: whereG10 is the Gini coefficient calculated from the deciles of the ranked series, ΣQ i is the sum of the accumulated frequencies in (n-1), i.e. in this case 9, values. It is measured from 0 (full equality) to 1 (one gets everything).

9 According to data published in December 2006 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the poorest quintile of the population had only 4.7%, while the richest quintile had about half of the country's total income (Brenner, 2006). The high rate of inequality is largely due to the fact that China's coastal regions, where 22-23% of the population lives, produce 70% of China's GDP, the gap in per capita income between provinces reaches seven times, and 66% of all bank deposits belong to 10% of the population of China. According to WHO, China ranks 181st (out of 191) in the world in terms of equal access to health services [Sisci, 2005; Friedman,, 2005; Belloq and Chaponniere, 2006, p. 3; Pei, 2006, p. 39; Beech,, 2006, p. 22.; World Bank. Sharing Rising Incomes..., 1997, p. 8; World Bank. World Development Indicators, 1997, p. 54; 1998, p. 68; 2003, p. 64; World Bank. East Asia. 2006, p. 56; Dyer, 2006; Li Peilin, 2005, p. 107].

10 The situation in the countryside is particularly worrying. Farmers, many of whom have unclear property rights, are often driven off their land by local authorities. When land is taken away, farmers are compensated for no more than a tenth of its real market value. At the same time, trade in land ownership has become the most important factor of enrichment. Of the 50 largest Chinese oligarchs, half of them made their capital from land and other forms of real estate transactions [see Fat of the Land, 2006].

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For almost three generations, a democratic regime has been functioning more or less effectively, and successive Governments continue to allocate subsidies to support poor and backward areas, while running large budget deficits. Since unemployment, poverty, misery, inequality and social injustice do not disappear anywhere, there are many reasons for discontent among the population. But so far, the scale of social unrest in democratic India is generally lower (Giridharadas, 2007) than in communist China.

conclusion

Very different from each other, the two super-large poor Asian countries, having carried out a series of liberal economic reforms, the scale of which is greater in China than in India, globalizing and to some extent globalizing the world, have made a powerful economic breakthrough over the past two or three decades [see: The New Titans, 2006]. It brings to mind the successes of Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, and Asian NIS in the 1970s and the first half of the 1990s.

Nevertheless, despite the impressive economic growth rates, the increasing share of these countries in global GDP growth, industrial production, exports, FDI inflows and other macro aggregates, as well as the possibility that in the next ten years, all other things being equal, China will become the first in absolute gross product volume, and India will firmly take the position The third largest country in the world after the United States, the two Asian giants are still mostly poor countries. According to our calculations, in the years 1980-2005, their per capita GDP, attributed to the level of the United States, grew in China by two and a half times, in India - only by one and a half times. At the same time, China is 6-7 times and India is still 12 times behind the world economy leader in this relative indicator. The absolute gap in GDP per capita between 1980 and 2005 between the two countries did not decrease, but increased by 1.6 - 1.7 times, from $ 22.5 thousand in China, respectively. (in PPP 2005) to 35.4 thousand dollars and in India - from 22.7 thousand dollars. up to $ 38.5 thousand (see Table 1).
I believe that it is still too early to sum up the "final results" of the economic recovery of the two Asian giants. Their growth, for all its phenomenality, is characterized by industry, sector and regional disproportionality, and retains the features of fragility and unbalance. The accumulation rate is particularly exorbitant in China, where the most serious risk is also associated with the possibility of transforming its political system [see Harr and Bjorn, 2006, p.6]. The overall contribution of efficiency to GDP growth in China is small. Its financial system is comparatively more vulnerable.

India, despite a significant acceleration in its economic dynamics over the past three years (it is almost equal to China in terms of GDP growth) [see: Mahapatra, 2007], if it does not want to "overheat financially" [see: Indian Market..., 2007; China Right..., 2007; Summers, 2007; Chinese Stocks..., 2007], it will have to invest a lot in infrastructure, backward industries and unpromising states, which can in the short and long term even in the medium term, slow down productivity growth in this country.

The environmental and social cost of the development of the world's two largest countries is alarming to many, including even their neighbors who are not close to them. However, one cannot help but see that the relative scale of poverty has recently begun to decline in India, and China has made a significant contribution to overcoming global poverty through its success.

The rise of the two countries is the subject of all sorts of discussions, concerns, and concerns [for more information, see Melyantsev, 2007]. But there is also some positive news for the global economy. China and, to a lesser extent, India, thanks to their growth and intensive imports, are expanding export opportunities not only for countries specializing in the export of raw materials and energy. The rapidly developing domestic markets of the two giants and the rapidly growing export-oriented segments of their economies present a significant challenge.

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huge demand for components, intermediate and capital goods, various technologies and services [Prasad, 2004, p. 8; Lampton, 2007; World Bank. Global Economic Prospects, 2006, p. XX]. Cheap exports of Chinese goods and Indian information services to a certain extent constrain the growth of prices and production costs, and increase corporate profits, primarily in developed, post-industrializing countries [see: Weapons of Mass Disinflation, 2006] 11. China, we recall, placing its considerable foreign exchange reserves in the securities of the United States and a number of other developed countries, strongly supports their financial systems.

At the same time, China and India may and do pose a certain threat, first of all, to medium-developed countries with similar specialization in the production of ready-made consumer goods of varying degrees of complexity and not yet the most "advanced" information services (Kramer, 2006; Lall and Albaladejo, 2004, p. 1447). UNCTAD..., 2005, p. 50, 55; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2006, p. 12, 18; Summers, 2006]. There are also estimates that up to one-fifth of jobs in Western countries may be at risk in the medium term. This is due to the rapid increase in the number of graduates of engineering and technical universities in China and India. However, it is estimated that only one-fifth of Indian and one-tenth of Chinese engineering graduates are still able to work in international companies at the required level [see: Lucas and Heines, 2005, p. 4; Prestowitz, 2006, p. 149; Gilbert, 2006]. At the same time, World Bank experts believe that the employment services of developed countries underestimate the amount of job losses in developed countries associated with outsourcing in favor of the countries of the South [see: World Bank. Global Economic Prospects, 2006, p. 121, 133].

Concerns are also justified to some extent because China and India are strongly focused on building up their scientific and innovative potential and intend to increase their unit R & D expenditures to 2%-2.5% of GDP in the next 10 to 15 years (Sirkin, 2007). The average "bar" of their scientific developments is still low, but both countries are expanding the network of research universities and innovation clusters, mobilizing their large diasporas, attracting to promising projects the scientific elite who studied and work in leading foreign universities and companies [see: Einhorn, 2006; Einhorn, 2007].

Their military potential is also growing. According to our rough estimates, India's official military expenditures may have increased from 11-12% of the corresponding US figure in 1990 to 22-23% in 2004/2005, while the same indicator for China increased from 18-19% to 41-42% [calculated from Maddison, 2003, p. 86, 174; World Bank. World Development Report, 2006, p. 288 - 289; UNDP..., 2006, p. 348 - 350]. American experts who assess the dynamics and scale of modernization of the Chinese army have found with alarm that the annual rate of increase in real military spending of the PRC in the last 15 years, it turns out, is at least one and a half times faster than the growth of Chinese GDP [Kahn, 2006; The Financial Times, 2006, December 29].

In developed countries, as is well known, there are many problems associated with the aging of the population and the exhaustion of the demographic "dividend", a certain sclerotization of social institutions, and the objective difficulty of "switching" to a purely innovative development model in a short period of time, thereby compensating for the exhaustion of simple ways to increase labor productivity, which in the past was largely associated with intersectoral and intersectoral movement of major production facilities-

11 However, the Chinese factor in consumer spending in developed countries should not be overstated. According to one estimate, in 2004-2005, Chinese imports accounted for about one - tenth of American households ' consumer spending on clothing and footwear, and only 2% of total personal consumption expenditures [see Asia Times, 2005, July 14].

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In addition, there is an increase in labor's armament with physical and human capital, the departure of highly productive businesses to Asian markets, etc. [see: U.S. Labor Productivity Growth..., 2007; Denis, McMorrow, Roger, 2006, p. 58; Blanchard, 2004, p. 3-26, p. 3; The American Economy... , 2006; Fackler, 2006]. But it is reasonable to realize that the countries of the vanguard, no matter what they say, are generally not" weaklings "at all, they are reforming [Coy, 2006; Wolf, 2007] and are generally able to stop the "breaking semi-periphery"if it is in their interests to do so12.

Although the relative level of investment (as a percentage of GDP) in fixed assets and basic education in developed countries has not increased for a long time [see: Melyantsev, 2006(2), p. 37, 46], total expenditures on higher education, science and information and communication technologies (ICTs) in 2003/2004 reached the level of Japan and Asian NIS 11.3-11.8% of GDP, in the Scandinavian countries 12-13%, in the USA 14.3% of GDP. They were thus 2 to 2.5 times higher than in China (6.4%) and India (5.5% of GDP). [рассчитано по: World Development Indicators, 2006, p. 302 - 304, 306 - 308; Expenditure on Educational Institutions..., 2006]. On a per capita basis, the total expenditure on the development of the most active elements of physical and human capital in developed countries is at least 10 times (by an order of magnitude) higher than in China and 21-23 times higher than in India. In the early 2000s, the number of researchers per million inhabitants in developed countries was 5-6 times greater than in China and 30 times greater than in India. Per million inhabitants, 34 fewer scientific articles were published in China, and 55 times fewer in India than in developed countries [calculated from: World Development Indicators, 2006, p. 306-308].

In this connection, we can also recall Russia, the country of Mendeleev-Korolev-Perelman, which, alas, has turned into a raw material / "petrogas" appendage not only of the West,but also of the East. In history, of course, there have been cases when countries with the initial raw material specialization of their exports (the United States and Japan of the last third of the penultimate century) have carried out rapid catch-up and surpass development. Markets, competition, the human factor worked there, and most importantly - a "high-quality" elite aimed at an innovative and technological breakthrough, which, as you know, was the reason for the "economic miracle" and small "Asian dragons" and is beginning to work with might and main in rising China and India.

In a favorable price environment, Russian GDP, as we know, increases 13, but the intensive component of growth, and therefore its long-term sustainability, is minimal 14. Without a rapid increase in investment in fixed production assets (the rate of which in the Russian Federation is one and a half times less than in India and half as much as in China), as well as in information technology, science and higher education development, the total expenditure on the needs of which in Russia ( 5.3 - 5.4% of GDP) is two or three times without building reliable legal, financial, and socio-political institutions that enjoy public confidence, and developing a strategy for accelerating the formation of dynamic comparative advantages, Russia can, after some time, achieve the same level of development as two other countries."three centuries ago," he said.

12 In particular, non-tariff restrictions, financial and other technologies [see: Merk, 2006; Summers, 2007].

13 The real growth rate of the economy is most likely less than the official one, since, as researchers note, deflators and price indices are underestimated [see: Your personal inflation..., 2007].

14 If we take more adequate account of the use of natural and labor resources (including migrant labor), and the increase in capacity utilization in the post-default period, we can find that the economy is dominated by extensive growth associated with the dynamics of total costs [see: Melyantsev, 2005, Table 2]. Meanwhile, the share of innovative products in the Russian economy is still growing. In Russia, less than 1% (in Finland-more than 30%, in Italy, Spain and Portugal-from 10 to 20%) [see: Vaganov, 2007].

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below both the countries of the West and the East [see: Melyantsev, 2003, pp. 85-86, Table 1]. In this case, China will be able to implement one of Russia's now almost forgotten national projects - reaching Portugal in terms of per capita GDP - before us.

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