The United States has used various means and methods to secure its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of World War II. Among them - the creation of bilateral military-political alliances, attempts to form regional military-political associations, participation in military conflicts.

After the end of the cold war, the United States continues to focus on strengthening bilateral allied ties, but gradually begins to pay more attention to regional multilateral agreements and structures - ASEAN, the ARF, the ASEAN-plus Meeting of Defense Ministers, and the East Asia Summit.

Keywords: strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region, bilateral military-political alliances, regional multilateral agreements and structures.

After the end of World War II, the United States, in an effort to secure its strategic military-political and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region, resorted to various means and methods.

In the first stage, which lasted until the US defeat in the Vietnam War, a three-pronged scheme was used. The strategy was based on the policy of creating bilateral military alliances with as many regional States as possible. These alliances with Japan (1951), the Philippines (1951), South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan (1953-1954), and Australia provided protection for American allies and guaranteed favorable access to Asian markets for American companies.

In addition to relying on bilateral alliances, Washington has made attempts to form regional military and political associations, including those similar to the Asia-Pacific NATO. So, in September 1954, SEATO was established as part of the United States, England, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. The creation of SEATO was considered by Washington as the first step in forming a more significant organization in terms of composition and functions.

^{PANOV Alexander Nikolaevich-Doctor of Political Sciences, Chief Researcher of ISKRAN.} * E-mail: panov.taishi@yandex.ru

It is no coincidence that when signing the pact on the establishment of SEATO, a special protocol was adopted that extended the scope of the organization to Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

However, the experience of creating an Asia-Pacific NATO was unsuccessful. In 1975, a decision was made to dissolve SEATO, which took place two years later.

After the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1957, consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, the United States showed no interest in its activities. Only during the administration of President J. R. R. Tolkien. Under the leadership of President Carter, the United States began to pay attention to contacts with ASEAN in order to influence its orientation in a direction favorable to American interests, taking advantage of the fact that a number of the "five" countries had developed military ties with the United States, especially Thailand and the Philippines. However, these calculations were not justified. An important role in the failure of American plans was played by the growing orientation of the ASEAN countries towards neutrality and non-alignment, as well as the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War. In November 1971, the conference of leaders of the ASEAN member states adopted the "Declaration on Peace, Freedom and Neutrality", which proclaimed the organization's policy of turning Southeast Asia into a zone free of foreign military presence, as well as the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in this area.

This decision was followed by concrete actions. In 1976, the last US air base in Thailand was closed, followed in 1991 by the closure of two US military bases in the Philippines.

Having experienced a setback with the ASEAN members, Washington nevertheless positively perceived their intention to "prevent communist expansion in Southeast Asia", the danger of which, after the victory of Vietnam, was considered by the ASEAN members as a real threat.

The third component of the American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region in the first post-war stage was the readiness of the United States to participate in military conflicts to protect its Asian-Pacific allies - the wars in Korea and Vietnam.

The defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War, as well as unsuccessful attempts to create a regional organization like NATO under the auspices of Washington or any of its allies, led to a revision of the main provisions of the US Pacific doctrine.

The "Guam Doctrine" proclaimed by R. Nixon in July 1969, against the background of the approaching defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War, provided not only for reducing the direct participation of the American armed forces in the Vietnam War, but also for seriously limiting "direct, i.e. military involvement" in Asian-Pacific affairs. It was meant that the countries of the region would ensure their own security, and the United States would limit itself to providing assistance in material support and training of the armed forces.

Within the framework of the Guam Doctrine, the Asia-Pacific region's importance in global American politics slightly decreased, but this did not mean the US withdrawal from the region. According to R. Nixon's definition, the United States planned to pursue a "course between over-engagement and withdrawal" in the Asia-Pacific region [12].

At the end of 1975, President J. R. R. Tolkien Ford came up with the "new Pacific Doctrine", which developed the provisions of the "Guam Doctrine". Central to it was the concept of a "flexible and balanced position of power" of the United States as an essential part of "any stable balance of power in the Pacific."

President J. R. R. Tolkien Carter reiterated the United States 'intention to remain an " Asia-Pacific power", emphasizing its determination to maintain a strong military presence in the region [6].

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the sentiment of "universal victory of democracy, human rights and a market economy" spread in American public opinion, ideas began to appear about the possibility of reducing the advanced American military base, including in Asia.

The American political and expert community, studying new developments in the Asia-Pacific region, came to the conclusion that it is advisable to develop a new American regional strategy that would not be limited exclusively to bilateral military alliances, but would pay more attention to the possibility of implementing multilateral actions, the forms of which would be born depending on emerging needs. This is exactly the spirit expressed by US Secretary of State James Baker in 1991 in the article "America in Asia: an emerging Architecture for the Pacific Community" [3].

However, thinking about the new role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region did not mean that they refused or significantly revised the policy of maintaining bilateral alliances as the main factor of the American presence in the region.

Nevertheless, with the Clinton administration coming to power, the evolution of American views on the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region has received an additional acceleration.

In an April 1993 congressional hearing, Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, listed "a commitment to multilateral dialogue on security issues"as one of the new administration's top ten priorities in Asia. He stressed that the Clinton administration will be determined to "try out consultations and dialogue on security and policy issues that can lead to the creation of new institutions over time." [4]

Shortly thereafter, on July 10, 1993, during a trip to Northeast Asia, President Clinton delivered a speech in the Parliament of the Republic of Korea in which he called for the creation of "a new Pacific community built on common strength, common prosperity, and a common commitment to democratic values" [4].

It was intended that such a community would build on continued U.S. military commitments to the region, stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the creation of new regional dialogues on common security challenges, and the maintenance of democracy and more open societies throughout the region.

Thus, despite a certain novelty in the approach to the Pacific strategy, B. Clinton generally did not change the loyalty of American policy to bilateral alliances, which he described as "strong".-

the cornerstone of America's security role in the Asia-Pacific region, " he explained.: "We need to keep what was reliable."

And yet, for the first time, the American President's speech clearly recognized that it is appropriate to start a discussion on the new security situation in the region. Noting that, unlike Europe, there is no structure in the Asia-Pacific region that can provide a platform for such discussions, he suggested using a "specific approach", taking into account the diverse situation.

Despite all the vagueness and uncertainty of the idea expressed by the US President, it was obvious that it would be more rational to develop new multilateral agreements not from scratch, but using existing structures, although limited in function and significance.

It was then that the United States turned more serious attention to ASEAN structures, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In a speech to the South Korean parliament, Clinton emphasized the" great hope " that the ASEAN platform "will provide a direct opportunity to advance the dialogue on security issues."

On July 15, 1991, during the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama proposed the formation of a region-wide forum for multilateral political dialogue and discussion of security issues.

It was a very rare occasion when Japan took an important foreign policy initiative without first obtaining the approval of the United States. The fact that this was the case was evidenced by the American reaction to the Japanese idea. Secretary of State J. R. R. Tolkien Baker stated that this idea is "a threat to existing bilateral agreements in the region". [3]

Tokyo's " boldness "was explained by concerns about a serious increase in instability in the region due to the possible withdrawal of the United States from the Asia-Pacific region after the end of the Cold War, as well as the intensification of Chinese regional expansion. In this new environment, as the Japanese believed, the system of bilateral security treaties is not fully effective and it should be supplemented by a multilateral dialogue institution.

Asean members initially reacted with restraint to the Japanese initiative, fearing that in the new structure they might lose leadership and the right to a decisive vote. However, in the end, in 1993, the ASEAN member States came to a consensus in favor of creating a region-wide security forum. The change in the ASEAN approach was explained by a number of circumstances.

The outcome of the end of the Cold War was perceived ambiguously in the capitals of the ASEAN member states. On the one hand, the new situation was positively assessed, in which the threat of a clash of two superpowers in the Asia-Pacific expanses was no longer on the agenda, and the countries of the region did not need to solve the complex problem of which side to take in the "fight between two elephants". On the other hand, there are concerns about a possible US withdrawal from the region and the creation of a "power vacuum" that Japan and China will be ready to fill.

The leaders of the ASEAN member states, realizing the importance of "surviving" in the new historical conditions, decided, based on their own initiatives and efforts, first, to expand the membership of the ASEAN post-ministerial conferences, which were held after the annual ASEAN meetings, from seven partners (Australia, Canada, the United States, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the EU) up to ten, inviting China, Russia and Vietnam (later Vietnam became a full member of ASEAN), and, secondly, to start holding conferences within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

The first meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum was held in Bangkok in July 1994. The main goal of creating the Forum, as it was proclaimed, was to create "a predictable and constructive form of interaction in the Asia-Pacific region." The new structure was based on negotiations and consultations, when decisions were made solely on the basis of reaching consensus, i.e. a consultative and consensual approach to regional security issues prevailed.

At the second meeting of the ARF Foreign Ministers in August 1995 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, the ASEAN concept of ARF activities was adopted, which defined a three-step approach:

the first is the development of trust measures;

the second is the development of mechanisms for preventive diplomacy in the short term;

The third is to hold consultations to develop approaches to resolving regional conflicts.

The concept and other documents of the Forum emphasized that its activities will be carried out "at a speed convenient for all participating countries", i.e. without haste, and the Forum itself is declared a place for " open dialogue and consultations on regional policy and regional security issues, to discuss and settle differences in the positions of countries." - members of the Forum in order to reduce the possible risks of security threats."

The ARF is a kind of forum on security issues.

First, its founders believe that it represents a "process" rather than an organization. The Forum does not have its own secretariat, and its participants rely on the ARF section of the ASEAN Secretariat, which was established only in 2004, for administrative matters.

Secondly, the basic principle of consensus-based activities, which has been called the "Asean way", as well as such principles as non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, remains unshakable.

Third, the Forum is unique in that it now unites 26 countries plus the EU, being the only regional Asia-Pacific forum in which key states - the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and India-take part.

Fourthly, although the Forum is attended by the world's leading States, it is not they, but the ASEAN member States, who play the leading role in determining its work. Officially, ASEAN remains the" main driving force " of the ARF.

Fifthly, the ARF remains not a place for decisions, but mainly a platform for holding discussions and exchanging views on confidence-building measures in relation to the Asia-Pacific region, i.e. it is still at the first stage of its activity.

In 2010, ASEAN leaders and their dialogue partners decided to expand the work of the ARF by holding meetings of ASEAN Defense Ministers plus Dialogue Partners (SMOA-plus). The first meeting of Defense Ministers was held in October 2010 in Hanoi. It was attended by ten defense ministers of ASEAN member States, as well as eight defense ministers of dialogue partner countries, namely Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the United States.

It was decided that the format of SMOA-plus will be similar to that of the ARF. The meeting was positioned as a forum where defense ministers will conduct a dialogue on regional security issues, encourage the use of confidence-building measures, and help increase the level of interaction between countries in solving problems caused by "non-traditional" security threats. Thus, a comprehensive mechanism on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region was formed, including the ARF and the SMA-plus.

The US attitude towards the ARF has repeatedly changed. Initially, the cautious reaction changed to a positive one within six months after the Forum was created.

In January 1995, W. Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, explained this approach by saying that the United States believes that " the ARF can play an important role in clarifying government intentions, reducing tensions, promoting transparency, developing confidence, curbing the arms race, and fostering the habit of consulting and cooperating on security issues." [4].

But again, this did not mean abandoning the traditional strategy of alliances. The same W. Lord stressed that multilateral security dialogues "will complement, not displace, our alliances and the forward military presence that we will resolutely maintain" [4].

Nevertheless, at that time, Washington assumed that the ARF could become an important and even permanent factor in Asian regional security.

The US administration positively assessed the first steps of the ARF to establish practical activities. Among them are the invitation of the military to the Forum, the creation of working groups, and a significant expansion of the security issues discussed, starting with the problems of combating tropical diseases and ending with the topic of peacekeeping operations.

The coming to power of the George W. Bush administration in Washington. It led to the formulation of a new agenda of American policy in the Asia-Pacific region. It was stated that, first, the United States should maintain its dominance in the region (and in the world as a whole) and not allow anyone to challenge America.-

kansk superiority [15]. Second, China was identified as a strategic competitor state. The goal was to pay more attention to Asian allies, especially Japan, which was relegated to the background of the "formation of a new relationship" with China by the Clinton administration. Accordingly, multilateral efforts and institutions were viewed with distrust and criticism because they threatened American freedom of action. In the documents of the George W. Bush administration. multilateral mechanisms and negotiation processes on security issues, including the ARF, were not even mentioned.

However, much has changed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although the White House continued to rely primarily on the sole power of the United States, nevertheless, it began to recognize that regional forums can be useful in focusing on new security issues, especially terrorist ones.

Attention was again drawn to the ARF, whose meetings were regularly attended by the US Secretary of State. American representatives began to aggressively promote counterterrorism issues on the Forum's agenda and more actively seek to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the ninth meeting of the ARF in July 2002 in Brunei, at the initiative of the United States, the agenda of the Forum meetings for the medium term included the item that "the fight against international terrorism is the main task in the work" of this structure. As a result, thanks largely to American efforts, the ARF countries adopted a number of anti - terrorist decisions-to prevent the financing of terrorists, to control the movement of terrorists, and to step up the exchange of information and intelligence about terrorist organizations. Questions were also raised about measures to combat illegal arms trafficking, international crime, and response to natural disasters.

Nevertheless, the United States focused on counterterrorism issues at meetings in the Asia-Pacific region, primarily in Asian Muslim countries, which gave the impression to a number of regional states that Washington was fixated on the fight against Islam.

The same tasks were set by the George W. Bush administration. and in developing relations with ASEAN. In 2005, at the ASEAN Leaders ' summit in Busan, the US President jointly signed the document "Enhanced ASEAN - US Partnership", which provided for a five-year plan to jointly counter terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational crime.

In 2008, the United States was the first ASEAN dialogue partner country to appoint an ambassador to the organization. The evolution of the White House's views on the role of the ARF has resulted in recognition of the importance of this Forum "in promoting freedom, prosperity, and regional security." However, again, with a certain reservation that the approach to the activities of any regional multilateral structure "should be based on the foundation of strong bilateral relations with key states in the region" [16].

It is noteworthy that at this time, representing the Republican administration, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill, began to use words that were used by employees of the previous administration of the Democratic Party. In particular, he stated that the ARF is "a key institution in promoting regional integration in Southeast Asia. And we want to strengthen bilateral relations with multilateral ones, and thus work closely with ASEAN and very closely with the ASEAN Regional Forum" [7].

This assessment of the ARF was documented in official documents of the State Department, which recognized that the ARF "provides both a useful forum for discussions on important security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, and progress on some of these issues" [15].

Finally, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in a speech on November 9, 2007 in Tokyo, noting the central role of bilateral American alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, added that the United States "would like to see greater involvement and cooperation among our allies and security partners, i.e. more multilateral ties "[4].

The Obama Administration has demonstrated from the very beginning that it is committed to paying serious attention to the Asia-Pacific region and relations with the ASEAN countries.

In February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton paid her first foreign visit to the ASEAN Secretariat, which was the first visit to this body by a US foreign policy chief. At the same time, a clearly benevolent attitude towards ASEAN did not mean an expression of enthusiasm for the activities of the ARF, which, according to American diplomats, lacks "practical results".

As Undersecretary of State James Steinberg noted: "Our strategy... It consists of three elements: supporting traditional bilateral ties that have provided peace and prosperity for generations; building new cooperative relationships with emerging forces in Asia and with our Asian friends; and building new cooperative structures both in the region and around the world that will link Asia to the broader global order." [10]

In July 2009, the United States signed the Asean Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which was a condition for the possibility of admission to the East Asian Summit.

The George W. Bush Administration I did not take such a step, based on the fact that the treaty emphasizes non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and this will limit the freedom of American actions, especially in relation to Myanmar. Moreover, joining the treaty could, in the opinion of the White House staff, mean recognition by the United States of the ruling junta. In addition, it was concluded that participation in the treaty could damage Washington's bilateral alliances with Asian countries.

In 2011, President Barack Obama, already as the head of a full member of the East Asia Summit, attended its meeting. In November 2009, Barack Obama was the first American president to attend a meeting with the President of the United States.-

the ASEAN Council of State and Government in Singapore. On the eve of this event, speaking on November 14 in Tokyo, he said that Washington now considers multilateral organizations as potential contributors to regional security and will actively support such structures.

On October 12, 2010, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates participated in the first meeting of the ASEAN Defense Ministers and heads of defense departments of the partner countries: China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, Russia, Australia and New Zealand.

Since then, the heads of the Pentagon regularly attend such meetings. At the same time, as American analysts note, the task is to confirm that the United States remains militarily seriously involved in the affairs of the region and is ready to develop cooperation on a wide range of security issues, starting with providing assistance in natural disasters and ending with actions directed against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [11].

However, the main task of the US military is to form relations in the field of military cooperation on a bilateral basis. In recent years, Washington has significantly strengthened security contacts and exchanges with Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.

After the end of the Cold War, the developers of American foreign policy tried to find a justification for the American military presence in the region. In the absence of a clear threat and the presence of a successfully developing economic situation, Washington began to express an opinion about the excessive presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, and this gave rise to fears in a number of countries in the region about the possibility of US withdrawal.

The search for an excuse to stay resulted in the conclusion that the American role is necessary as an "honest intermediary", a "balance beam" that ensures stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, it was concluded that reducing the US military presence would reduce Washington's ability to influence the development of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, and in relation to the ARF, it would not allow it to participate in determining the agenda for its work.

After the decision to "stay" was made, it was necessary to answer the question of the most appropriate form of US involvement in the affairs of the region.

The main conclusion of all post-Cold War US administrations is that it is in the best interests of the United States to strengthen bilateral allied relations, which provide an advanced American base, unencumbered by any restrictions on actions. Attempts by the most reliable allies to impose even minor restrictions on the activities of the US armed forces are resolutely suppressed [13].

Attitudes towards multilateral structures remain ambivalent. On the one hand, there is an opinion that they can restrict " American freedom of action." Ralph Kossa, one of the leading experts on U.S. policy in Asia, warned that "any effort that may be perceived as undermining U.S. bilateral agreements, and especially the United States, should not be allowed to do so."

those that seek to limit or replace America's key bilateral security alliances should certainly be rejected by Washington at this time and by any future administration. " [5] It was written in 2007.

However, at the same time, the well-known American political scientist Francis Fukuyama spoke out in support of a multilateral approach. He did not dispute the importance of US bilateral alliances with Asian countries, as they allow Washington to " gain a unique sanction for its military and political presence in the region and provide a strong position to prevent the emergence of hostile coalitions."

F. Fukuyama called for the development of a system of multilateral organizations in Asia with the active support of the United States. He sees the importance of creating such a system in the fact that "against the background of the end of the cold War and the ongoing economic development of East Asia, the balance of power has changed in such a way that "nationalist passions and rivalries have broken free." "Misunderstandings and conflicts between South Korea, Japan and China, in his opinion, are very likely in the coming years, but the degree of this danger will decrease if possible channels for international dialogue are used" [9].

F.'s opinion Fukuyama shares a number of prominent American politicians and researchers who believe that multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region are needed to reflect the peculiarities and diversity of regional states. However, caution prevails over possible multilateral initiatives that could emerge from the bowels of these institutions. Moreover, it is widely believed that the activities of the ARF are limited to endless conversations around the topic of confidence-building measures, and even timid attempts to develop common approaches to solving acute regional problems are not visible. It is concluded that, on the one hand, the ARF is a relatively "young" forum, and on the other hand, the Asia - Pacific countries are not ready to make even the slightest concessions of their sovereign rights in order to reach common agreements. It also points to the lack of intellectual leadership in the ARF, to the "Asean way" of agreeing on a position, in which the principle of consensus for all collective actions is strictly observed, again for fear that otherwise interference in the internal affairs of one or another member of the organization may occur.

Although American politicians and academics believe that the ARF is not ready to deal with pressing regional security issues, it is considered suitable for secondary or auxiliary purposes.

The Forum's agenda includes meetings on maritime security, drug control, computer terrorism, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, the trade in light weapons, energy security, the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, measures against money laundering, and the fight against infectious diseases. These meetings encourage cooperation, transparency, and help create a framework for responding to or preventing crisis situations.

Another important task of the ARF, as it is seen in Washington, is to" socialize "China, involving it in the "common cause" as a "responsible participant" [1].

Washington has repeatedly made attempts to give the ARF "solidity" and effectiveness.

First of all, the idea of institutionalizing the Forum was promoted, in particular, through the creation of a permanent secretariat to perform coordinating functions. At the same time, it was assumed that the process of institutionalizing the ARF would help establish the foundations of preventive diplomacy in the region. For example, to provide early warning about the possibility of a conflict situation by collecting and organizing relevant information. Such activities require a permanent secretariat or a special body attached to the ARF, such as a Regional Risk Reduction Center.

At the fifth meeting of the ARF Foreign Ministers, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that regardless of reaching agreement on confidence-building measures, the ARF should move forward in matters of preventive diplomacy so that the Forum "remains viable" [8].

However, the ASEAN member States intend to maintain a low - institutionalized multilateral discussion format, in which they play a leading role and which allows them to establish norms and rules of conduct in the region that limit the ability of major Powers to interfere in their internal affairs and disrupt regional stability.

Washington is also disappointed that it is not possible to direct the activities of the ARF to the discussion of human rights issues. Recently, the ASEAN members have been fending off reproaches on this topic, citing the example of Myanmar, when their approach of non-interference in the internal affairs of this state has finally yielded positive results.

Participation in the ARF is seen in Washington as an American signal to the countries of Southeast Asia that US involvement in the region remains and the region is on the priority list of US foreign policy areas.

In general, the American approach to the ARF remains two-pronged. On the one hand, there are concerns that the Forum has the potential to weaken American alliances in the region, Washington's leadership, and its superiority.

On the other hand, it is concluded that the ARF is "useful" as it has created new channels of communication for discussing traditional and emerging security issues and established new mechanisms for cooperation. The ARF, according to American analysts, has provided a platform for regional support for global norms of behavior and is a testing ground for identifying Chinese readiness to accept the security status quo in Asia. Finally, it serves as the engine of American engagement in Southeast Asia.

List of literature

1. Russia in global politics. 2005. N 1. pp. 139-140.

2. Abramowitz Morton and Stephan Bosworth Chasing the Sun: Rethinking East Asian Policy. New York, 2006.

3. Baker James A. America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community // Foreign Affairs. 1991. No. 5. P. 1 - 18.

4. Cooperative Security in the Asia - Pacific. The ACEAN Regional Forum / Ed. by Jurgen Haake and Noel M. Morada. 2010.

5. Cossa Ralph A. East Asia Community Building: Time for the United States to Get on Board. Pacific Forum. CSIS. Issues and Insights. 2007. Issue 7.

6. Hifer M. The ACEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake // The Pacific Review. 1999. Vol. 12. No. 1. P. 25 - 38.

7. Hill Christopher. The U.S. and Southeast Asia. Remarks to the Lee Kuan. New School of Public Policy. Singapore. 22.05.2006.

8. Johnston AL, Ross R.S. Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power. London, 1999. P. 309.

9. The New York Times. 30.06.1977.

10. Steinberg James B. Engaging Asia 2009: Strategies for Success. Remarks at National Bureau of Asian Research Conference. Washington D.C 1.04.2009.

11. Swaine Michael. America's Challenge. Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century. Washington, 2011. P. 121.

12. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report. September 2001. P. 4.

13. The United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Thirty Years of Dialogue and Cooperation. Fact Sheet. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs. Washington D.C. July 31, 2007.

14. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's. A Report to the Congress by President Nixon. 03.05.1973. P. 109.

15. The National Strategy of the United States of America. White House. September, 2002. P. 1.

16. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. White House. March 2006. P. 40.

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