J. STUDWELL. Asian Godfathers. Money and Power in Hong Kong and South-East Asia. London, Profile Books Ltd., 2007, XXX + 328 p.

"Let me say something about very rich people. They are not like you and me." These lines belong to F. They also appeared in the 1926 novel "The Rich Man"by Scott Fitzgerald. The comment to them, which is persistently attributed to old man Ham (E. Hemingway), went something like this: "Yes, they have more money."

It is about tycoons, their political and economic "exploits", and their specific "habitat" that the book by J. R. R. Tolkien deals with. Studwell's " The Godfathers of Asia. Money and power in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia."

Southeast Asia (SE) includes Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, the countries that were at the origins of ASEAN, plus Hong Kong that became part of China. The region also includes Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), and Brunei. A special feature of the latter is their low economic significance. Note: taken together, their GDP is not much more than half that of Singapore alone, which has a population of 4 million people.

In 1996, Forbes magazine placed 8 active businessmen in Southeast Asia in the list of 25 and 13 in the list of the 50 richest people on the planet. The result is that in this relatively small region, where there is not a single non-state corporation included in the list of the world's 500 largest companies, a third of the two dozen richest people in the world are concentrated. Moreover, the personal wealth of 4 of them exceeded $ 4 billion (And this is in a region where a salary of $ 500 per month is considered very decent.)

The economy of Southeast Asia is a product of the interaction of political and economic forces formed in colonial times and developing quite steadily in the post-colonial era, despite the significant structural changes that have occurred. In accordance with the established order of things, the political elite grants the subjects of the economic elite virtually monopoly rights to create concession enterprises (mainly in the domestic market of services). This provides the latter with access to vast wealth, without stimulating them to technological developments and innovations, the creation of prestigious firms and productivity growth, that is, all that is the driving force of sustainable economic development. Previously, such opportunities were used by the colonial elite. Then the work was continued by new national political elites, who for their own purposes attracted industrial or financial magnates who did not have local roots. They provided the collection of economic rent, its share for the political elite and, importantly, did not pose a threat to the existing government. The tycoon class performed the functions required of it by the authorities, acquired huge wealth, but, we emphasize, at the same time did not do much for overall economic growth. The latter was provided by small entrepreneurs in manufacturing and related industries, as well as as a result of the policy of providing labor to TNCs engaged in exports. The city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore have thrived on port facilities, financial services, and offshore business services for countries across the region. All of this worked perfectly well until July 1997, before the financial crisis, when it became clear that Southeast Asia was both institutionally and politically burdened with a lot of serious problems, which led to a comprehensive crisis. In the years that have passed since the crisis, they have not been eliminated, and it is unclear when the situation may change.

Economic cataclysms, recessions, etc. Studwell, almost do not affect the special "habitat" created and skillfully programmed by the main "characters" of the book. Tycoons who live in stunning luxury do not experience any moral (as well as material) inconveniences. At the same time, it would also be wrong to claim that they are mafia bosses, although many of them are engaged in smuggling (goods and services, less often-people, drugs and weapons), have contacts with organized crime.

organized crime in the form of Chinese triads, Indonesian premans, etc. Asian organized crime, existing in parallel, has areas of intersection with the world of tycoons. In this regard, it may be recalled that the political actors and their leaders in the region - the British and Japanese colonists, the Chinese Communist Party, and Suharto-had a long history of relations with organized criminal groups. As the term "godfathers of Asia" is rather a myth, which, in my opinion, is not necessary to maintain and cultivate.

As shown in the monograph, ethnic Chinese now own 50-80% of the shares listed on the ASEAN stock markets. At the same time, their share in the total population of the Philippines is 2%, Indonesia - 4%, Thailand - 10%, Malaysia - 29%, Singapore - 77%. In the 1990s, the Chinese controlled 45% of all major firms in the Philippines, almost all but 2 of the 20 largest corporations in Indonesia, 9 of the 10 largest companies in Thailand, and 24 of the 60 in Malaysia. Most of the "godfathers of Asia" are ethnic Chinese (p. XV).

However, it would be wrong to consider these impressive statistics as a confirmation of some special exclusivity of the Chinese, their specific national culture. Rather, the main explanation may be a reference to the number of ethnic Chinese in the world. Not the least role was played by historical factors. The Chinese had no choice but to survive "at any cost", since in the position of immigrants they were not allowed to work in the civil service, and a number of professions were prohibited for them. Moreover, in some countries they were not even allowed to engage in agriculture. So saying that the Chinese are born merchants is about the same as saying that the Jews are " born financiers." The Chinese had to survive in the face of fierce competition, which also affected the formation of the list of"godfathers". Today, the Chinese among the latter are not carriers of the traditions of the richest Chinese culture, but rather its surrogates. They are well-educated, cosmopolitan, speak many languages and are reliably isolated from the ordinary aspirations and concerns of their fellow tribesmen.

The status of "godfathers" is reinforced in this case by the current political and institutional system, which is characterized by the absence of real democracy and is not able to ensure sustainable economic growth, but at the same time does not push the countries of the region to the scenarios of Latin American development. The crisis of 1997 did not change the existing foundations, but rather strengthened them. That is why the "godfathers" of Asia are still successfully exploiting the political inefficiency of these states.

As shown in the book, greedy, successful tycoons are primarily consumers of economic growth, and not its stimulators. The productivity of their companies is significantly lower than the average for the national economy. Thus, in Thailand, in 1985-2005, productivity growth in agriculture and manufacturing was significantly higher than in the service sector, which is mainly controlled by the "godfathers".

Who is the engine of development in the region? Export production, practically not controlled by tycoons. It employs small firms and employees of foreign enterprises. In 1960 - 2005, exports of these industries from the ASEAN countries grew by 11-15% annually in dollar terms. At the same time, Malaysia's exports increased 118 times over the same period, and Singapore's - 150 times (p. XXIII).

According to a Chinese proverb, the first generation accumulates wealth, the second maintains it, and the third loses it. The actual experience of the last hundred years suggests a cycle of 4 generations, of which the first creates only the core of capital. The second is that, with the help of the newfound strong political connections, it turns him into a really huge fortune. The third generation tries to preserve widely diversified assets that reflect the personality of their grandparents. The fourth-has the same results as in the proverb. The reason lies in the organization of business based on the family, which is, by definition, a weak point compared to professional management, as well as in the general decline of the original mores-the foundations on which the empire was created.

Achieving wealth within a single generation is unthinkable in Southeast Asia. First of all, because there is no open economy here. This is possible in the United States, to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom, and to an even lesser extent in Europe. At the same time, the rich in the region under consideration traditionally support the myth of their difficult childhood, attempts to escape from the grip of poverty. In fact, their path to the top is a typical insider story, often supplemented by marrying the boss's daughter.

Another myth, the book notes, is the popular perception of tycoons as thrifty people. Refusing even a taxi in favor of the metro, cheap hours, and lower wages than workers. All this - not just like that, but for a permanent demon-

the passion of asceticism, that is, the ability to save capital. In addition, for tax reasons, high salaries are unprofitable, unlike dividends. This is the case in Hong Kong. Real annual revenues are estimated in the hundreds of millions. All the local tycoons, without exception, are regulars of casinos all over the world.

In personal terms, they are patriarchal, vindictive, and demand obedience from their relatives. Loyalty is provided by the prospects of future inheritance, but in the present, money is not much favored by relatives. There are no strict rules in the order of inheritance, although the position of men is a priority.

In general, the family business culture in Southeast Asia is prim, often causing personal unhappiness, but almost never causing opposition.

The life of a tycoon is filled exclusively with work, breaks in which are given to sex, most often debauched. None of them have any friends, in the usual sense. Pre-war Indonesian tycoon Oei Tiong Ham has always had a keen interest in women and sex. He had at least 18 live-in partners and 42 children.

A mandatory component of being a standard "godfather" in the region is secrecy. This is due to the cultural traditions of the Chinese, who are horrified by any communication with the media, and the peculiarities of the activities of the "godfathers". Suffice it to recall that back in the 19th century, the private banks of Rothschild, Morgan and Warburg did not even have signs, which, in general, was due to their insider activity. At the same time, South-East Asian tycoons are showing increased interest in such magazines as Forbes and Fortune. Interest is mainly due to the desire to know what is written directly about them. Finally, all tycoons are afraid of kidnapping themselves or their loved ones. The Philippines has the most impressive statistics of this kind. There are more than 100 abductions a year (p.61).

No matter how original it looks, but the stimulation of the activities of regional tycoons lies in their perception of business as a game, a high level of excitement. Many of the tycoons died at an advanced age at work. What should I do if I don't work? Play golf? Then why change anything? It's better to play in business. That's how they all think, or nearly so. On the other hand, few of them have even the smallest idea of the life of ordinary people.

At the heart of almost every godfather empire is a concession or license that gives them the right to conduct mono - or oligopoly activities. If this is not the case, the tycoon cartel may gain the right to flourish as a result of government-created structural anomalies and competition suppression measures. Any aspiring tycoon is on the lookout for such uncompetitive powerful cash flows. Their source is usually very simple. So, the 6 richest people in Hong Kong and Malaysia draw money with the help of gambling monopolies. In 1961, Stanley Ho acquired such a monopoly in Macau. In 1986, it managed to renew its monopoly rights for another 15 years. Ananda Krishnan, Malaysia's richest man since Robert Kuok left for Hong Kong, is considered the owner of real estate, telecommunications and mass media. He built the world's tallest buildings - the Petronas Twin Towers in Kuala Lumpur. At the same time, for almost 20 years, this gentleman received the main flow of funds from the monopoly rights to organize cross-country games in Malaysia. There are other examples, such as food import licenses. They were issued to ensure the fight against speculation in local markets. Thus, no one thought specifically about the interests of the "godfathers". Subsequently, for the tycoon who received it, the license became a source of a constant influx of huge funds. It is clear that it could not have been otherwise with the suppression of competition, even under a completely plausible pretext. This situation was especially favorable for the tycoons under Marcos in the Philippines and Suharto in Indonesia.

As noted in the monograph, Hong Kong and Singapore, due to the lack of tariff and currency regulation of international trade in terms of economic freedom, were considered the best in the world in the late 90s. At the same time, Hong Kong has long been a conglomerate of various cartels. Historically, they appeared here in colonial times. Under the influence of the British administration, the concentration of capital reached a particularly high level in the real estate market. In 1991-1994, only 10 developers (as it is now commonly said, developers) provided for the construction of 3/4 of all new residential buildings. 4 of them accounted for 55% of this volume. The profitability of construction, including income from land use, reached 77-364% (p. 68).

From the point of view of economic theory, such a concentration in the real estate market cannot but contradict all ideas about fair competition.

Hong Kong has no competition laws, and its" godfathers " are usually Chinese, British, and Chinese.-

ts and others actively use it, extracting unthinkable incomes. The container terminal in the port of Hong Kong is recognized as the most expensive in the world. In fact, this is rent collected by local magnates. The largest of these is Hutchison, which owns 14 of the 24 berths.

The entire system of obtaining licenses and other tools to ensure a monopoly or oligopoly would be incomplete without large-scale corruption and bribery, explains J. P. Blavatsky. Studwell. However, this has its own regional specifics. We are not talking about the usual search for the right person in such cases and giving a bribe. In the region, it is customary to look more broadly. What is important here is the presence of stable relationships with top managers, supported by family relationships.

The author considers the system of relations between the "godfathers" to be interesting. Actually, there is nothing unusual here. They compete to gain access to the political elite, but they can collaborate on joint business plans. At the same time, everyone is always guided by their own interests. As a result, their interaction can hardly be called cooperation, but rather a relationship in which forced partners get along no better than wolves.

One of the features usually inherent in the business of tycoons is the vertical integration of monopoly and oligopoly activities. So, in the 50s, Henry Fok (Henry Fok), who received monopoly rights to import Chinese sand to Hong Kong, later acquired barges for its transportation, as well as storage facilities for storage. In addition, vertical business integration gives tycoons freedom of action when preparing an income statement at different stages of the process.

On the other hand, each of the tycoons is overgrown with conglomerates covering 300 - 400 private companies in different industries. The principle of control is the same-to capture any new business.

If someone tells you that they got rich as a result of hard work, ask them whose it is. These words of the American humorist, journalist and writer Don Marquis are quite appropriate when studying the activities of the "godfathers" of the region. Admittedly, they work harder than mere mortals ever dreamed possible. But this is not the job of an ordinary manager. Top bosses maintain and develop their connections. They do this almost uniformly. For example, they all play golf without exception. Their working day is really long, but it is filled exclusively with secular communication. So, the usual day of Asia's richest tycoon Li Ka-shing (Li Ka-shing) begins around 6 am. By about 7, he arrives at his own golf club and plays with one of the right people, or at least one of his top managers. By 10 o'clock, he goes to the office and begins to get acquainted with the press. He is interested in everything you can read about yourself. He speaks English, but all materials that might interest him are translated into Chinese before he arrives. At 11: 30, he is ready for a massage. At 13 o'clock business lunch. Then Lee spends a couple of hours at the office and leaves for home at 16. At 17 o'clock, another massage and at 18 - 30 a game of cards with business partners. Then a business lunch and bedtime at 22: 00. The cycle resumes the next day.

In general, the working day is about 16 hours. It is clear that the real work falls to the share of managers. As a rule, there are many of them, but the main one is always one. It is also called the "main slave". The tycoon turns to him when he wants to do something. The relationship between them resembles the communication of the ever-memorable Don Carleone with his thugs. For their service and obedience, the "master slave" receives approximately $ 15 million a year. He doesn't go to bed until 2 a.m. at the earliest, and he should be at the office long before the boss arrives. It is believed that money is not his main motivation. He is alive with closeness to the boss and power.

More serious cases are handled by foreigners close to the top boss. This practice has been built up over the years since colonial times. Modern tycoons trust them as much as their compatriots. They are usually engaged in equity, work with the stock market.

In general, tycoons are great masters of "pulling strings" and thus managing their virtual puppet environment, even though this environment consists of highly paid representatives of international business.

The main staff of employees is deprived of any privileges and has low incomes due to the underdevelopment of trade unions. Having a monopoly eliminates the boss's interest in hiring the best specialists, so his priorities are always to minimize costs, in particular, salaries.

In 1802, in a letter to the head of the US Treasury, Thomas Jefferson wrote that for the free development of the country, the danger from banking institutions may be higher than from the enemy's army.

As noted in the book, for the first time, Southeast Asian entrepreneurs gained access to the capital market after the decline of the colonial era.

eras. This was due to changes in the credit policy of banks, the acquisition of licenses by tycoons to open their own banks (which, in fact, became something like an ordinary piggy bank, although filled with other people's money), as well as the development of the regional financial market (p. 94).

The financial revolution in the region is connected with the activities of Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1949, after the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, he moved from Shanghai to Hong Kong.

None of the shareholders could own more than 1% of the shares. In many ways, this circumstance prompted the bank to cooperate with the "godfathers" of the region, since without the participation of the latter, it became increasingly difficult for bank management to hide their income. Until the mid-90s, HSBC actually played the role of a central bank. With his active participation, the transfer of economic control over British companies in favor of Chinese companies (which became very profitable) was ensured. The bank has become a kind of catapult that puts Chinese-born tycoons into an unattainable orbit.

Just before the 1997 crisis, as the author of the book shows, loans accounted for between half and 4/5 of all Southeast Asian banking assets. Despite the fact that in the United States this indicator was equal to 1/5 (p. 107). The incentive for creating such an asset structure was the average annual growth of bank deposits by more than 20% in the 10 years before the crisis. This fact, in turn, was supported by an increase in household savings. Between 1986 and 1996, the volume of bank lending in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines increased 6-fold. The financial system of the region would be significantly more reliable if the banking assets had the structure established in America and Europe. However, this was unlikely, since, despite the rapid growth of the stock market, its scale was small, and the position in it was largely due to the activities of insiders. In addition, there were all conditions for expropriating minority shareholders. The bond market was a tenth of the size of the corresponding market in developed countries. All this suggests that it was simply easier to get access to bank lending. The latter circumstance usually creates the best conditions for the emergence of acute economic problems. In the context of South-East Asia, this guaranteed an economic catastrophe, as the excessive scale of lending contributed to abuse by the" godfathers " of the region.

Political patronage in relation to the" godfathers " of the region can be both active and reactive, that is, in the form of a reaction to certain events. In the first case, we are talking about simply providing tycoons with profitable orders and benefits. In the second case, the political power intervenes in the course of affairs and thereby provides direct support to the very process of interaction between political and economic elites. There are plenty of examples of this reaction. The essence of support boils down to the following, explains J. R. R. Tolkien: Studwell argues that under certain conditions that threaten a particular tycoon, the authorities intercede for him under the pretext of the need to maintain economic stability (p. 116). Taking advantage of this support, regional tycoons have achieved serious skill in seizing the most profitable business areas, turning companies that have gained access to the stock exchange into private ones, and other illegal operations.

In general, banks, despite the development of all sectors of the financial market, played a key role in organizing the access of the "godfathers" to capital.

The stock market in the region appeared much later than the banking services market. On average, less than 15% of the adult population owns shares in the region. In Hong Kong, which is a leader in this area, the indicator is significantly higher - 28% (p. 121). By the way, the region as a whole is distinguished by the system of mandatory savings for the population. The income on these deposits is, of course, at the lowest level. The stock market did not become an alternative due to poor public awareness.

As one Hong Kong tycoon Ronnie Chan wrote in 2002, the beauty of Confucianism is that it makes Asians want to suffer.

The Asian financial crisis was predetermined by the action of 4 powerful and mutually supportive trends operating at the macroeconomics level. The first was limited to attempts by the countries of the region to copy the development paths of Hong Kong and Singapore in order to obtain indisputable benefits: export-oriented industrialization, increased foreign investment and, as a result, export growth. The second is associated with a rapid increase in the population. The third - with the growth of savings. For example, household savings account for 30% of GDP in Hong Kong and Indonesia, and 45% in Singapore. In the mid-60s, this indicator in the countries of the region corresponded to the level of Latin America. In the early 1990s, it increased by 20% points (p. 126). Finally, in the pre-crisis period, the region had the psychological benefits of a fast-growing emerging economy, which spurred the growth of the economy.-

It is characterized by a high level of public confidence in the political elite.

At the same time, there was a growing belief in all countries that economic growth was based on solid foundations. At the same time, contradictions accumulated, the region did not achieve sustainable development, and large, reliable companies did not appear. Since the mid-90s, it was impossible not to notice that the greed of tycoons, corruption and excesses in the region began to go off scale, asset trading replaced productive business in most companies, and many financial institutions began to experience difficulties.

The analytical studies of the region's economy conducted at that time were not very effective (and indeed generally so). The World Bank and the IMF prepared reports that resembled victory reports. The only exception was the study of Alwyn Young (Alwyn Young) from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It was published in a popular form in 1994. Its essence boiled down to the fact that the "Asian miracle" is a myth. Growth in capital investment and labor was not accompanied by productivity growth. At the same time, the latter grew more slowly than in the United States, whose economy is undoubtedly more mature. Post-crisis studies have shown that productivity was actually slightly higher, but the conclusion about unsustainable economic growth remained unchanged.

Much of the analytical research on the Asian crisis has focused on the role of changes in foreign exchange rates, short-term capital flows, and foreign loans from local firms in the deterioration of regional currencies. This is certainly correct. At the same time, it is already clear that the Asian financial crisis was more than just the result of a short-term economic imbalance. Some economists argue that with a better macroeconomic policy and without the intervention of international organizations, there would be no shocks at all. Perhaps, in this case, the crisis would have been delayed, would have been somewhat different, but it could not have been prevented. It would have happened sooner or later. The reasons for it were primarily internal circumstances - political manipulation in the economy, a corrupt banking system, cartelization, and restrictions on free business activity.

The unprecedented growth of investment in the region's economy before the crisis was mainly provided from domestic sources. Foreign investments began to arrive only shortly before the crisis and in a limited amount. At the same time, they were mostly of a short-term nature. The inflow of funds from abroad to the regional stock market and significant fluctuations in the exchange rates of foreign currencies against the dollar turned out to be the final component of the formation of the pre-crisis state.

The Asian financial crisis, firstly, made the rejection of some of the "godfathers" of the region, and secondly, significantly changed the system of economic regulation. As a result, there was a slight increase in competition in the regional services market, but overall the economy did not undergo any significant political and economic structural changes. The most agile and clever of the top bosses managed to strengthen their positions. In addition, there are a number of new ones. The former tycoons who had sunk into oblivion were mostly representatives of Malaysia and Indonesia, who came to the top as friends from school or close relatives of influential people. There was even some deregulation of the economy.

From the macro-economic point of view, the economic recovery of Southeast Asia is associated with the development of exports in the region and the boom in the Chinese economy, which began in 2003.For some reason, the scale of the positive impact of exports on overcoming the crisis consequences in the region has limited recognition. At the same time, the growth of exports is largely due to the conscious policy of TNCs regarding the organization of export production outside of China, in particular, in Vietnam and the Philippines.

In 1997-2006, the share of exports in the region's GDP increased from 45% to 65%. To support it, the governments of Southeast Asian countries have ensured the purchase of incoming foreign currency, resumed fixing to the dollar exchange rate and continue to increase their gold and foreign exchange reserves.

As J. R. R. Tolkien notes: According to Mr. Studwell, the region's "godfathers" have been able to take advantage of the export boom by providing services to the sectors of the economy they control, such as gas from Malaysia, rubber from Thailand, and timber from Indonesia. An important aspect of their activity was the use of the Chinese boom to expand operations in the real estate market and develop the gambling industry. Casinos are banned in China, but citizens are allowed to travel. As a result, no one is complaining about the lack of visitors at the Genting Highlands Casino complex near Kuala Lumpur. The greatest benefits went to Macau, which became a special administrative region of the People's Republic of China in 1999. The attraction of this center is connected with the possibility not only of playing games without restrictions, but also of laundering unrighteous money (pp. 176-177).

Who paid for the 1997 crisis if the godfathers were not affected? Apart from ordinary people , there is no one else. Despite the economic recovery, in early 2007 the population of Southeast Asian countries fared worse than in 1995. The reason is the policy of the respective governments. For example, in Singapore, the richest people received tax breaks, while indirect taxes increased significantly. Value added tax increased by 5-7%. With variations, a similar situation has developed in other countries of the region. The main difference between Hong Kong and Singapore, in terms of crisis consequences, is due to the fact that the former still has currency restrictions. This means that the deflationary pressure in Hong Kong is entirely on the stock market and real estate market, and not on the exchange rate. As a result, it was only by the end of 2006 that the cost of home ownership reached its 1997 level. This largely contributed to the politicization of the population in the post-crisis years. This circumstance allows us to hope that as democratic trends grow, Hong Kong can become the leader among the region's economies, that is, it will overtake Singapore, which is recognized by the IBRD today as the best, optimal place for organizing and developing business (p. 187).

The level of poverty in Southeast Asia has either remained at the same level or, as in Indonesia, has increased significantly. In 2006, 52% of the Indonesian population had an income of less than $ 2 per person. per day. In the Philippines, this figure is 47%, in Thailand-32%. For comparison, it was 14% in Argentina and 22% in Brazil.

The current inequality in the region is still below the Latin American level, but it tends to increase.

It is noteworthy, we read in the book, that in general the region is characterized by a huge number of political murders. In the Philippines, between 2001 and 2006, according to local police, 110 such murders were committed. During the 20 years of Marcos ' rule, 3,000 people disappeared without a trace (p. 181).

The development model of the Southeast Asian countries differs from the corresponding model of North-East Asia in three areas. First, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan implemented land reform that gave the population the right to own land. As a result, effective prerequisites were created for everyone to create their own capital and improve their lives. In Southeast Asia, the political elite managed to avoid these reforms. The Gini coefficient, the best existing measure of inequality, is 0.25, 0.32, and 0.24 in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, respectively. It is 0.34 in Indonesia and 0.5 in Hong Kong and Singapore.

Secondly, in the northern neighbors, state support for corporations - also based on family lines, by the way-did not lead to the emergence of economic elites like the "godfathers" of Southeast Asia, since it did not take the form of rent and did not apply only to the service sector. The main focus was on supporting the manufacturing industry and established businesses. In addition, it did not destroy the factor-environment and the mechanism of competition.

The third difference lies in the political approaches that were democratic in the North-East, borrowed from the developed countries of Europe. (For example, the Japanese Constitution is based on the German basic Law.) Despite periods of military dictatorship, South Korea and Taiwan have managed to embark on what is now commonly called a path of democratic transformation.

In summary, it is still very difficult to predict how long Southeast Asia will be able to withstand the irresistible, pervasive gravity of economic logic. The region has become an example of a clearly difficult and contradictory path of development. I want to believe in the best. Sooner or later, but, apparently, the "godfathers" - a semi-parasitic, obsolete retro ballast - will have to say goodbye.

Permanent link to this publication: