The last third of the last century was marked by unprecedented economic growth in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN countries have achieved the highest and most sustainable economic growth rates in the world. The following data from the World Bank provide unique but very convincing evidence of this: from 1970 to 1990, the number of people living below the poverty line decreased in Indonesia from 60% to 15%, in Malaysia from 18% to 2%, in the Philippines from 35% to 21%, and in Thailand from 26% to 16% ^.1 The important (albeit indirect) role of the United States in this process should be recognized. Assessing that period, Singapore's Ambassador to Moscow Mark Hong pointed out: "The role of the United States in regional security is one of the important factors for the success of ASEAN. The United States has opened the security umbrella under which its member countries can focus on social and economic development. " ²

The steady economic growth of the Southeast Asian countries "pushed" a number of analysts, including in our country, to the never-fulfilled forecast that these countries together can claim the status of one of the poles that is emerging - after the collapse of the bipolar world-the multipolar world. In the late 80's and early 90's, the general situation in the Asia-Pacific region (and indeed in the world in general)gave grounds to talk about the strengthening of the impact of economic factors on the international situation, while reducing military factors. In the early 90's, there was a sharp reduction in the scale of the foreign military presence here, a number of military bases were eliminated, the largest of which are American-Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines. As the Russian researcher G. I. Chufrin noted at that time, "at the turn of the 1990s, the process of transition from one paradigm of the development of international relations in Southeast Asia, which was based on the principles of geopolitics, to another, which was based on the principles of geoeconomics, was basically completed." ³ The validity of this estimate for the specified time interval is beyond doubt. Moreover, it fully fits into the general trend of public thought existing at that historical period in Russia and abroad, including in Southeast Asia. This is confirmed by the contents of the document "Common Destiny: Southeast Asia in the 21st Century", compiled by prominent scientists and politicians of the ASEAN countries. It reads in part:: "The growing importance of economic factors in international relations at the global level is comparable to the growing desire of Southeast Asian countries to give priority to economic tasks in public administration and foreign policy" ⁴ .

Ensuring economic stability

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The security of the ASEAN member states at that time became an essential component of their joint political activities. They have made considerable efforts to protect their collective interests, as opposed to creating economic groupings of developed countries with their trade protectionism and a system of closed trade and economic blocs. In line with this policy, the Fourth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the ASEAN member States in 1992 in Singapore decided to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) within 15 years (starting from January 1, 1993), the main mechanism of which was to be the Single Preferential Tariff System (SEPT). It was assumed that the above-mentioned trends in international relations in Southeast Asia will play a significant role in the foreseeable future, contributing to the strengthening of the economic potential of both the Association as a whole and each of its participants, thereby creating further prerequisites for stability in the region.

However, the subsequent course of events in the world made serious adjustments to the development of the international situation and put the Southeast Asian countries in need of revising approaches to developing security mechanisms. These events primarily include the economic crisis of the late 1990s and the tragedy of September 11, 2001 in the United States. The financial crisis that broke out in the second half of 1997 engulfed the real economy in almost all countries of Southeast Asia. It also had a negative impact on political processes and made these countries very vulnerable to external forces. If during the entire previous period of ASEAN's existence, its members from among the members of the "first wave" Association skilfully avoided too close and rigid rapprochement with the West on foreign policy and national security issues, then the events that followed the outbreak of the crisis radically changed the situation. M. Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), admits very eloquently that "there is no silver lining", since the countries of Southeast Asia that find themselves in a crisis situation will now willy-nilly have to follow the recommendations that Western credit and financial organizations have long offered them ^.5 Washington practically did not hide its desire to ensure that the economic crisis in Asia "worked" to ensure the interests of the United States. This was confirmed by the unprecedented tour of US Secretary of Defense William Cohen, who visited seven Asian countries at once in January 1998 - Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, China, Japan and South Korea.

The assessment of his trip by many politicians and analysts was summed up by the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri, which described it as the implementation of "a well-thought-out line aimed at consistently promoting relations with Asian countries, making absolutely unshakable the leading role of the United States in ensuring security in Asia." ⁶

Cohen carefully informed his interlocutors that the United States does not support initiatives in the region that "would undermine their operational flexibility or limit their military capabilities." He warned against this, in particular, Malaysia, whose purchases of Russian fighter jets caused Washington great irritation. During the trip, the US Secretary of Defense insisted on greater access for the US armed forces to ports and other infrastructure in Southeast Asia to meet regional security challenges, as well as greater opportunities for conducting exercises in the region. Cohen has made significant progress in this area in Singapore and the Philippines. In Singapore, it was announced that American aircraft carriers, submarines and other warships will be able to use the new Singapore naval base for resupply, routine maintenance and repairs free of charge. In Manila, the head of the Pentagon announced that the United States and the Philippines initialed a new agreement that makes it possible to resume calls of American warships to Philippine ports and conduct joint exercises on the territory of this country (calls of US Navy warships to the Philippines were stopped in 1992, when American military bases were withdrawn from there).

The period associated with the recovery of Southeast Asian countries from the crisis and the recovery of their economies was, in fact, a new phase of competition and confrontation between the main world power centers-the United States, Japan and China - for expanding their influence and presence in this strategically important region. Although the United States remains the undisputed economic leader, its share of global aggregate GDP is estimated to fall from 20.8% in 1995 to 17.6% by 2015. It is expected that China will come in second place, pushing aside Japan, and its share in world GDP will increase from 6.8% to 9.8% over ^the specified period7 . Attempts to bring the spheres of influence in Southeast Asia into line with the changing balance of economic potentials of the main centers of power and the resulting ambitions pose certain challenges to the national security of the Southeast Asian countries.

In the post-crisis situation, Japan has taken measures to play a leading role in the economic recovery of the region's countries. The total amount of funds allocated for the recovery of the economies of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea, in accordance with the so-called "Miyazawa Initiative", amounted to $ 30 billion. Loans under this program were made denominated in yen and linked by contracts with Japanese companies. By lending in this way, Japan was taking a step toward converting its currency, at least within the region, into an international currency, in an effort to displace the dollar, whose position in East and South-East Asia was shaken by a sharp outflow of short-term loans and dollar-denominated investments, which, in my opinion, led to a decline in the US dollar.-

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This was the reason for the financial crisis. Thai Foreign Minister Surin Putsavan assessed this development at the time: "The Japanese want to demonstrate their leadership in the region at a time when it is noticeably diminished by the United States." ⁸

China has also been quick to capitalize on the wave of anti-American sentiment generated by the financial crisis. While Washington has been slow, Beijing has committed $ 1 billion to support the region's economies at the most critical time. The economic activity of the People's Republic of China in the Southeast Asian countries in the post-crisis period, according to the representatives of the ASEAN countries themselves, was largely aimed at becoming a factor of economic stability in their collective consciousness, tipping the scales when choosing between confrontation for security purposes and economic rapprochement in favor of the latter. Lee Lei Toh, a researcher on political issues at the National University of Singapore, notes that the crisis contributed to the expansion of China's influence in Southeast Asia, since its actions were not based on strict postulates related to security issues ,but in the direction of developing economic opportunities. ⁹ But since the 1998 crisis, Southeast Asian countries have been looking at China with mixed feelings of anxiety and hope.

Hopes are based on the rapid economic growth of the neighboring giant with a population of 1.3 billion. countries that show an ever-growing and unmet demand can stimulate the production and export of countries in the region. Concerns arise from the fact that this neighbor, with its cheap labor and WTO membership, will attract foreign investment even more than in previous years, to the detriment of competitors. These concerns are largely justified. In 1990, China accounted for less than 20% of all investment in developing Asia, while Southeast Asia accounted for 60%. Currently, the situation has changed to the exact opposite: 60% is in China and 20% is in Southeast Asia, which until recently was one of the priority regions for foreign investors ^.10 Almost every year, another record number of foreign direct investment inflows to China is recorded. So, in 2002. they reached $ 53 billion, which led the United States to lose its leading position in the world by this criterion. For 2003, the Economist research group predicted a new Chinese record of $ 62 billion. despite the SARS epidemic and the slow development of the global economy ¹¹ .

The geography of external investment is also changing. Although China has not yet become the largest investor in Southeast Asia, ING Barings believes that China is following the path laid first by Japan, and then by South Korea, which made massive investments in the manufacturing industry of Southeast Asia. Singapore's Ministry of Trade and Industry predicts that Chinese investment will play a significant role in the development of the ASEAN economies over the next 20 years. In fact, Japan has already ceded the status of a regional economic leader to China. According to the IMF management, China is rapidly assuming the role of a regional "locomotive" of economic growth, which was previously played by Japan ^.12 At the same time, manufacturers of industrial products in the region are forced to resist growing competition from China, especially after its accession to the WTO. This is stated in the UN annual report on Trade and Development. In particular, it points out that in labor-intensive production, for example, in the assembly of electronic components, the ASEAN countries will face the strongest competition from the PRC. At the same time, China is striving to capture the markets of Southeast Asia. In Vietnam, motorcycles imported from China or assembled from parts made in China account for 70% of the total fleet. The Chinese company Suchuan Electric Group has become the market leader for air conditioners in Indonesia two years after the start of deliveries. In the run-up to the abolition of textile quotas in 2005, a number of Southeast Asian countries fear the complete disappearance of their own textile industry in the region.

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as a result of filling their markets and those of third countries with cheap products from China.

Thus, the Southeast Asian countries are losing out to China in the fight for both foreign investment and sales markets, including in their own territories. Realizing the inevitability of the growing influence of the Chinese factor on their economy, the countries of the region are faced with the need to work out the best option for cooperation. In the opinion of the ASEAN Secretary-General, R. Severino, the Association countries should treat China not as a competitor, but as a promising market, and ASEAN should focus on active participation in the development of the Chinese economy and on expanding cooperation with its rapidly developing neighbor. Since the crisis has recently dispelled the unshakeable belief of ASEAN members about the ability of the Association to become a sub-regional center for Asia-Pacific economic integration, on the basis of which AFTA was formed, they have undertaken a hasty search for new options for international economic cooperation. On this path, having forgotten the decision taken in 2000 in Singapore to create a single free trade zone for the entire region with equal participation of the ASEAN ten, China, Japan and South Korea, the members of the Association in November 2001. We signed an agreement on the creation of a free trade zone (FTA) with China within the next ten years.

China, which is even more interested than the ASEAN countries in creating an FTA, has committed itself to reducing a number of trade barriers in this area before taking similar steps in relation to other countries in accordance with its status as a WTO member.

The new economic agreement is certainly in the interests of ASEAN. In the rapidly growing trade with China, the ASEAN countries have a positive balance. The prospects of duty-free trade may encourage foreign investors to return to Southeast Asia. At the same time, a number of ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, express concerns about the creation of an FTA too quickly. There are suggestions that duty-free deliveries from China will damage their economy. R. Severino admitted that a number of industries will suffer damage from the creation of an FTA. At the same time, he stressed that the removal of barriers to mutual trade brings undoubted benefits for both sides and that the economic expansion of the PRC will remain a reality regardless of whether or not the FTA ¹³ is created . Something similar can be heard from China. Thus, Jin Yulin, a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Research, said that China's transformation into an economic giant is an indisputable fact, which is useless to deny, and for the ASEAN countries in this regard, there is only one way out - to use the opportunities that come from this ¹⁴.

China has been quick to consolidate its success in the field of economics with diplomatic activities. Beijing has caught the irritation that ASEAN members feel towards the United States when it manipulates the declared human rights and principles of democracy, which, according to many in Southeast Asia, for Americans are nothing more than a means to ensure their economic interests and solve strategic and geopolitical tasks. These sentiments of the ASEAN members were developed during the visit of Indonesian President Abdurahman Wahid to China in December 1999. In a joint statement, the parties expressed the view that the solution of human rights issues cannot be sacrificed to the problems of sovereignty and equality between countries, i.e., the principles on which the UN is built ^.15 In September 1999, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin arrived in Thailand in an attempt to do what none of his predecessors had been able to do - form a new model of partnership with the ASEAN countries and thus limit the influence of the United States. China has shown a desire to pit itself against the United States as a counterbalance in Asia.

Denouncing the "new gunboat diplomacy" and "economic neo-colonialism", referring to the United States, Jiang Zemin called on the Southeast Asian countries to create an atmosphere of mutual trust through dialogue and collective security.

The results of the visit were very modest. In response, official Bangkok practically limited itself to echoing the words of the high-ranking Chinese guest about the need for a "new international order" in Asia. The ASEAN countries prefer to pursue an ambivalent policy towards China, focusing on the economic side and not particularly trusting China's declared good intentions. Southeast Asia is clearly aware that China's efforts to expand economic cooperation are more strategic than tactical. Assuming that the new strategy of the People's Republic of China has a positive component in terms of the interests of the Southeast Asian countries, Yusuf Vanandi, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, points out that although China has changed and is trying to consolidate these changes, its ultimatum attitude to the issue of the Spratly Archipelago, the meaning of which is islands, remains the same. According to Vanandi, the changed conditions put on the agenda the development of new forms of relations with a regional superpower, such as the PRC ^.16 In this regard, a diplomat from one of the ASEAN countries is typical: "We would like to see that the unipolar structure of the situation in the region, in which the United States has too much influence on so many things, is being pushed back... But I don't think China is the party that we would prefer as a counterweight." ¹⁷ All this shows that Beijing, despite its best efforts, has failed to crack the scab of distrust and suspicion on the part of the ASEAN countries.

Thus, after a short period of relative peace and well-being-between completion

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After the end of the Cold War and the financial crisis of the late 1990s, the countries of Southeast Asia once again found themselves in the center of events dictated by the contradictions of the great powers. In the opinion of ASEAN members, in the recent past, the military - political status quo in Southeast Asia was largely determined by the presence of close centers of power-the USSR and the United States, on which the ASEAN countries based their policies equidistant from each other. This policy for many years (in fact, the entire period of the "economic boom") brought significant military, political and economic dividends to the countries of the region. The regrouping of forces in the region that began in the post-crisis period not only failed to bring stability, balance and security, but, on the contrary, made the situation precarious, subject to external influences, and, consequently, poorly managed and uncontrolled by the countries of the region themselves. The stabilizing presence of the USSR in the ASEAN region was also felt by the ASEAN members in a certain limitation of the ambitions of China, which is gaining economic and military potential, and one of the axes of its territorial claims is directed towards the Southeast Asian countries, the waters of the South China Sea, and the disputed territories located there. During the Soviet period, the ASEAN countries were impressed by Moscow's efforts to contain China's "creeping expansion" in the region.

Loss of the stabilizing factor with the departure of the USSR/The ASEAN countries have also been acutely aware of Russia in connection with the dramatic change in the international situation after the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, which required different approaches to security issues, which in the new century cannot be defined in the traditional categories of the previous century. The new totalitarianism and Islamic fundamentalism that give rise to terrorism threaten peace not only in certain regions, but also on a global scale. The impact of the 2001 terrorist attack in the United States and the rise of Islamic terrorism itself on the situation in Southeast Asia is extremely multifaceted. Security issues and ways to address them were perhaps the main component in a number of reasons that determine the close mutual interest of the ASEAN countries and the United States in maintaining and developing their relations during the Cold War and later. But if before these events, only the ASEAN countries were in need of constant support, then in the new conditions a completely different system of priorities is emerging.

A dramatically changed world is forcing US leaders to take a fresh approach to international issues. In this regard, the situation in Southeast Asia, where there is a place for militant Islam, is of particular interest to the United States. Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost notes: "Now no one in Washington can ignore Southeast Asia, given the large Muslim population in these countries and its importance in the global security system." ¹⁸ There is a threat of joining forces of terrorists at the regional level. The United States insists that a significant number of al-Qaeda activists are concentrated in Southeast Asia. If the Islamists want to unite, then the United States is trying to thwart these plans. This, according to analysts in Jakarta, is one of the main political contradictions in the Southeast Asian region, which is turning from a possible "base" of Al-Qaeda into a "front of military operations". In line with this logic, one should obviously consider another explosion in Jakarta in August 2003 of the 5 - star Marriott Hotel owned by Americans, which can also be considered as a warning sign about the undesirability of their stay in Indonesia and in the region in general. In the same row is the plot uncovered shortly after that, which involved striking the US Embassy in Singapore and other American targets. In the current situation, as local observers predict, the United States will not miss the chance to influence the states of the region to strengthen its influence (through expansion into various spheres of their life - economy, politics, diplomacy, military cooperation) in creating anti-terrorist alliances and the subsequent fight against terrorism. And it, as Washington admits, will be protracted. But this development is fraught with very worrying prospects. The growing dependence of Southeast Asian states on the United States will inevitably encourage nationalist and anti-American sentiments in Muslim circles and fuel terrorism. The power of the enemy, making it impossible to openly fight,

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it serves as an excuse for Islamists to conduct it using guerrilla warfare methods, and in fact-terrorist acts. The spread of anti-Americanism, or more precisely, anti-hegemonism, around the world is associated with rejection, often with defiant behavior of the only superpower that, in the eyes of many peoples, seeks not only to dominate the whole world, but also to impose its values and way of life on everyone, depriving others of their identity.

In this situation, Islam is seen by its radical followers as the only force capable of resisting US imperial policy and American globalism. In addition, reports in the world press about the US administration's intention to extend the retaliatory action to Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries have caused considerable concern to the ASEAN community. They believe that such threats, even if they are only an attempt to exert moral pressure and nothing more, can lead to unpredictable consequences. The Asean countries are once again experiencing an acute need for counterbalance, as Indonesian political analyst Devi Fortuna Anwar put it with complete frankness: "Everyone is concerned about American hegemony, and therefore there is a need to find a traditional state of balance." He further noted that the Indonesian military, against the background of these events, is extremely interested in easing its dependence on the United States in security matters ^.19

But the paradox is that if the US influence in the region is weakened by its imperial policies, other countries, primarily China and Japan, will immediately try to fill the political vacuum. This, in the presence of such explosive points in the Asia - Pacific region as the Spratly Islands, the Korean Peninsula, and Taiwan, will inevitably lead to a violation of the military-political balance in Southeast Asia. So the search for a formula for stability in Southeast Asia will require great efforts, perseverance and patience from the leadership of the countries of this region.

-----

¹ "Newsweek". N.Y. 1993, March I, p. 22.

² From the speech of Singapore's Ambassador to the Russian Federation Mark Hong at an international conference at MGIMO on September 24, 1997.

³ South-East Asia: Security parameters at the end of the 21st century, Moscow, 1995, p. 10.

⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

⁵ ITAR-TASS, 20.10.97.

⁶ ITAR-TASS, 12.02.98.

⁷ "Problems of the Far East", 1999, N 5, p. 8.

⁸ "Far Eastern Economic Review", 31.12.1998.

⁹ Ibid., 16.06.1999.

¹⁰ BIKI, 4.10.02.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 20.12.03.

¹³ Ibid., 5.11.02.

¹⁴ "Far Eastern Economic Review", 13.04.02.

¹⁵ Ibid., 16.09.99.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 10.06.99.

¹⁸ Ibid., 6.12.01.

¹⁹ Ibid., 20.11.03.

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