Soviet emigration and re-emigration policies in Central Asia in the early 1920s were chaotic. On the one hand, the new authorities of Turkestan themselves widely implemented a resettlement policy, and therefore migration flows through the Afghan and Persian (Iranian) borders did not particularly bother them. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership had an idea of tribes constantly migrating across borders as the main revolutionary-minded force in Afghanistan and Persia, which should be used for revolutionary, propaganda and intelligence-operational purposes. Since Afghanistan was practically closed to Europeans, the "tribal factor" was considered particularly important, as in pre-revolutionary times.

An important stage in the change in the official Soviet position regarding tribes migrating across the border was the signing of the first Soviet-Afghan treaties (September 13, 1920 and February 28, 1921), when the idea prevailed that the Afghan Emir Amanullah Khan was interested in maintaining allied relations with Soviet Russia and was an enemy of Great Britain. Despite the fact that the NKID had contradictions due to this position with the leadership of the Comintern, which developed bold plans for "revolutionizing" not only Afghanistan, but also India with the help of tribes, official Moscow refused to raise Pashtun and non-Pashtun tribes against Kabul and sought not to undermine the authority of the Afghan monarch. In addition, the opening of an official Soviet mission in Kabul and the acceptance by the Afghan authorities of obligations under the 1920-1921 treaties on the establishment of Soviet missions on the border with British India (which were never implemented in practice) allowed us to hope that propaganda and intelligence work could be carried out without the help of the tribes.

The previous policy of attracting Afghan Jamshids from Afghanistan to the Kushka region also became unprofitable for the Soviet authorities of Turkestan from the point of view of economic development of this area. Moving to Russian territory, the tribes sought to remain in densely populated border areas, not wanting to move to remote, economically undeveloped lands, thereby creating additional economic and political problems for the authorities, aggravating relations with the local population, and in fact, waiting for the Afghan border authorities to negotiate with them1 .

The Soviet authorities on the border, aware of Kabul's territorial claims to the Kushka region, became suspicious of migrants from Afghanistan, believing that the Afghan authorities did not accidentally allow them to cross into Soviet territory,

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and in the hope that the population of Kushka, largely consisting of Afghan immigrants, will sooner or later initiate a plebiscite on the issue of annexation of this area to Afghanistan ^.2 In addition, the idea of migrating tribes as a source of replenishment of bandit and partisan detachments prevailed. But the main reason for the changes in Soviet emigration policy after 1921 was Moscow's fear of provoking Kabul's dissatisfaction with the reception and settlement of tribes in conflict with the Afghan authorities in Turkestan, and weakening the position of Soviet diplomacy and intelligence in Afghanistan, especially near the Indian border.

At the end of October 1922, the Soviet authorities of Turkestan began to implement harsh measures against the Afghan nomadic tribes of Jamshids and Hazaras, who emigrated to Turkestan during periods of deterioration in their relations with Kabul, and moved the Jamshid villages to the hinterlands. ³ In 1923, another migration of Jamshids was carried out from the border areas, now together with the Balochs located in the Serakhs region, to the Tejen region (1,100 caravans were transported here, of which 700 belonged to the Balochs and 400 to the Jamshids) ^.4 At the same time, the Soviet authorities did not evict the Jamshids back to Afghanistan, apparently considering that if relations with Kabul changed, they could be used to put pressure on it, and also fearing that as Afghan subjects they would make devastating raids on Soviet territory ^.5

Official Kabul responded approvingly to the actions of the Soviet border authorities, but for its part increased agitation in the Kushkinsky district for the return of the Jamshids to Afghanistan. It was promoted by the "Statute on Emigrants" adopted by the Afghan authorities in 1924, according to which land was provided to those returning to Afghanistan on preferential terms or even free of charge; they were exempted from military service for six years and from paying taxes for three years. Although the main purpose of this law was to keep the Ersara Turkmens, as well as the residents of Eastern Bukhara, who had crossed over from the Basma movement areas to Afghanistan, the Afghan authorities hoped that it would also create favorable conditions for the return to the country of Jamshids and Hazaras, who for many years had migrated to the north of the country. Russian territory created tension in interstate relations.

At the same time, despite the opposition of the Soviet authorities to the resettlement of Afghan tribes in the USSR, families of Hazaras, Jamshids and other ethnic minorities of northern Afghanistan continued to move to Soviet territory in the second half of the 1920s for one reason or another. Thus, in 1926, 55 families of Khazars and Jamshids migrated from Afghanistan to the village of Chemeni-Bid in the Kushkinsky district, which sharply worsened the economic situation in this area, where for 380 families who already lived here, there were only 500 dessiatines suitable for irrigation land cultivation.

In the spring of 1927, almost 500 Hazara families emigrated from Afghanistan to the Takhtabazar district and settled on its territory. The central authorities of the Turkmen SSR were forced to provide the displaced people with assistance and assistance in settling down. At the same time, it turned out that the defectors were only a part of those who wanted to move to Soviet territory (the number of Hazaras who intended to leave Afghanistan and settle on Soviet territory was 1200 kibitkas) ^.6 The Khazars who emigrated to Takhtabazar district had a very unfavorable situation: they found themselves in bonded conditions when renting land plots from the indigenous population of this area. There was a feud that threatened to dramatically complicate intertribal relations. At the end of August 1928, rumors were spread in Takhtabazar that the Khazars intended to rob the local population and migrate back

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to Afghanistan. Acting Plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in Central Asia Boksha informed Tashkent that although the verification of these rumors was not confirmed, the situation is such that it can happen. He feared that such events, which had already occurred more than once, could again lead to increased banditry in the border areas and to an increase in the number of border conflicts with Afghanistan ^.7

In November of the same year, 1928, another 600 families of Afghan citizens tried to cross the border into the Kushkinsky district. The reasons for their emigration were economic and administrative pressure from the Kabul authorities, the brewing political and economic crisis in the country. However, the Soviet authorities did not intend to allow such a large number of Afghan subjects to enter their territory and spoil relations with official Kabul. About 500 caravans were detained at the border and sent back to Afghanistan. Only 116 families managed to stay on Soviet territory, although Tashkent recommended that the border authorities also return these emigrants to Afghanistan ^.8

By the end of the 1920s, the Soviet border authorities had also decided on the resettlement of Afghan tribal leaders. It is well known that prominent tribal leaders and even members of the Emir's family used to have the opportunity to settle on Russian territory. However, by the early 1930s, the Soviet leadership no longer intended to support the" political game " of the tribal leaders of northern Afghanistan against the Kabul government, considering that their families were connected to the transition ("the poor are enslaved and only therefore follow them"). the Soviet territory was pushed by the administrative reform in Afghanistan, as a result of which they were deprived of the right to collect taxes from the population. The Soviet authorities recognized that this support for the Khans did not provide any economic benefits, and that their political reception on Soviet territory could "adversely affect our relations with the Afghan government." ⁹

During the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet authorities took a different position with regard to people from Central Asia who left their native villages with the beginning of the Basmach movement and went to Afghan territory. The Soviet leadership saw the return of the population as a factor of great political significance, which should show the rest of the world that living conditions in the USSR had changed for the better, and the Soviet system had become attractive to thousands of former compatriots. In order to facilitate the re-emigration of the population, the government of the USSR already in early 1922 announced an amnesty for people from Turkestan and Bukhara, as well as ordinary Basmachi who wanted to return to peaceful life (in fact, this was a formal act) ^.10 An interdepartmental meeting of representatives of the NKID, OGPU and the Special Commission on Border Issues held in Tashkent on July 5, 1925, recognized the need to allow re-emigrants to pass unhindered with all their property: livestock, tools, inventory, household items, food supplies ¹¹ . Only with regard to weapons were strict measures left: "Firearms are taken away during the crossing, but for re-emigrant Turkmens, such weapons are allowed to pass freely in the amount of one rifle and two hundred rounds of ammunition per family and are registered..." ¹² . It was also announced that re-emigrants "are granted for labor land use the land on which they worked before leaving for Afghanistan" ¹³ .

A special category of emigrants included the former Emir of Bukhara and his inner circle, as well as former figures of the Bukhara revolutionary government who moved to Afghanistan during the 1920s. The latter were considered opportunists, with whom the Soviet authorities did not want to deal. However, the attitude towards the Emir of Bukhara was more complex. The Soviet authorities understood that the Emir was a great leader.-

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He was the leader and spiritual banner of all emigration, and therefore, while he was still on the territory of Bukhara, and then when he was received on Afghan territory, representatives of the NKID in Uzbekistan and Soviet diplomats in Kabul conducted, although unsuccessfully, secret negotiations with his representatives, trying to persuade the emir to move to Russia for permanent residence. ¹⁴

But the main thing was to return the bulk of emigrants who left Soviet Central Asia. It is not known exactly how many of them left Turkestan during the 1920s and 1930s. This figure was, according to the roughest estimates, at least a million people. However, re-emigration rates in the first half of the 1920s could not satisfy the Soviet authorities. Thus, 246 thousand people (44 thousand farms) emigrated from Tajikistan (mainly from Kurgantyubinsk and Kulyab districts) to Afghanistan, which accounted for 60% of the total population of East Bukhara, but only 18 thousand people (4.5 - ⁵ thousand farms) returned to Tajikistan by the spring of 192615 . With the exception of two thousand Pamir Tajiks who sought resettlement in the USSR for several years in a row and finally moved from Shugnan and Rushan to the territory of the Tajik ASSR16 ⁱⁿ 1925 , there were few examples of mass resettlement or return to the Soviet borders of emigrants who were former residents of these areas. The situation was similar on the Uzbek and Turkmen sections of the Soviet-Afghan border.

This trend contradicted the official ideas that existed in the USSR at that time: It was believed that the majority of emigrants fled to Afghanistan either from the civil war, or as a result of the ill-conceived policy of the Soviet authorities at the first stage, and now they are trying to return to their homeland. The Soviet authorities were sure that the emigrants in Afghanistan were going broke and that the bulk of them-the poor and farm labourers-had "a natural instinctive attraction to us in accordance with the theory of class relations." The Soviet press and public opinion have formed the idea that the majority of emigrants who left Soviet Central Asia in the first half of the 1920s are pastoralists who spend a significant part of their time grazing cattle on pastures within the USSR, and, consequently, are ready to finally switch to the Soviet side. However, their return is hindered both by the Beks and Khans, who are afraid of losing their main political and economic support in the tribal mass, and by the Afghan authorities, who do not want this for economic and political reasons ^.17

It was only in 1928 that a different mood began to take hold among Soviet officials in the Central Asian republics. These new sentiments were succinctly expressed by the acting Commissioner of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs in the Turkmen SSR, L. P. Nemchenko, who in his memo addressed to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, L. M. Karakhan, was forced to admit that "we know nothing about the economic situation of emigration, nor about new economic ties, nor about the amount of stolen and preserved livestock, or the size of the acreage" used by emigrants in Afghanistan ¹⁸ . According to its data, only 11,376 farms (about a third of the population) emigrated from Kerki, the most economically developed region of Turkmenistan, of which 4,230 farms were cattle-breeding and agricultural, and they took with them more than half of the livestock ^.19

The settlement of Turkmen emigrants in Afghanistan took place among relatives who were naturalized here many years ago, and the Afghan Turkmens formed, as it were, an outer ring of settlements, and the emigrants settled inside it. Families of the same family or similar in tribal genealogy settled nearby. Turkmen emigrants settled in Afghanistan in two large groups. The first group settled in Andkhoy-Karamkul-Davletabad - Jelagor district, the second-in the district of

page 15

Shibirgan-Akhcha-Mazar-I-Sharif. This also had its own deep economic expediency. The first district was rich in water, arable land, and seasonal pastures, and was located near the Soviet border. Most of the pastoralists settled here, especially karakul breeders, for whom seasonal grazing on Soviet territory was economically necessary, and some of the farmers. The second district was poor in water, but had a supply of unused land and extensive pastures-some farmers and a smaller part of pastoralists settled here.

The settlers received land plots in Afghanistan; during the few years of emigration, they formed large villages, built mosques, and began a more or less normal economic life. During the 1920s, they entered the system of local economic turnover and were connected with new markets. Nemchenko believed that re-emigration would require them to break their existing economic ties, and, consequently, most of them are unlikely to risk such a step now, especially since the Afghan government was actively involved in settling emigrants and sought to consolidate them in the country. According to L. P. Nemchenko, in 1925-1927. Kabul has allocated 600,000 rupees for this purpose. The Afghan government paid much more attention to the areas of Andhoy and Mazar-I-Sharif, where the bulk of Uzbek and Turkmen emigrants are located, than, for example, Shugnan and Rushan. Therefore, in concluding whether the Afghan emigration has serious economic prerequisites for returning to Soviet Central Asia, the author of a secret report to the NKID of the USSR admitted that "this question has to be answered in the negative" ²⁰ . The figures that came from the republics of Central Asia to Moscow confirmed this trend: by 1928, out of 11,376 farms that emigrated from the Kerki district of Turkmenistan, about 2,200 farms returned, i.e. 20% of the emigrants, bringing with them, according to the most inflated data, no more than 7% of the stolen cattle. Only those of the emigrant farms who had completely gone bankrupt in Afghanistan and had nothing to lose returned to the USSR: some hoping to restore their economic well-being in the USSR, others fleeing from creditors or Bayan bondage.

Moreover, in 1927-1928 there were new waves of emigration from the USSR to Afghanistan, although not as significant as in previous years, the main causes of which were the drought of 1927, the introduction of the so-called water tax in 1928, the conscription of the indigenous population into the Red Army, and, of course, the curtailment of the NEP simultaneously with the introduction of the New Economic Policy. attempts by the Soviet authorities to develop collectivization of agriculture in Turkestan. Many Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens fled to Afghanistan and joined their families. Western historians estimate that more than 50,000 people emigrated to Afghanistan in the early 1930s as a result of the violent policy of collectivization ^.21

As in the previous period, instead of mass re-emigration, there was only a constant movement of small tribal groups and individual dehkans on the Central Asian border, who went bankrupt in Afghanistan. Examples of emigrants ' participation in seasonal work on Soviet territory did not change this basic trend. Thus, up to 500 emigrants worked on the construction of the Palvarat Canal in Kerki district, but none of them remained here for permanent residence ^.22 Economic activity in the Central Asian republics at that time did not attract emigrants.

Having realized the failure of their re-immigration policy in the early 1930s, the Soviet authorities began to use sporadic means of influencing emigrants, creating various difficulties for them, especially with regard to grazing conditions within the USSR. However, these measures proved to be ineffective. First, they only forced emigrants to become more "naturalized" in Afghanistan, and second, they forced them to become more "naturalized" in Afghanistan.-

page 16

Thus, additional taxes on the grazing of emigrant cattle resulted only in higher prices, especially for karakul skins.

Failures in the implementation of re-immigration policy, as well as the constant desire of tribal leaders in the Afghan north to involve the Soviet border authorities in a confrontation with the Kabul authorities, required a rethink of the entire Soviet re-immigration policy. L. P. Nemchenko proposed to stop the activities of a specially created commission on re-immigration, as its work was fruitless (the commission, according to L. P. Nemchenko, even that small number of people who want to return to the USSR), and it itself is a means of extracting financial resources from Moscow. In his opinion, only the unhindered reception of all re-emigrants by the Soviet side and the provision of state-established benefits and assistance could have changed the situation ^.23 However, this position was opposed by the top officials of the Turkmen SSR (first of all, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the TSSR K. S. Atabayev) ^.24

The new method of solving the problem was "born" in the authorized representatives of the NKID and OGPU in Turkmenistan and was extremely simple - by bribing the leaders of Turkmen families to make all emigration loyal to the Soviet government, without seeking its return to the USSR. This proposal was supported by the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) Sredazburo I. A. Zelensky. Under the influence of the Uzbek and Turkmen republican authorities, the NKID compiled a report for the Kremlin, from which it followed that it was not necessary to make the main bet on the re-emigration of former compatriots to the USSR, but rather to strive to ensure that "groups of emigrants processed in the above-mentioned way become loyal to us, remaining within the borders of Afghanistan" ²⁵ . The question now came down to the availability of the necessary amounts for these purposes. Judging by the continuation of the anti-Soviet activities of the emigrant elite in Afghanistan on the eve of World War II, such funds were not found, and, therefore, we can talk about the failure of the Soviet re-immigration policy, especially since it was impossible to solve the problem of re-emigration without neutralizing the participants of the Basmachi detachments or reconciling with the bulk of the Basmachi.

In the second half of the 1930s, when the active activity of the Basmachs on Soviet territory was broken down, most of them settled in the Afghan territory along the border strip with the USSR: in the Yangi-Kali, Imam-Sahib, Rustak, Talikhan khakimstv, on the island of Urta-Tugai. In the Yangi-Kali khakimstvo, there were more than 800 farms of Uzbek-Tajik emigration, where influential leaders who actively participated in the Basmachi movement lived: Homza Kholmatov, Davlat Ali, Kattakhan, Buri, Sharbenitdin, Baratbay. A large number of members of former armed groups in Central Asia settled in the Talikhan khakimate (more than 550 farms), in the Kok-Buri area, where supporters of the former Kurbashi Ibrahim Bey settled, as well as in the Kunduz (2,470 farms of emigrants) and Imam Sahib (up to 600 farms) khakimstv26 .

Despite the end of the main military operations in Central Asia by the mid-1930s, Soviet intelligence believed that emigration continued to pose a potential threat: "The presence of ex-emigration in the border zone and the presence of national counterrevolutionary elements among them does not exclude the possibility of organizing Basmian gangs for armed border crossing into Soviet territory," ²⁷ he reported April 13, 1939-Captain Vasiliev, head of the intelligence post on the border with Afghanistan.

The Soviet side repeatedly made representations to the Afghan authorities about the need to remove these settlers from the border, but the resettlement of emigrants to the interior of the country promised by Kabul before the outbreak of World War II was never fully implemented. It should be recognized that the Afghan government-

page 17

The government understood the complexity and even danger for its relations with the USSR of finding a large number of armed and discontented people in the border zone, but it was forced to be guided not only by political attitudes, but also by economic expediency: the eviction of a significant part of the working-age population from the border areas would negatively affect the cotton industry. In addition, Kabul was determined to carry out such activities, only increasing the proportion of Pashtun people resettled in these areas from other provinces of Afghanistan, thereby trying to reduce its dependence on the actions of Jamshids and Hazaras in border affairs. In the 1930s, the Afghan authorities managed to organize the resettlement of only 11 thousand farms of the Umarheil, Durani and Gilzai Pashtun tribes to the northern regions of the country, settling them in the Kunduz Valley and on the island of Urta-Tugai. These measures of the Afghan authorities were met with discontent and even hostility by both the indigenous local population and the Uzbek-Tajik emigration, which was facilitated by the allocation of better land with water and pasture to the displaced people. ²⁸

By resettling emigrants along the borders with the USSR, the Afghan authorities pursued certain political and military goals. Uzbek-Tajik emigration in the border zone remained a factor of political pressure on the USSR, as well as a source of necessary information about the neighboring territory for the Afghan special services. In particular, in the Kattagan-Badakhshan province (with its center in Khanabad), counterintelligence work was actively carried out by the Maksus organization, which was subordinate to the intelligence department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan. It had its own branches, which simultaneously served as police stations in Yangi Kala, Imam Sahib, and Kunduz. The Khanabad Maksus was supposed to find out the mood of the population inside the country, and also carried out the task of recruiting agents from among the former citizens of Soviet Turkestan ^.29 According to archival documents, many former Basmachi soldiers with strong ties to Soviet territory were in cooperation with Maksus and other Afghan intelligence services.

Soviet special services in the late 1930s were aware of the activities of Maksus and justified the 1937-1938 repressions on the Soviet territory bordering Afghanistan by isolating its people. At the same time, they found out that special services of a number of other states operate on the territory of Afghanistan, which actively attract emigrants from Soviet Central Asia to their work. According to Soviet reports at the time, the Afghan authorities did not interfere with their activities, and the leaders of the Basmachi detachments and former leaders of the national governments of Turkestan and Bukhara were often agents of both the Afghan and other intelligence services. Thus, Soviet intelligence reported that the former chairman of the BNSR, O. Khodjaev, was connected with the Japanese military attache in Kabul, Major Miazaki, and that Mahmud Bey was carrying out assignments for both the Turkish ambassador and the Polish consul in Kabul, Domashevich ^.30

The leaders of emigration in Afghanistan were tensely waiting for a new war in Europe. Rumors persistently spread among the emigrants that Japan was preparing to move against the USSR and that as soon as this happened, uprisings would begin all over Soviet Central Asia, in which they should take part. For this purpose, in the second half of the 1930s, underground anti-Soviet organizations were established in Tashkent, Bukhara, and Samarkand by order of one of the leaders of the emigration, the former head of the Kokand government, Mustafa Chokayev (Mustafa Chokay-oglu) ^.31

However, intelligence and departments of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD for Central Asia closely monitored the activities of the top emigrants in Afghanistan, especially the leaders of Basma formations and former leaders-

page 18

mi of the BNSR and Kokand Autonomous Region. Therefore, before the outbreak of World War II, when Japanese and German intelligence services dramatically increased their activities in the East, including in Afghanistan, the Soviet special services stopped any attempts by both Afghan and Western special services to use emigration for anti-Soviet activities and intelligence. Unable, even for political and propaganda purposes, to ensure the return of thousands of emigrants to their homeland, Soviet special agencies and diplomats in Kabul on the eve of World War II focused their activities on neutralizing and weakening the forces of the Muslim opposition emigration.

notes

¹ For more details, see: Report note on the trip to the Baluchs of the Authorized CEC of the Turkmen SSR L. P. Nemchenko dated February 14, 1927, Top secret / / Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (hereinafter - RGASPI). F. 62. Op. 2. D. 879. L. 33-34.

² Note by Ibragimov and Sakhat - Muradov, Secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of Turkmenistan, to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of February 11, 1927, Top secret // Ibid., d. 878. l. 14, 18.

³ Secret message of the NKID Commissioner N. G. Ostanin to the NKID. Kushka, October 31, 1922 / / Ibid. d. 18. l. 102 vol.

⁴ Report of the representative of the NKID in Central Asia I. E. German to G. V. Chicherin. Tashkent, February 14, 1924 Top secret // Ibid., d. 71. l. 12.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Secret message of the OGPU plenipotentiary Mission in Central Asia to I. A. Zelensky. Tashkent, September 10, 1928 / / Ibid. d. 1342. l. 99-100.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Report of the NKID Commissioner in Turkmenistan I. A. Ostretsov to L. M. Karakhan. Top secret // Ibid., l. 43.

¹⁰ Summary of events in Afghanistan for January 1922 / / Archive of Foreign Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (hereinafter-WUA RF). f. 071. Op. 4. Pap. 109. D. 25. L. 4.

¹¹ Text of the appeal to emigrants wishing to return to the USSR, signed by the Consul General of the USSR in Mazar-I-Sharif B. P. Postnikov. February 8, 1927 / / RGASPI. F. 62. Op. 2. D. 879. L. 73-74; Protocol No. 6 of the meeting of the Special Commission on Border Issues. Top secret. Tashkent, July 5, 1925 / / Ibid. d. 193. l. 81-82.

¹² Minutes No. 6 of the Special Commission meeting...

¹³ Text of the appeal to emigrants...; Minutes No. 6 of the Special Commission meeting...

¹⁴ Telegram of L. M. Karakhan to D. Y. Gopner in Tashkent from December 2, 1920 / / WUA RF. f. 071. Op. 1. Pap. 101. D. 5. L. 20.; Summary of events in Afghanistan for January 1922.

¹⁵ Copy of the secret report of the Executive Secretary of the Organizing Bureau of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR. to the Taj. ASSR Tolpygo of April 22, 1926 / / RGASPI. F. 62. Op. 2. d. 533. L. 1-3.

¹⁶ For more information, see: Panin S. B. Soviet Russia and Afghanistan. 1919 - 1929. Moscow-Irkutsk. 1998. pp. 140-145.

¹⁷ Report of the Acting Head of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs in the Turkmen SSR L. P. Nemchenko Deputy Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L. M. Karakhanu. 1928 / / RGASPI. F. 62. Op. 2. D. 1242. L. 1-2.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., l. 4-5.

²⁰ Ibid.

^{Bradsher H.S.} 21 Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. New and expanded edition. Durham, 1985. P. 15.

²² Summary No. 8 of the most important information on external Central Asia for the period from November 15 to November 30, 1927, Strictly secret / / RGASPI. f. 62. Op. 2. D. 1346. l. 11; Secret message of the authorized representative of the OGPU in Central Asia ... l. 99.

²³ Memo... to L. P. Nemchenko... to L. M. Karakhan. 1928, l. 5-11.

²⁴ Ibid.

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²⁵ Secret letter of the NKID commissioner in the Turkmen SSR D. E. Skalov to the Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR L. M. Karakhan dated September 16, 1928 / / RGASPI. f. 62. Op. 2. d. 1242. L. 108-109.

²⁶ Agent reference on Northern Afghanistan, compiled based on the materials of the 48th border detachment as of 15.1. 1939 and the report for the 2nd half of 1938 by the chief of the point Captain Vasiliev of April 13, 1939 / / Russian State Military Archive (hereinafter - RGVA). f. 25895. Op. 1. D. 941. L. 7-8.

²⁷ Ibid., l. 7.

²⁸ Ibid., l. 9.

²⁹ Ibid., l. 13.

³⁰ Report of the deputy head of the SAVO intelligence department, Major Abdullayev, to the head of the SB GUGB of the NKVD SAVO, Major of State Security Zheleznyakov. April 15, 1939 Top secret / / RGVA. F. 25895. Op. 1. D. 944. L. 203.

³¹ Circular report of the deputy. Chief of the SAVO Intelligence Department, Major Abdullayev, to the People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Central Asian Republics of the USSR, dated February 27, 1939.

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