"Oligarchs" and "oligarchy" are concepts (or pseudo - concepts?) that will go down in the history of the formation of the new Russia. There is no doubt that there was and still is a certain reality behind them. Doubts are raised about the scientific validity of such a definition of a phenomenon that actually exists in Russia. But at the same time, it is unproductive to spend energy searching for a precise definition of the concept of "oligarchy". Marxist science did not single out the oligarchic phase in the development of capitalism, but only considered this phenomenon as a superstructure rather than a basic product of early, immature capitalism. As for "bourgeois science", the oligarchy was by no means its primary interest. Let's not forget that during the years of confrontation between the two world systems, many concepts were simply adapted to the interests of ideological and political struggle.

Nevertheless, there was a somewhat similar view of the oligarchy among Soviet and Western scholars. (Not excluding discrepancies: Soviet ideologists saw the main reason for the emergence of the oligarchy in private property, Western authors-in the authoritarian nature of the regime.) And this is not surprising, since the concept appeared in Ancient Greece: olu-apxia - the power of a few. The Great Encyclopedic Dictionary, published in Soviet times, defines an oligarchy as "a regime in which political power belongs to a narrow group of the wealthiest individuals." Reference is also made to the concept of "financial oligarchy". However, the interpretation of the latter concept ("a small group of the largest and wealthiest monopolists representing the dominance of financial capital") generally leads away from the understanding of the concept of "oligarchy". In the 1997 reissue of the dictionary, the words "the richest" are omitted, and in parentheses are added: "the rich, the military, etc.". This, in my opinion, is closer to revealing the essence of the phenomenon. Roughly the same definition is given by the Oxford Dictionary: power held in the hands of a narrow group of individuals.

Looking ahead, the concept of "oligarchy" has been raised more than once during discussions with foreign social scientists, in which I have recently participated. They all agreed that there were no clear definitions, and that the classic variants of oligarchic regimes known to the world in Asia and Latin America were very diverse. As for Russia,

Alexey V. Kiva-Doctor of Historical Sciences, Chief Researcher of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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this phenomenon is still in the process of development. Discussions around it are highly politicized, and not only by the efforts of Russian, but also Western politicians. Therefore, the phenomenon needs further study and understanding.

Discussion of the problem of oligarchy at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

My proposal to discuss the problem of the Russian oligarchy in the walls of my institute was met with skepticism by many. "What an oligarchy this is! "I heard the answer. "The government will change, and only a vague memory of this oligarchy will remain." However, supporters of this point of view participated in the discussion, which only made it more acute. Some speakers said that there are, so to speak, oligarchies and quasi-oligarchies. In Russia, most likely, we can talk about a quasi-oligarchy. Others argued in favor of the fact that each country has its own unique oligarchy, and that the Russian oligarchy as a phenomenon has already taken place. Although in this case we have a different type of oligarchy than in the countries of Asia or Latin America.

At the same time, it was emphasized that the Russian oligarchy is still poorly understood, because by historical standards it has only just been born, while in developing countries the oligarchy has either outlived itself or is becoming obsolete. With economic growth, the development of democracy, and especially the internationalization of economic and social relations, there will be almost no place for the oligarchy as a special phenomenon of underdevelopment. But since orientalists are primarily concerned with developing countries, they mostly spoke not so much about Russia as about these countries. Moreover, the majority pointed out that the concept of "oligarchy" in the usual sense has already entered scientific circulation and conveys the realities inherent in individual countries at the stage of immature capitalism, burdened by the legacy of the previous phase of development. It can be a legacy of colonialism, feudalism, family-clan relations, etc.

The oligarchic regime, as a rule, rests, figuratively speaking, on three or four pillars. First, they are large landowners of the pre-capitalist or early capitalist type. In Latin America - latifundists, in Asian countries - landlords, feudal lords, etc. Secondly, it is the emerging multi-layered new ruling class, which is already quite bourgeois landowners and traditional rulers, as well as financial speculators and other businessmen associated with the government - nouveau riche, corrupt officials of state institutions, etc. Third, it is an army with strong caste principles. Officers are traditionally formed on the basis of people who come from large land owners, wealthy segments of the population in general, and therefore there is most often a direct link between these layers and the officers. Fourth, clans, traditionally influential families that are often related to each other, play an important role in public life. Moreover, the influence of family and kinship ties and the clans that arise on this basis is so great that entire regions can be ruled by people with the same surname. In the center, the government is replaced, the regime is also replaced, some revolutionary reforms are announced and carried out, affecting both political power and the sphere of property, while local clans are preserved.

The Philippines was cited as an example. There, in particular, the largest landowners for a long time even had their own armies, which were not always funny and sometimes numbered thousands of people. (Some researchers believe that in some cases these armies still exist in some form.) The emergence of private armies seems to have been largely due to the weakness of the central government, the isolation of many regions from the center due to their insular position, and the presence of armed partisan and partisan groups in the country.

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separatist movements. But perhaps most of all, this is due to deep-rooted traditions.

The Philippines was a classic oligarchic country in Asia. At the same time, it was possible to speak about the oligarchy in relation to Indonesia during the reign of General Suharto and to Zaire during the presidency of Mobutu. Although it should be emphasized right away that putting these three countries in the same row would be a serious mistake. So, in the Philippines, where the majority of the population professes Christianity and where the influence of the Catholic Church is generally very great, modernity and archaism, democracy and authoritarianism, get along quite well, making public relations quite tolerant and soft. Even in times of revolutionary upheaval, they rarely became so violent as to result in bloodshed. (Even though leftist elements and Muslim separatists may be engaged in guerrilla warfare on the country's outskirts.)

In predominantly Muslim Indonesia, any major upheaval usually ends in bloodshed and pogroms against the thriving Chinese community, which occupies a strong position in the country's economy. Accordingly, there the face of the oligarchy is completely different, and the basis for its emergence is also different.

In Indonesia, it was not so much tradition as strength that played the decisive role. After the military, led by General Suharto, came to power (as a result of an unsuccessful coup d'etat launched in 1965 by leftist forces and resulting in the death of half a million to a million mostly innocent people), oligarchic relations began to arise on the basis of the real power of the military in the center and on the ground. Generals and officers appointed to high administrative posts began to actually redistribute part of the social product in their favor as a result of embezzlement and corruption, but especially at the expense of the Chinese community. Fearing the next pogroms, ethnic Chinese businessmen, under pressure and even on their own initiative, invited high military officials who held key administrative posts to serve on boards of directors, as consultants, etc., created joint ventures with their participation, gave them undisguised bribes, etc.

Almost all oligarchies are characterized by:

- more or less influence on the country's policy of illegitimate authorities;

- the ability of oligarchic groups to transform and adapt to new political and economic conditions;

- the presence of conflicting tendencies and interests in the ruling clan, which often result in sharp contradictions up to open clashes;

- a special role in the ruling clan of a narrow circle of people connected by close ties, primarily economic interests;

- manifestation of nepotism - "co-rulers" are most often wives, daughters, and other immediate relatives;

- the heyday of corruption.

Oligarchic regimes can exist both in openly authoritarian forms and under formally democratic constitutions. For example, Mobutu's regime was openly dictatorial. The Suharto regime in Indonesia is a strictly authoritarian, or so-called directed democracy regime. The heyday of the oligarchy in the Philippines came at a time when the country had a completely democratic constitution copied from the American one (which is not surprising, since Spanish rule in this country in 1904 gave way to the American one, which lasted until 1946), there was a bicameral parliament, presidents were elected by popular vote, etc.

However, in almost all cases, the oligarchic clan relies on the support of the army, police and security services, and it keeps the press under its control. It was with the support of the army that F. Marko, who was elected President of the Philippines in 1965 and 1969, introduced a state of emergency in the country in 1972, dissolved the parliament and political parties, and established an openly authoritarian regime. By pushing

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Indeed, by launching a series of serious political, administrative and socio-economic reforms aimed at modernizing the country, Marcos dealt a blow to the institution of private armies, to the old oligarchic clan, which grew up mainly in the bosom of pre-capitalist social relations, but at the same time actually created a new oligarchic clan mainly on the basis of state-owned enterprises. on a bourgeois socio-economic basis. The most prominent role in this was played by his wife I. Markos. The example of billions of dollars stolen by the Marcos couple has become a kind of landmark in the history of corruption regimes in Asia. According to some estimates, the Markoe family stole from the state from 4 to 12 billion dollars.

During the presidency of K. Aquino, who was widely seen as a fighter for freedom and the people's interests, returned to normal, or almost everything, because she herself was closely connected with the clans. More precisely, during the change of power in the Philippines, some clans pushed others, while the oligarchy remained as it was. Some experts on the Philippines argue that the healthiest policy, if you can say so, for the country was carried out by the next president - General F. Ramos. Maybe it was because he was the least connected with the clans. This may have contributed to the Philippines ' relatively easy handling of the so-called Asian financial crisis (1). But even he could not cope with the oligarchy. What can the former artist D., who replaced him in 1998, do? The bandstand, the future will show.

But the most surprising thing is that the Philippine oligarchy, which is indestructible even during the relatively rapid modernization of the country, draws strength from deep-rooted family-kinship and clan relations, traditions and habits, is not only not aggressive. It is quite compatible with the liberal - democratic order. According to experts, there is more real democracy in the Philippines than in today's Russia. It seems that this can only happen in Eastern countries with strong remnants of traditional ethics and morals. "Live for yourself and let others live" - this widespread principle in the United States seems to have been transferred to the Philippine soil and there transformed in its own way. As a result, the recently reviled Marcos family does not feel at all like an outcast in their country.

But there is also a direct opposite example: the robbery of Zaire by the clan of General Mobutu brought the matter to a bloody civil war. The riches of Mobutu, who ruled Zaire for more than 30 years with direct support from the army elite, were legendary. However, the looting of Zaire by the Mobutu clan is not comparable in scale to the plundering of Indonesia by the family of General Suharto, who also ruled for more than 30 years, although in a country with an immeasurably large population and immeasurably richer opportunities.

The word" family " was pronounced as often in Indonesia as it is now in Russia. In addition to his wife, the richest people in the country were the sons and daughters, numerous relatives of President Suharto. According to some reports, in the hands of the "holy family" there were assets and property worth $ 40 billion. The result was about the same as in Zaire: the country collapsed at the first serious test. Although it is also true that the test of the global financial crisis for Indonesia, which was sharply inferior in terms of development to its neighbors, including the Philippines, turned out to be not just difficult, but the hardest (2).

The financial collapse of August 1998: the end of the Russian oligarchy or a powerful incentive for its transformation?

Obviously, no one needs to explain that democracy, under the banner of the struggle for which a powerful democratic movement grew up in Russia during the years of Gorbachev's perestroika, and the oligarchy are difficult things to combine. Why at the end of the XX century we have this phenomenon of past centuries, the phenomenon of immature and painful

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developing capitalism, as well as "wild capitalism" itself , is a question that requires special consideration. Here we are only interested in the oligarchy. It was first mentioned in Russia shortly after President Boris Yeltsin, having solved the problem of dual power by force in his favor, actually created a regime of personal power in the country.

By the way, Yeltsin's vast power as president under the Constitution adopted in December 1993 did not cause much concern in democratic circles. This fact was initially regarded rather as a victory for the democratic forces. The democratic public was strongly impressed by the confrontation between the power of the president and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, a confrontation that ultimately led to dual power and threatened a new major civil war. At the same time, the executive branch headed by Yeltsin was an iconic figure of democratic reforms, while the legislative branch (first represented by the Supreme Soviet, and then by the State Duma) was associated with resistance to these reforms. Most Democrats at the time thought that the more power a president committed to democratic reforms had, the more successful these reforms would be, and the sooner Russia's changes would be irreversible.

The fear of the restoration of the communist order among the politically inexperienced Russian democrats left no room for historical analogies about the corrupting role of power in general and, in particular, the power of the vast, without real checks and balances. The democratic intelligentsia began to realize the negative aspects of the president's superpower only after the beginning of the entry of federal troops into Chechnya in December 1994. But the same fear of the restoration of real socialism, coupled with the efforts of the state apparatus, huge funds and new electoral technologies (which, according to prominent psychologists, can give a rating increase of up to 15%), prompted not only the majority of the democratic intelligentsia, but also millions of representatives of the general population to vote in the presidential elections of 1996 not for the "good communist" G. Zyuganov, but for the" bad democrat " Yeltsin.

The first references to the Russian oligarchy were more a journalistic metaphor or a device for political struggle, rather than a statement of fact or an act of providence. Anyone was called an oligarch - a prominent nouveau riche, a presidential security guard A. Korzhakov, or the head of a large state-owned company. Of course, it can be said - and some analysts do say it-that the oligarchy's premises were laid already in the last years of Gorbachev's Perestroika. In an attempt to force the socialist economy to serve the real needs of people, laws were passed that allowed the creation of various types of cooperatives at state-owned enterprises, cash out non-cash money, etc. This allowed dishonest managers and various types of crooks to siphon funds from the public sector to the shadow economy, which began to grow by leaps and bounds. The latter serves as the foundation of the oligarchy. After all, the shadow economy is a fertile ground for the development of corrupt and criminal ties, for their close interweaving, and ultimately for semi-criminal and criminal businesses to reach the highest level of government officials. In the last years of Perestroika, the first commercial banks began to appear, whose leaders were often Komsomol employees who had accumulated business experience while working in the so-called Komsomol construction teams, etc.

Proponents of this view believe that the roots of the oligarchy should be sought in the Soviet period of Russian history, in particular, pointing to many current bankers, called or called oligarchs, who just at that time made the initial capital. This includes Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Boris Berezovsky, and many others. When did E. Gaidar's "shock therapy" and software privatization begin?

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According to A. Chubais, the nouveau riches were already ready not only to skillfully take advantage of the revolutionary changes in property relations that had begun. They were already capable of directing these reforms in their own interests. The involvement of some nouveau riches directly in the reform of the country, the connections of others with the "young reformers", and the third with the Kremlin allowed everyone to go through such a path to wealth and political influence in just a few years, which in other countries the nouveau riches have passed for decades, or even hundreds of years.

You can say something else, and with no less convincing degree. The oligarchy in Russia was created by the unprecedented redistribution of financial resources in favor of the same nouveau riches during the "shock therapy" and the boom in the construction of financial pyramids, and the equally unprecedented lightning-fast redistribution of giant public property. Western analysts estimate that it was during this period that a huge social stratification occurred in the former Soviet society, and extreme poverty belts appeared, covering tens of millions of people.

But be that as it may, the first significant signs of the emergence of an oligarchy in Russia made themselves felt only in March 1996. It was then that the so - called "Statement of the Thirteen" appeared-an appeal from thirteen of the most influential bankers and heads of financial and industrial groups. In it, in a somewhat vague and confused form, all branches of government and all influential political forces were called upon to cooperate and even postpone the presidential elections in order to preserve public stability. Such a statement was met with incomprehension in society, and very critically among the political elite. Moreover, he was criticized by both Communists and liberal Democrats.

But such a reaction was explained by the fact that only a few people actively involved in politics knew what the captains of Russian business knew, namely: Yeltsin, who had a rating of 3-4% at the beginning of the year and considered himself uncompetitive in the upcoming presidential elections, was preparing to cancel them (3). At the same time, only a narrow circle of people politicians and political scientists knew that at the annual meeting of world business leaders and influential politicians in Davos, Switzerland, in February 1996, the Russian business captains, who had previously been at odds with each other, decided to join forces for the sake of Yeltsin's victory in the upcoming elections.

This, obviously, was the first serious evidence of the formation of an oligarchy in Russia, and a powerful incentive for the process itself. The famous slogan of election technology specialists who worked for the Kremlin is " Vote or lose!" he could not have better conveyed the mood of the top of the "new Russians": for them, Yeltsin's loss would mean their own loss. For virtually any new person in the presidential chair would demand a review of at least the most scandalous cases of blatantly fraudulent privatization, when, for example, state property valued at billions of dollars was purchased for several million. Moreover, at that time, the most likely "new person" was the communist Zyuganov.

However, the oligarchy in Russia finally took shape after the presidential election. The bankers who invested considerable resources in Yeltsin's election campaign, both financial, informational and intellectual, and all those who actively contributed to his victory, demanded compensation. The re-elected president has met almost all of their demands. (Rather, not even himself, for he was permanently disabled as a result of a serious illness that required heart surgery and subsequent complications, but those who acted on his behalf.) Everyone got what they wanted. Who increased their property, who received new benefits for the media controlled by them, who came to power. It can be concluded that it is during this period that a group of very influential people begins to form around the sick president, which a little later will be called the "family".

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The truth is that after the operation, Yeltsin's working capacity plummeted, and in general, his legal capacity began to raise doubts. There are cases when he, speaking to the public, spoke at random, made impossible promises, made political and other forecasts that were literally refuted by life before our eyes. In this situation, someone had to compensate for his inadequacy as a president with the broadest powers. At the same time, they had to be especially trusted people, before whom the president would not be afraid to show himself even during periods of his complete infirmity. Hence the appearance of her daughter, T. Dyachenko, as an adviser to the president and one of the most influential members of the "family", and the promotion of the journalist V. Yumashev, who is particularly trusted by the Yeltsin family, to the forefront of politics. But this also leads to the disbanding of the institute of presidential assistants, and a sharp weakening of the intellectual support of decisions made by the president.

In any case, the victory of the already seriously ill Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election cost Russia not only the final formation of the oligarchy. The economy was plundered, the social sphere declined even more, and the state's ability to perform the constitutional functions of a social state and fulfill its obligations to its citizens was undermined.

Did the oligarchy disappear as a result of the financial disaster of 1998?

In this regard, we can repeat, somewhat changing, the well-known words of Mark Twain: rumors about the death of the Russian oligarchy are greatly exaggerated. Yes, the" semibankirschina", as it declared itself during the presidential election, is no longer in Russia. First, a number of oligarchs have become, so to speak, ex - oligarchs. The once influential Inkombank headed by V. Vinogradov completely went bankrupt. Oneximbank, once managed by V. Potanin, has suffered heavy losses, while the Media Bridge of V. Gusinsky, SBS-Agro of A. Smolensky, etc. are experiencing considerable difficulties. But, first of all, there were new financial and financial-industrial magnates-R. Abramovich, A. Lebedev, an influential financier in the highest circles A. Mamut and some others.

Secondly, are we dealing (at least in some cases) with false bankruptcies dictated by an elementary reluctance to return money to depositors? The financial scandal involving the laundering of "dirty money" from Russia to the Bank of New York, during which the names of many well-known Russian financiers have already been revealed, suggests exactly this idea. Multibillion-dollar amounts of" laundered " dollars of dubious origin in Western banks have already been named. If the Russian side, fearing further revelations of corruption in the highest echelons of power, does not deliberately slow down the investigation, everything will soon fall into place. Perhaps we will learn the names of even more powerful financial magnates than those whose real or imaginary ruin as a result of the global financial crisis is lamented by the media close to the oligarchs in our country.

Third, after the financial crash in August 1998, the regulatory role of the state in the financial and economic sphere was dramatically strengthened. And since the highest state power in Russia not only serves the interests of the oligarchy, but, in essence, embodies it, then as long as this power remains, the oligarchy remains. After all, it is no secret that most commercial banks were born just with the active assistance of the state. The so-called authorized banks, which served as intermediaries between the state and the client and which, during a period of high inflation, made huge profits by "scrolling" money intended for" state employees", pensioners, etc., are just one of the ways the state works for the interests of private banks. In fact, there are many of them.

E. Government Primakov immediately became disliked by Russian speculative financial capital as soon as it declared that it would not serve its interests.

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Another thing is that the highest authorities, not following the advice of the well-known economist A. Livshits "we must share" and taking a focus mainly on the interests of the Berezovsky - Abramovich financial and industrial clan, which is obviously closest to it, caused sharp discontent on the part of other oligarchs and ex - oligarchs. But this is essentially a scandal in one's own family. It flares up and then subsides.

Fourth, the role of the " family "has also dramatically increased, both in making important government decisions and as a regulator of financial flows. Be that as it may, after the financial collapse, the state's resources have become less, and it is necessary to pay more debts than before. And the West, in the face of the Bank of New York's money laundering scandal, as well as corruption in the highest echelons of power, is tightening its demands on Russia on the one hand, and on the other, it is in no hurry to provide it with new loans. Even to pay off its debts, and this constantly threatens the country with default with known consequences.

A clear example of how openly aggressive the "family" acts in order to gain control over the main financial flows of the country is the removal of A. Savelyev from the leadership of Transneft (which controls almost all Russian oil pipelines and has an annual income of about $ 0.5 billion) and the appointment of a person who pleases him in his place. This was not just a strong-willed, illegal act, but, according to Savelyev, it was carried out under persistent pressure from Abramovich, who allegedly even resorted to threats. Abramovich, according to everyone, is now one of the most trusted and influential members of the "family", moreover, he is, so to speak, in the narrowest circle consisting of only 4 people. Something like how the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU consisted of a narrow group of people especially trusted by the General Secretary, who made the most responsible decisions during his illness. The only difference is that Abramovich is not officially endowed with any power functions.

But before" taking on "Transneft, Semya had already taken control of almost all the main highly profitable industries and companies, including railway transport and the power supply system. Only Gazprom remained outside the full control of the "family". However, it has also recently strengthened its position there, and some analysts believe that it will also get its hands on it by the presidential elections. Why this is done is no secret to anyone. Having concentrated huge sources of financial resources in their hands, having placed their own people in key government posts, the "family" has the opportunity to expand the circle of "their" people in the center, and to influence regional leaders, including through the provision of subventions, to expand the circle of "their" people in the regions, to establish control over everything new media outlets, and, of course, get a strong financial support during the parliamentary and presidential elections.

And here you don't have to go far for examples. The appearance of the new Unity electoral bloc on the eve of the parliamentary elections is due solely to the efforts of the oligarch Berezovsky, the president and his entourage. The block primarily included those regional leaders who either needed the center's financial assistance most or felt vulnerable to justice. Or such an example: in a very short period of time, under investigation on charges of economic crimes (and even a fugitive from justice outside of Russia before the change of the Primakov government and the removal of the "intractable" Prosecutor General Yu. Skuratova) Berezovsky, despite the arrest of his Swiss bank accounts, allegedly managed to buy the newspaper Kommersant and 6 other newspapers with money borrowed from a businessman of dubious reputation, an Israeli citizen L. Cherny (also, by the way, who came to the attention of Western investigative authorities on suspicion of laundering "dirty money"). - th TV channel. Moreover, he, a person who does not have any legitimate power, "miraculously" managed to consolidate his position on the ORT channel, in which the state owns a controlling stake. With the help of such unscrupulous and

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This channel has turned into a tool of real information terror against politicians who are reputed to be corrupt journalists like S. Dorenko. Some of his handpicked "masters of speech" even boast of being " political hitmen."

Fifth, the threat posed to the "family" not only of losing the fortunes acquired by honest and dishonest means, but also of losing security guarantees in the future, contributes to its cohesion. And if everything that the West openly says and writes about prominent members of the presidential entourage is in fact justified, then the threat to the "family" looms quite serious. Officials in Western countries are already talking about corruption in the highest echelons of the Russian government, including members of the president's family. If at first it was only about credit cards of the Swiss company Mabetex, then during the hearings in the US Congress of the case of money laundering in the Bank of New York, the first head of this bank, under severe pressure from congressmen, named accounts with the names of members of the president's family Dyachenko and Okulov.

In the face of this danger, it is not only the "family" that is rallying as the core foundation of the oligarchy. The "power of a few", i.e. the oligarchy itself, is also growing. The press constantly reports about high-ranking officials who are being drawn to their side by the "family" in one way or another, about an unexpected positive solution to problems that have not been solved for years in favor of certain governors and other influential leaders.

The Russian oligarchy as a unique phenomenon in its ugliness

The uniqueness of the Russian oligarchy is caused by the fact that it appeared not in the course of a progressive historical process, but as a result of an inversion - a return - development. A country that has once again reached even the lowest level of the average level of development of capitalism, even if only in the center, and not on the periphery, as a result of the collapse of real socialism and subsequent chaotic development, was forced to return to its original positions in some ways. After all, the phase of low-civilized, "wild capitalism" Russia already passed at the end of the XIX-beginning of the XX century. The uniqueness of the Russian oligarchy also lies in the fact that it originated in the depths of a developed society. No matter how inefficient the Soviet economy was, no matter what shortcomings its socio - political system might have, the country had an almost universally literate population, a huge army of scientists, advanced technologies, at least in some key areas of the scientific and technological revolution, world achievements in science and technology, and its achievements in the social sphere for a long time. time was the envy of even developed countries.

In addition, the Russian oligarchy was not a by-product of capitalist progress, as it happened in other countries, or even a by-product of Russia's regressive development in the last decade, but itself became one of the cardinal causes of Russia's regression. This has never been seen in the world before. Here, for example, is what a well-known American professor, a leading expert on the problems of Russia and the CIS countries, S. Cohen, says about this: "In my opinion, you are experiencing an unprecedented process of demodernization. If miners, teachers, doctors and other categories of the population do not receive a salary for their work, this is from the era of slavery. When the average age of a man fell to 57-58 years-this is not the level of the XX century, but of the previous century. If there is no investment in industry in the country, this is also not the 20th century. If a significant part of the middle class is forced to grow products for their own food in country and garden plots-is this the XX century? Therefore, I see in modern Russia not a transition from the worst to the best, but huge losses, lost opportunities. All the achievements in industry, in science-it doesn't matter if

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what kind of power they came from-they were achievements of the state. And why was it necessary to part with them? " (4).

Consider Indonesia: the example of the local "family" is out of the ordinary. The Suharto family, or rather, the presidential oligarchic clan, as stated in the same media, "owns assets equal to half of Indonesia's gross national product "(5). However, per capita income in Indonesia has increased 10-fold on average over three decades, while the number of people living below the poverty line has tripled over the same period (5). However, as the crisis deepened and unemployment increased, Indonesian incomes began to decline and the poverty zone expanded. Nevertheless, it turns out that the oligarchy of oligarchs is a discord. The most destructive oligarchy for the country is the one that sucks all the juice out of it, does not allow it to develop.

I would also point out a number of specific features of the Russian oligarchy. First. The ground for its emergence, of course, was laid in the course of a large-scale redistribution of property in favor of the "new class", mainly nouveau riche speculators. Thus, between 1992 and 1994, at least 70% of the country's property passed into private hands (5). By 1996, the oligarchy had already been formed. It was based on big bankers, heads of financial and industrial groups, who had already grown together with the authorities, had the leading central media at their direct disposal or exerted a strong influence on them with the help of various levers, mainly financial ones.

It should be particularly noted that at that time the Russian oligarchs enjoyed the unconditional support of the West. The ruling circles of the West, and the United States in particular, as it now turns out, were well aware of the methods of privatization and fake mortgage auctions in Russia, but they were silent and even hid the relevant reports of the special services, considering that any privatization of state property, and even more so one that leads to a sharp weakening of Russia's military-industrial potential, meets their national interests. By the way, this was almost openly stated by US President W. Bush. Clinton, fending off accusations from Republicans that they were recklessly supporting those in Russia who were called reformers.

However, after the financial collapse in August 1998, "family" has become almost synonymous with the oligarchy. Many of those who took the initiative in 1996 to mobilize all the resources needed to win Yeltsin's presidential election have either stepped aside or come out in opposition to the Kremlin. If, for example, Gusinsky's NTV played a crucial role in the propaganda campaign in favor of Yeltsin in 1996, now it acts as a sharp and skillful critic of him. The "family", becoming more and more odious in the eyes of public opinion, is gradually becoming more and more isolated. But at the same time, paradoxically, its role in making the most important state decisions is constantly increasing. However, here, obviously, the law of compensation manifests itself in full force: the functions of a seriously ill president are assumed by his inner circle.

In any case, it is unprecedented for an oligarchic regime that the shadow government, which in fact is the "family", is stronger than the official government. No matter what country with an oligarchic regime in the past or present we turn to, almost everywhere the official power is strong. Whether it's in the Philippines, Indonesia, a number of Latin American countries, or Zaire. Our situation is different, and this obviously happened because the Constitution adopted in Russia in fact in the extreme conditions of 1993 is extremely unbalanced. On the one hand, it proclaims broad democratic rights and freedoms of citizens, and on the other ? giving the president almost royal powers, violating the holy of holies of democracy ? the principle of separation of powers deprives them, citizens, of a mechanism by which their rights and freedoms can be guaranteed. The result is that on behalf of the president, who, by the way, is not accountable to anyone, members of his family and friends commit arbitrariness.

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people from the immediate environment. Apparently, having forgotten himself, the presidential press secretary D. Yakushkin himself at one of the press conferences called the president's daughter Dyachenko-just an adviser to the president-one of the most influential politicians in the country.

Second. No oligarchic country, and probably no other country in the world, has such a powerful organized crime as in Russia. If the criminal world, according to some estimates, controls about 40% of the economy, it should not be surprising either the penetration of crime into the government, or the criminalization of the government itself, or the fact that the whole world is talking about corruption in the president's family. However, the issue of criminality in Russia has already been considered by me on the pages of " ONS " (6).

In conclusion, I would like to say the following. You don't have to be either a politician or a political scientist not to see that the highest authorities are doing everything possible to preserve the so-called continuity. In Berezovsky's understanding, this means leaving everything as it is: leaving unpunished both the blatant cases of predatory privatization and the economic crimes of representatives of the current ruling class. To achieve this, it is necessary to keep power in the hands of the current ruling elite in one way or another. To do this today seems simply incredible. However, if this happens due to a combination of circumstances, we will be dealing with an oligarchy, to paraphrase the words of the classic, "seriously and for a long time."

But I am an optimist and I hope for a different outcome. The "normal government" will come, and the oligarchy will end one way or another. This can happen both evolutionarily and revolutionarily. It would be better, of course, if the oligarchy, having lost its stronghold in the face of the "family", died a natural death. But if it resorts to unconstitutional actions beyond its expectations, then anything is possible.

list of literature

1. Baryshnikova O. G., Levtonova Yu. O., Shabalina G. S. East Asia on the threshold of the XXI century // East. 1999. N 2.

2. Fedorov V. A. Army and modernization in the countries of the East, Moscow, 1999, pp. 73-103.

3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1999. July 23.

4. Izvestiya. 1998. February 11.

5. NG-political economy. 1998. N 7. P. 5.

6. Kiva A.V. Criminal revolution: fiction or reality? // Social Sciences and Modernity. 1999. N 3.

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