Singapore's two-year stay in Malaysia was the last step on its path to independence. The article examines the prerequisites for the creation of the Federation of Malaysia and the internal political differences between the central government in Kuala Lumpur and the government of Singapore in the period from September 1963 to August 1965, which led to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia.

Keywords: Singapore, Malaysia, HDP, OMNO, Lee Kuan Yew, Tunku Abdul Rahman, domestic policy.

The plan to create a Federation of Malaysia, which would include the Malay Federation, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei, was put forward on May 27, 1961 by the Prime Minister of Malaysia Tunku Abdul Rahman1 in Singapore at a breakfast hosted by the Association of Foreign Correspondents in Southeast Asia [Tyurin, Tsyganov, 2010, p.274]. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew supported Tunku, and in August 1961 an agreement in principle on unification was reached [Sopee, 1976, p. 159-160]. On November 11, the basic conditions for the unification of the two territories were approved by the Governments of Malaya and Singapore [Sulitskaya, 1973, p.50].

The idea of uniting Malaya and Singapore emerged long before the speech of the Malay prime Minister, but it was in the summer of 1961 that the ruling circles of various parts of the future Malaysia began to actively implement these plans. The leaders of Malaya hoped to strengthen the country's economic position by creating a Federation and form a strong state in Southeast Asia, in which they would occupy a leading position. The leaders of Malaya did not want to go for unification only with Singapore, because an alliance with this country, which was dominated by the Chinese population, threatened to change the numerical ratio of Malays and Chinese in favor of the latter. The inclusion of the territories of North Kalimantan with a large Malay and Dayak population in the Federation somewhat balanced this balance: the Chinese in the future Federation would make up 42.8% of the total population, that is, less than half [Tyurin and Tsyganov, 2010, p.274].

BACKGROUND OF THE MERGER

An important factor in favor of unification was the internal political situation that developed in 1961 in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. Singapore's ruling People's Action Party (MHP) was defeated in the April 1961 parliamentary election to fill a vacant seat in the Legislative Assembly for Hong Lim District [ibid., p. 275]. This event, against the background of the activation of left-wing pro-Chinese forces in Singapore and the weakening of Lee Kuan Yew's influence, caused alarm in the ruling circles of the Federation of Malaya. There were legitimate concerns that Singapore might become a communist stronghold in the region. There were statements that

1 Next-Tunku. The title of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of independent Malaya, became his name.

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The island will turn into a "second Cuba" and this will lead to unpredictable consequences for the Federation [Sopee, 1976, p. 123].

However, the emergence of Malaysia was associated not only with the specific political situation in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya, but also with a whole range of historical, cultural, ethnic, economic and foreign policy reasons. Joining the Federation freed Singapore from colonial dependence and could, according to the plan of the Singapore authorities, solve the country's economic problems: dependence on foreign trade and rising unemployment.

But not everyone in Singapore welcomed the idea of unification. A group of leaders of the Singapore Trade Union Congress, led by Lim Qin Hsiang, expressed disagreement with the principles of the creation of Malaysia and the policies of Lee Kuan Yew, and in July 1961 left the People's Action Party, in August creating a new political party, the Socialist Front (SF). The SF, which held 13 seats in the Singapore Parliament, insisted on achieving full independence. Singapore's independence by 1963, after which the country could merge with Malaya, gaining proportional representation in the federal Parliament. The HDP, which had a one-vote parliamentary majority after the split, proposed holding a referendum on joining Malaysia. The referendum was held on September 1, 1962. Of those who participated in the voting (90% of those who had the right to vote) 71% supported the government option of unification; 25% dropped blank ballots at the call of the Federation Council, protesting against the referendum, which did not contain the answer "no" to the creation of Malaysia, but only talked about the conditions of unification [Lee, 1998, p.452]. In any case, the position of the MHP led by Lee Kuan Yew was strengthened after the referendum [Sopee, 1976, p.163-165].

A series of negotiations took place between parts of the future Federation, as well as between Malaya and England (which owned Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei).

On November 20, 1961, negotiations between the Malay and British delegations began in London. An agreement was signed under which England approved the creation of Malaysia and the start of negotiations between Malaya and Singapore. A special place on them was occupied by the issues of preserving the Anglo-Malay Defense Treaty: it was decided that its terms would apply to all the territories of the future state [Sulitskaya, 1973, pp. 50-51].

Negotiations between Britain, Malaya, Singapore and Brunei continued throughout the first half of 1963. The Malay-Singapore negotiations were particularly difficult. The Singapore government pushed for the creation of a common market in Malaysia, which would provide significant advantages to the strong Singaporean bourgeoisie over its weaker partners in other parts of the Federation. The issue of allocating part of Singapore's revenue to the federal budget has also become a stumbling block. Only on July 5, 1963, the Malay and Singapore delegations negotiating in London reached an agreement under which 40% of Singapore's revenues went to the central government, and the rest remained at the disposal of local authorities (FEER, 1963, p.207).

On July 8, 1963, in London, representatives of England, the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah signed an Agreement establishing the Federation of Malaysia on August 31, 1963 [Malaysia..., 1963]. The legislative proposals that were required to be added to the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya were separated into a section of the Agreement called the Malaysia Act. This Act, together with the 1957 Constitution of the Federation of Malaya. drafted the Constitution of Malaysia.

The basic principles of unification were as follows: The Federation of Malaysia consisted of 14 states, but the states of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah had significantly greater autonomy than the 11 states that were part of the Federation of Malaya. The ruler of the state - yang dipertuan agong-was elected from among the Malay sultans. Lower one

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The House of Representatives consisted of 159 deputies. Each state had two representatives in the Senate. Malay was declared the official language. Singapore retained the status of a free port. The functions and powers of the Legislative Assembly, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Prime Minister of Singapore were limited to defense, foreign relations, security, and some other matters (Lee, 1998, p.406). Singapore maintained autonomy in education, health care, and labor policy. The creation of a common Malaysian market was envisaged, but this process lasted for 12 years: thus, the federal government of Malaysia, using administrative levers, restrained Singapore's initiatives aimed at accelerating economic development [Pakhomova, 2007, p.21].

624 thousand people born in Singapore automatically became citizens of the Federation upon unification, and approximately 327 thousand natives of China, India, and even Malaya, before obtaining federal citizenship, had to first pass a special federal qualification procedure and pass the Malay language proficiency exam [Lee, 1998, p. 407-408].

CONFLICT-CAUSING FACTORS OF UNIFICATION

The conditions for Singapore's entry into the Federation, approved by the British and Malay authorities, obviously contained elements of potential conflicts. Singapore, which was home to 16.7% of the total population of the Federation, was allocated only 15 seats in the federal Parliament, while Sarawak (7.7%) - 24 seats, and Sabah (4.7%) - 16 seats [Malaysia..., 1963, p.13]. In addition, under the citizenship clause of the Malaysia Agreement, Singapore citizens could only participate in elections in Singapore.

The agreement to establish Malaysia left many vital political questions unanswered. The leaders of the HDP felt that the Agreement, with all its limitations, provided them with an opportunity to expand their political influence on the mainland, and the leaders of Alliance 2 were sure of the opposite.

The preservation of the Malay sultanates, the adoption of Islam as the state religion and the Malay language as the state language (the only official language after 1967), the constitutional provisions that ensured the special status of Malays - all testified to the special status of Malays in political life [Government..., 1967, p.71]. And, more importantly, in terms of the relationship between the Singapore government and the central government, the latter assumed that the HDP would limit its political activities to the territory of Singapore, and the city itself would be content with the role of the" New York of Malaysia " [Straits Times, 10.12.1964].

The conflict between the Chinese Association of Malaya (CAM) and the HDP as a result of CAM's attempt to expand its political influence in Singapore did not improve the situation. In the months immediately leading up to the formation of Malaysia, KAM sent two senators to Singapore to enlist the support of conservative-leaning Chinese. These actions drew sharp criticism from Lee Kuan Yew [ibid., 27.05.1963].

Fundamental differences in the views of the leaders of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya existed even before the formation of Malaysia. During the negotiations in Manila in August 1963, the concept of creating a confederation of three states-Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia - Mafilindo was put forward. Lee Kuan Yew has openly criticized the concept, saying that while he has no objections to closer economic and cultural cooperation between the three countries, he believes

2 The Union Party is a coalition of the United Malay National Organization( UMNO), the Chinese Association of Malaya (CAM) and the Indian National Congress (ICM). Established in October 1954.

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Mafilindo is a "racist conspiracy" against foreign Chinese in Southeast Asia [Suryanaryan, 1969, p. 6].

Disagreements between Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya led to the postponement of the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. On August 6, 1963, at the Manila meeting of the heads of the three Governments, Tunku agreed to postpone the proclamation of Malaysia until the end of the survey conducted by the UN Commission in Sarawak and Sabah on their entry into the Federation [Lee, 1998, p. 493]. The Commission worked from August 26 to September 5, 1963 and came to the conclusion that the majority of the population of Sarawak and Sabah supported joining Malaysia [Tyurin and Tsyganov, 2010, p.287].

The proclamation of the Federation of Malaysia took place on September 16 at the Merdeka Stadium in Kuala Lumpur. Singapore joined the Federation as an independent state, as on August 31, 1963, at a solemn rally at the City Hall, Lee Kuan Yew unilaterally declared Singapore an independent state [Lee, 1998, p. 498]. Sabah and Sarawak declared internal self-government on the same day [State of Singapore..., 1963, p. 21]. This event was an unpleasant surprise for the Malay Government and caused a wave of criticism from its side [Straits Times, 03.09.1963]. In response, Lee Kuan Yew stated that Singapore did not actually give its consent to the postponement of the merger date to September 16 and, accordingly, the independence associated with this event. In addition, there were objective domestic political circumstances for declaring independence on August 31. Lee Kuan Yew feared overt action by the Socialist Front and pressure on the Malay Federation from Indonesian President Sukarno [Lee, 1998, pp. 496-497].

General elections to the Legislative Assembly of Singapore, which took place in September 1963 immediately after the formation of Malaysia, did not improve relations between the central Government and the Government of Singapore. The struggle unfolded between three political forces: the ruling HDP, SF and Alliance 3 of Singapore [Tyurin, Tsyganov, 2010, p. 292]. Each party had a clear political orientation: the MHP was pro - Malaysian, the SF was anti-Malaysian, and the Singapore Alliance was a conservative alternative to both of them. The alliance counted on the support of conservative-minded Chinese and Malays, who traditionally supported the Unification of the Malay national organization, but their expectations were not met.

The MHP won a landslide victory in the election. It won 47% of the vote and 37 seats in Parliament. The Socialist Front won 35% of the vote and 13 seats. The Alliance received 8% of the total vote, all the party's candidates were defeated and did not win a single seat in Parliament [Singapore Government Gazette, 24.09.1963].

The Singapore Government was clearly aware of the difficulties it would face if it were to openly address its differences with Kuala Lumpur. Lee Kuan Yew stated that his immediate task will be to restore good relations with the central government and gain its trust [The Times, 30.09.1963].

Concerns about "restoring good relations" were reflected in the selection of Singapore's representatives to the Senate. For the House of Representatives, the HDP elected twelve candidates and allowed the Federation Council to choose three. Ko Tek Kin (President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore) was selected for one of the two seats in the Senate, and the second candidate was given to Tunku, who was proposed by Inche Ahmed bin Taffa, one of the leaders of the Singapore branch of OMNO [Suryanaryan, 1969, p.10].

3 The Singapore Alliance Party was formed in June 1963 after the merger of the Singapore People's Alliance and the Singapore branches of KAM and OMNO. It was also joined by members of the parties that had ceased to exist by that time, the Labor and Progressive parties.

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An important factor that united the leaders of the Singapore Government and the federal Government immediately after the formation of Malaysia was the policy of confrontation with Indonesia. The leaders of the two governments settled their differences for a while in order to present a united front against external threats and" iron-clad " opposition parties.

Lee Kuan Yew apparently felt that in the face of the growing confrontation with Indonesia, there was a possibility of a new alignment of political forces in the Federation and that all pro-Malaysian parties would cooperate and work together, unlike those parties that opposed Malaysia. However, everything turned out to be different. The Federation leaders considered any new alignment of political forces undesirable [ibid., p. 11].

CROSS-PARTY CONTROVERSIES

Having failed to form a pro-Malaysian alliance, the MHP leaders were faced with a choice of further ways to expand their political influence on the mainland. There were only two possibilities open to them. The first is to become an opposition party in Malaysia, putting forward its own socio-economic program; the second is to try to become a partner in the Alliance as a conduit for the interests of the Chinese population. The first direction was associated with great difficulties. Any direct opposition to the central government, especially during the period of confrontation with Indonesia, could weaken Malaysia and worsen relations between the leaders of the two territories. Such a move could be interpreted as anti-national. There was also a risk that the Malay population might become dissatisfied with the attempt of a non-Malay political party to seize power in Malaysia. Therefore, the only viable option, preferred by the HDP, was to win the support of the Malay Chinese and take the place of the KAM in the Alliance. It was obvious that many Chinese living in the cities had by then become disillusioned with KAM and its policies. Since 1959. The People's Socialist Front (PSF) became active in urban areas, and it managed to enlist the support of the younger generation of Chinese [ibid., p.12].

The HDP has begun to criticize the KAM and its chairman, Tan Hsiu Sin, while strengthening contacts with OMNO and endorsing the Alliance's policies. In September 1963, Lee Kuan Yew announced that the MHP would not participate in the 1964 federal election. At the same time, he noted that KAM has no chance of winning, and suggested that in the near future the HDP will replace KAM in the Alliance [Straits Times, 10.09.1963]4.

OMNO's reaction to these remarks was lukewarm. At the end of September 1963, Tunku made a public statement that he supported the positions of the KAM and was outraged by statements that could lead to a split in the Alliance [Malayan Times, 30.09.1963].

Despite assurances that the MHP would not participate in Malaya's elections, the Chairman of the MHP, Deputy Prime Minister of the Singapore Government Toh Chin Chi, said at the opening ceremony of a Tamil newspaper in Singapore on March 1, 1964, that the MHP, which had played an important role in the formation of Malaysia, considered itself a national party and, therefore, should take part in participation in elections. At the same time, he stressed that this step is not the intention of the HDP to enter into a struggle with the central government and the leadership of the Federation [Lee, 1998, p.540].

However, the possibility of participating in the elections caused controversy even in the MHP itself. Ken Swee (Singapore's Finance Minister) was strongly opposed, believing,

4 On 29 September 1963, Lee Kuan Yew repeated that the MHP was not interested in the 1964 federal election in Malaya [Malayan Times, 30.09.1963].

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that this move would damage relations between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and jeopardize Singapore's industrialization plans within the Federation [ibid., p. 540].

Apparently, the HDP was guided by two considerations. First, there was the fear that, in the absence of a decent alternative to KAM, the urban electorate in Malaya would vote for an anti-Malaysian and pro-communist NSF. Second, it was hoped that if the 1964 elections were won by candidates nominated in urban areas from the HDP, this would prove to Tunc that the HDP can better represent the urban population than the KAM. Moreover, local and federal elections were to be held simultaneously, and the HDP had no other opportunity to test its level of support in Malaya before the 1969 elections [Suryanaryan, 1969, p. 14-15].

The results of the 1964 parliamentary elections were disastrous for the MHP: only one of the nine candidates it fielded won by a narrow margin. The Alliance won 89 seats out of 104, an improvement over the previous election (Lee, 1998, p. 547).

The MHP won only 2% of the vote and was defeated by the KAM in six electoral districts, one by the NSF and the other by the United Democratic Party. In the elections to the Federation Council, the HDP performed no better. It contested fifteen seats, but received only 0.9% of the total vote and no seats [Suryanaryan, 1969, p. 17].

Analyzing the results of the 1964 elections, it should be borne in mind that the main problem at that time was the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia. The HDP had nothing new to offer on this issue. The party could not clearly present its socio-economic program, and "it seemed that the MHP did not have its own electoral platform, which could be clearly separated from the Alliance's platform" [ibid., p.17].

Lee Kuan Yew outlined three main reasons for the MHP's defeat in the election: first, there were no branches of the party in Malaya. Secondly, there was no experience in conducting election campaigns in the Federation format. Third, the party's agitators failed to convince the electorate to prefer the HDP over the KAM [Lee, 1998, p. 547].

SINGAPORE KUALA LUMPUR COLLISION

The MHP's entry into the Malay political scene marked a turning point in relations between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. A series of events followed that eventually led to Singapore's withdrawal from Malaysia.

MHP leaders understood that their political activities within the Federation would be perceived by Malays as a threat to their special position in Malaysia. Moreover, Malays made up only 13.6% of the population and could lose the special privileges guaranteed to them in Malaya. The Malaysia Agreement specifically stipulated that the privileges of Malays in the Federation of Malays would not apply to Malays residing in Singapore. The Constitution of Singapore recognized the" special status "of Malays, but did not grant them any" special rights " [Our First Ten Years..., 1964. p. 109-114]. Many Singaporean Malays expected that after the formation of Malaysia with a Malay-dominated central government, they would be in a better position than before, but their hopes were not fulfilled [ibid., pp. 125-127].

As already noted, after the 1963 election defeat, UMNO stepped up its activities in Singapore to pressure the MHP Government into granting Malays certain privileges. It is in this context that we need to consider the social unrest that began in July 1964. Its immediate cause was the eviction of two hundred Malay families who had been forced to leave the country.-

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taken over by the Singapore Government, from Jurong District. OMNO Singapore accused the MHP of deliberately trying to redistribute Malay voters and disperse them among the large Chinese and Indian populations [FEATHER, 06.08.1964].

To defuse the situation, Lee Kuan Yew decided to organize a meeting of representatives of various Malay social and cultural organizations, but OMNO was not included in the list of participants. OMNO accused the HDP of deliberately trying to divide the Malays and retaliated by organizing the so-called Malay Convention on July 12, 1964, at which "Malay Demands"were made. The Convention was attended by 150 Malay organizations, including OMNO, the Pan-Malay Islamic Party and the Union of Malay Peninsula. In his address to the Convention, Ali bin Ahmad, Deputy Secretary-General of OMNO, accused the HDP of trying to create a "State of Israel" in Singapore with the aim of suppressing the Malays: "the tactics of oppression of Muslims by Israelis in Israel are identical to the way Malays are oppressed by the HDP in Singapore" [Daily Press Summary, 13.07.1964].

The conference organized by the Singapore Government on July 19, 1964, did not solve its problems. Lee Kuan Yew assured delegates that he would provide Malays with all the conditions to compete with non-Chinese people in search of work, but at the same time he made it clear that there would be no quota system for allocating jobs or issuing licenses, nor reserving land for Malays [ibid., 20.07.1964].

In such an explosive atmosphere, it was not difficult to stir up public unrest.

It all started on July 21, 1964, when more than 25,000 Malays gathered in Padang to celebrate the Prophet's birthday. Malay leaders have criticized the HDP, accusing it of mistreating Malays. During the procession, a police officer was beaten, attacks on Chinese people began, and clashes between Chinese and Malays broke out in different parts of Singapore. A curfew was imposed, which was lifted only on August 2. 23 people were killed and 454 were injured. After a difficult six-week truce, riots resumed in the first week of September 1964. 13 people were killed and 106 were injured. The riots exposed the dangerous potential for inter-communal tensions and the fragility of the basic principles on which the concept of Malaysia was based.

When riots broke out again in September 1964, Lee Kuan Yew was on a trip to Europe. In a speech in London, he said that the riots were related to the defeat of OMNO in the elections in Singapore and to differences in the understanding of the Federation's principles by the governments of the Federation and Singapore. "Malaysia will survive or fall," Lee Kuan Yew said, "depending on whether we intend to create a Malaysian nation or a Malay nation" [Some Problems in Malaysia.., n.d., p. 12-18].

Articles in British newspapers were highly critical of Toonk and the central government. The British press called on their government to influence Tunka and force him to build a "non-racial unified society" [Sunday Telegraph, 13.09.1964].

After the riots, the leaders of OMNO and MHP temporarily stopped the confrontation. The Central Government appointed a commission to investigate the circumstances of the incident [Straits Times, 10.10.1964]. Singapore's leaders met with Tunku and concluded an agreement, which later became known as the"truce". Toh Chin Chi stated that the leaders of the Alliance and the HDP agreed not to publicly address "sensitive issues" for the next two years [ibid., 27.09.1964].

However, the provisions of the" truce " were vague. Federal Minister of Agriculture and Cooperation Mohammad Hir Johari said that the Singa Alliance-

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pura will win a sufficient number of votes in the elections and form a new government in Singapore [ibid., 26.10.1964]. This provoked an immediate reaction from the HDP's chairman, Toh Chin Chi, who called the statement a"violation of the truce." Hir Johari replied that he was not aware of any" truce " and that the MHP should be prepared for competition from other political parties [ibid., 28.10.1964]. As a result, the HDP decided to "repurpose and reorganize" the party in such a way as to achieve success in Malaya (Suryanaryan, 1969, p.25).

The HDP's decision to step up its activities on the mainland and become one of the main political forces in opposition to the Alliance has led to a sharp deterioration in relations between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. Tunku asked Singapore's politicians to focus on the fact that Singapore is "Malaysia's business hub, not a hotbed of political squabbles": "If the politicians in Singapore don't agree with me, the only solution is to divide..." [Straits Times, 10.12.1964].

In November 1964, at the anniversary congress dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the HDP, Lee Kuan Yew put forward the concept of "Malaysian Malaysia" [Tyurin, Tsyganov, 2010, p. 305]. Explaining its meaning, Lee Kuan Yew pointed out that the old policies and attitudes that were so successful in the Federation of Malaya did not match the situation in multiethnic Malaysia, and that the extremist leaders in OMNO - "ultras" as he called them-instead changed their policies to suit their needs They want to "push Malaysia into the Malay scheme" [Are There Enough.., 1965].

There were fundamental differences in the approaches of the Alliance and MHP leaders to community and nation-building issues in Malaysia. The Alliance's policy provided for a rather long period of parallel coexistence of the three main ethnic groups before they merged into a single nation (Suryanaryan, 1969, p. 27). MHP leaders argued that the Alliance's community parties only perpetuate differences between communities, and therefore urgent measures should be taken to break down interethnic barriers and ensure the operation of multiethnic political parties [ibid., pp. 27-28].

The Alliance's leaders did not want to openly discuss interethnic issues. The HDP leaders acted in the opposite way. The paradox was that the leaders of the Alliance-a party with a" communalist " structure-believed that too frequent discussion of the problems of "communalism" is "communalism" with all the negative consequences that follow from this. The MHP was a multi-ethnic party in terms of membership, but its leaders believed that community problems should be constantly analyzed [Milne, 1964, p. 216].

In May 1965, Lee Kuan Yew stated that none of the three largest peoples of Malaysia can consider themselves nation-forming to a greater extent than the others, since the ancestors of each arrived in Malaysia no more than a thousand years ago. That is, none of these peoples had more reason than the other to call themselves Malaysians (Asian Almanac, 1965, p. 1218).

OMNO leaders took the announcement as a serious challenge to Malaya's political system, which is based on the fact that Malays are the country's indigenous population. The British, and later the independent Malay Federation, recognized the Malays as an indigenous people.

A series of actions and protests against the Prime Minister of Singapore soon followed. A group from the youth organization OMNO in Kuala Lumpur burned an effigy of Lee Kuan Yew. There were calls for his arrest [Lee, 1998, p. 607].

The culmination of the MHP leaders ' attempt to create the basis for a united opposition on a Malaysian scale was the formation in May 1965. Malaysian Solidarity Associations. It includes the MHP, the People's Progressive Party (NPP) and

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United Democratic Party (ODP) of Malaya, Sarawak United People's Party (PONS) and the Machind Sarawak Party.

The Association unanimously adopted the vision of building a "democratic Malaysian Malaysia" and signed a declaration that read: "Malaysian Malaysia means that the nation and State are not identified with the rule, welfare and interests of any particular community or race... The special and legitimate interests of different communities must be reliably protected and ensured within the framework of collective rights, interests and responsibilities of all races" [ibid., p.606]. The declaration noted that recent statements made by the Federation's leadership were contrary to the spirit and purpose of Malaysia and that "violation of the basic principles, not confrontation with Indonesia and the pro-communist threat, pose the greatest threat to Malaysia" (Declaration by the Convenors..., 1965).

It should be borne in mind that the HDP has adopted constitutional provisions regarding Malay rights and the national language, but other Unification partners, especially the NCE, have been strongly opposed to granting Malays special rights and language policies of the central Government. Equally important, the HDP, NPP, PONS, and ODP depended, despite their multi-racial ideology, mainly on the support of the Chinese population. The very nature of the campaign to create a "Malaysian Malaysia" was such that Malays could hardly be counted on to support it, and it only increased inter-communal tensions [Suryanaryan, 1969, p.32].

On May 26, 1965, the Federal Parliament met. It was held in an atmosphere of mutual attacks and accusations. Member of Parliament Mahathir Mohamad 5 stated that the MHP is a "pro-Chinese, pro-communist and absolutely anti-Malay" party and that if the MHP does not change its policy, it will destroy the country [Parliamentary Debates..., 26.05.1965, cols. 71-85]. The appeal to the Parliament stated that there is a threat to Malaysia's security not only from outside, i.e. from Indonesia, but also from within the country [ibid., 26.05.1965, col. 31]. Lee Kuan Yew asked to specify what is meant by "threat from within", emphasizing that he considers this a veiled accusation of the HDP, and read excerpts from the Utusan Melayu and Malay Merdeka newspapers. He reiterated that the HDP had signed up to the fundamental principles of the Malaysian Constitution, and noted that the speeches of the Alliance's leaders had made him question the central Government's intentions [ibid., 26.05.1965, cols. 537-568].

Lee Kuan Yew's speech caused a storm of protest from the Alliance. Interior Minister Tun Ismail accused the HDP of violating ethnic harmony and demanded that Lee Kuan Yew provide "examples or signs of Malay domination instead of making vague and indirect statements" [ibid., 31.05.1965, cols. 703-718]. At the end of the debate, however, it turned out that the" threat from within " did not refer to the HDP, but to the communist threat [ibid., 03.06.1965, cols. 991-1011]. To respond to the allegations made against him, Lee Kuan Yew called a press conference to repeat the accusations against extremists [The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia, 1965].

It soon became apparent that Lee Kuan Yew was determined not to step back from running a "Malaysian Malaysia" campaign and teetering on the brink of war. He talked about the possibility of using an "alternative option" to suppress opponents of this idea and pointed out that Sabah and Sarawak support Singapore and that Malacca and Penang may join them [Straits Times, 01.06.1965]. However, the Ministers of Sabah and Sarawak Affairs issued categorical statements that Sabah and Sarawak would remain part of Malaysia [ibid., 05.06.1965].

The escalation of the conflict between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore occurred in connection with by-elections to parliament in the Hong Lim district. Member of the Legislative Assembly from this

5 Prime Minister of Malaysia 1981-2003

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Ong Yong Guan resigned from the electoral district, accusing the MHP government of "suppressing the media through which opposition parties can reach the people" [ibid.]. MHP leaders were confident that Ong Yong Guan resigned under pressure from the federal government to test popular support for the MHP [Lee, 1998, p. 622].

By June 30, there were two candidates for the Legislative Assembly in the district: Lee Hoon Choi from HDP, and Ong Chan Sam from SF. The Singapore Alliance has decided not to participate in the election. The election campaign was short. The election was held on July 10. Voters had to vote either for the" Malaysian Malaysia " of the HDP, or for the SF with its call to crush Malaysia [ibid., p. 622]. Lee Hoon Choi received 59% of the vote, more than doubling the results of the 1963 elections, when the MHP received only 26%.

Lee Kuan Yew presented the MHP's victory as a sign of public support for its "Malaysian Malaysia" concept: "Hong Lim's verdict is clear and convincing. Almost 60% - in favor of the Malaysian Malaysia... When Toonku returns from London, we will have to solve some fundamental problems... this is either Malaysian Malaysia, or the collapse of Malaysia " [ibid., p. 624].

All of this took place against a backdrop of heightened communal tensions and complex relations between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. Tunku was in London at the time for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers ' Conference, after which he fell ill and was admitted to hospital on June 25, 1965. Later, he recalled that there he weighed in his mind all the pros and cons of separation and came to the conclusion that "for the well-being and security of Malaysia and Singapore, the territories must part" [Sunday Times, 16.08.1965].

SINGAPORE BRANCH

Tunku returned to Malaysia on August 5 and two days later met with Lee Kuan Yew, who tried to offer a compromise option for forming a more flexible federation [Straits Times, 10.08.1965]. However, Tunku had already made up his mind, and the Prime Minister of Singapore was forced to agree to the separation.

The events leading up to Singapore's secession from Malaysia demonstrated that Lee Kuan Yew never seriously considered the possibility that Tunku was using separation as a way to stabilize relations between the two Territories (Lipski, 1965, p. 21-23). Serious disagreements have emerged in Singapore's leadership. Some members of the government did not want to sign the agreement until the last moment [Straits Times, 10.08.1965].

On August 9, 1965, simultaneously in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, the creation of a new sovereign independent State, the Republic of Singapore, was officially announced.

list of literature

Lee Kuan Yew Singapore History: from the "third World to the first", Moscow: MGIMO-Univsrsitst MFA of Russia, 2005.

Nakhomova L. F. Models of prosperity (Singapore, Malaysia. Thailand, Indonesia). Moscow: IV RAS, 2007.

Sulitskaya T. I. Anglia i Malaya (1961-1971) [England and Malaysia (1961-1971)]. Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1973.

Tyurin V. A., Tsyganov V. A. Istoriya Malaysii XX vek [History of Malaysia in the XX century]. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010.

Are There Enough Malaysians to Save Malaysia? Singapore: Government of Singapore, Ministry of Culture, 1965.

Asian Almanac (Singapore).

The Battle for a Malaysian Malaysia. Singapore: Government of Singapore, Ministry of Culture, 1965.

Daily Press Summary.

Declaration by the Convenors of the Malaysian Solidarity Convention. Singapore, 1965.

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