Why don't any of them lead to the right goal

Recognition of the fact that the world's center of power is moving from the Transatlantic region to the Pacific Ocean has become a common place in the last year or two in the reasoning of researchers from various countries and schools. Even the most outspoken skeptics are forced to admit that the economic pole of influence has almost completely shifted to the Asia-Pacific region, although they are under the illusion that the West in general and Europe in particular will remain a cultural center (including for Russia) and retain at least part of the current political capital. However, world history shows that the shift of the economic center inevitably entails a similar shift of cultural and political components.

A new economic leader can demonstrate a success story to the city and the world, which means that his political system and cultural traditions are considered a priori advanced, since they allow him to achieve a high standard of living. This is the path that Europe once took (in 1500). it provided only 18% of world production, while the East-77%, including the Far Eastern Confucian civilization-35%), such a path, apparently, is expected in the coming decades and the Asia-Pacific region.

As a result, a new historical chance is given to Russia, which, unlike Europe, for purely geographical reasons is able to take part in the formation of a new geopolitical project. By the way, the United States has the same opportunities due to its "island" position, and they are already using them. Washington announced its intention to significantly increase the military grouping in the Asia-Pacific region (sea, land-

P. B. Salin-PhD in Law, Director of the Center for Political Science Studies of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation.

international trade and aviation), and high-ranking politicians are increasingly traveling to countries in the region.

Moscow does not yet have a clear and consistent strategy for asserting its position in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as for the development of the Russian Far East. Since the beginning of its development a century ago, this part of the country has been perceived as a remote suburb, rather than an outpost in a dynamically developing region. Judging by the increased activity in this area, the Russian authorities have begun to realize the ongoing tectonic shifts, but they do not yet understand how to respond systematically to this. Actions in the Asia-Pacific region are either intended for an internal audience, like Dmitry Medvedev's recent visit to the Kuril Islands, or they are an attempt to "show the flag" and show that Moscow is in principle capable of taking unconventional steps. This was the case with Russia's participation in the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise) exercise under the auspices of the United States, where for the first time it was represented not by observers, but by a warship, and where China was not invited.

This article is an attempt to understand the new geopolitical configuration in the region, taking into account its growing importance, as well as to consider possible strategies for Russia's behavior, when the main players in the Asia - Pacific region - the United States and China-have already begun to actively build a political framework in their own interests.

UNITED STATES STRATEGY

The US strategy in the Asia-Pacific region is quite transparent and fits into the pattern of actions that Washington followed during the Cold War, although in a more complicated version. And although so far Fulton's speech, which directly points to the strategic enemy of the "free world", has not been heard, it becomes clear that it was China that almost completely replaced the USSR for Washington. True, countries are economically dependent on each other, and the world today is multipolar and less predictable than in the second half of the twentieth century. But in general, many elements of the United States ' geopolitical strategy are drawn from the past.

The first and most important component of American activity in the Asia - Pacific region is the creation of a "security ring" around China, just as they once tried to surround the Soviet Union with NATO bases. This strategic direction can be divided into two tactical ones. The first is the strengthening of the actual American military grouping in the region. A striking example is the agreement on the deployment of the US military at the Australian base Darwin. By 2016, there will be stationed-

This includes 2,500 US military personnel and "a certain number of naval and aviation formations", the exact number of which is not yet reported. According to the US military, modern types of weapons will be deployed in Australia, including F-22 fighters and C-17 transport aircraft. F-22s are equipped not only with advanced technologies for conducting air battles, but also with equipment for cyber and electronic warfare. Earlier, there was information about an increase in the US contingent on the island of Guam in the Pacific Ocean, as well as about the expansion of the fleet's presence in the waters of allied countries, for example, Singapore.

A military base in Australia will close the" ring of encirclement " around China and allow it to control the most important routes through which the transit of goods worth $ 5 trillion a year passes, while keeping all states in the region under surveillance. Australian officials have openly acknowledged that the Darwin base is convenient because new generations of Chinese missiles are capable of hitting American bases in Japan and South Korea, but have difficulty reaching Australia.

The priority of the Asia - Pacific region for the United States from a military point of view is also indicated by plans to redeploy the main American means of projecting power-aircraft carriers. According to the head of the Pentagon, Leon Panetta, Washington intends to strengthen its military presence in the Pacific Ocean, as a result of which up to 60% of the US Navy will be deployed there by 2020. Currently, there are just under 300 US warships in the Asia-Pacific region, and five of the 11 US aircraft carriers are stationed in the Pacific Ocean. According to Panetta, in the future this number will be increased to six (despite the fact that the total number of aircraft carriers will be reduced to 10 this year). In addition, most cruisers, submarines and other types of vessels will be concentrated in the Pacific Ocean. Despite the minister's assurances that these actions are not directed against the PRC, the reason for the relocation is transparent.

The second direction is political: the creation of two-and multilateral alliances, de facto directed against Beijing. Success in this area is largely due to two factors. The first is the fear of China's neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region that the growing ambitions of a new global power will sooner rather than later make them dependent on Beijing. In addition, many countries (South Korea, Japan) have strong historical fears (as well as, for example, the Balts and Eastern Europeans before the Russian Empire / USSR). They are due to the expansionist tradition of the Chinese kingdoms in ancient and Middle Ages, as well as the fact that Beijing is behind the-

It wants to take revenge for the imperialist policies pursued by some of its neighbors during the period of China's weakening over the past 200 years (especially Japan).

The second factor is Beijing's growing geo-economic ambitions, which are exacerbating long-standing territorial disputes. This allows the US to pursue a "divide and rule" policy. First of all, we are talking about the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos in the South China Sea, which Beijing is increasingly beginning to consider its "inner lake". At the same time, almost all players in the Asia - Pacific region-both key and secondary-are involved in the conflict. For example, Vietnam, China and Taiwan claim ownership of all the islands, atolls and reefs of the Spratly and Paracel groups. The Philippines claims island groups that are located in the northeastern Spratly Archipelago. Malaysia and Brunei consider their reefs and atolls, which are located within their continental shelf and exclusive economic zones. Indonesia's area of interest and jurisdiction directly borders the Spratly Region. The settlement of the long-standing dispute over this archipelago is complicated by the presence of a large number of applicants who have a lot of overlapping and overlapping territorial claims, as a result of which the prospect of full satisfaction of all claims is almost unrealistic. So far, the" dividing line " runs between China and its neighbors - competitors in the issue of archipelagos, but it is not a fact that this will always be the case. It is quite possible that Washington is using this topic to put pressure on countries that, in the new geopolitical situation, will bet on an alliance with Beijing. A very explosive situation has also developed in the East China Sea, where the Sino-Japanese conflict over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) sharply escalated in the fall of 2012. The conflict over the ownership of Takeshima Island (Dokdo) seriously overshadows relations between South Korea and Japan.

As mentioned above, Washington relies on both bilateral and multilateral policies. In the first case, we are talking either about demonstrating support for the countries of the region in the confrontation with Beijing, or about engaging a few players who are considered consistent allies of the PRC. For example, in April, the United States and the Philippines conducted exercises near a reef that is the most problematic point in Philippine-Chinese relations (Scarborough Reef on international maps and Hongyan Reef on Chinese maps). As for the second case, the textbook can be considered a quick software update.-

warm relations with Myanmar, whose leadership for many decades was considered non-handshake. At the end of 2011 The first official visit of the US Secretary of State to this country in 50 years took place. At the same time, the Myanmar leadership took this move with great approval, as it has long been burdened by growing economic dependence on Beijing, which threatens to turn into a political one.

As for Washington's multilateral policy in the Chinese (or rather, anti-Chinese) direction, the Americans are trying to implement it using international organizations. First of all, we are talking about ASEAN, which the United States seems to be increasingly able to attract to its side. The Association, whose membership is informally prohibited to geopolitical "heavyweights" (the dialogue with them is conducted in the "ASEAN+" format), is still forced to follow in the wake of the United States, because it is concerned about the activation of China. Both Washington and ASEAN members are interested in developing a "code of conduct" in the Asia-Pacific region (this idea was voiced by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen), which would put China's expansion in a relatively predictable framework.

CHINA'S STRATEGY

Beijing's strategy in the region as a whole can be described as reactive, since the inertial development of events objectively works in its interests and against its opponents, primarily the United States. The Chinese army is actively rearming, focusing on naval means of projecting power. So, in August 2011, the PRC conducted the first tests of an aircraft carrier, stating that it does not threaten anyone. As mentioned above, new generations of Chinese missiles are already capable of hitting American bases in South Korea and Japan.

In addition, Beijing actively takes advantage of the growing economic dependence of the Asia-Pacific countries, including those that are members of ASEAN, on it. For example, after the establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) in 2010, trade between the two countries reached $ 300 billion, and it is predicted that it will soon reach $ 500 billion. At a time when Philippine-Chinese relations over the Scarborough Reef have been strained, Beijing has resorted to an asymmetric response. China's largest travel operators have been strongly advised not to sell tours to the Philippines. Since Chinese tourists make up about 10% of the total flow, this has dealt the Philippine industry a major blow.

We should pay attention to another key area of Chinese policy - the north-west. Beijing's orbit of influence is getting worse-

The countries of Central Asia - the former Soviet republics-are also involved. Unlike Moscow, the PRC relies not on broad coalitions, but on bilateral contacts, which puts Russia in a deliberately losing position. For example, before the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was held in Beijing in early June, the Chinese side held a series of consultations with SCO members. Before the summit, PLA Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde toured Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Tajikistan, while Presidents of Kyrgyzstan Aslambek Atambayev and Tajikistan Emamoli Rahmon visited Beijing. As a result, the summit largely became a materialization of the bilateral agreements already reached.

Thus, Beijing provides itself with "rear lines" in the event of an escalation of the conflict with the United States and other opponents in the region, for example, India. Although China has guaranteed itself a resource base in many regions of the world and continues to expand (for example, it has announced its intention to invest another $ 20 billion in Africa), almost all the ways of delivering raw materials to the country are by sea. This means that the United States, which has absolute superiority in the world's oceans, has no problems blocking transport arteries (in many respects, the strengthening of the US Navy's presence in the Asia-Pacific region is aimed at preparing such a scenario). Accordingly, Beijing needs overland transit routes that are easier to cover using the PLA's capabilities.

RUSSIA FACES A DILEMMA

The United States and China, in fact, are already in a state of conflict, which, although it does not completely copy the half-century-old US-Russian confrontation, but in key characteristics corresponds to the concept of the cold war. This complicates the development of a political course for Moscow, but there are also prospects that are inaccessible in the absence of such a large-scale antagonism in the Asia-Pacific region, which will have echoes around the world.

Russia will have to make a choice that will determine the logic of its foreign policy behavior for at least the next decades. We are talking about two polar options : whether, remembering the former superpower, we should try to form a new center of attraction in the Asia-Pacific region (much like Washington is currently putting together an anti-Chinese alliance), or enter the orbit of interests of one of the larger and more influential players (of course, we are talking only about the United States and China). However, there is also a third option, which in the last

time is beautifully called "multi-vector politics/diplomacy", "pendulum tactics". In reality, this means that there is no clear strategy and smaller players bargain for preferences from larger ones under the threat of entering into an "exclusive" alliance with a party that is antagonistic to this large player.

As for the first option-the formation of an independent center of influence in the Asia-Pacific region-it clearly looks unrealistic. In terms of economic power and influence in the region, Russia is not only incomparable to China, but also inferior to many other countries, for example, India and even Indonesia. All of Russia's economic ties have historically been built on the "East-West" principle, and if this was strategically advantageous during the period of European dominance, it is now beginning to play against Moscow's interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Moreover, the ability to be the basis of an independent center of power is often determined by military power - a state claiming to be a leader must ensure the security of its satellites. Such guarantees were given to its allies by the USSR in the framework of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the United States in NATO during the Cold War, the same guarantees, although not yet enshrined in any legal document, Washington provides to its current and potential allies in the Asia-Pacific region.

From a military point of view, Moscow's presence in the Asia - Pacific region is negligible-even less than the economic one. Moreover, Russian (and Soviet) military construction was aimed at the European theater of operations (to a lesser extent, at the southern direction), which is characterized by a large land area. That is why the emphasis was and is being placed on the land component of the armed forces, and the program for building aircraft carriers (not even aircraft carriers, as many media mistakenly write, but aircraft-carrying cruisers that do not reach the classic aircraft carriers) was curtailed with the collapse of the USSR. As a result, the Russian Navy now has only one of the five cruisers put into service (and two more unfinished) - the Admiral Kuznetsov - which, with a few escort ships, can only serve to demonstrate the flag, and not to project power. It is symptomatic that the remaining four ships, as well as one of the two unfinished ones (Varyag), were sold to the Asia-Pacific countries-China, South Korea and India.

Due to the geographical features of the Asia-Pacific region, namely the island or coastal nature of almost all states,

it is the fleet that will be of key importance for building geopolitical balances. The Russian Pacific Fleet has few ships suitable for long-distance navigation, and even after the arrival of the Mistral helicopter carriers (it is still unclear whether there will be two or four of them), it is unlikely to be able to claim to be considered a serious combat unit.

True, Russia has a chance to become (or rather remain) an independent center of power in the" soft underbelly " of China. We are talking about Central Asia, where Moscow's position is quite strong due to its Soviet heritage. This region is of strategic importance for Beijing as a source of resources (and in the future - as part of the China-Europe transport corridor). Partially controlling it can influence the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, however, and here Moscow's position is being eroded, largely due to the actions of the PRC. Thus, the SCO, which was considered by Moscow at the beginning of the "noughties" as an instrument for reviving influence in Central Asia, is increasingly getting out of its control. Moscow is well aware of the potential of Beijing's tactics of "bilateral diplomacy", as it successfully uses them in the western direction - in relations with Europe.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization, which is under Russian control due to its overwhelming military superiority, is increasingly overlapping with the SCO in its issues. For example, at the last summits of both organizations, issues of security in Central Asia were discussed, and the big question is which organization will give priority to its members. In addition, the CSTO has clearly accumulated deep problems related to the lack of full-fledged trust between the allies, and even the growing uncertainty around Afghanistan does not yet lead to the consolidation of member countries around Moscow.

Realizing that the formation of an independent geopolitical center of power in the Asia - Pacific region is impossible, Russian elites may fall into the opposite temptation-to go with the flow. Such a scenario is being lobbied by the Chinese side, which at the expert level almost openly says that Moscow does not need to develop any strategy in relation to the Asia - Pacific region - "everything is fine as it is." Moreover, feeling that the Russian authorities are increasingly burdened by the inertial development of events, which is fraught with the transition of economic dependence to political dependence, the Chinese act according to the principle "if the process cannot be stopped, it must be led."

So, for example, Beijing is trying to use popular ideas in Moscow about Russia as a corridor between the East and the West for its own purposes.

West. Currently, China is actively lobbying (using the SCO for this purpose) for the project of the Eurasian Transcontinental Bridge (new Silk Road), which will connect the Pacific Shanghai with the largest European capitals by land. The work is already reaching the level of legally significant agreements - currently, SCO members are holding consultations on the signing of the "Agreement on Creating Favorable Conditions for International Road Transport". The appearance of this document encourages the creation of a network of transport highways covering the entire region.

Beijing is trying to attract all potential project participants. He argues that Russia, as the country with the largest territory, should become the main transit country, but at the same time Central Asia is the "core" of the project, and the term "new Silk Road"is aimed precisely at the elites of these states, who dream of returning to the former significance of their countries in the Middle Ages and in antiquity. However, it is not mentioned that China is supposed to be the "motor" and moderator. It will control its progress and basic parameters, and the transport corridor itself will be designed exclusively for the export of Chinese goods to Europe, which means that it will be critically dependent on the flow from this country.

Realizing the impasse between these two options for positioning in the Asia-Pacific region, the Russian authorities predictably chose the third-the "swing tactic". In a simplified form, it consists in demonstrating to China that there is an alternative in the face of the United States, and to Washington-the exact opposite. It is in this context that the participation of the Russian Navy in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise exercises under the auspices of the United States can be considered. They did not involve Chinese troops, but the Philippines was involved, with which the PRC's territorial conflict escalated, and India, which is perceived as a counterweight to China in the region, also took part for the first time.

QUESTIONS INSTEAD OF ANSWERS

Conducting a" multi-vector policy " in its classic form, when instead of strategy, the tactic of defecting from one center of power to another is also not in Moscow's interests. The paradox of the situation is that its strategic goals partially coincide with those of China, and partially with those of the United States.

In the first case, we are talking about the fact that neither China nor Russia is interested in preserving the world order, which provides for unconditional cooperation.

Western dominance. Now, in the most concentrated form, this is reflected in the confrontation over the Syrian issue. The world order that emerged with the tacit consent of the majority of players after the collapse of the eastern bloc under the auspices of the USSR was fragile. It was based on the dominance of speculative capital, whose management infrastructure is mainly concentrated in the United States (partly in the United Kingdom). However, the 2008 crisis (in fact, it began much earlier, in 2000, with the dot-com crash) buried hopes for the stability of the global structure under the leadership of the United States.

It is necessary to build a new system, and we are talking not only and not so much about the global economy, although it is the basis, but also about the global humanitarian infrastructure, which is now based on the symbolic capital of the West. In other words, on the belief that everything Western automatically means advanced. The system troubles that are just beginning in Europe will soon bury this logical link, as well as many others. As a result, "Protestants" who are not satisfied with the old world order will have to participate in the development of a new infrastructure - both banal stock and commodity exchanges (Asian countries are actively involved in this process) and a new humanitarian network. Relatively speaking, the new world will need its own Nobel Prize, its own Oxbridge, its own Wall Street Journal and The Economist, as well as its own Amnesty International.

However, the strategic interests of Russia and the United States in the region also partially coincide. Both countries are interested in involving China in the system of obligations that arise from membership in international organizations. Beijing fundamentally prefers bilateral diplomacy, while using a strategy of engagement could make its policies more predictable. But so far, Moscow is far from building new infrastructure, and from drawing the PRC into the system of international obligations.

None of the three linear recipes of foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region is acceptable for Russia. This means that its actions in the region, compared to Europe, must and will be, on the one hand, more complex, and on the other, more flexible. You need to be prepared for situational response to challenges.

However, such situationality does not automatically mean the absence (or even impossibility) of a holistic concept of realizing one's interests. It is debatable whether Russia is a European country, especially whether it is part of a civilizational "center" or not.

"periphery" - there are polar points of view on this issue both in Russia and in Europe. However, it is absolutely certain that Russia is not an Asian country from a civilizational point of view, especially in the perception of the peoples of the Asia - Pacific region-in the foreseeable historical perspective, Russians will never be perceived there as "their own" (which does not exclude the successful integration of the country itself into the geopolitical balance of the region). However, this seemingly obvious weakness can also become a strong point. The fact is that Russia does not have a long history of participating in the colonization of the Asia-Pacific countries (the extremely limited Soviet experience does not count, and it is not fixed in the historical memory of the inhabitants of the Asia-Pacific region). Accordingly, there is no such rejection that exists in relation to Europeans and Americans. This means that Russia has a chance to position itself in the region as a neutral force, which, in the face of a confrontation between two blocs, especially hypothetically equal in strength, can be capitalized in significant geopolitical and purely economic benefits. In other words, we are talking about using the cliche of a "distant neighbor", an alliance with which can be contrasted with a possible threat from a" neighbor of the near", which has expansionist plans. This cliche is successfully used by the United States, for example, in Central Asia to the detriment of the interests of Russia and China (Uzbekistan), or in Mongolia.

Permanent link to this publication: