Moscow: Gumanitarii Publ., 2001, 211 p. (Research and training materials. Issue 1)

Two extremes prevail in the contemporary literature on the Central Asian countries: either accusations of political tyranny and economic decline, or embellishments of their reality .2 Against this background, the work of L. A. Friedman, written on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the collapse of the USSR, can be considered a model of objective, comprehensive and qualified analysis.

The book under review consists of a " Preface "(p. 4-5), which substantiates the significance of the chosen topic and lists the main sources used for the study (publications of the World Bank and international organizations; databases of the CIS State Committee; materials of national statistics, including data from the 1999 censuses in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), and four separate parts called "essays"by the author. The first of them, "The economy of Central Asia on world scales and on the scale of development" (p. 6-27), examines the economic potential of the Central Asian republics on the basis of data on the annual value of gross domestic product (GDP), or gross national product (GNP), and gross national income (GNI), recalculated in US dollars. At the same time, the author analyzes different methods of calculation: by the exchange rate of national currencies and by the parity of their purchasing power, which sometimes give different results. In any case, it turns out that even the total economic potential of the countries of the region, amounting to about $ 180 billion, is not enough. It is more than 2-3 times (!) lower than the same indicator for Iran or Turkey. Almost 45% of the total potential is in Kazakhstan and 30% in Uzbekistan. In terms of its level of development, measured by GDP/GNP per capita, Kazakhstan is comparable to such countries of the world as Peru and Macedonia, Turkmenistan - as Egi-

(c) 2003

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pet or Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are like Bolivia or Lesotho, and Tajikistan is like Uganda. However, L. A. Fridman rightly emphasizes that "the correlation of forces in geoeconomics and geopolitics depends mainly on the absolute potential of a particular country" (pp. 12-13). It is clear that China, being on the same level as Turkmenistan in terms of per capita GNP, is a superpower in terms of absolute indicators of its economic and territorial - demographic power, while Turkmenistan can hardly even claim the role of a regional leader.

In the same essay, the author tries to build a possible forecast of the economic development of Central Asia. The picture again turns out to be far from joyful. It would take Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan 10-15 years to reach the level of per capita income of Kazakhstan's GNP, assuming sustained annual growth of 7-8%. Kazakhstan, in turn, will need the same number of years and the same growth rate to reach the current level of development of Chile, Slovakia or Uruguay. Following the experts of the IMF and the World Bank, L. A. Friedman expresses hope for the very possibility of such economic growth, though cautiously calling it "the most favorable scenario" (p.14).

Let us express our doubts about this. The point is not even that the signs of economic recovery in Central Asia are still "recovering" in nature and are largely due to the favorable conjuncture of world prices for oil, gas, gold and cotton, and not deep changes in the economy itself. And it is not that "carrying out necessary reforms" and "minimizing internal and external risks"," ensuring the security of property rights "seem unrealistic wishes for countries where public consciousness remains at the "village" level and corruption, authoritarian leadership methods, etc. flourish. And it is not that religious and interethnic conflicts can easily destroy any trend towards stability at any time. In our opinion, Central Asian society retains a number of fundamental, fundamental features that hinder any economic progress.

One of these features that L. A. Friedman does not address in his book is the high level of demographic growth. Without this problem, it is simply impossible to analyze the past, present, and future of Central Asia. As an illustration, we compare, using official data, the growth of GDP, per capita income (these figures are very approximate, since we had to multiply, divide and round the already rounded figures from the statistical handbook) and population growth in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (in % compared to the previous year).

The table shows that per capita economic growth rates in these countries are lower by 1/3-1/5 compared to the GDP growth rate as a whole. The difference is "eaten up" by demographic growth.

Table 1

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^* Officially, these data refer to the beginning of next year.

Calculated for: Commonwealth of Independent States. Statistical Yearbook 98. Moscow, 1999. Pp. 479, 484, 557, 563; Commonwealth of Independent States. Statistical Yearbook 99. Moscow, 2000. p. 463, 468, 469, 539, 544, 545.

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Of course, there is a general trend of declining demographic growth in Central Asia. If in the 1960s it averaged 3.6% in Uzbekistan and 3.7% in Tajikistan, in the 1970s-3.0 and 3.1%, respectively, in the 1980s - 2.6 and 3.0%, then in the late 1990s it dropped to 1.5 and 0.3% (largely due to high inflation rates). migration of mostly Russian-speaking residents from the region, while the natural growth rate is still quite high). Today, it can be argued that Central Asia, although with great delay, is still entering a new phase of demographic development. However, this process will be very difficult for the region, since changing the demographic model is hindered by the socio-cultural values that have developed over many generations, the psychology of people, social structures adapted to having many children, and economic behavior. However, there is no reason to expect sustainable development in Central Asia until such a change takes place.

The author of the book under review did not pay attention to another consideration that calls into question the concept of so-called "catch-up development". The fact is that the main macroeconomic indicators used to assess Central Asian countries do not reflect the entire modern reality of socio-economic life in a globalizing world. What does this mean? Today it has become obvious that there is such a phenomenon as seasonal or labor migration. And although there is no exact data on its scale, there can hardly be any doubt that it has a colossal size. At the conference "Prospects for external migration of the titular peoples of Central Asia" held at the Carnegie Moscow Center (March 24, 2000), S. Olimova (Tajikistan) gave her estimate of the annual labor migration from Tajikistan - 800 thousand people, but also mentioned the figure of 500 thousand. In the publication of A. Topilin, with reference to the "estimates" of the Ministry of Labor and Employment of the Republic of Tatarstan, the figure of 250 thousand labor migrants from this republic in the CIS countries is indicated ³ . Thus, according to various estimates, from 1/8 to 1/2 of the working-age population of Tajikistan today is somehow connected with the Russian labor market. And this is not only small-scale trade, crime and drug trafficking, as the media often present, but also the service sector, construction, oil and gas fields, and agriculture.

It follows from the above that a significant part of the family budgets of Tajik residents is formed from income received in Russia (and other countries outside the republic), which means that it is part of the statistics (GDP, GNI, etc.) of these countries and falls out of the "big" statistics of the Republic of Tajikistan. This component of the economy can only be identified through micro-rather than macro-economic studies. This means that we are dealing with a completely new type of economic system, in which a significant part of the population exists simultaneously in several economic coordinates. It creates a product in other countries, and consumes the resulting income at home. With such a model of economic development, Tajikistan (and other Central Asian countries, but so far, of course, to a lesser extent)is the same As a state and socio-economic unit, it is doomed to remain in the last places in the ratings of economic development, with all the ensuing consequences for its political structure, public consciousness, and culture.

In the essay "Structural shifts in the economy of Central Asian countries" (pp. 28-60), L. A. Fridman analyzes data on the dynamics of employment in the main sectors of the economy and points out such general trends as a decrease in the share of people employed in education, health and science, while increasing relative employment in trade and directly related activities. The author notes the strengthening of the "bureaucratization" of the economy in the 1990s (an increase in the share of managers) in these countries and its "agrarization". Thus, in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the share of people employed in agriculture, forestry and fisheries increased 1.5 times and became absolutely dominant. True, this share has decreased in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, but L. A. Fridman rightly questions this kind of data. Noting also such phenomena as "deurbanization" and" deindustrialization "in the Central Asian countries, he makes a general conclusion about" the growth of regressive patterns in the life of states, societies, and mass social groups "(p. 57), including the growth of "elements of traditionalization, and sometimes even primitivization, archaization, and temporary chaos of the economy and society". social structure" (p. 60). However, true to the idea of "catch-up development", the author considers all these processes to be a temporary consequence of the transition period from "a system associated with the total nationalization of property, as well as public and political life", to the system of social and political economy.-

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a topic "characterized by the predominance of private property and democratic forms in the social sphere and the management system" (p. 58).

In the essay entitled "On Agrarian reform and agricultural production in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan" (pp. 61-120), L. A. Fridman compares two different strategies of "transition to a market economy": accelerated implementation of radical reforms by A. Akayev, relying on the private sector, and gradual progress along the path of reforms by I. Karimov, relying on collective farms. In Kyrgyzstan, in the first half of the 1990s, the volume of agricultural production fell by 1/3 compared to the favorable 1990, and the average yield of almost all major agricultural crops decreased. Then the republic began to increase the rate of production recovery, reaching 93-94% of the 1990 level by 2000, with faster development of crop production and slower animal husbandry. However, the author notes that this recovery was achieved largely due to a significant increase in the number of people employed in agriculture, which was a way of survival for a significant part of the population of the republic. In Uzbekistan, the decline was not so great - only 15%, but a little longer, and in 2000 the level of 1990 was exceeded by 1%. At the same time, neither Kyrgyzstan nor Uzbekistan have achieved such a level of production of basic products (especially grain, meat and milk) to fully provide for the population, and, we should add, they are unlikely to achieve this, since there are no objective prerequisites for this.

From this comparison, L. A. Fridman concludes that, in fact, the chosen reform model did not have a big impact on the final result. At the same time, analyzing the total volume of agricultural products produced in the 1990s, he comes to the conclusion that Uzbek society has experienced less shocks than Kyrgyz society, so the gradual ("Chinese") path of reforms looks more preferable in the end than "shock therapy" ("European" path). However, the author admits that these are "preliminary conclusions" (p. 120), which may be clarified in the coming years.

The most interesting and important part of the book, in our opinion, is the last essay " The level and living conditions of the population "(p. 121-201). And not because the rest of the essays suffer from any significant shortcomings or do not contain thoughtful and in-depth observations and conclusions, but because L. A. Friedman was almost the first to analyze in such detail and expertly the completely undeveloped problem related to the level and living conditions of the Central Asian population. Without going into too much detail, we refer readers of the book and specialists in Central Asia to the author's arguments about the dynamics of wages and consumer prices, the structure of household spending, the level of consumption of food, non-food products, durable goods, various kinds of paid services, housing conditions, healthcare and education. Everywhere, the author notes the deterioration of the situation of people, negative trends, a return "by 20-30, and sometimes even 40 years" ago (p. 170), as well as a sharp polarization of society into rich and poor.

However, L. A. Friedman could not give exhaustive answers to all the questions. So, he talks in detail only about the wages of the population of Central Asian countries and tries to find out its real value, translating the figures into dollar terms at the exchange rate. It turns out that the average monthly salary in Central Asian countries ranged in 1994 from $ 15.8 in Tajikistan to $ 47.6 in Kazakhstan; in 1999, from $ 9.4 in Tajikistan to $ 90.6 in Kazakhstan (p. 137). In Uzbekistan, this indicator, calculated at the official exchange rate, is 26.6 and 57.2, respectively (but the first figure can be reduced by about 1/3, and the second by almost 5 times, if we take into account the "market" exchange rate). The author concludes that in Tajikistan, where the monthly salary was less than $ 30, "all those who received this salary, according to international criteria for determining poverty, lived on less than $ 1 a day, i.e. they were below the poverty line" (p.138). In Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, wages were slightly higher than this indicator, i.e. at the level of "poverty". And only in Kazakhstan the situation was better (there are no data on Turkmenistan).

This, at first glance, sad picture should be taken critically. The author himself correctly notes the not quite correct nature of calculations using the dollar exchange rate. A more accurate result is obtained by determining the purchasing power of the dollar in the local market of goods and services. It is clear that, for example, $ 100 can buy more goods in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, or Kyrgyzstan than the same amount of money can buy in Russia or Europe. However, statisticians have not yet made such complex and time-consuming calculations.

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In addition, we are talking only about wages, while the population of the Central Asian Republic receives additional "shadow income", income from household plots, etc. L. A. Friedman confines himself to mentioning the fact that according to official data, wages in the structure of household monetary income in the 1990s amounted to about 70% in Kazakhstan, 60-70% in the United States. Turkmenistan, 55-60% in Uzbekistan, about 50% in Kyrgyzstan, and 25-35% in Tajikistan (p. 134). Since these figures require comment, we will provide more detailed information on the structure of family income in Tajikistan (there are no data for 1994-1995).:

Table 2

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^* For January-September.

^** This column is not included in the official data. Calculated for: Commonwealth of Independent States. Statistical Yearbook 98. P. 514; Commonwealth of Independent States. Statistical Yearbook 99. p. 497 ⁴ .

To this we must add those products that the population, especially in rural areas, produced for their own consumption (in Kazakhstan-half of all consumed products, in other Central Asian republics this share should be even higher), but which did not enter the market and were not valued in monetary terms, although they were a significant increase in the population's income.

All this makes it possible to estimate the total household income in Tajikistan in the late 1990s in an average and very approximate calculation of $ 100-150 (perhaps slightly more). per month. In Uzbekistan, in the same years, the "average" income was $ 200-250. per month per household ⁵ . Speaking about the income structure, it should be noted that the figure given by the author of 50-70% of the share of wages in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan looks clearly overstated. More realistic are the data for Tajikistan, which, by the way, also showed a figure above 50% in the early 1990s, and then lowered it to 25-35%. We believe that the income structure of residents of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, southern Kyrgyzstan and southern Kazakhstan, as we can judge from our personal experience of ethnographic work, is generally similar to the proportions given for Tajikistan.

Of course, even the income of 150-250 dollars. per month is extremely low, given the fact that Central Asian families tend to have many children and the average family member still accounts for a depressingly low figure of $ 20-30. However, it is necessary to make a correction here. In Central Asian society, the indicators of "poverty" and "wealth" are calculated not per person, but per family - household. The higher the overall measure of its (family or household) economic strength, the more opportunities there are to make expensive family-wide purchases or other investments in both the economic (rent) and social (education) future. Such investments yield returns over time and allow the family to develop a "sustainable development strategy" ⁶ . At the same time, indicators per family member may be critically low and the household may officially appear as exceptionally poor.

The book ends with " Preliminary Results "(p. 202-211) with very strict and well-founded assessments of the socio - economic situation in Central Asia. L. A. Fridman notes "the deep inconsistency of the changes taking place" (p. 202), since a significant part of the population felt as negative (a sharp decline in real incomes, a deterioration in the quality of food, restriction of many habitual forms of recreation, etc.), and

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positive changes (no queues, the appearance of elements of democracy and freedom of speech). Comparing the "pros" and " cons "of the changes that took place in Central Asia, the author concludes that in the 1990s" negative trends prevailed over improvements in the situation of the majority of their population " (p.211), although he speaks about the signs of economic growth that appeared in the late 1990s, although not yet stable.

While we generally agree with L. A. Friedman's correct and highly valuable observations and calculations, we must nevertheless say that his conclusions are largely of a primary nature. The author, in fact, remains within the framework of the old concept of transition from the command and administrative system to the market that developed in the early 1990s. After 10 years, the picture is much more complex. First, the observed crisis phenomena in Central Asia are caused not only by the "transition", but also by systemic imbalances. Some crisis phenomena (cotton monopoly, demographic explosion, etc.) have been observed since the end of the XIX century, when the Russian authorities began to modernize the region, others (the excess of the Russian - speaking population's departure over entry, the cessation of crop growth, etc.)-since the beginning of the 1970s. Some crisis factors are also more long-term, one can even say "civilizational" (for example, the presence of mechanisms in Islam that prevent the concentration of capital and property) ^.7 Secondly, it has already become clear that the development of various parts of humanity does not follow a "linear" principle. There are different types of development that do not exclude regression, as well as different types of modernization: primary and secondary, central and peripheral, productive and parasitic. It is not at all inevitable for everyone to move towards a "bright future of the market" ⁸ . Let us add that L. A. Fridman does not analyze the concepts that already exist in this regard in relation to Central Asia, starting with the "multi-layered society" (V. N. Ulyakhin ⁹) or "traditional society" (S. P. Polyakov ¹⁰) and ending with the concepts of "incomplete modernization" (A. G. Vishnevsky ¹¹ ). or "non-market modernization" (¹² Kandioti village), etc.

Another omission of the author, who masterfully knows the methods of analyzing statistics, is the insufficient use of the conclusions and developments of ethnography, sociology, and historical science, i.e. a large layer of information that allows us to see the actual life of people behind dry figures (by the way, L. A. Friedman almost does not refer to the numerous studies on Central Asia that have already been published ¹³ ). Direct observations, field studies, and population surveys could undoubtedly supplement, and in some cases even correct, or strengthen the author's conclusions.

All these, sometimes very significant, comments and suggestions about possible additions, however, do not change the overall positive impression of the reviewed book. Unfortunately, a print run of 250 copies is not enough to satisfy the interest of a wide range of scientists, politicians, journalists and others interested in Central Asia, real and imaginary experts. We hope that the book will still come to the attention of this circle of specialists, and thanks to it, judgments about this region will become, at least, more balanced and, at most, more truthful.

notes

¹ Although, in our opinion, the term "Central Asia" is inaccurate, since in geographical and historical-cultural relations this concept in the Russian tradition covers not only the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, we, following the author of the book, use it in our review.

² For example, the extremely one-sided book of the little-known specialist L. Levitin "Uzbekistan at a historical turn "(Moscow: Vagrius, 2001) says a lot about the success and achievements of Uzbekistan, but not a word about the size of wages, income of the population, etc. However, it had an inadequately large resonance in the Russian press. Rimma. Reduce and divert danger from the people... About the book by Leonid Levitin "Uzbekistan at the historical turn", Moscow: Vagrius, 2001 / / Komsomolskaya Pravda. 22.03.2001; Alexey Malashenko. About Uzbekistan with passion: A monograph on the largest state in Central Asia has been published in Moscow // Nezavisimaya Gazeta (hereinafter - NG). 23.03.2001. See also a number of similar publications on Uzbekistan: Azizova G., Khasanov U. Islam Karimov's State Capitalism // Izvestia. 24.12.1999; Lunev I. Uzbekistan: what's next? // NG. 17.04.1999; Gafarli M. Reformer-pragmatist // NG. 26.01.2000; Yegorov Yu. Nine years on the path of reforms / / NG. 1.09.2000; Burlatsky F. Ten years of independence and reforms / / NG. 11.09.2001; Sotnikov I.

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An island of stability and harsh order // NG. 1.09.2001; Panfilova V. Pan or disappeared? Five principles of the Uzbek economy / / NG. 4.11.2002.

^{Topilin A.} 3 Demograficheskiy potentsial stran Zakavkazya, Tsentral'noi Azii i obshchego rynok truda CIS [Demographic potential of the Transcaucasian countries, Central Asia and the CIS common labor Market]. 2000, N 3 (9). P. 183.

⁴ The article by I. Asrorov, 3. Asrorova with reference to the "Yearbook of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2000" provides slightly different data. See: Asrorov I., Asrorova Z. Economy of Tajikistan in the years of independence / / Central Asia and the Caucasus. 2001, N 6 (18). P. 114.

^{Abashin S. N.} 5 Family budget of rural Uzbeks / / Vostok (Oriens). 2000, N 2.

^{Abashin S. N.} 6 Contrary to "common sense"? (To the question of "rationality/ irrationality" of ritual expenses in Central Asia ) // Vestnik Evrazii, Moscow, 1999, N 1-2 (6-7).

^{7. Bushkov V. I.} 7 Tajikistan: traditional society in the post-industrial world / / Ethnographic Review. 1995, No. 4; Bushkov V. I., Mikulskiy D. V. "Tajik revolution" and Civil War (1989-1994). Moscow, 1995; Bushkov V. I., Mikulskiy D. V. Anatomiya grazhdanskoi voyni v Tadjikistane (Etnosotsialnye protsessy i politicheskaya borba, 1992-1996). Izd. 2-e, reprint. Moscow, 1997.

^{Cheshkov M.} 8 Post-Soviet Central Asia in three Dimensions: traditionalization, peripherization, and globalization. 1998. N 1 (13). See also: Neklessa A. I. Postmodern world in a new coordinate system // East (Oriens). 1997. N 2.

^{Ulyakhin V. N.} 9 Mnogoukladnost ' v sovetskoi i zarubezhnoi Azii [Multiculturalism in Soviet and foreign Asia]. 1991. N 5.

^{Polyakov S. P.} 10 Traditionalism in the modern Central Asian society, Moscow, 1989. Sovremennaya sredneaziatskaya derevnya: traditsionnye formy sobstvennosti v kvaziindustrialnoi sisteme [Modern Central Asian Village: traditional forms of ownership in a quasi-industrial system].

^{Vishnevsky A.} 11 Central Asia: unfinished modernization // Vestnik Evrazii [Bulletin of Eurasia], Moscow, 1996, No. 2 (3).

^{Kandiyoti D.} 12 Modernization without the market? The case of the "Soviet East" // Economy and Society. 1996. Vol. 25. N 4; idem. Rural livelihoods and social networks in Uzbekistan: Perspectives from Andijan // Central Asian Survey. 1998. Vol. 17. N 4.

¹³ Meanwhile, the number of studies on Central Asia is growing from year to year. See: Rastiannikov V. G. Uzbekistan. Economic growth in the agrosphere: anomalies of the XX century, Moscow, 1996; Central Asia: new trends in the economy, Moscow, 1998; Post-Soviet Central Asia: losses and Gains, Moscow, 1998; Uzbekistan: finding a new Image, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1998; as well as regular (from issue to issue) publications in Russian in the magazine "Central Asia and the Caucasus", which is published in Sweden. The list of foreign publications on socio-economic problems of Central Asian countries already includes hundreds of titles (see: Devolution in Central Asia, 1990-2000. An Essay and Annotated Bibliography of Books and Pamphlets about the Region Published in English in this Period // Nationalities Papers. 2002. Vol. 30. N 1).

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