On based on analysis entered data in scientific turnover unknown people wide to the public materials newspapers and logs beginnings XX centuries, but also new ones archived data documents attempted attempt recreations separate ones episodes stories "Chinese espionage " in Of Russia military personnel and pre-war time. Being justified version about self-sufficiency and independence day intelligence agencies China. Marked with practice her activities in some of them regions Russian states.

words: Key translators, Chinese intelligence, espionage, training, agents, border intelligence, diplomats.

Military espionage, considered a craft and later an art, dates back to ancient times. No major state that aspired to take an exceptional place on the global stage and strengthen its own power, did not refuse the services of military spies. However, unlike the leaders recognized by the beginning of the 20th century, primarily Germany (in the West) and Japan (in the East), which had a long-term and effective military intelligence infrastructure within and outside national borders, there were also"outsider"countries.

A clear example of this is the Qing Empire, which for a long time was focused on resolving internal political contradictions and paid only indirect attention to the foreign policy and intelligence issues of nearby countries (including in the Far Eastern region). But soon after the end of the 1904-1905 armed conflict in the Far East - the Russo-Japanese War-the Chinese became more belligerent and pretentious about Russia's territorial, economic, and political superiority. As the Governor-General of the Amur region P. F. Unterberger noted," China's arrogance, which was a consequence of Russia's unsuccessful war with Japan, is dangerous for us " [Lee Hang Jun, 2006, p.188].

Having shown military weakness, the Russian state faced a complex of external threats to its security coming from China. In contrast to the economic, criminological, sanitary-epidemiological, and military factors that had a predominantly cross-border nature, its military-intelligence intervention acquired an all-Russian scale (separate areas of the Far East, Siberia, the North-West, and the Caucasus fell into focus).

Before discussing the activities of the Chinese intelligence service (before 1911 of the Qing Empire, after the Xinhai Revolution - the Republic of China) in Russia, we will briefly focus on the characteristics of its internal organization and professional development.

The cross-border/military, diplomatic and military (agent) intelligence agencies with a general subordination to the Ministry of War or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China have become structural bodies of military and political awareness abroad. Such an arrangement of intelligence forces was typical for the leading European and Asian states of that time, which became a kind of standard in the professional intelligence environment.

From its inception in the interwar period onward, the Chinese intelligence service could not fail to take into account the combat experience gained by some participants in the armed conflict in the Manchurian theater of operations. Her genuine interest was aroused by the peculiarities of the activities of Japanese intelligence, whose recent activities often involved the Chinese themselves. Available ones

page 45
documentary evidence allows us to recall two historical facts: one of them (well-known in scientific circles) is connected with the criminal activities of foreign translators during the war with the Japanese, the other (unfamiliar to specialists) sheds light on the method of forcibly introducing potential Chinese candidates to the collection of espionage information about Russian forces in Manchuria.

The first fact. According to the Russian Disabled military daily, the Russian army (for which the presence of experts in Oriental languages was very rare) was served as translators from Japanese by local residents (mainly Chinese).

"Without Chinese translators, the Russian troops could not even take a step. Being constantly with the authorities, often located in offices with clerks, translators were well aware of everything that was being done in the army. The trials revealed a number of facts indicating that Japanese spies maintained relations with our translators... " [Ogievsky, 1905, p. 7].

How serious was the means of military print information, which published information about Japanese / Chinese espionage? The Russian Invalid newspaper, which celebrated its 90th anniversary in 1903, became a platform for popularizing military knowledge. As the press organ of the Ministry of War (the first military newspaper in Russia), focused not only on "retired" people, but also on a wide range of educated military personnel of the Russian army, it covered the problems of foreign espionage in the Russian state and beyond (which was not typical for other Russian print publications).

On the pages of this publication appeared notes and articles about the intelligence activities of Japanese, Chinese and other foreign agents during the Russo-Japanese War and after its end against Russia [From Far Eastern newspapers...]. By the way, one of the frequent authors was the prosecutor of the Warsaw District Court A. S. Rezanov-the initiator and ideological inspirer of the law of July 5, 1912 G. "On espionage". His personal involvement in the reform of the criminal law (section on high treason by espionage), which tightened the penalties for espionage among Russian subjects and foreigners, underlines the importance of his published works (their theoretical and practical value for readers). I believe that such a well-known and authoritative lawyer (like other military writers) could only be published in a newspaper that received recognition in the military environment. "Russian Invalid" was not only distinguished by its professional personality in the selection of relevant topics and famous authors, but also was a source of timely and reliable knowledge about foreign espionage.

The second fact. The Russian Warrior weekly reports that on the Russo-Japanese front, cases of attracting, or rather "forcing", Chinese subjects to assist the Japanese army were not uncommon. Due to the lack of their own agents in the location of enemy troops, according to the author of the note, the Japanese took family members of rich or influential families as hostages. Under the threat of reprisals against hostages, their leaders were required to "expel their spies" and provide them with spy reports [Mikhailov, 1907, p.3].

Such specific information was made public by the "Russian warrior" not by chance. The target audience of this military newspaper was the lower ranks and soldiers of the Russian army, many of whom participated in battles with Japanese forces. Therefore, this publication covered a wide variety of military stories and events of the Russo-Japanese War (especially in the first post-war years), introduced readers to new achievements in the field of small arms, combat tactics, military intelligence, etc. In other words, the publication "Russian Warrior" had a clearly expressed theoretical and applied character.

page 46
After the end of the Far Eastern conflict, the Chinese revised their attitude to espionage as a secondary occupation. This was due to understanding the true purpose of national intelligence in the context of Beijing's immediate foreign policy preferences, including its territorial claims in the right-bank Amur region. Acting informally (without reaching the interstate level of border dispute settlement), the Chinese side systematically moved entire settlements and their administrations to this border zone. The decree of the fudutong (governor) of Heilongjiang Province, General Ao-lin, dated June 16, 1906, read: "... you residents start building commercial wharves on the Amur River and shops. All this will quickly reach prosperity and prosperity in 3-5 years and raise its head high..."[RGIA, f. 1276, op. 7 (1911), d. 45, l. 66]. This phrase was reflected on one of the pages of A. N. Chikolev's essay "About our Far East", which ended with the words: "... indeed, the Chinese raise their heads and stop standing on ceremony with us; so they announced that we should clear the land on the right bank of the Amur River or pay taxes; demolish existing buildings and no longer build them, do not cut down forests without the permission of the Chinese government... " [ibid.].

Not only the "eyes and ears" of Chinese labor migrants, but also qualified intelligence personnel were needed to provide agent support for China's growing economic presence in the Russian border area (the waters of the Amur River and its coastal strip were considered Russian possessions).

The military Department of the Celestial Empire has reached an agreement with the governments of Japan and the United States of North America on the possibility of training their officers in military affairs (including the basics of intelligence). This is confirmed by the information of the magazine " China and Japan. Review of the periodical press", published by the printing house of the headquarters of the Amur Military District. Its regular editorial staff-military district intelligence officers-subscribed to the Chinese and Japanese press, translated military news, and informed Russian officers about innovations and actual changes in the armed forces of China and Japan. In 1910, as follows from a note found in the newspaper "Ji-ji Shimio", ten Chinese soldiers who graduated from the secondary military school were sent to the Japanese Toyama military school to receive "special military education" [Special education..., 1910, p.3]. In the same year, according to the Zhongwei Daily, Prince Zai Xun intended to "send to America 20 officers who had graduated from schools to study espionage, and order all spies, both serving at the court and everyone else, to adhere to American rules in everything" [Study of Espionage..., 1910, p. 11].

These newspaper data were not classified as secret, but due to their specificity, they could have a certain interest in the military departments of foreign powers (in this case, Russia). For example, knowledge of the peculiarities of the American school of espionage would help to identify its graduates who are involved in Russian intelligence work. Conversely, at the stage of preliminary investigation of cases of Chinese espionage (search, interrogation, etc.), domestic law enforcement agencies, and later military counterintelligence, could obtain valuable information about the organization of the system of American espionage abroad (for timely exposure of criminal activities of US citizens within Russia).

Such assumptions, as well as other analytical forecasts, prompted Russian intelligence officers/editors of the magazine " China and Japan. Review of the periodical press " to recognize the importance of the above news for practitioners (they expanded their knowledge of the functions of special units of foreign armies) and the expediency of their early publication.

page 47
Military news of the Chinese press testified that a mechanism for improving the military force, in particular the foreign intelligence service, was launched in China. The global (Japanese-American) standard of its organization entailed not only liberation from Japanese dependence, which was observed after the end of the Russo-Japanese War (involving the Chinese in Japanese espionage against Russia), and obtaining national professional intelligence status, but also the beginning of independent actions to collect military information in other countries [Zverev, 2014, p. 54].

Now we will briefly describe the structure of the activities of each of the previously identified Chinese military-political awareness agencies in Russia.

BORDER / MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

The few available archival materials on the organization and effectiveness of the Chinese intelligence service in the adjacent Russian territory do not allow us to form the desired idea of the history of the creation of cross-border intelligence. Therefore, referring further to a single and very important document, I will try to open at least one of its pages. After the Russo-Japanese War, due to the expansion of its influence on the right bank of the Amur River and the intention to establish a national shipping company there, China needed not only its own fleet, but also a system of border awareness (by local administrations). The projected intelligence service was aimed at solving economic and military-political problems. The first ones included studying the number and technical condition of Russian steamships, observing river cargo transportation (volumes and types of cargo, their cost, etc.), and getting acquainted with the staff. The second includes anticipating possible threats to the economic and military-political security of Chinese gold mines in the coastal zone. The rationale for this is the report No. 101 of the commander of the Amur River Flotilla, Captain 1st rank Koponov, dated June 1, 1909. transmitted to P. A. Stolypin. On the one hand, it states the facts of the appointment of the head of the Chinese shipping company on the Amur/On the one hand, it reflects the initiative of the Chinese government to accelerate the formation of troops and police in Manchuria, as well as to strengthen surveillance of Russians along the border [RGIA, f. 1276, op. 5 (1909), d.739, l. 510-512].

Unlike cross-border intelligence, the foundations of which were laid three years after the end of the military conflict in the Far East, military intelligence, as a special type of activity of the Chinese ground forces stationed in close proximity to the Sino-Russian borders, has only just begun to take shape. According to the Junguo Bao newspaper of 1911, there was "not a single person in the Chinese state who was knowledgeable about Russian military preparations and Russian border affairs..." [Business trip..., 1911, p.1-2].

Concerned about the lack of intelligence resources in the Russian border zone and the associated operational view of the northern neighbor, the Governor-General of Manchuria, Zhao Er-xun, sent the commander of the 2nd mixed brigade, General Lan Tien-wei, to the Russian possessions in the summer of the same year to conduct a military intelligence survey of the border areas. I would like to emphasize that such exploratory raids on the territory of a neighboring state soon became widespread, since hundreds of versts of the Russian-Chinese border (along the Amur and Sungari rivers) on the Russian side did not have a well-organized system of deep-echeloned security. According to the memoirs of P. Yavorovsky (note "The true state of affairs in the Amur region", 1910), "the land defense of the region for most of the length of our border is absent, and there are few troops" [RGIA, f. 1276, op. 7 (1911),

page 48
D. 45, L. 45]. Speaking about the military river flotilla that exists in the basin of large Amur rivers, the author noted with regret: "... all these fragile vessels will undoubtedly be sunk to the bottom without any difficulty" for the Chinese and their artillery [ibid., l. 46].

DIPLOMATIC INTELLIGENCE

In 1910, reports appeared in the periodical press about the first visits of Chinese military missions to the Russian capital. In the "St. Petersburg Vedomosti" it was possible to read: "Yesterday, the extraordinary Chinese Embassy arrived to get acquainted with the development of maritime affairs in Europe. The embassy is headed by Prince Tsai-hsiung 1. With him are the vice-president of the Admiralty, five Guard officers of the 2nd and 3rd classes, and others. Only 20 people. They were met at the Warsaw railway station... Assistant to the Chief of the Main Naval Staff Admiral Knyazev 2 and Captain 1st Rank Zilotti 3... " [St. Petersburg Vedomosti, 1910, p. 4].

The stop of such a representative delegation in the military-industrial center of European Russia, where the base of ships of the Baltic Navy was located, was not accidental. At this time, state and private enterprises-contractors of the Military and Naval Ministries-were working to create the main strike force of the Russian Fleet: the dreadnoughts Sevastopol, Petropavlovsk, Gangut, and Poltava, designed to restore the naval power lost after the Battle of Tsushima. This fact could not fail to interest high-ranking foreign officials for at least one reason. They had a need to gain experience in modern shipbuilding. During the interwar period, China made great efforts to build its own naval forces. According to the intentions of the Maritime Ministry, a military fleet consisting of 8 battleships, 20 cruisers, 10 ships of other types and 5 destroyers was to be built over the next seven years [Kharkiv Evening News, 1911, p. 1]. To implement these plans, special knowledge, skills and abilities were needed. Therefore, the Chinese naval mission, which arrived from a state that did not have its own navy, could not visit St. Petersburg without visiting its large shipyards.

The assumption that the Chinese delegation has military-educational goals can be confirmed by information from another provincial source. According to the Voice of Siberia, referring to the news feeds of the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency, the Chinese showed concern about the professionalism of some Russian elite sea and land units: "The Chinese mission led by Vice-President Admiral Sazhevbin visited the Guards crew, watched the exercises of Her Majesty's company. He got acquainted in detail with the premises, the everyday life of the lower ranks" [Telegrams..., 1910, p. 1].

So, the only but important argument that allows us to see in the Chinese not only travelers, but also military specialists who are interested in the armed forces of Russia, gives us the right to come to the following conclusion. Session

1 Zai-Xiong - Aixingero Zaitao (, 1887-1970), younger brother of Aixingero Zaifeng, Prince Regent under the infant Emperor Pu Yi (1908-1911).

2 Knyazev Mikhail Valerianovich (1856-1933), Russian admiral. In 1907, he was promoted to Rear Admiral. In 1908-1911-Assistant to the Chief of the Main Naval Staff. As you can see, the St. Petersburg Vedomosti promoted M. V. Knyazev to full admiral, a rank he received only in 1917, when he was already retired.

3 Ziloti (Zilotti) Sergey Ilyich (1862-1914), cousin of S. V. Rachmaninoff, composer, director, career sailor, in 1908-1911 - captain of the 1st rank, 1911-1914-Major General in the Admiralty, in 1914 - Lieutenant General in the Admiralty. At the time described, he served as a senior adjutant of the Main Naval Staff.

page 49
Tsai-Hsiung's diplomatic delegation had a clearly defined familiarization, and therefore intelligence purpose.

I admit that the arrival of the Chinese Embassy in St. Petersburg and the awareness of its participants of the wide opportunities for espionage in this city were one of the reasons that prompted China to establish the institute of military attache abroad. According to the Zhongguo Bao newspaper, in January 1911, Foreign Minister Zou held a meeting with the representatives of the Ministry of War (the Main Directorate of the General Staff), Princes Tao and Lang, at which it was decided to establish military agencies next year at the Chinese embassies in Russia, as well as in England, the United States, Germany, France and Japan [Establishment of military agencies, 1911, p. 1].

This military-political step was dictated by the urgent need to conduct regular (coordinated with the military and naval authorities of the host country) targeted activities aimed at expanding the understanding of Chinese agents about the military sphere of their host countries.

MILITARY (AGENT-BASED) INTELLIGENCE

After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Russian military and civilian authorities on the ground treated Chinese subjects with suspicion. They were often seen as potential Japanese spies. In the formation of this stereotype, not only the individual Chinese who provided services to Japanese intelligence on their own initiative or under duress played a role, but also the viability of the myth of the anthropological uniformity of the Chinese and Japanese (according to Europeans), which they did not stop exploiting during the war and after the war. According to information collected in Russian archives, the Japanese General Staff resorted to the espionage services of " kinsmen "(Chinese subjects) in Russia until the beginning of the First World War [GARF, f. 217, op. 1, d.539, l. 20].

However, even before the outbreak of the military catastrophe of 1914, having minimized its dependence on Japanese intelligence, which was not so much interdepartmental as private, China began to expand its influence to the Far East and later Siberia. Adjacent to the northern Chinese provinces, this vast region, rich in natural resources and bioresources, was of political and economic interest to the multimillion-dollar state.

However, not relying on a superior offensive military and naval force due to its lack, the Qing took the path of "peaceful conquest" (demographic expansion) of the sparsely populated and poorly protected eastern outskirts of Russia. Thanks to the huge domestic human resources available, by 1907, 83,000 people had moved to live in the Primorye, Amur Regions and Sakhalin Island. kitaytsev [Draft laws..., 1909, p. 1, 13]. By 1910, according to official Russian statistics, the Chinese population of Primorye (Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Nikolsk, Nikolaevsk) increased to 46 thousand people [Population of the Primorsky region..., 1910, p. 3]. In January 1913, for every 53,000 Russian men and women in Blagoveshchensk (the administrative center of the Amur Region), there were 3,959 Chinese (i.e., every thirteenth inhabitant of the city was a native of China) [Statistics of Blagoveshchensk..., 1913, p.3].

The social mobility of Chinese citizens in the Amur region was explained not only by the desire to open up new opportunities for self-realization (here labor migrants found many job vacancies and earnings that exceeded those they had in their homeland), but also by the need to take into account the conceptual guidelines of their national government. As follows from the secret report of the Russian Ambassador in Beijing, I. Ya. Korostovets, No. 68, dated April 2, 1909, the Chinese are ready not only not to prohibit, but also to encourage migration, since immigrants who maintain ties with the Chinese are ready to do so.

page 50
"are a source of economic and political influence" [RGIA, f. 1276, op. 5 (1909), d. 739, l. 341].

The spontaneous mass of immigrants (merchants, artisans, artists, prospectors, etc.) was in some cases used by Chinese intelligence for covert (legendary) movement and collecting visual data on Russia's defense capability. One of the main goals of the Chinese was to study the system of strategic communications in close proximity to their borders. Thus, the Primorye press publishes notes about the repeated detentions of Chinese agents on the Russian section of the Chinese Eastern Railway: some of them tried to draw or photograph bridges, others managed to get drawings of these bridges [Holy Simplicity is worse than theft..., 1911, p.3-4].

Along with the migration flows that have flowed to the Far Eastern part of Russia, and often under their cover, Chinese intelligence has expanded its range of activities to include Siberia. Thus, according to the Omsk police in 1907, some of the Chinese merchants who were in Semipalatinsk could "belong to an intelligent society and be officers" by their "bearing and bearing", as well as their command of the Russian language (which, by the way, was uncharacteristic for Chinese migrants) [GAOO, f. 270, op. 1, d. 622, l. 123].

As the correspondence between the head of the Omsk city police department and the head of the Omsk gendarme department showed, the overwhelming majority of Chinese arrived in groups ranging from 5 to several dozen people. Only on October 14, 1910, 19 people arrived in Petropavlovsk, and 30 in Omsk [Ibid., 616, pp. 23-24, 26]. The number of such foreigners in the Steppe General Government grew "exponentially". According to some experts, the actual number of Chinese was "several times higher than the statistical data" [Grekov, 2000, p. 88, 96].

In addition to the multiple arrival and movement of Chinese people from one locality to another, which brought a certain disorganization to the registration procedure, the Chinese military department relied on the mobility of its agents, which also excluded the possibility of registering with the police. The deliberate deception of the Russian administrative and police authorities prevented the establishment of external surveillance of all arrivals from East Asia (including potential spies). In numerous letters of bailiffs and district supervisors of the 1st and 4th units of Omsk addressed to the Omsk police chief in 1910-1911, one can find the same phrase: "the Chinese who arrived on the wanted list in the area of the unit entrusted to me were not found" (the secret correspondence included the names of only those Chinese who raised doubts about the meaning of their trustworthiness. - V. Z.) [ibid., f. 14, op. 1, d. 1233, l. 99, d. 1254, l. 5, 6-8].

The previously unknown method of organizing military espionage, which allowed foreign agents to merge with the impersonal social mass (prone to frequent changes of residence), disoriented not only the police, but also the military. Vigilantly observing the "Asians" who came from the Far East in the hope of finding war criminals among them, they were often deeply mistaken in their assumptions. From the message of the Chief of Staff of the Omsk Military District to the Akmola governor V. S. Losevsky, it follows that on May 19, 1907, the chief officer for assignments, Captain Michaelis, detained a dealer in cigarettes and paper fans because "he looks like a Japanese and turned out to be suspicious." However, during the immediate investigation of his identity, the soldier's fear was not confirmed. But it turned out that this Chinese fought with the Japanese as part of the Russian Fleet and was in Japanese captivity [ibid., d. 1189, l. 64]. Nevertheless, along with the facts of fruitless searches of Chinese citizens (who were wanted by the Police Department) or their erroneous detentions, archival documents also preserved the following facts:

page 51
other evidence. Of greatest interest are reports about the arrests of agents of the Chinese intelligence service who actually operated in Western Siberia, confirming not only the creation and functioning of such an agency during the formation of the Chinese military organization, but also its complete independence. Here are just two examples.

On October 15, 1912, in compliance with the request of the chief of Irkutsk counterintelligence, Captain Popov, the Omsk gendarmes arrested the Chinese subjects "Jan-Yun and Duan-men-fu"on suspicion of military espionage. During the search conducted at the place of their stay, they found: "an order from the President of the Republic of China Yushinkai (Yuan Shikai) to leave to collect information concerning the location of troops, the number of weapons, etc. related to military espionage", drawings and a service record in which "Jan-Yun" was listed as a lieutenant colonel of the Chinese army [ibid., f. 190, op. 1, d. 206, l. 290]. On January 28, 1913, in the Mariinsky Uyezd of Tomsk Province, an assistant to one of the rural volost foremen was arrested on suspicion of conducting topographical reconnaissance, four Chinese subjects, "because they asked residents about the location of villages, cities and mines, roads, rivers or borders, with notes in Chinese" [ibid., d. 226, l. 30, 31].

Simultaneously with the study of Russian troops and certain areas of the Omsk Military District [Military Encyclopedia, 1914, p. 125] Chinese intelligence began to study the military sphere of the Caucasus. In addition to collecting indirect information that did not represent military secrets (remote inspection of fortresses, railway bridges and other strategic military objects, analysis of newspaper and magazine products, etc.), her attention was focused on accurate geographical maps of individual sections of the Russian defense available in each military district. According to Order No. 153 on the troops of the Caucasian Military District of April 5, 1911, the district headquarters had all the necessary list of operational and tactical maps, each of which was classified as "Secret" [Orders..., 1911]. Despite the fact that these cards were kept in a special cabinet and under lock and key, a wide range of people had access to them. Hypothetically, each of those who were issued cards "for a more or less long time" (officers of units) or "only for the duration of classes "(lower ranks), could get into the field of view of foreign agents. In the case of making a deal with the enemy, it was not difficult to make a copy of the desired card.

An indirect confirmation of the assumption that the Chinese have a target task and the actual possibility of acquiring the items they are looking for can be the case of detention in 1912 described in the Moskovsky Golos newspaper. Six suspicious Chinese were found near Pyatigorsk, where several secret maps of European Russia were found [Arrest of the Chinese, 1912, p. 3].

Studying the problem of Chinese espionage against Russia in the early twentieth century, we can draw the following conclusions:

- periodicals (mainly military press) they became a source of valuable, timely, and in some cases unique knowledge about the activities of Chinese spies during the Russo-Japanese War and in the period that followed. The popularization of information about the little-known phenomenon of foreign espionage in the military environment not only improved the professional skills of gendarmes and counterintelligence officers, but also helped to increase the literacy of soldiers, lower ranks and combatant officers in matters of counter-espionage. The publication of certain Chinese intelligence activities increased the level of security of army units;

- pre-war Chinese intelligence (for all its merits) cannot be put on a par with the largest special services of other powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, England

page 52
and Japan). However, it should be recognized that the general development of China's military organization on the eve of the First World War contributed to the growth of the professional skill of its intelligence service;

- the Chinese military and partly civilian authorities, having accumulated primary knowledge and skills in the forms and methods of collecting secret information during the Russo-Japanese War, as well as having absorbed some of the achievements of Asian and European intelligence, in a short time managed to create information positions along the Amur, resorted to the capabilities of the military attache and established agent intelligence.

Due to the small number of notes about Chinese spies in the Russian press, the lack of special research in Soviet and Russian historiography that sheds light on the past of Chinese intelligence (exception: [Grekov, 2000]), as well as the narrowness of the archive base, it is difficult to understand the true scale and specifics of the activities of this special service in Russia. Limited sources do not allow us to give an objective assessment of its results in terms of the degree of damage caused to the defense capability of the entire state and its individual regions (primarily the Far East, Siberia, St. Petersburg and its provinces, and the Caucasus).

list of literature

Arrest of the Chinese // Moscow voice. August 25, 1912. N 196.

K. I. Velichko V. F. Novitsky, A.V. von Schwartz et al., ed., 1914. Armament of China / / Kharkiv Evening News. September 9, 1911. N 20. GAOO - State Archive of the Omsk region. GARF - State Archive of the Russian Federation.

Grekov N. V. Russkaya kontrrazvedka v 1905-1917 gg.: shpionomaniya i real'nye problemy [Russian counterintelligence in 1905-1917: spy Mania and real problems]. Moscow, 2000. Draft submitted various ministries for consideration State Duma 3rd convocation, and reports on them Commission for direction legislative proposals. Session 2. 1908-1909. SPb., 1909. N 120.

Zverev V. O. [Strengthening the military security of the Russian Empire (1906-1912)] . 2014. N 4.

From Far Eastern newspapers / / Russian invalid. January 3, 1908. N 2.

Studying espionage in America / / China and Japan. Review . 1910. N 14.

General's business trip for intelligence / / China and Japan. Review of periodicals . September 10, 1911. N 53.

Lee Hang Joon. Governor-General of the Amur Region Pavel F. Unterberger and his Far Eastern policy: diss. ... Candidate of Historical Sciences, Moscow, 2006.

Mikhailov. Secret scouts-spies and spies / / Russian Warrior. May 16, 1907. N 20.

Population of the Primorsky region / / Priamurskie vedomosti. August 24, 1910. N 1603.

Ogievsky M. Nashi perevodchiki v Russko-yaponskoy voine [Our translators in the Russian -Japanese War]. October 16, 1905. N 220.

the district. military Caucasian by Orders of 1911.

RGIA - Russian State Historical Archive.

Rezanov A. Spying and our powerlessness in the fight against it. Russian disabled Person. February 17, 1910. N 38.

Holy simplicity is worse than theft / / Khabarovsk leaflet. October 21, 1911. N 4.

Smirnov K. Military secret and military espionage / / Russian invalid. June 14, 1908. N 130.

Special education of Chinese officers / / China and Japan. Review of periodicals . 1910. N 13.

Statistics of Blagoveshchensk / / Amur leaflet. February 13, 1913. N 1376.

Telegrams of St. Petersburg. A telegraph Agency. Across Russia / / Voice of Siberia. January 8, 1910. N 5.

Establishment of military agencies / / China and Japan. Review of periodicals . January 23, 1911. N 21.

Extraordinary Chinese Embassy in St. Petersburg / / St. Petersburg Vedomosti. January 3, 1910. N 24.

page 53

Permanent link to this publication: