Russia's trade with the countries of the East is a long-standing tradition, which was based on the geographical location of the country bordering many Asian states. Already in the 16th century, with the formation of the Russian centralized state, this trade reached significant proportions and was conducted with Transcaucasia, Iran, Central Asia, India and China - mainly by land caravan routes.

Russia has not had direct contacts with Southeast Asia for a long time, which is explained both by their geographical remoteness and by the fact that Southeast Asia has long been outside the sphere of Russian foreign policy.

Nevertheless, Russia has long known goods from Southeast Asia, especially spices. Russians used "spiced potions" and "spiced vegetables" for food (especially a lot of pepper), as well as for making medicines. M. I. Chulkov, a prominent ideologist of the Russian merchant class, in his capital work on Russian commerce at the end of the XVIII century. cited import tariffs in the ports of St. Petersburg, Vyborg, Narva, Arkhangelsk for spices: pepper, cloves, cinnamon, cardamom, nutmeg, ginger [Chulkov, vol. VIII, 1788, pp. 6-7].

At the beginning of the 19th century, spices continued to be included in the so-called colonial goods imported into the Russian Empire, but cane sugar, coffee, cocoa, and tea occupied a larger place in the list of such goods , 1 and with the development of manufacturing textile production, cotton and natural dyes (indigo, cochineal, etc.).

Table 1

Importation of colonial goods to Russia in 1805-1810. (poods)

Years

Granulated sugar

Coffee

Cotton

Indigo

Cochineal

1805

63613

74163

3871

11801

892

1806

118763

49109

11362

10921

1470

1807

112207

37010

10274

7852

503

1808

9396

66925

7527

5916

223

1809

258068

98606

48 358

5801

264

1810

290412

65568

125528

3914

486

-----

Source: [Statistical Notes..., 1835, part I, adj.].

Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the share of Southeast Asian countries from the table below (such statistics appeared only at the end of the XIX century), and

1 Tea was imported from China, mainly via Kyakhta, and from there it was already distributed throughout the country.

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after all, cane sugar was bought not only in the West Indies and Cuba, but also in Indonesia, coffee was brought from Brazil and Java, and indigo and cochineal - from India and the Malay archipelago.

More definitely, we can talk about the import of various spices, since the majority of them were then produced in the Moluccas (although some came from British India). In 1817-1821, spices were imported to Russia for 328,700 rubles in silver per year. In 1822, when duties on nutmeg, cloves, cinnamon, pepper, and ginger were increased, their import in 1822-1826 decreased by an average of 22%, amounting to 267,814 rubles per year. But then the import of spices increased again, reaching 357,441 rubles in silver per year in 1842-1845 [Statistical notes..., 1835, part I, pp. 292-293].

Although the import of spices increased every year, Russia ranked last in terms of their consumption among European countries. For example, in 1819-1820, only 2,342 pounds of cloves, 1,025 pounds of cinnamon, 0.45 pounds of nutmeg, and 42,296 pounds of pepper were imported annually [Statisticheskie zapiski..., p. 294]. These scanty quantities were sold in no less scanty parts not even in grocery stores, but in pharmacies [Skalkovsky, 1870, p. 223].

The lack of a Russian merchant fleet led to the dependence of the import of colonial goods into the Russian Empire on the capitalist countries of the West. At the beginning of the XIX century to the main Russian ports (St. Petersburg, Riga, later-Odessa) British, Dutch or German merchants brought products from the colonial countries of Asia and America. Almost in the first half of the 19th century, 50% of the import of spices to Russia was carried out at the expense of trade with England, and the remaining 50% - with other European countries [Statistical Notes..., 1835, part I, p. 296].

Thus, the Russian Empire did not have any direct contacts with the countries of Southeast Asia at that time. The first projects to establish such contacts were associated with new trends and successes in the development of the empire, starting with the Peter's reforms, and above all with the colonization of Eastern Siberia, the Far East, and Alaska, the creation of the Russian fleet, and the formation in 1799 of a monopoly Russian-American company on the northwestern coast of America and adjacent islands-that is, Russia to the Pacific Ocean. The expansion of Russia's borders, as well as the discovery of the Bering Strait by Russian scientific expeditions, was a prerequisite for reaching the "Far Indies", as the countries of Southeast Asia were then called.

Since the end of the 18th century, the problem of relations with the Southeast Asian region has acquired economic significance due to the need to regularly supply Russian possessions in the Far East and Alaska with food, raw materials, and building materials, since it was not possible to create their own food base there. In addition, shipping goods from these countries to the new Russian possessions by sea was significantly cheaper than shipping goods by land-from the center of Russia or via round-the-world sea expeditions of a Russian-American company, as well as using the Internet. transportation of European vessels.

The second important reason for establishing ties with the countries of Southeast Asia was the intention of the Russian government to improve the situation on the fur market, the main buyer of which remained China: at the end of the XVIII century, it accounted for 85% of Russian exports. Since Russian merchants had to carry "soft junk" on the overland road to Kyakhta, this made Russian furs expensive compared to those delivered by European and American traders from the Pacific Islands by sea to Canton, which had been closed to Russia since 1757. The Russian government hoped to circumvent this ban through the use of

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maritime trade with China of furs of merchants and sailors from Southeast Asian countries.

The third reason was of an international nature. The growing importance of Russia in the "European concert" could not but draw it into the sphere of colonial rivalry between the Western powers. The greatest attention of Russian diplomats and statesmen was drawn to the struggle between England, which had been Russia's main rival since the end of the eighteenth century, and the Netherlands for the Malay Archipelago, as well as Spain's colonial policy in the Philippines, especially the trading activities of the Royal Philippine Company. Other Southeast Asian countries that were still independent (Burma, Siam, Vietnam) received minimal attention. All the initial Russian projects to establish trade ties concerned the Spanish Philippines and the Dutch colony of Java, as the closest to the Far Eastern possessions of Russia. The projects were numerous and belonged to members of the imperial government, diplomatic, military, and business circles (for more information, see Kozlova, 1986).

Thus, the founder of the Russian-American Company, G. I. Shelikhov, considered it necessary to organize not only regular sea navigation between the Philippines, Java and the Pacific possessions of the Russian Empire, but also, first of all, to open an official consular representation in one of these countries [Russkie otkritie..., 1948, p. 212, 225] in order to facilitate trade in the necessary goods: rice and other foodstuffs, clothing and fabrics, canvas for sails, ropes, ropes, etc. [Russian discoveries..., 1948, p. 363].

The famous Russian navigator Admiral I. F. Krusenstern paid special attention to the importance of the maritime fur trade of the Russian-American Company with China, believing that on the way back from Canton, the Company's vessels could call "either in Manila, or in Batavia, or to the East Indian coast to purchase such goods, which are sold with reliable profit." I. F. Krusenstern adhered to a far-reaching plan to transform a Russian-American company into a Russian East India Company [Lazarev, 1952, pp. 9-10].

Tsar Alexander I and the Minister of Commerce N. P. Rumyantsev were introduced to these ideas. The latter in 1803 considered it necessary to develop Russian foreign trade in the Pacific Ocean, and in connection with this, the first Russian circumnavigation of the world was organized under the command of I. F. Krusenstern [AVPRI, F. Asian Department, 1803, d. 8, l.1].

N. P. Rezanov, who sailed with I. F. Krusenstern on the flagship frigate Nadezhda, appointed Russian ambassador to Japan and at the same time head of the Russian-American Company, in his report to Alexander I from Unalaska dated July 18 (30), 1805, believed that first of all it was necessary to establish trade relations with the Philippines (and not with the United States). In general, with the countries of Southeast Asia, as the company's directors designed, as Rezanov wrote from Siberia in November 1805: "From your latest papers, I see that extensive species already include the Cochin, Thin, Burmese Empire and, in a word, all the Indian possessions [TsGIA, p. 199], in order to "supply the entire territory of the country". Kamchatka" and strengthen the Russian-American company by building ships, thereby expanding the trade operations of the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean " [TsGIA, p. 236].

The most detailed idea of developing Russia's own trade in the Pacific region was outlined in a note in April-May 1805 by J. O. Lambert, an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He proposed to establish trade relations not only with the Philippines, but also with the Spanish colonies in America by connecting the galleon trade (the annual arrival of a Spanish galleon ship from Acapulco or Saint Blas to Manila) with the OT-

page 52

from there, at least three Russian ships were sent to Kamchatka and Okhotsk with Spanish goods from its American possessions [Politika evropeyskikh derzhav..., pp. 442-445].

The already prepared decision regarding the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands India [Politika evropeiskikh poterakh..., p. 446-448] as Russia's trade partners in the waters of the Pacific Ocean was pushed back by the Napoleonic Wars and the Patriotic War of 1812. The project was returned to in 1814, however, only in relation to the Philippines. The implementation of this project - the establishment of a Russian consulate in Manila, the only one that existed in the Southeast Asian region in the first quarter of the 19th century - was largely connected not only with Russian politics, but also with the identity of the American merchant (who later became a Russian citizen). Peter Dobell. He was an ardent enthusiast for the development of Russia's Pacific policy and trade, traveled around the country himself, visited the Far East and Kamchatka, studied the state of the Russian-American Company, infected public and political figures of Russia with his ideas, wrote about the need to expand Russian trade to I. F. Krusenstern [Politics of European Powers..., pp. 450-451], Major-General I. A. Petrovsky, Commandant of the Kamchatka region [AVPR, f. Main Archive, IV-5,1812, op. 123, d. 4, l. 10-11 vol.], to the Governor-General of Siberia I. B. Pestel [Politika evropeyskikh derzhav, p. 363-464]. While in St. Petersburg, he introduced his plans to the Minister of Foreign Affairs K. F. Nesselrode, the Minister of Commerce N. P. Rumyantsev, and even received an audience with Alexander I [Kozlova, 1986, p. 70]. He also informed the Russian public by publishing in 1815-1816 in the magazine "Son of the Fatherland" his travel notes about his trip to Kamchatka and Siberia and about the prospects for their development.

Unlike the previous purely commercial plans for establishing contacts with the Philippines, Dobell believed that expanding Pacific contacts would radically change for the better not only the position of Russian possessions in the Far East and Alaska, but also turn Russia into a powerful trading power in the Pacific region: organizing whale fishing, extracting iron, soda, creating a large-scale oil field, and creating a large-scale logging operations, various factories, etc. [Politics of European powers..., pp. 463-464]. Dobell also attributed Russian dominance on the northwestern coast of America to the reorganization of the Russian-American Company: turning it into a government organization, in other words, into a semblance of the English East India Company.

International relations at the beginning of the 19th century were favorable for the adoption of the Dobell project by Russian government circles, especially in the case of Russian-Spanish relations. After the Congress of Vienna in 1814, Spain found itself in a state of international isolation and was losing ground in Latin America under the onslaught of insurgents, one after another, Spain sought to enlist the support of Russia, the arbiter of the fate of Europe at that time. In 1816-1819, Russian influence at the Madrid court was predominant, and Ambassador D. P. Tatishchev enjoyed great authority there. In this situation, the idea of establishing trade relations with the Philippines , as well as the activation of Russian policy on the west coast of America, 2 was further developed, and the P. Dobell project was launched. On June 14(28), 1816, the Main Board of the Russian - American Company appealed to the government to establish not only closer trade relations with the Spanish colonies, but also to seek the appointment of Dobell as the Russian consul in Manila [Politika evropeiskih poterah..., pp. 471-472], in order to support the Company's ships and monitor the pirate trade European and ame-

2 In California, the ROSS settlement was founded in 1812, and in 1815 permission was granted to trade with the Spanish colony of Peru (Lazarev, 1952, p. 49).

page 53

Puerto Rican traders in Russian waters (also referring to their illegal use of the Russian flag for their vessels) [Politics of European Powers..., p. 485].

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs treated the Dobell project based on political considerations. If at first it decided to use to the advantage of Russia the struggle of the Spanish colonies for independence [Politika evropeiskikh poterakh..., p. 476], then soon the Foreign Ministry took a more cautious position. Dobell's appointment as Russian Consul General by Alexander I's decree of March 4 (16), 1817 [AVPRI, F. Chancellery, 1817, D. 13378, L. 106] was accompanied by the following restrictive instructions::

Dobell was supposed to be studying: 1) collecting information and communicating it to the Ministry regarding possible trade between Kamchatka and the Philippine Islands; 2) familiarizing yourself with the prices at which you can buy or exchange food supplies for Kamchatka in the Philippine Islands, but on condition that these supplies are purchased and transported exclusively by Russian ships. It was also pointed out that "the more such information about prices is available, the easier it will be for the Ministry to form an idea of goods that will be useful to import into Manila and profitable to export to Kamchatka"; 3) provide the Ministry with samples of goods in the existing trade of Manila with the Canton; 4) recruit one or more whaling masters in the service of Russia to organize it off the coast of Kamchatka; 5) to prevent the abuse of the Russian flag, under which foreign ships illegally sail [Politika evropeyskikh poterzhav..., p. 502]. As a result, when relations with Spain worsened and it was even going to liquidate the Russian settlement of Ross in California, the Foreign Ministry suggested that Dobell act in the Philippines only as an unofficial person [Politics of European Powers..., p. 513].

P. Dobell arrived in Manila on March 28, 1820, without losing his optimism about trade in Manila [Politika evropeiskikh poterav..., pp. 535-536]. But the very first call to Manila of the ship Borodino, which was carrying out another expedition of the Russian-American company from Kronstadt to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky in July 1820, showed the unreasonableness of Dobell's calculations. The commissioner of Borodino, F. Krasilnikov, in a report to the Main Board of the company, made a detailed report, in which he regretfully pointed out that the range of goods for sale in Manila was chosen unsuccessfully and that wholesale trade was practically not conducted there [Politics of European Powers..., p. 546]. The Russian Consul in Rio de Janeiro, P. P. Kilchen, in a letter dated June 18(30), 1821, K. V. Nesselrode quite colorfully described the first Russian trade experience in Southeast Asia: "The directors sent a rich cargo of Russian products to Manila on the ship Borodino to test the local market. The supercargo was only able to sell a small amount of sailcloth at a negligible price... Manila doesn't seem to encourage direct deals with Russia at all: sales of Russian products are not large enough to allow the entire cargo to be sold immediately upon arrival. There are no wholesale buyers at all. The French, English, and others who frequent this market unload their ships, rent storage areas, leave their goods in them, and continue to sell them themselves at retail, which usually lasts more than a year. During this time, the ship is laid up, the crew is dismissed or chartered to India and China. Only in this way can the transaction become profitable. If the market does not offer the possibility of a quick sale immediately after the arrival of the ship, then the Russian company can not hope to receive any benefits. It will be necessary, therefore, to count on a period of at least 2 years to return the time spent on such a program.

page 54

this is capital, and only rich merchants can wait so long for the return of the advanced amounts" [Politics of European powers..., p. 546].

This was a complete failure. P. Dobell, due to illness, left Manila in the second half of 1820. Practically from that time on, the consulate ceased to exist. The idea of trade and establishing ties with the countries of Southeast Asia was abandoned in Russia for a long time. Nicholas I signed a decree of the Board of Foreign Affairs on the abolition of the post of "our consul General in Manila" only later-in 1826 [AVPRI, F. Administrative Affairs, IV-3, 1826, d. 16, l. 6]. K. V. Nesselrode attributed this failure to the unwillingness of the Spanish government to recognize Dobell officially, as well as "cholera riot" in Manila, although he left the Philippines before the epidemic [Politics of European powers..., p. 548].

The reason for the failure of the initial period of Russian trade in Southeast Asia was not only due to P. Dobell's organizational miscalculations and the specific political situation in the Spanish Philippines, where the process of national liberation movement was developing, which coincided with that in the American colonies of Spain. Russia, which sided with the Spanish royal power, did not put political pressure on Spain to officially recognize the Russian consul, because, like Spain, it pursued a protective protectionist policy. However, the monopoly trade was already collapsing: the Philippine Royal Company was liquidated in 1830, and Manila was declared a free port (porto-franco) in 1834.

The Russian-American company created in the year of the liquidation of the Dutch East India Company (1799), in the conditions of transition to industrial capitalism, had no future, despite the support of the state. Without a sufficient economic base in the Far East for the production of goods, as well as a strong naval fleet , 3 Russia was unable to expand trade in the Pacific Ocean and gradually lost its position there: it allowed free navigation and trade in the internal waters of the Russian colony in the Pacific, first to the United States (1824), and then to England (1825). After that, she went to sell her possessions: Russian America in 1867, and the Ross settlement in California even earlier - in 1842. Plans to establish trade with the Philippines were never revived and even diplomatic relations between Russia and Spain were interrupted until 1856.

Much less important from the point of view of the influence on the development of trade of the Russian Empire in the Pacific region in the first half of the XIX century were commercial relations with another region of Southeast Asia-the island of Java, a Dutch colony in Indonesia. The first proposal for trade was made by the Dutch government in the 20s of the XIX century [AVPRI, F. Main Archive, 1823, d. 871, l. 202 - 203,207 - 207 In 1833, one of the private Dutch merchants also proposed to establish permanent trade relations between Russia and the Dutch East India colonies. Although the project was approved in the Netherlands, it did not arouse interest in Russia. In the same year, in the context of the introduction of a system of forced crops in Java, which immediately led to a sharp increase in the marketable colonial products - sugar, coffee, indigo, etc., the Dutch government, interested in ensuring its rapid and profitable sale, addressed the Russian Foreign Ministry with a note stating: "...will there be a problem with the export of sugar, coffee, indigo, etc. it is possible to conclude an agreement between the two governments, according to which the island of Java, for example, would undertake to supply annually or every other year to the Russian possessions in Kamchatka a certain amount of-

3 In 1833, the Russian-American Company had only 11 sailing vessels, and the main profitable commodity was still furs [Statistical notes..., part I, p. 202].

page 55

the quality of araki (sugar cane vodka. - M. K.), coffee, salt, rice and others... supplies" [The policy of European powers..., p. 158].

Whether trade links were established between Java and the Far East remains unknown, but it is possible that the Russian-American company sent its ships to Batavia.

Since 1822, the existence of high import protectionist duties imposed by Finance Minister E. F. Kankrin under Nicholas I has severely affected all of Russia's Asian trade, including trade in colonial goods. Thus, the duty on carnations in 1819 was 8 p. 75 kopecks in silver per pood, in 1822 it was raised to 15 rubles. it amounted to 15 rubles. 50 kopecks, and in 1846 it slightly decreased - to 14 rubles. Duties on ginger, respectively, for the specified years changed as follows: 20 kopecks., 2 rubles., 2 rubles. 20 kopecks., 2 rubles. 50 kopecks.; on cinnamon-8 rubles. 75 kopecks., 10 rubles., 10 rubles., 5 rubles.; for nutmeg - 8 rubles 75 kopecks, 15 rubles, 18 rubles, 9 rubles; for pepper-1 rubles 50 kopecks, 3 rubles, 3 rubles 20 kopecks. Russia ranked last in Europe in terms of spice imports and had the highest import tariff for them [Statisticheskie zapiski..., part I, 1835, pp. 293-295].

Coffee and sugar were of great importance in the trade of colonial goods in Russia, not counting tea exported from China by land caravan road. The annual import of coffee until the 20s of the XIX century was kept at the level of 70 poods, in 1822 - 1831 it was about 100 thousand poods, in 1829-1831-139,500 poods, in 1842-1846-163,025 poods, and in 1848-234,263 poods. The duty on coffee after 1822 increased from 2 rubles to 6 rubles and 15 kopecks by 1841. per pood [Statistical notes.. ., ch. 1, 1835, p. 384-385,389].

Naturally, such a colonial commodity as coffee in Russia could not be cheap. The import of Javanese coffee to Russia increased, which was received through Amsterdam, Hanseatic cities and London. The amount of Javanese coffee imported to Russia increased markedly: if in 1827-1831 it was imported at the level of 1,009 poods per year, then in 1837-1841 - 11,722 poods, and in 1842-1846 - 18,335 poods. With the opening of Odessa as a port franco, the import of coffee through this port increased by 120% [Statistical notes..., part I, 1835, p. 387].

Sugar in Russia was consumed as cane, imported from Cuba and Java (about 1,600,000 poods), and its own, beet (about 900,000 poods), and on average per inhabitant in Russia accounted for 1 2/3 pounds of sugar (in England - 21 pounds). This difference, along with other reasons, was also explained by the huge import duties, which from 1811 to 1814 rose from 1 rub. per pood to 3 rub. 80 kopecks.; revenues from the collection of duties on sugar accounted for about 22% of the total customs income of Russia from 1842 to 1847 [Statistical notes..., part I, 1835, pp. 305-306].

High import duties in Russia were unprofitable for the Netherlands, which was the second largest supplier of coffee to Russia after Brazil. It was difficult for Holland to resist Cuba, which won the first place in the Russian raw sugar market, 4 since the cost of transporting Javanese sugar was almost 90-100% of its cost (while Cuban sugar was only 35-50%) [Statisticheskie zapiski..., part I, 1835, p. 335].

In an effort to achieve a change in the conditions of importation of Javanese goods to Russia, the Dutch envoy in St. Petersburg, Baron V. Mollerus, sent a note to K. V. Nesselrode in January 1845, in which, in particular, it was stated that Russia's trade policy with respect to East Indian goods, especially coffee and sugar, had a detrimental effect on the general condition of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Russia. In the note, it was proposed to reduce import duties on Javanese coffee and sugar in Russia, respectively.-

4 Out of 1500,000 poods of sugar imported to Russia in 1845, 7/8-accounted for Havana [AVPRI, F. Main Archive, P-3, op. 77, 1845, d. 2, l. 13 vol.]

page 56

tires for Russian goods in the Netherlands. Finance Minister F. P. Vronchenko, in response to a request from Nesselrode, expressed doubts about the possibility of meeting the wishes of the Dutch government [Politika evropeiskih poterah..., p.189]. In November 1845, the Dutch embassy in Russia, in a new letter to the Foreign Ministry, once again raised the issue of duties on sugar and coffee imported from Java. It noted that out of 800 thousand pounds of coffee consumed annually in Russia, only 100-150 thousand pounds "enter Russia legally, i.e. with the payment of a duty set at 6 rubles in silver per pound, while the rest is smuggled", due to high duties [Politics European powers..., p. 193].

The Dutch demarches largely reflected the planned changes in the customs policy of the Russian Empire, related to the interests of Russian (mainly St. Petersburg) sugar producers, who sought to increase the import of both raw sugar and semi-processed sugar, as well as to revise customs rules and tariffs. In 1845-1847, the duties on coffee were reduced to 3 rubles. 70 KOPECKS. From Pud, semi-refined sugar was allowed to be imported, which significantly expanded the possibilities of Javanese colonial goods on the Russian market [Kozlova, 1986, p. 96].

The Russian Embassy in the Netherlands kept its government in St. Petersburg constantly informed of the state of Java's trade. Russian archival documents contain statistical reports for 1836 and 1842 on the import and export of Java as a whole, as well as on its trade with China, Japan and Russia. Documents containing excerpts from the new Dutch customs tariff, which came into force in 1845, were sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which noted articles of Javanese-Dutch trade of interest to Russia and new customs tariffs for them, and the declaration of a number of Moluccas ports free for trade (porto franco) in 1853 [And In PRI, F. Chancellery, 1845, d. 116, l. 41-43; 3, I-3, 1853, op. 77, d. 17, l. 6].

Minor trade in products from other Southeast Asian territories (Siam, British Burma, and Straits Settlements), which was included in Russia's trade with England (the main place in Russia's colonial trade with England was occupied by Indian products), was also carried out by Singapore. The adoption of a new customs tariff by England in 1842 aroused the interest of Russian diplomacy, which considered it necessary to seek a reduction in duties on a number of colonial goods, primarily sugar, coffee, and indigo. Indigo was brought to Russia mainly from India, but by the middle of the XIX century, Javanese indigo also appeared: the average import of indigo in 1822 - 1825 was at the level of 13,385 poods, in 1832 - 1836 - 28,711 poods, and in 1842-1846-42,844 poods [Statistical notes..., part 2, p. 339].

In general, the largest volume of Russian trade in colonial goods fell on England. These goods were produced not only in the English colonies, but also in the Dutch and Spanish ones, as well as in Siam and Vietnam. It accounted for 1/3 of the total import of colonial goods to Russia and was carried out on ships of the English merchant fleet. In 1847, 12,000 foreign ships were involved in Russian foreign trade, carrying goods worth 168 million rubles, and 1,768 Russian ships carried goods worth 23 million rubles. [Statistical notes..., part 2, 1850, pp. 453-461]. The volume of trade with Southeast Asian countries was insignificant. As before, the main place in Russian eastern trade was occupied by China, Persia, Central Asia, and India.

Long-distance sea transportation (a roundabout route through the southern tip of Africa and further to Europe), the participation of foreign firms in the purchase and sale of colonial goods for Russia, the absence of their own merchant fleet in the waters of Southeast Asia - led to a huge increase in the price of products of these countries for the Russian buyer. "Leaving foreigners with the main income - sea transportation," wrote D. I. Men-

page 57

Deleev, "Russia is losing a lot in its industrial development" [Mendeleev, 1892, p. 622].

* * *

After the sale of the colonies in Alaska and California, the liquidation of the Russian-American company, Russia's desire to establish trade with the countries of Southeast Asia lost its significance. However, a constantly present foreign policy factor has now emerged - the attitude of Russian diplomacy towards the colonial rivalry of powers in this region, especially those with whom the interests of the Russian Empire came into conflict in other parts of the world, primarily Great Britain.

Along with the foreign policy aspects, the documents contained in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI) also began to reflect the situation in the countries of Southeast Asia themselves: from this period, the Russian public became more well-known, especially since a significant number of descriptions of these countries appeared in the periodical press, both translated and original, as well as in the Russian travelers and merchants, military personnel and sailors began to appear more frequently in Southeast Asia, although direct contacts - diplomatic or commercial-still did not exist.

Due to the economic development of Russia, the expansion of textile production, and the growth of the dye industry, there is a greater demand for goods such as sugar, cotton, indigo,and cochineal. In the middle of the XIX century. Russia has become one of the largest importers of cotton and indigo from India and Java. Only the port of St. Petersburg annually received about 4 million pounds of goods from the East Indies. In the 60s of the XIX century, textile enterprises in Russia consumed more than 3.5 million pounds of cotton and 47 thousand pounds of indigo [Statistical notes..., part 2, 1850, p. 285]. In addition, Russia imported 5.5 million rubles worth of spices. All these imports in the Russian statistics were included in the column of trade with England and other European countries. Almost 80% of indigo was purchased through the intermediary of the UK. This increased the cost of goods purchased by Russia by millions of rubles. At the end of the 1860s, Russian firms annually paid 2.5 million rubles for the freight of foreign ships, 1.5 million rubles for insurance obligations, 2 million rubles for mediation in buying and selling, 0.25 million rubles for renting warehouses and shops, and 0.5 million rubles for commissions to foreign firms and banks. total - 6.75 million rubles. [Vestnik Evropy..., 1871, p. 762]. Thus, Russian foreign trade in" colonial goods " provided huge profits to the European commercial bourgeoisie, reducing the opportunities for its own economic development.

The need for direct contacts with the countries of the Pacific region and the Indian Ocean was again on the agenda with the opening of the Suez Canal, when it turned out that the sea route from Odessa to these countries was thousands of miles shorter than from these same countries to European ports where Russia bought East Indian goods brought there. In addition, the Russian Shipping and Trade Society (ROPiTO), which had been operating in Russia since 1856, opened communication with the ports of the Mediterranean and North Seas and the Atlantic, and in 1871-with the Indian and western Pacific Oceans. It had 67 vessels (1870), and its revenue increased from 292,022 rubles in 1857 to 4,894,250 by 1870 [Otechestvennye Zapiski..., 1871, p. 51]. ROPiTO was the largest monopoly of Russian maritime transport, associated with Russian banks, as well as the Society for Promoting Russian Trade and Industry and the Free Economic Society, i.e. representatives of the commercial and industrial circles of Russia, who expressed the interests of the emerging monopolistic capital.

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Influential commercial and industrial circles of Russia spoke in 1870 for the earliest opening of direct trade with the East Indies and China along the Black Sea, through Odessa, and from there goods could be delivered to the center of Russia by rail. Indeed, already at the beginning of 1871, the Nakhimov steamer entered the Odessa-Bombay line, and the Chikhachev steamer entered the Chinese line in Hankow, which visited Batavia and Singapore on its way. However, regular commercial flights of Russian ships were never established: this was hindered by competition with Western European firms and shipping companies, as well as the weak development of commercial navigation in Russia and the establishment of high charters on Russian ships.

The development of capitalism in Russia in the last third of the nineteenth century, the creation of a factory industry based on advanced technology in the cotton and metallurgical industries, oil production and refining, and extensive railway construction made it necessary to expand foreign markets and establish trade relations with the colonial possessions of European states in the East and with semi-colonial countries.

With the construction of the Siberian Railway (in 1897 Siberia and the Far East began to develop, for which the markets of China, Korea, Japan, and the countries of Southeast Asia were closer than the markets of the European part of Russia. The first centers of monopolistic enterprises of Russia appeared in new industries (in the late 80s and early 90s of the XIX century, syndicates of sugar growers, kerosene growers, etc.). The struggle of the powers for the redistribution of the world, for new spheres of influence also affected Russia: its ruling circles were interested in expansion in the Far East. In 1895, the Russo-Chinese Bank was established (with the participation of French capital), in 1896, a concession was obtained for the construction of the CER; Russia's influence in Korea increased, and in 1898, Russia obtained a lease from China for the Liaodong Peninsula, Port Arthur and Dalny. During the same period (before the Russo - Japanese War), Russia tried to expand its trade in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, including the Southeast Asian countries.

The problem of the future of Russian trade in this area of the globe occupied Russian economists, as well as Russian diplomatic and consular representatives who were already active in most countries of Southeast Asia during this period. In the last decade of the 19th century, imports to Russia from Eastern countries tripled in comparison with the 1860s. At the end of the 1880s, Russia annually imported over 20 million pounds of goods from Asia for a total of 200 million rubles. At the same time, half of them still came through European countries. The share of Southeast Asia in Russia's trade was still insignificant, with China taking the first place in the export of its goods to Russia, followed by Iran, Egypt and India [Skalkovsky, 1870, p. 9, note 1].

In the first half of the 1980s, Russia's attention was again drawn to the possibilities of trade with the Dutch colony in Indonesia-the island of Java. This time it was connected with the appearance of works of an economic nature by mining engineer E. V. Coriander, who was sent by the Russian Ministry of Finance to the Amsterdam Exhibition of colonial and export goods in 1883, as well as with the activities of the Russian Consul M. M. Bakunin in Batavia in 1894-1899, who published the book "Tropical Holland" in 1902. which raised the problem of trade relations with the Netherlands India.

Coriander gave a statistical sketch of Java's trade in 1875, drawing on various sources .5 The author attached crucial importance to the discovery of the Suez Canal-

5 This part of Coriander's work is the first Russian scientific paper dealing with the economy of Indonesia.

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and that " Marseilles, Trieste, Genoa, Venice, and other ports, which had previously had almost no trade with the colonies in the Indian Ocean, have since 1869 entered into direct relations with the East Indies, Ceylon, and the Sunda Islands, to the detriment of London, Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam." He believed that now the Dutch market will lose its former trade turnover [Coriander, 1885, pp. 30-31].

Coriander considered trade with Java "as a particular issue of Russia's trade with the coasts and islands of the Indian Ocean." He was a proponent of connecting the Russian Black Sea and Caspian ports by rail directly to the coast of the Persian Gulf, "establishing Russian relations through Suez with Java and the East Indies", which "requires familiarity with business, enterprise and a merchant fleet of appropriate size" [Coriander, 1885, p.39].

Coriander analyzed in detail the possibility of exporting and importing certain goods that might be of interest to Russia's trade with the countries of South and Southeast Asia, especially with Java. He believed that "Russian manufactured goods, especially cotton and linen fabrics, can safely, as the Amsterdam Exhibition of 1883 showed, compete with English and American goods of this kind in terms of good quality" [Coriander, 1885, p.39]. Some Russian-made food products, as well as wines, pottery, glass and metal products, ropes and cables, could also be sold in Java. The author focused on the export of fuel from Russia - coal and kerosene, believing that coal could take one of the first places among other export items, since "Russian coal will not be more expensive... English" [Coriander, 1885, p. 54].

Speaking about possible imports to Russia from Indonesia, Coriander mentioned sugar, coffee, indigo, tobacco, tea, tin, hides, spices, pepper, rubber (it is more profitable to buy rubber in Singapore than in Brazil, he believed), rice, kapok, rams and cinchona bark. Speaking in favor of "direct importation of colonial and other products from Asia to South Russian ports," Coriander regretted that "the historical conditions of development of our industry, trade and navigation deprived" Russia of an annual income of 30 million rubles. [Coriander, 1885, p. 54]. The engineer criticized the slowness of the Volunteer Fleet, whose ships returned from the Far East "often with a cargo consisting of several barrels of coconut oil, or even without cargo at all" and called for the creation of a modern merchant fleet on the Black Sea and familiarization with the markets of the East Indies, for the establishment of Russian ships in the main ports of the East Indies and the Sunda Archipelago. consulates that would also be trade agencies " [Coriander, 1885, pp. 67-68].

M. M. Bakunin, Consul in Batavia, was also interested in the possibility of trade relations between Russia and the Netherlands India. In his dispatches, he paid much attention to the economy of Indonesia and its export opportunities; he presented a report on this topic to the Department of Trade and Manufactures of the Ministry of Finance (published in a separate booklet), and also wrote a book in which he used both his diplomatic reports and reports on this topic.

Bakunin was disappointed that there was almost nothing to do in Indonesia in his consular specialty, since " Russian interests and Russian trade do not exist in this remote corner of the far East..." [Bakunin, 1902, p.97]. Pointing out that the only product exported to Russia from Java on foreign ships is "several hundred tons of copra", Bakunin was skeptical about the Russian export: "As for products from Russia that could be sold on the local market, the ground for such sales was not yet prepared, in view of the complete absence of any direct relations between Russia and the Netherlands Indies" [Bakunin, 1902, p. 99].

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Bakunin saw the reason for this in the sluggishness and sluggishness of Russian entrepreneurs [Bakunin, 1902, pp. 310-311]. Not relying on private initiative, for "the spirit of enterprise... we do not have, everyone in Russia craves government support and state subsidies, and without these basic conditions and without this starting point, no one will risk anything at their own risk" [Bakunin, 1902, p. 311]. Bakunin suggested that the government steamship company organize regular calls of ships to Batavia and gradually develop this market.

The consul wrote about the futility of his proposal to the Ministry of Finance to send three steamers of the Voluntary Fleet to Batavia on the way to the Far East, "so that they could get acquainted with market conditions on the spot and prepare the ground for future commercial operations "[Bakunin, 1902, p. 98]. Although the Committee of the Voluntary Fleet approved the proposal of the Ministry of Finance to allow steamers to call at Batavia on the way back from Vladivostok to Odessa, and Bakunin began preparations among the commercial circles of Batavia for this event, but a few days before the expected arrival of Russian steamers, the consul received a brief telegram from the Committee of the Voluntary Fleet, in which steamboats will not enter Batavia [Bakunin, 1902, p. 314]. "This cancellation had an unfavorable impression for our seriousness. The local public was critical of the inconsistency in our ideas and doubted the reliability of Russian initiatives in general in view of the unexpected and insufficiently motivated refusal of the Voluntary Fleet Committee for the Dutch, " he wrote [Bakunin, 1902, p. 314].

Bakunin, like Coriander, believed that Russia could buy coffee, cloves, nutmeg, vanilla, quinine and other colonial goods not in London, Amsterdam and Hamburg, but locally. He pinned his hopes on the creation of a strong Russian merchant fleet to maintain ties between the Netherlands Indies and the Far East and Siberia [Bakunin, 1902, p. 315].

The problem of Russian shipping in the seas of Southeast Asia and the sale of Russian goods in the region was also the focus of the activities of the Russian Consulate in Singapore (opened in 1891), the only city in Southeast Asia that had a Voluntary Fleet agency (the Moscow company Shcherbachev, Chokov & Co.). All vessels of the Volunteer Fleet on regular flights from Odessa to the Far East called at Singapore to refuel and buy food and take some cargo sent to Russia here. Sometimes Russian ships in Singapore were also chartered by foreign firms, but more often they transported Muslim pilgrims from Southeast Asia to Mecca .6 In general, despite the regularity of flights of the Voluntary Fleet on the route Odessa-Vladivostok-Odessa (in 1881 there were 5 flights, in 1885 - 6, in 1896 - 8, in 1898 - 24 flights (22 of them to Port Arthur) [Poggenpol, 1903, p. 90, 98, 177] and a certain increase in the cargo of colonial goods (mainly Chinese tea) transported by ships of the Russian Fleet, the weakness of the commercial activity of the Volunteer Fleet in the waters of Southeast Asia and South India caused serious criticism. Trade turnover was generally insignificant due to the fact that the vessels of the Volunteer Fleet were often used for military purposes: cruising in the waters of the Pacific Ocean, transporting soldiers and military equipment, and even delivering convicts to Sakhalin.

The widespread development of trade was hindered by the lack of a sufficient range of Russian goods for import and the almost complete absence of Russian trade and intermediary firms in the Southeast Asian countries. In Singapore, the main trade emporium of the Southeast Asian region, the Far East and India, the Russian trade policy miscalculations were very significant.

6 Thus, in 1913, the income of the Volunteer Fleet amounted to 3879322 rubles for the delivery of cargo and 44940 rubles for the transportation of pilgrims. [Poggenpol, 1903, p. 177].

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noticeable. The Russian Consul General in Singapore in 1891 - 1909, A. M. Vyvodtsev, bitterly wrote that Russia " gets only a minimal share, namely: the cost of import from Russia to Singapore was determined at 73 thousand dollars. (out of $ 3,645 million) and that, in addition to cement and occasional shipments of cigarettes, tobacco, canned fish, and caviar, which are received from Odessa by the small merchant Bolter, "who trades on ships arriving from Russia, from which he buys goods and supplies provisions, other goods Russian ships calling at Singapore, do not bring" [Politics of the capitalist powers..., part I, p. 242].

Having considered the range of goods delivered to Singapore, Vyvodtsev came to the conclusion (as Coriander and Bakunin had done before) that Russian merchants needed to act more actively, they needed to "make extensive use of advertising, through ads, and send salesmen with samples." He also wrote about a deeper reason for the weakness of our trade in the Pacific, namely, the underdeveloped production base in the Russian Far East: "But it would be even more successful if Russian factories and factories were installed on the outskirts of Siberia, in Vladivostok. Then in the vicinity of the path (10 days) we could compete with freight from Europe... Thus, the branches of match factories, flour mills, and especially the construction of canned Russian fish factories, which are so cheap in Siberia, could probably count on wide sales in China, Indochina, Siam, and the Malacca Peninsula, with Singapore in the center. After all, it is not the gods who burn pots, and what can others do, why not do it to us, the Russians?" [Politics of the capitalist Powers..., part 1, pp. 242-243].

Listing the goods exported to Russia from Singapore (copra, tin, kapok, canned pineapple, rice, black pepper), Vyvodtsev considered it necessary to expand the export from Russia to Singapore "more regular flights of our ships, as well as their entry into the ports of the Mediterranean Sea, in order to ensure their full loading there and back". Complaining about the lack of Russian firms in Singapore, the consul believed that "a Russian commission firm could flourish here in order to introduce the market to Russian goods and buy directly from the manufacturer" [Politika kapitalistnykh derzhav..., part 1, 1965, p.242-243].

In 1900, the Russian Society of Shipping and Trade raised the question of creating a Russian shipping company based directly in Singapore. N. I. Zhevanov, Chairman of the Company's Management Board, wrote to V. I. Kovalevsky, Director of the Department of Trade and Manufactory of the Ministry of Finance, on May 16 (29), 1900: "In view of the significant movement of Russian ships, 7 it would be useful to establish carriage lines connecting Singapore with the ports that feed it, to transport cargo to Russian steamers returning from the Far East for the most part empty" [Politics of the capitalist powers..., part I, 1965, p. 232].

The representative of the Russian business community believed that only a shipping company that received financial support from the government had a chance of success. The latter was supposed to establish regular lines between Singapore and Bangkok, Saigon, and Batavia, which would be "of great importance for reviving our trade relations with these Asian states, which can become serious markets for selling all sorts of Russian goods, especially sugar and kerosene, because direct relations will undoubtedly cause trade exchange" [Politics capitalist powers..., part I, 1965, p. 232].

7 "Singapore is visited by Russian steamboats of the Voluntary Fleet 40 times a year, the Russian Society of Shipping and Trade 12 times, and in addition, about 5 or 6 random steamboats under the Russian flag come there" [Politika kapitalistnykh derzhav..., part I, 1965, p. 232].

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No less important to Russian trade interests in Southeast Asia was the Russian diplomat, Consul in Bangkok (since 1897), A. E. Olarovsky, who sought to conclude the Russian-Siamese trade treaty, which was signed in July 1899 in the form of a "Declaration on Jurisdiction, Trade and Navigation". In his Historical Review of the policy of England and France in Indochina, Olarovsky listed the list of goods imported into Siam (cotton fabrics, metal products, kerosene, silk, sugar, opium, glass, bags) and exported (rice, teak, pepper, salted and dried fish, cattle, skins, shellfish)., and he believed that as the Siamese market is studied, it is possible that Russia will also be able to sell not only kerosene and oil to Siam, but also its other goods [Politika kapitalistnykh derzhav..., part II, 1967, p.148]. Therefore, Olarovsky collected information in Siam about goods for which Russia could find a market in Siam; at his insistence, some Odessa and St. Petersburg firms sent samples of some of their goods to Bangkok, i.e., a very interesting sample of Russian goods took place [Politics of the capitalist Powers..., ch. II, 1967, p. 197]. An employee of the Russian Consulate in Bangkok, A.D. Kalmykov, believed that calico and tobacco would be the easiest to sell in Siam [ibid., p. 199]. But Russian ship calls to Bangkok were very rare, and as a representative from Bangkok reported in 1901, " Russian shipping is still insignificant." Kerosene was the main article of import to Siam, and the export consisted of a small amount of rice for Vladivostok and teak wood.

Like other Russian representatives, Olarovsky considered it necessary to support the idea of the chairman of the Board of the Russian Shipping and Trade Society to open lines connecting Singapore with other ports in Southeast Asia, which could turn into markets for all sorts of Russian goods, primarily sugar and kerosene. However, his stay in Bangkok showed Olarovsky that it was impossible for Russia to conquer the Siamese and South Chinese markets in the conditions of the trade monopoly of England and the firm positions of France, Germany and Japan there.

Practical steps were never taken to open steamship lines in the waters of Southeast Asia, and the only major and competitive item of Russian exports to Siam and other Southeast Asian countries was only kerosene, the export of which was given great importance, especially in the 80-90 years of the XIX century, when tsarist Russia In terms of oil production, it came out on top in the world (in 1898). It was in this year that it exported 69 million poods of oil. Petroleum products-kerosene and lubricants-were in great demand on the world market, and the rivalry between the powers, including Russia, for their sale escalated, especially by the beginning of the XX century.

Russian kerosene was sent from Baku via Batumi and Odessa to consumer countries, the largest of which in the East were India, China, and Japan, and almost a third of kerosene exported from Russia went to India and China .8 In the markets of the Far East, Southeast Asia, and India, Russian kerosene successfully competed with American kerosene, and Russian oil producers with the opening of the Siberian Railway began to hatch plans to master the Asian markets [Monopolistic Capital..., 1964, pp. 200-201].

Russian consuls in Asian countries were instructed to pay special attention to the kerosene trade. In 1897, Russian oil producers, proposing to create a Russian export company for petroleum products [Bursenko, 1965, p. 221], compiled questionnaires to find out the prospects for trade in Russian petroleum products in 23 Asian ports, including Batavia, Chittagong, Singapore, Georgetown (Penang) and Bangkok. The list of ports also indicated their relative importance for the import of Russian kerosene transported in crates (1 crate = 30 li-

8 In 1899, the first place in the export of Russian kerosene belonged to India (Lyusternik, 1958, p. 59).

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tram) and the presence or absence of reservoirs that could receive oil from oil-loading vessels. Batavia was ranked third (after Calcutta and Bombay). on the import of Russian kerosene, Chittagong-the twentieth, Penang-the thirteenth, Bangkok-the twelfth [AVPRI, F. Singapore Consulate, 1897, d. 26, l. 1-5].

The answers to the questions showed that Russian oil products, transported both in crates and in bulk, were widely sold, but all their delivery was carried out not by Russian, but by foreign ships and companies that did not care about the income of exporters. Thus, the English firm Samuel & Co.was engaged in the import of bulk Russian kerosene to Singapore and Bangkok. The form of transportation of kerosene in bulk has shown its clear advantage over box transportation: for five years, from 1892 to 1897, the import of bulk Russian kerosene to the Far East was equal in quantity to its export in boxes [AVPRI, F. Singapore Consulate, 1897, d. 26, l. 1-5]. According to the data of the Russian Consul in Singapore A. M. Vyvodtsev, in 1890 183,601 cases of kerosene were imported to Singapore from Russia, and in 3 months of 1891 - another 8,200 cases [AVPRI, F. Pacific table, d. 1355, l. 15 vol.In Siam at the end of the 19th century. Russia ranked first in terms of kerosene imports. In 1898, 220,000 boxes worth $ 308,000 were sold there. [AVPRI, F. Pacific Table, 1783, l. 9].

Russian economists and consuls in the Southeast Asian countries were concerned both about the high cost of freight for the transportation of Russian kerosene on foreign ships, and competition with Sumatran and American oil products.

M. M. Bakunin predicted the development of the oil industry in Sumatra and the transformation of Indonesia into one of the main sources of fuel supply for the entire region. He pointed out that Russian kerosene is transported "not on Russian ships that do not visit Batavia, but on English, Italian and other steamers, as a result of which cargo collected often not even in Batum, but in London, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Antwerp, etc., is more expensive here than if they arrived directly from Russian ports on ships sailing under the Russian flag, since it is necessary to pay an extra commission for freight to various intermediary agents "[Bakunin, 1902, p. 323]. E. V. Coriander, who sought to expand Russia's economic position in Asia, insisted on creating his own Russian liquid fleet and a special " partnership of Russian oil producers", which would sell Russian kerosene with great benefits in South and Southeast Asia [Coriander, 1885, pp. 50-51].

A. E. Olarovsky also proposed to organize the delivery of kerosene from Batum, using the most modern bulk method of transportation on their ships, so that Russian kerosene could "count on a complete victory over its competitors - Sumatran and American" [AVPRI, F. Japanese table, d. 1783, l. 9].

Kerosene , the main article of Russian importation into Siam, was the reason for competition with England, which demanded that they charge higher duties for kerosene itself, and would not include transportation in its price. This would be a blow to Russia's interests, since the transportation of Russian kerosene on foreign ships was very expensive, both because of the freight and because of the distance (especially compared to Sumatran kerosene).

The Russian government instructed Olarovsky in 1901 to insist to the Siamese authorities on maintaining the previous trade duties. Russian Finance Minister XU. Witte believed that changing them in Siam would cause "significant harm to our interests, since there will be a wide field for arbitrary assessments of kerosene , the main object of our import into Siam" [AVPRI, F. Japanese Table, f. 23, op. 24, d. 1041, l. 029]. The Russian Foreign Ministry believed that Russian-Siamese trade relations should be expanded, but this was unrealistic in the face of the dominance of foreign capital in Siam. Even the kerosene trade did not have great prospects. The Russian diplomat A. I. Yansakovsky estimated that only in one Bangkok for obo-

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It would take 96,500 rubles to purchase oil and kerosene storage sites [LVPRI, f. 23, op. 24, d. 1041, l. 052ob.].

Russia's position in the markets of the Far East and Southeast Asia was weakened by the Russo-Japanese war. Instructions from the Russian Foreign Minister A. P. Izvolsky to the Russian representative in Siam in 1908 stated that Russia's trade and economic relations with Siam "appear to be completely unsatisfactory." Even the relatively thriving kerosene trade of a few years ago is said to have "now fallen completely." The reason for this situation was the almost complete displacement of Russian kerosene-Indonesian from the island of Sumatra. The Russian Foreign Ministry believed that the reverse conquest of the lost market is unlikely, although this country, being an "important market of the East", would deserve closer attention [Politics of the capitalist Powers..., part II, 1967, d. 130, p. 254].

In general, Russia's trade with the Southeast Asian region was insignificant even in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

In 1896, 207 thousand pounds of spices (cardamom, nutmeg, cloves, etc., both in powder and unprocessed form) were imported to Russia for 1,863 thousand rubles, and in 1897 - 218 thousand pounds for 1,667 thousand rubles. [Foreign trade..., 1898, p. 36, Table VI]. Moreover, the duties on nutmeg this year amounted to 7 rubles. 20 kopecks per pood, and it cost 2 rubles. 25 kopecks per pound in St. Petersburg; cloves-11 rubles per pound. Bitter Singapore pepper cost in Odessa 11 rubles. 38 kopecks. per pound, and in London-5 rubles. 16 kopecks., and in Hamburg-5 rubles. 29 kopecks. [Foreign trade..., 1898, p. 67, Table X]. In 1896, 5,115 thousand pounds of teak wood were imported in the amount of 1,735 thousand rubles (out of the total amount of imported timber and timber products, 8,008 thousand rubles). [AVPRI, F. Consulate in Bangkok, 895, pp. 18-26].

Javanese coffee was imported to Russia, the best variety of which cost 23 rubles per pound in St. Petersburg. In total, coffee was imported (without specifying the country of departure) in 1896-390 thousand pounds in the amount of 5,276 thousand rubles, in 1897-465 thousand pounds-for 6,150 thousand rubles. [Foreign trade..., 1898, p. 33, Table VI]. They also imported coconut oil from Cochinchina, rubber resin, rubber and gutta-percha, some of which in the total importation in 1896 - 1 thousand pounds in the amount of 388 thousand rubles - was purchased mainly in Malaya.

It can be assumed that part of the tin in the blanks was also brought from Southeast Asia (the total import in 1896 amounted to 311 thousand pounds for 2,408 thousand rubles, in 1897-262 thousand pounds for 2,113 thousand rubles) [Foreign trade..., 1898, pp. 40-42, Table VI]. In 1896, a total of 63,331 thousand pounds of oil and petroleum products were exported from Russia in the amount of 28,679 thousand rubles, and kerosene-50,321 thousand pounds in the amount of 20,744 thousand rubles. [Foreign Trade..., 1898, p. 20, Table III]. In 1896, 36,165 thousand poods of kerosene were exported through the customs of the Batumi port, the main oil export port of Russia (including to the countries of Southeast Asia and the Far East), and in 1897 - 44,977 thousand poods [Foreign Trade..., 1898, p. 31, Table V].

The revenues of the Batumi Customs occupied a large place in the Russian budget. The following table shows their constant growth (in thousands of gold rubles).:

Table 2

1888

1890

1892

1896

1897

639329

822382

523461

939583

1138048

-----

Source: [Foreign Trade..., 1898, p. 3, Tables 1-6].

Russia in the late 1890s, as already mentioned, came out on top among exporters of petroleum products and especially kerosene, overtaking the United States. However, their export to the countries of South and Southeast Asia decreased at the beginning of the XX century. If during the period

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after the Russo-Japanese war, the export of petroleum products from Russia as a whole decreased (from 69 million poods in 1898, when Russia ranked first in the world in terms of their export - to 48,620 thousand poods in 1908), then gradually by 1912 it increased again to 51,190 thousand poods (for the amount of 38,412 tons). thousand rubles). However, the export of kerosene through Batumi fell very much: in 1908, it amounted to 27,303 thousand pounds, in 1909 - 23,966, in 1911-20,409 and in 1912-16,037 (for comparison, in 1897, 44,977 thousand pounds were exported) [Data set..., 1914, p. 13].

Despite the fact that cargo delivery from Southeast Asia took place mainly on ships of a foreign fleet (in Odessa, for example, in 1896, 1224 ships under a foreign flag arrived, and only 226 under a Russian one; in Batumi in the same year - 758 foreign ships and only 80 Russian ones [Foreign Trade..., 1898, p. 89, Table XIII], however, the export of colonial goods to Russia steadily increased, as evidenced by the following table of imports for the first decade of the XX century.:

Table 3

Thousand poods

1908

1909

1910

1911

1912

Spices

291

255

333

310

327

For the amount in thousands of rubles.

3475

1478

2856

2842

3266

Coffee

704

713

708

618

719

By the amount of

6438

6420

6609

7917

9430

-----

Source: [Data Set..., 1914, pp. 18-19].

In the review of foreign trade for 1908-1912, a separate item of export to Russia from Southeast Asia is specifically indicated - Manila hemp twine, which was imported more and more to Russia from year to year through Odessa:

Table 4

1908

1909

1910

1911

1912

Quantity in thousands of poods

14

37

154

583

690

For the amount in thousands of rubles.

18

68

293

2125

3382

-----

Source: [Data Set..., 1914, p. 33].

list of literature

AVPRI (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire).

Bakunin M. M. Tropical Holland. Five years in Java. St. Petersburg, 1902.

Bursenko A. A. Neftyanoi trest i mirovaya politika [Oil Trust and World Politics]. 1890-1918. Moscow -Leningrad, 1965.

Bulletin of Europe, Book 2, 1871.

Foreign trade of Russia for 1897 St. Petersburg, 1898.

Kozlova M. G. Rossiya i strany Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii [Russia and the Countries of Southeast Asia]. Moscow, 1986.

Koriander E. V. Trade and statistical essay of Java in connection with the future of Russian trade in the Indian Ocean. St. Petersburg, 1885.

Lazarev M. Documents. T. I. M., 1952.

Lyusternik E. Ya. Russko-indiskie ekonomicheskie svyazi v XIX v. Russko-indiskie ekonomicheskie svyazi v XIX v. Russ., 1958.

Mendeleev D. Sensible plan or research on industry of Russia in connection with the common customs tariff in 1891, Vol. 2. St. Petersburg, 1892.

Monopolistic Capital in the oil industry of Russia, 1883-1914. Documents and materials. Moscow-L., 1961.

Domestic notes. Vol. 196. SPb., 1871. N 6.

Poggenpol M. Essay on the emergence and activity of the Voluntary Fleet during its XXV-year existence. St. Petersburg, 1903.

The policy of European powers in South-East Asia (60s of the XVIII century - 60s of the XIX century). Documents and materials. Moscow, 1962.

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Politics of the capitalist Powers and the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia (1871-1917). Documents and materials. Ch. I. M., 1965; Ch. P. M., 1967.

Russian discoveries in the Pacific and North America in the 18th century. Collection of documents, Moscow, 1948.

Summary of Russian statistics for 1908-1912 St. Petersburg, 1914.

Skalkovsky K. Suez Canal and its significance for Russian trade. St. Petersburg, 1870.

Statistical notes on Russia's foreign trade compiled by Grigory Nebolsin. St. Petersburg: Part I, 1835; Part II, 1850.

Tikhmenev N. Historical review of the formation of the Russian-American Company and its actions up to the present time. T. I. St. Petersburg, 1806.

Central State Historical Archive. SPb. F. Ministry of Trade and Industry.

Chulkov M. I. Historical description of Russian commerce at all ports and borders from ancient times to the present, and all the pre-emptive legalizations on it of the Sovereign Emperor Peter the Great and the now safely reigning Empress Catherine the Great composed by Mih. Chulkovym. Vol. 1-7. Moscow, 1781-1788; Vol. VIII. Book 2. Moscow, 1788.

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