The article is devoted to China's economic expansion in the Eurasian space, overcoming the policy of restraining development, new trends in the development of the Central Asian states, problems of effective integration in Central Asia, analysis of the coincidence and intersection of the interests of the Russian Federation and the PRC in Central Asia, and prospects for Russia's Eurasian projects, including energy ones.

Keywords: economic expansion, China, Russia, Central Asia, integration, competition, energy, prospects of Russia's Eurasian projects.

The rise of China as an independent, active and powerful player, which has long professed the doctrine of a polycentric world, catalyzes ties between non-Western countries that are closer to each other in terms of level and development goals [Salitsky and Semenova, 2014]. Beijing has moved from adapting to the global economy, which ended with its WTO accession in 2001, to embracing it. By interacting on an equal footing with the old centers, China has actually created an independent subsystem in the international division of labor. It has become the largest industrial and commercial power, and has firmly tied to itself the near and many distant countries. Its economic expansion, which intensified in parallel with the financial crisis in the West and the US failures in the Middle East, provoked a sharply negative reaction in Washington at the turn of the 2010s. As a result, the trend towards polycentrism has acquired a new shade of bipolarity [Barsky and Salitsky, 2012, p.28].

This bipolarity in foreign policy is supported by Russia, which actively defends the ideas of national sovereignty. In particular, Russia's consistent policy on Syria and other issues has a positive impact on international relations, allowing relatively weak countries to take full advantage of polycentrism. This fully applies to the Central Asian countries, which have gained reliable and interested partners in the face of a growing China and a stabilizing Russia.

CHINA - "THE ENGINE OF THE NEXT STAGE OF GLOBALIZATION"

After the crisis of 2008-2009, it was recognized that the neoliberal stage in the domestic and foreign policies of Western countries that began in the 1970s turned out to be a period of restraining development and a massive decline in economic growth. Western-led globalization has allowed only a small group of countries and territories to follow the success trajectory of a post-war Japan-oriented economy. Paradoxically, globalization has led to stagnation in Japan itself, the formation of a vast "gray zone" of forgotten countries in the third world, an increase in the number of failed states, and, finally, major disruptions in economic dynamics in the developed countries themselves.

Statistically significant and successful counterweights to neoliberal globalization in the last quarter of a century were China and India, which, due to their size, could not be integrated into the Western - centric (dual-nuclear-US, EU) world economy. As a result, a polycentric world began to form, and the transformation of the PRC into its new center actually meant overcoming the policy of restraining development.

The ASEAN countries have also achieved significant results in independent development (including collective and regional development), which, among other things, has reduced the role of

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"global" institutions-the IMF, IBRD and WTO, making them an arena for more equal and heated discussions. The importance of regional cooperation, including in the financial sphere, has increased. Accordingly, the possibilities of choosing development paths for other states are also expanding, especially since the currency and credit monopoly of the West, and with it the ability to dictate development strategies, are actually becoming a thing of the past.

The emergence of China as a powerful new partner in a number of "forgotten countries" of the third world in the first decade of the twenty-first century has caused renewed competition for the third world. The People's Republic of China, having finally mastered globalization, has become an active and active component of it. So, among the new points in China's foreign policy, announced at the XVIII Congress of the CPC (2012), it is worth noting the call for further liberalization of the international movement of goods and capital flows. "By taking an active part in global economic governance, China promotes liberalization and objects to all kinds of protectionism," Hu Jintao noted [XVIII Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2012, p.90].

This is quite a long-overdue declaration, given the current level of competitiveness of the PRC. Although this level has been achieved largely due to decades of protectionist policies, the very transformation of China into the "engine of the next stage of globalization" should be perceived without any irony as a natural and serious qualitative shift.

This shift signals the beginning of an intensive stage in China's economic development, when national capital (first public and now private) is becoming cramped in the vast domestic market and is increasingly rushing abroad, where it also has connections with a large, newly paternalized diaspora - old and new. In China, it should be noted, expats are no longer encouraged to be politically neutral. Thus, about 500 prominent representatives of the diaspora were invited to the Huaqiao International Conference in Beijing in the spring of 2012. The forum was attended by almost all top leaders of the country, and their speeches, among other things, emphasized the importance of participation of foreign Chinese in the political life of their countries of residence, "achieving common goals through public diplomacy" [China Meets Overseas Chinese Organizations Leaders, 2014].

Chinese expansion not only promotes, but also partially modifies globalization. Beijing offers its partners more acceptable terms of cooperation than those that were available at the previous, Western-centric stage of this process. By accepting these conditions, they are also free to bargain with other centers of power, which turns out to benefit the weaker or simply forgotten participants in the international games at the previous stage of globalization. In other words, with the help of China, the space for independent development of countries and the diversification of its external sources is being recreated.

At the same time, with the most active participation of the PRC, there is a foreign policy revival of development ideas, including in the activities of BRICS, SCO, and regional organizations of developing countries (including ASEAN). Criticism of the West is becoming practical and constructive.

The resumption of development and its independent ability to support the main offer of the PRC to economically weaker states. In its new role as the mastermind of sustainable growth, Beijing declares, not without reason, including in Central Asia, that it is interested in nothing more than the real independence of its partners. Independence, on the other hand, cannot be complete without the re-establishment of capable states and their economic development, including infrastructure and industrial development, which China is ready to promote both in words and deeds, since it now has a strong investment, construction and economic potential.

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a machine-building complex that is already experiencing a shortage of application areas within the country.

As a result of these general trends, Central Asian countries have found China not only an important alternative market for hydrocarbons, but also a tool for strengthening their foreign policy positions, including in relations with Moscow, Europe and Washington.

Beijing's distrust of strengthening the position of extra-regional powers in Central Asia is due to natural fears of their support for separatism in Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as possible destabilization of Pakistan and Iran. Russia has similar concerns.

Describing the current geopolitical situation in the region, Chinese analyst Yu Sui writes: "Intervention in Central Asia is a strategic breakthrough for the United States after the Cold War. Washington's measures are directed against Russia, but it should also be noted that these are attempts to encircle and change China. The importance of the Central Asian countries is not at all inferior to the importance of the North-East and South-East Asian states, since the region has close ties with China's Xinjiang, where numerous separatists are waiting for suitable opportunities." In addition, Xinjiang is now the most important domestic fuel base for the Chinese economy.

"China in Central Asia," Yu Sui continues, "is in most cases an auxiliary force of Russia, and the attitude of Beijing and Moscow towards the United States largely depends on American policy" [Yu Sui, 2014]. In general, we can agree with this formula, mentioning that Beijing's emerging reputation in Central Asia is a key parameter of the entire situation in and around the region.

PATRONAGE OF RUSSIA AND CHINA IS THE KEY TO EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

It is necessary to add an important touch to the characterization of Chinese expansion into the Central Asian region. It also began and continues in the form of the export of labor-intensive products, which often blocks the reconstruction of the manufacturing industry and the integrated agro-industrial complex in the region. At the same time, the problem of employment in Central Asia is currently extremely acute and cannot be solved only by increasing labor migration to Russia. In recent years, there has been a noticeable desire to sharply restrict foreign immigration to Europe.

On the agenda is a sparing regime on the part of the PRC to protect vital domestic markets in the region and, possibly, the transfer of part of labor-intensive production facilities from China itself, where it is already overdue and officially declared to restrict exports with the most efficient and high-tech assortment.

Apparently, it is also necessary to avoid certain self-restrictions on the part of China when performing contract work in the Central Asian countries - completing facilities with personnel from the PRC and training qualified workers on the spot.

It is hardly necessary to prove that only socio-economic stabilization in the region on the basis of reindustrialization (which in the current situation is difficult to imagine without China's participation) will ultimately be the only guarantee for the restoration of statehood here, and in the future, the possible democratization of the existing political regimes, in the destabilization of which Beijing and Moscow will not participate. And Russia and China are more interested in the consistent course of reconstruction processes than non-regional players, both Western and Asian.

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Formed in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as the first international regional grouping initiated by Beijing, is of considerable political importance for it in addition to the specific tasks of maintaining security in the region. Therefore, the issue of a regime of economic cooperation with China that spares the reindustrialization of Central Asia deserves close attention of this organization. The 2013 Bishkek Summit of the SCO fully confirmed the viability of associations based on the tendency to strengthen regionalism in the modern world. This strengthening is largely due to the fact that in the new century there is a weakening of the "center-periphery" structure of the world economy and politics.

After summing up the results at the anniversary summit of the SCO in Astana in 2011, the media published publications about the insufficient use of potential and a certain period of" stagnation " in the development of the organization. The results of the 2012-2013 summits make it clear that, despite the existing problems, such opinions are becoming outdated. The significance of the SCO in the world is being rethought: from a regional organization, it has become one of the world's centers of influence of the "non-American world". The Organization has become an important element of the emerging architecture of security and cooperation in Asia.

RNGIONALIZATION RELEVANCE OF NEW FORMATS

The question from the future is also whether a sufficiently effective intra-regional integration grouping will emerge in Central Asia following the strengthening of the economic sovereignty of the participating countries and the resulting ability to solve problems in relations with their neighbors. To what extent will the existing structures of the Eurasian Economic Community and the SCO help its creation? How will the problems of transit and access to distant markets be solved?

There are already some specifics in this context. Transport is one of the most important bonds that ensure the unity of the SCO region. The profitability of trade and economic cooperation largely depends on the availability of convenient transport links, optimal routes for cargo and passenger transportation, which contribute to the development of business ties and reduce costs. At the Tashkent meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of the SCO member States (November 29, 2013), it was planned to sign an agreement on creating favorable conditions for international road transport, a document that was prepared by many years of joint efforts of the SCO member states. This event was supposed to open up a whole range of routes necessary for business for road carriers of the SCO member states, including the right of through passage from the Atlantic coast (St. Petersburg, Russia) to the Pacific Ocean (Lianyungang, China). This, in turn, would create prerequisites for the formation of the Western Europe - China transport corridor. The E-40 motorway is being built to connect Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with China (Barsky, 2013). For technical reasons, only a Joint Statement on further development of cooperation in the field of transport was signed. Optimistic experts say that this decision will speed up the signing of an agreement on creating favorable conditions for international road transport [Council meeting held in Tashkent, 2013]. Thus, the development of a program for the coordinated development of highways in the SCO space will continue. It seems that without the patronage of Russia and China, such plans can no longer be implemented.

It should be noted that, while fixing (including in international treaties and documents of the SCO) the principle of special importance of relations with its neighbors, Beijing should theoretically have a favorable attitude towards regional economic integration in its near abroad-whether it is ASEAN or the Customs Union. In the first case, it has already proved its effectiveness

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In the second case, it seems that such an agreement could be considered in the future, again with possible sparing exceptions, since Chinese commodity expansion causes considerable concern in Central Asia, and intra-regional integration is extremely weak. At first, such an organization could focus on improving the collective ability of Central Asian countries to negotiate with external partners, on restoring the regional energy system, and on solving the water problem.

Although the main structural component of the SCO is interaction between Russia and China, today we also see "soft" competition between Moscow and Beijing [Integration..., 2014]. The SCO's leading countries are sympathetic to the inevitable contradictions and a number of complex issues, including integration projects. In particular, China offered its partners to approve three initiatives. The first is the creation of the SCO Development Bank: create a bank from scratch, place its headquarters in Beijing, fill it with Chinese money and put the current president of the Development Bank of China at the head. The second is the creation of a special SCO account 2. Beijing's third initiative is the organization of the SCO free Trade Zone, which was once again announced in 2012. [Russia before the SCO summit..., 2013]. Russia is still taking a wait-and-see approach to all these projects.

Amid what appeared to be a second wave of the crisis and falling oil prices, cheap Chinese loans were an additional temptation for many members of the organization. And then Beijing "would have the opportunity to dictate its terms to partners on many issues, including those that are not directly related to the SCO's activities," Kommersant noted [Shanghai Competition Organization, 28.11.2013].

So far, Russian diplomats have managed to convince their colleagues that it is premature to make decisions on these projects. China, aware that Russia is lagging behind it in the economic development of Central Asia, continues to recognize its unofficial political leadership in the region and is increasing its economic activism in the Central Asian direction. Moscow and Beijing are thus developing relations of competition in the economy and mutual understanding in politics, which, of course, does not exclude some contradictions.

At the same time, Beijing could see the implementation of the "Eurasian Union" concept and the creation of a Customs Union as part of Russia's China-friendly efforts in its renewed eastward movement. Russia's Eastern project inevitably gives China additional weight in its foreign policy. And an important part of this project is to increase the density of the space connecting the Pacific coast with central Eurasia - the Urals, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan.

We see the consolidation of this space as a diversification of its economic specialization. China's food shortage is growing rapidly. Self-sufficiency in grain is still an important policy setting, and grain farming has become a subsidized industry in recent years (in 2012, subsidies exceeded $ 30 billion, or more than $ 50 per ton). At the same time, the country can no longer physically do without purchasing soybeans. Its import in 2012 It amounted to 60 million tons, saving the PRC about 30 million hectares-with only 110 million hectares of land occupied under grain arable land [China and BRICS..., 20.01.2014]. In addition, there is a very promising demand in China

1 It is important to emphasize that when creating a joint free trade area with ASEAN, China actually acted according to the rules of this grouping - including in matters of preferential treatment to the weakest members. Unlike the EU, ASEAN does not set itself the task of creating a "superstate" and takes care of the national sovereignty of its member states.

2 This idea was initially put forward by the Russian Federation; in 2011, at the SCO summit in Astana, the Council of Europe was again voiced by Dmitry Medvedev. The Chinese offered to turn the account into a tool for supporting member countries in case they have a hole in the budget, and they wanted to link the account to their bank project.

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on environmentally friendly agricultural products. Among the promising projects, it is possible to create a kind of "Asian breadbasket"on the territory of the Customs Union.

Information about the creation of the Eurasian Union, as it might seem, was perceived in Beijing outwardly calmly and even approvingly [Li Xing, 2014]. In fact, it has caused a serious surge of attention in China, especially given the "suspended" creation of a free trade zone within the SCO 3. In this situation, China should "understand the essence of what is happening, but not interfere, remain cautious, but not ignore what is happening, and follow the course of events, but not get carried away with excessive analysis" [Li Xing, 2014]. The Chinese are puzzled by the institutionalization of this organization in connection with the prospect of integrating most of the SCO countries into the Eurasian Union. Beijing began to offer to "think about the idea of inviting China as an observer to the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space, or even the Eurasian Union" (Li Lifan, 2014).

Despite the ambivalent perception of the situation, there is a positive prospect for deepening integration: Russia and other countries of the Eurasian Union need foreign investment in the construction of infrastructure for successful competition in the eastern and global markets. In this context, China opens up a large field of activity in the investment sphere and the activation of the passive, according to Beijing, position of the Russian Federation in economic cooperation. China intends to participate in the life of this union on behalf of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in particular with another proposal for a free trade zone of the SCO. Deeper integration in the Russia - CA - CHINA format will allow the countries of the region to come to a coordinated foreign economic policy, will contribute to the development of common norms and laws, and will increase the effectiveness of cooperation, which will have a stabilizing effect both in the economic and security spheres. All this is in the hands of the PRC, especially given the situation in the South and East China Seas.

According to Chinese experts, China should approach the Eurasian Union " cautiously, carefully understand the essence of the matter... at the very least, provide Russia with moral support, do not put a stick in its wheels, do not put obstacles in its way, participate moderately in the activities of the union, follow its success with approval, see the future and build far-reaching plans on this basis" [Li Xing, 2014].

The main task of Russia, especially now, after the signing of the "Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union", the EEU [Treaty..., 06.06.2014]4, is to present the image of the Eurasian Union in the eyes of the Chinese, as not infringing on the interests of the PRC. Obtaining the status of an ally will allow Russia to avoid China's counteraction in Central Asia [China fears..., 2014].

ENERGY SECTOR: POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES

Complementarity in terms of energy supply of China, on the one hand, and Russia and the Central Asian countries, on the other, is an obvious basis and an increasing factor of multilateral cooperation and competition in the SCO [Wang Haiyun, 2014].

The elites of Central Asian countries consider the Chinese vector, given the growing potential of the PRC, as one of the most important: it provides an opportunity to receive external investment, loans, build infrastructure, develop trade, and implement energy projects. The mood of the ruling circles in Central Asia is often pro-Chinese. This is evidenced by many facts. In particular, the VII Eurasian Forum held in Astana in October 2012 allows us to make forecasts about the further development of the oil and gas industry in Kazakhstan. Minister of Oil and Gas

3 As you know, since 2004, the Chinese version of creating such a zone has been rejected by the Central Asian SCO member states.

4 Signed in Astana on 29.05.2014.

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Kazakhstan's Sauat Mynbayev said that the republic intends to increase oil exports to the markets of China and the European Union. Kazakhstan is located in the center between the key oil consumption markets-the EU and China. Deliveries are also possible to other distant markets with access to them via the Black Sea, via the BTC (Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan) pipeline, not to mention the markets of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, in terms of volumes, the main export markets for Kazakhstan are the EU and China. Experts believe that Kazakhstan can compete with Russia in terms of "black gold" in the Chinese direction, since Kazakhstan has a significant advantage - a shorter transport shoulder for pipeline supplies [Rasov, 2014]. There are also certain contradictions between Russia and Turkmenistan when pipeline natural gas enters the Chinese market [Semenova, 2012 (1), p.144].

External expansion and China's emergence as a new energy power mean a certain fragmentation and further regionalization of the global energy market, including on geopolitical grounds.

Experts in Kazakhstan recently expressed the opinion that China has reached a critical share of ownership in the fuel and energy sector of the republic and, possibly, there will be no new sales of Chinese assets in this area [Shibutov, 2013]. However, the sale of such assets to China continued in 2013.

China's expansion is natural, it is not limited to the energy sector, 5 and has not yet led to significant losses for Russia [Chinese investors set their sights on Kyrgyzstan, 2013]. Moreover, the global cost of Russia's continued presence in Central Asia has increased. In a certain sense, the scale of the Chinese market even pushes the issue of competition for China between Russia and Central Asian countries into the background, and there are already examples of cooperation that is beneficial to all parties.

The common interests of Moscow and Beijing have also increased. Thus, for Russia, the transfer of pipelines from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to China, although it meant certain losses, was beneficial for easing the pressure of these hydrocarbon producers on the European market. Now China is not particularly interested in the departure of Central Asian energy carriers to the west.

Competition between Russia and China is mitigated by the fact that with the growing role of Central Asia as a new sales market, source of raw materials, transit "corridor", partner in complex interaction with the West and neighbors in East Asia, the region has been and remains a strategic "rear" in comparison with global politics. By financing the economies of neighboring Central Asian countries, China contributes to the socio-economic development and stability of its western provinces, ensuring a safe environment along the perimeter of the XUAR borders [Semenova, 2012 (2), p. 148].

NEW GAS CONTRACT

Another aggravation of relations between Russia and the EU on energy issues may have been the catalyst for the signing of a contract between Russia and China on large supplies of Russian gas to Beijing. The economic deal concluded during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Shanghai has become a major factor in big politics. The signing of the contract had a wide resonance with the effect of surprise. There are at least three levels of impact of this transaction on further events. On a global level, a closer relationship between Russia and China could have serious geopolitical implications for the West. At the regional and Eurasian level, the goal is to reduce Russia's dependence on Western clients and protect it from sanctions in the long term. At the country level, this is a mutually beneficial approach for Russia and China.

5 For example, in Kyrgyzstan, China will build a machine-tractor plant and a plant for the production of nitrogen fertilizers. It is planned to build a cotton processing plant and textile industry enterprises.

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the contract. The conclusion of the contract turned out to be very timely, Russia "saved its face" in the current political situation, and China confirmed its "friendly neutrality" towards the Russian Federation.

During the visit of the Russian president to China in May 2014, the foundation of the Eurasian perspective was laid, which can no longer be imagined without close cooperation between Moscow and Beijing across the entire spectrum of relations between states.

The dramatic nature of the international situation in which Russian-Chinese relations are being strengthened illustrates the extremely painful stage of transition from the twenty-year Western-centric phase of international relations to a qualitatively new, polycentric system. But the irreversibility of such a transition is already obvious.

One of the tasks of Russian foreign policy remains to promote the creation of a global and regional architecture in which the United States and China would be bound by mutual obligations, arms control mechanisms and dispute resolution with the participation of other states. As a first step, we could propose the creation of a trilateral format of cooperation between Russia, the United States and China. Such a "friendly triangle", deployed for the decisive improvement of the planet, was, we recall, the cherished dream of F. D. Roosevelt.

It is in Russia's interests to pursue a balanced, multi - vector foreign policy that will ensure the development of relations with the United States, the European Union, and Japan, strengthen strategic partnership with India, and increase cooperation with South Korea and the ASEAN countries. And the special proximity with the PRC does not prevent this, but in many ways contributes to it. The position of Beijing, which does not hide the instrumental significance of relations with Russia, is also similar [http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/861193. shtml].

The emergence of so-called failed States makes the need for broad international cooperation to overcome the costs of globalization even more urgent. The observed disintegration of the state in Ukraine should, apparently, be attributed to the number of new, especially dangerous, global challenges. And the closeness of the positions of the Russian Federation and China on this issue is very important.

The Russian president's visit to China has brought a long-awaited breakthrough in energy cooperation between the two countries. Although many analysts thought that Moscow would be forced to make concessions to Beijing, it seems to us that Gazprom's wise turtle has crawled to the dragon breathing coal soot at the right moment: the struggle for a clean China is now beginning to unfold in this country with unprecedented force. The contract signed by the parties is set aside for approximately twenty years, but in the words of A. Miller, "only the first page of a thick volume of the fascinating history of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the gas sector, in which we will still write many important chapters" [cit. by: Salitsky, 2014].

Filling this first page means almost 12,000 new jobs in eastern Russia in the construction of the pipe alone, $ 55 billion. huge investments, huge orders for the Russian metallurgy, mechanical engineering, and pipe industry.

For the first time in the history of this vast expanse, the Eurasian "trubostanus" (P. Escobar's expression in a colorful article about a radical change in world history) already connects the SCO countries with strong interdependence relations, and its Siberian replenishment also has geopolitical significance [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/ CH1N-01-I90514.html].

The flow of Chinese investments into the Russian industry is expanding. More than half a billion dollars will be invested by Changcheng in an automobile plant in the Tula region. The largest investment package in the history of the Russian electric power industry will go to its eastern part. Major joint program with-

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the work is planned in the civil aircraft industry. The second major project with China will be implemented in Shanghai by Sibur.

Russia's task is also to protect itself from commodity expansion by major Asian producers. Here, friendship does not exclude, but rather presupposes, mutual criticism and vigorous defense of the still weak domestic industry.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning one acute problem that has long developed in Russian-Chinese economic cooperation. The agencies that are extremely important for China's economic development simply do not have partners in Russia yet. It is not clear, for example, who in Russia to interact with through the Chinese State Committee for Development and Reform, the same body in the field of science and technology. Directly subordinate to the government, the People's Bank of China, represented by its Russian partner, has an incomprehensible independent structure. In other words, Russia's flawed economic governance structure negatively affects the prospects for cooperation with China. It clearly needs to be supplemented with more effective and efficient links, initially in the east of the country.

Planning, forecasting, calculation - all these features are sorely lacking in the modern world, and especially in Russia. Their effective nature in China largely makes Chinese socialism an alternative to chaos in other countries. These features make it possible to consider the concept of scientific development, which is the basis of the CCP's current course, not a slogan, but a requirement of the era, a real conquest of this country.

In China, a strong state, planning and a well-developed market coexist side by side, and strong national corporations can be purposefully grown and completed, demanding unconditional loyalty to the national economy in return.

The current picture of international relations seems quite favorable for the implementation of Russia's Eurasian projects, including in multilateral cooperation with China, which also has a clear interest in stabilizing Central Asia and its successful economic development: among other things, the region has become a strategically important supplier of energy resources to China.

Recent months have been marked by the activation of Russia in the Central Asian direction, as a result of which we can state the strengthening and expansion of Moscow's presence in this region. Russia offers the Central Asian countries an alternative integration model to the Chinese, American and Turkish ones, based on the mechanisms of the Customs Union and, in the future, the Eurasian Union. This puts them in front of a strategic choice that limits the previous pendulum-like pattern of their foreign policy behavior.

New projects are next in line, which could increase the degree of collective self-sufficiency in the SCO with strategic goods (energy, food, water), contribute to the development of infrastructure, agriculture and manufacturing industries here, easing the situation of landlocked countries.

Only time will tell whether the projection of a polycentric world on Central Asia will be a tool for its socio-economic revival. Not everything depends on Moscow and Beijing, whose interests are quite close in most areas, including energy issues. But favorable external opportunities for a" breakthrough in development " in the region, we repeat, have developed and look better than at the beginning of the century - largely due to Russia and the PRC.

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