Personalist authoritarianism is an authoritarian regime of power in which the person of the ruler plays an extremely important role. He represents symbolic, legislative and executive power, and in his actions relies on the help and assistance of his closest circle. Personalist authoritarianism differs from elitist authoritarianism, in which power functions are performed by the ruling elite, a circle of individuals representing different interest groups on the basis of their interests. In a certain sense, these are just different aspects of considering authoritarianism: one focuses on the personal contribution of the autocrat, while the other focuses on the role of the corporation (part, group of society) that the autocrat relies on.

There are a significant number of regimes in the world that can be described as personalist-authoritarian, and Pakistan is no exception in this regard. Authoritarian regimes are usually characterized from a comparative point of view, in relation to the "extremes" of totalitarianism and democracy, or from the position of the dominant institutional groups - monarchical, bureaucratic, military, party, etc. Recognizing, of course, the importance of such approaches, I would like to emphasize that for a number of political systems it is the individual who plays a special role in the exercise of power functions. role. At the same time, the system is considered as a product of a certain political tradition, political culture, as a carrier of historically inherited and rather unchangeable properties and basic characteristics, from the point of view of time-limited observation.

The article aims to analyze the political system of Pakistan from the point of view of the authoritarian-personalist element embedded in it. An attempt is made to briefly describe the historical conditionality of such a system state and its pivotal role at various stages of the system's functioning.

"FOUNDING FATHER", LAWYER AND POLITICIAN

American historian S. Wolpert, author of a detailed biography of the" founding father "of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, often quoted words about him:" Rare personalities significantly change the course of history. Even fewer people are allowed to transform the world map. And there are very few people who can be credited with the creation of a national state" [Volpert, 1998, p. 7]. With some exaggeration of the role of one person (there are many other prominent participants in the movement for the formation of a Muslim country in the territory of colonial India) this observation is generally correct. Without the Jinnah, Pakistan probably would not have existed, at least at that historical moment and in the form it was formed. And the fact that at the origins

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One figure rises up in the Pakistani statehood, which already to some extent determines the subsequent development of state power.

After M. Weber, it is customary to distinguish three types of political domination by the nature of internal justification, namely: rational-legal, traditional and charismatic. While the former is typical of modern parliamentary democracies, the latter two are often combined in a mixed form with other political regimes and modern non-Western political cultures [Categories..., 2002, p. 109 - 112]. Among the 17 patterns that determine the specifics of the political process in a non-Western, particularly Eastern, society, L. Pai also identifies the charismatic type of leadership as the dominant one [quoted in: Voskresensky, 2005, p. 99]. Nevertheless, personalist authoritarianism is not synonymous with the charismatic nature of power, although it is historically and logically usually associated with it. The personalistic type of autocracy can be carried out, firstly, by a person who does not have a pronounced charisma, i.e. authority, attraction to the masses, or a "gift from above". Secondly, it is not necessarily associated with sharp turns and changes, with breakthroughs and revolutions, as opposed to an emphatically charismatic government. In other words, it can be a conservative regime that perpetuates the status quo, an inertial one.

Personalist authoritarianism takes root, let us repeat, on a certain political and cultural basis, which is formed mainly outside the Western European (Western) tradition [Voskresensky, 2005, p. 104]. Many people have written and continue to write about the peculiarities of this political tradition until recently [see: Zakaria, 2004, pp. 23-36]. We can agree with Fareed Zakaria, who, following a number of other authors, emphasizes the split sources of power, the presence in Western Europe of several centers of power and influence (churches and empires, Reformation and counter-reformation). This circumstance seems to be truly unique and distinguishes the Western tradition from any other. At the same time, in modern times, with the spread of Western political culture (through the mechanism of colonization, political and economic domination) to its (this culture's) periphery, absolutely new political and cultural models are being formed, and among them, those that are closer and further removed from the Western canon and which, therefore, to a greater or lesser extent can be distinguished. they are less favorable for the manifestation of the phenomenon of personalist-authoritarian power. The differences between these models are probably due to two factors. First, the diverse features of traditional political cultures that were formed before contact with the Western world of modern times, and, secondly, with the national type of colonialism (English, French, Dutch, Portuguese, etc.), as well as the depth (often determined by the duration) of the colonial impact.

As for the Muslim community in Hindustan, the prerequisites for the formation of a political culture that is very favorable for manifestations of personalist authoritarianism were probably formed from the features of Islam as a religion with its monotheism, one source of truth (the Koran) and its herald (the Prophet), as well as from the fusion of social (communal) and religious values characteristic of Muslim communities. political (hierarchical and organizing) principles, the inseparability and inseparability of conciliatory, mildly coercive, and domineering, rigidly coercive elements. In addition, there were two specific circumstances: Muslims in India were a large minority of the population (no more than a quarter of the population) and at the same time were for almost nine centuries (from the XI to the XIX century) a politically dominant force, although not everywhere and not always, but from the last third of the XVIII century. (with the establishment of the predominant influence of the British) for the most part only formally. These two conditions contributed to the formation of a psychology (complex) of superiority in the elite strata of Muslims, which must be constantly proved and defended. In addition, Muslims did not cease to feel themselves to a certain extent strangers in the vast expanses of India. Their thoughts and motives were directed to the west of it, to the spiritual and historical center of Islam. India and / or some of its regions were perceived as borderlands-

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on the Muslim Ecumene, a country conquered and needing to maintain dominance over it.

Of course, we are not talking about ordinary members of the Muslim community, but only about a "thinking minority" who rises in their worldview to generalizations of the spiritual (religious-poetic) and historical (ideological-political) levels. It is in this environment that the worship of the authority (charisma) of a person, the person of a spiritual leader, a Sufi sage, a thinker and poet, a connoisseur and interpreter of sacred knowledge and texts for Muslims, a politician-military leader, a conqueror and ruler, as well as a reformer, a transformer of tradition within tradition, is widespread.

Such a personalistic view is hardly unique to the Muslim community in India, but it is very typical of it. At the end of the 19th century, Sayyid Ahmad Khan became the undisputed leader of the Indian Muslim community. After the defeat of a widespread anti-colonial uprising in 1857-1859, he called on Muslims to abandon their disdain for European culture, including the language of the British who had established their rule in India, for science and technology developed in Europe, and for its positivist philosophy. At the same time, he tried to give an interpretation of the achievements of non-Muslim countries that would be acceptable to Muslims, would give them hope for reducing the distance between them and Europeans, hope for revenge and the ultimate triumph of Islam [Gordon - Polonskaya, 1963, pp. 137-143]. The British have awarded Ahmad Khan a knighthood, and Muslims revere him as the ideologue of Islamic modernism in India, the founder of the first Muslim college in Aligarh (near Delhi), which later became the Aligarh Muslim University.

Sir Sayyid is at the origin of both India's most influential Muslim political movement and the two - nation theory of Muslims and Hindus. It was his first skeptical and then negative attitude to the event that emerged at the end of 1885. In 1906, 10 years after the death of Ahmad Khan, the formation of the All-India Muslim League, similar in many respects in form, although with adjustments to the growing participation of the masses and middle strata in politics, led to the formation of the Indian National Congress (at first an elite organization created under the patronage of the British like an aristocratic club). The absence of an undisputed leader has long been reflected in the strength and cohesion of the organization. It was only in the late 1930s that it gained an authoritative and talented leader, M. A. Jinnah, and since then the indomitable movement towards the creation of Pakistan has begun.

Of course, there are many examples of a historically determined connection between an organization and a leader, a movement and a person leading it. Most likely, this is the rule of a fairly massive and successful opposition movement, one can say, of any revolution, whether it is political (the triumph of the opposition), national (the replacement of one ruling stratum by another in terms of national identity) or socio-ideological (the change in the prevailing ideology and structure of society). At the same time, in Western political culture, this phenomenon is weakened by competition among the main figures, competition that does not lead (or rarely leads) to a split. In non-Western (Eastern, in particular Muslim) political communities (polities), competition also takes place, but their usually more rigid hierarchy (sweep) gives more scope for identifying one and only one leader and subordinating the rest to his dictates. It is clear that the personalism of the leadership strengthens the unity of the movement, protects against splits within the elite and confusion among the masses. At the same time, each case of personalistic authority is different.

M. A. Jinny's charisma developed gradually, which is explained both by his individual qualities and by the peculiarities of the historical environment. Although the tendency of the Muslim community in India to venerate one or another of its outstanding representatives has already been mentioned above, this does not seem to apply to the Jinnah for a long time.

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couldn't have been directly related. He began his professional and public career in the 1900s as a lawyer, appearing in trials in Bombay, one of the most cosmopolitan cities in India. The language and manners of an English gentleman, which he acquired while receiving a law degree in England (he graduated from the prestigious Lincoln's Inn College in London), would seem to be unsuited to the role of a leader of the illiterate masses.

At the same time, unlike his contemporary and counterpart, the apostle of the broad Hindu masses Mahatma Gandhi, he rarely appealed to the mass consciousness and almost did not change the rules of fighting by legal methods. It was only in the summer of 1946 that he approved the call for direct, i.e., street, rally methods of struggle for Pakistan. By that time, such tools for achieving political goals had become widespread, and Jinnah could not ignore and not use (although, I think, with regret) this is a circumstance. At the same time, since the end of the 1930s , having solved the question of the purpose and essence of his political activities1, he changed his appearance, refused to appear in public in English-style suits, and began to wear national clothes (long jacket) and the soon-famous karakul hat (Jinnah's hat) (Ahmed, 1997, p. 98 - 99). After the death of M. Iqbal in 1938, Jinnah remained the only prominent figure among Muslims in the pan-Indian political arena. There were provincial leaders-in Punjab Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, in Bengal - "sher-i bangla" (tiger of Bengal) A. K. Fazlul Haq, and later H. S. Suhrawardi, but all of them lost to Jinnah because of their "provincialism". The All-India Muslim League, which he headed, was exactly the all-India league, and both politically active Muslims in India and the colonial administration were considered with this.

The British had to pay special attention to Jinnah after the refusal of the leadership of the Indian National Congress in the autumn of 1939 to support the British war effort and its decision to self-dissolve the congressional governments in eight of the eleven provinces at that time. Jinnah was pleased with this decision of the Congress and organized the celebration of the "day of deliverance" from Hindu domination in December 1939 (Wolpert, 1984, p. 176).

The viceroys of India later had to deal with the Jinnah (often overcoming their annoyance at his difficult nature). as the leader of the only major pan-Indian party that did not abandon the demands for national independence, but agreed to cooperate with the central authorities. During the years of World War II, five provinces were ruled by Governments led by Muslims from the League or associated political parties. On the one hand, taking into account, and on the other - encouraging the "fragmentation" of Indian society, its division into representatives of large religious communities (Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs), the British authorities promoted the Jinnah to the pedestal of the sole representative of the interests of the Muslim community (Jalal, 1985). Social psychology, the self-consciousness of Muslims, as well as other circumstances, including, of course, the outstanding personal qualities of the Jinnah, were among the conditions sufficient for him to play the role of the founder of the new nation-state to the end .2

1 Perhaps the greatest poet and philosopher, as well as a public and political figure, Muhammad Iqbal, had a decisive influence on him in this regard. In his letters to Jinnah in 1936-1937, he justified the need to fight for the creation of a state for the Muslims of India, especially in its north - west, and called on him to take the lead of the movement [Ahmed, 1997, p. 71-78].

2 His personal contribution was particularly significant in the final phase of the implementation of the "two nations" idea. It was he who, by his persistence, even stubbornness and intractability, forced both the British, who did not want to divide India, and the leaders of the Indian National Congress to agree to it, as well as to the immediate recognition of the complete independence of the two dominions, up to the presence of different governors-general in each of them (for India, the last viceroy Lord L. Mountbatten, and for Pakistan - Jinnah) [see: AN, 1967, p. 173-178; Wolpert, 1984, p. 340-342].

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FROM POLITICIANS TO BUREAUCRATS

Jinnah died a little over a year after becoming the first Governor-General of an independent dominion in the Commonwealth of Nations headed by an English king on August 14, 1947. His death on September 11, 1948, although expected, was a heavy blow for the young state. For a year, Jinnah, despite a serious illness, concentrated all the threads of power in his hands. He was the head of state and executive branch, chairman of the Muslim League, as well as the Constituent Assembly, consisting mainly of members of his party. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan kept in Jinnah's shadow. Twenty years his junior, he served as his closest associate and assistant, his confidant, and a skilled performer. None of the politicians in the first year of Pakistan's existence thought of challenging the authority of Jinnah, who in the early 1940s began to be called in the press and at rallies "the great leader" (qaid-i azam) 3 .

Jinnah's death did not change the personalist-authoritarian nature of power in the country. Liaqat Ali Khan inherited the mantle of undisputed leader. Like Jinnah, he was a lawyer by training, a politician by profession, and a member of the Shiite community (Talbot, 1998, p.393). The latter is significant, since the top Shiites in British India constantly felt as if they were in a double environment from the non-Muslim and Muslim majority.

Liaquat Ali Khan chose to remain as Prime Minister, giving up the post of Governor-General to Khoja Nazimuddin, his own age from East Bengal, who served as the province's chief minister. This decision reflects both personal and purely political considerations. Khoja was a representative of the family of nawabs (princes) Dhaka, the main city of the eastern, Muslim part of Bengal. Not having a strong character, Hoxha could not be a rival of Liaquat in terms of influence. And as a representative of the province where the majority of the population lived, he was an ideal figure for demonstrating the political unity of the country.

Liaqat Ali, perhaps even more clearly than Jinnah, understood the complexity of the problem of Pakistan's self-assertion as a State and especially as a nation.

In addition to the distance to East Bengal (the minimum distance by air was 1.5 thousand km, by sea-more than 4.5 thousand km, and land routes ran through India), the cultural and ethno-racial differences of the population of the two parts of the country served as an obstacle. This refers to the differences in the physical type and temperament of Bengalis from the inhabitants of the western part of Pakistan, as well as the difference in language and identity. In addition, the original population of the western "wing" was not united, breaking up into four large groups - Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns and Balochs. Administratively, the western part of the country consisted of three provinces with legislative assemblies (the largest of them was Punjab, until 1950 West Punjab, as well as Sindh and the North-West Border Province-NWFP), one province (Balochistan) without a representative body, and a number of former principalities that retained independence in internal affairs.

The first unifying factor for the young country was Islam, the second can be considered the legacy of the colonial order, which was authoritarian-democratic, combining, especially at the last stage, the authoritarianism of the central government with elements of democracy on the ground, in the provinces. This hierarchy of values is reflected in the Government's submission to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in early 1949. Resolutions on the goals of the country's constitutional structure. After a brief, though stormy, debate (it was felt

3 After electing Jinnah as chairman of the Constituent Assembly at its first session on August 12, 1947, its members adopted a special resolution stating that in official documents it should be referred to only as "qaid-i azam" (Callard, 1957, p.132).

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the presence of non-Muslims in its composition, representing East Bengal, where their share was almost 20%) it was approved by the meeting. It reflected the basic principles of the democratic system, but did not mention secularism. At the same time, it was proclaimed that power is based on the predestinations of Allah, and secondarily depends on the will of the people [Gankovsky and Moskalenko, 1975, p.21].

Liaqat Ali's mildly pro-Islamic views have left their mark on the state's domestic and especially foreign policy. At the same time, the peak of Karachi's activity in the Islamic direction is observed. Pakistan organizes a number of international Muslim conferences, tries to gain trust and support from Arab states, in particular Royal Egypt, etc. At the same time, he sees himself as the leader of the Islamic world, trying to "outplay" India at the expense of this.

In October 1951, the country suddenly loses its second leader: Liakat is killed at a public rally, and the motives for the murder remain unclear: whether this is a reaction of religious fanatics to an insufficiently pro-Islamic course, or an attempt by certain forces to hide behind a religious screen [Gankovsky, Gordon-Polonskaya, 1961, p. 198; Talbot, 1998, p. 139]. Be that as it may, the death of Jinnah's associate eventually affected both the democratic image of the state and the country's independent role in international affairs. It also contributed to the growth of authoritarian and bureaucratic tendencies, paving the way for the transition of power from a group of politicians to a corporation of bureaucrats.

After Liaqat's death, the Islamic motives in the policy of the Pakistani state became less obvious, and the unambiguously pro-Western bias intensified. At first, however, this was offset by the nomination of Khoja Nazimuddin for the role of Prime Minister and leader of the ruling party. He was known as a deeply religious man. At the same time, Nazimuddin's political credo was formed in the conditions of colonial India, and he was, in fact, the last representative of professional politicians who claimed to play a dominant role in the state. His short reign was marked by an aggravation of the conflict on religious grounds. In February-March 1953, Punjab, primarily the capital city of Lahore, witnessed mass demonstrations against representatives of the Ahmadiyya sect accused of heresy. Sunni-fundamentalist organizations, primarily Jamaat-i Islami (DIS), were behind the riots. To restore order in the city, martial law was imposed and regular troops were used. This first experience of using the army to ensure internal security turned out to be a landmark. Equally significant was the Governor-General's unexpected decision in April to dismiss the Cabinet of Ministers headed by Nazimuddin.

The first bureaucrat to embody the dominance of personalist authoritarianism in the country was Ghulam Muhammad, who was appointed Governor-General in 1951 immediately after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan. For a year and a half, he kept in the shadow of Nazimuddin, who headed both the Cabinet of Ministers and the party on whose behalf it was carried out. The fact that the Muslim League was only a de jure ruling force was already obvious to early researchers of the country's political development process (Callard, 1957; Sayeed, 1967).

The crucial role of a government based on a parliamentary majority, which is characteristic of the British tradition, was recognized abstractly, rather out of inertia, since there was no real opposition in the Constituent Assembly, which simultaneously performed legislative functions, and without it, parliamentary democracy of the English model is impossible by definition [Callard, 1957, p.126-130].

4 "While supreme power over the entire world belongs to the Almighty Allah alone, the power enjoyed by the people of Pakistan within Their prescribed boundaries is a sacred gift" (Constitution, 1956, p.1).

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The delay in the adoption of the new Constitution meant that the regime of government remained essentially colonial in form: the main code in force was the Indian Government Act of 1935, according to which the real power in the center belonged to the Governor-General. While Khoja Nazimuddin was the imam under Liaqat Ali Khan, this rule did not really apply. In addition, the situation itself, as it seemed at the time, was about to change-the Constituent Assembly was preparing to adopt a new parliamentary-type constitution.

However, by 1953, too. It was not accepted, and the bureaucracy led by Ghulam Muhammad, a man of authority and determination, took advantage of it. If not for a serious illness, he probably would have remained the head of an authoritarian and bureaucratic regime for much longer. The Constituent Assembly dutifully accepted his decision to dismiss Nazimuddin's cabinet, even though just a few weeks earlier it had approved the budget he submitted, thereby expressing a vote of confidence. Pakistan's ambassador to Washington, Mohammad Ali Bogr, a native of East Bengal, was appointed as the new Prime Minister. Under his leadership, the focus on the United States became even more pronounced, and the country joined the military-political blocs created on their initiative - SEATO in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact (February 1955). Before that, in May 1954, Karachi signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with Washington, and Pakistan began to receive significant support from the United States. American military assistance [for more details, see Cheema, 1990].

At the same time, M. A. Bogr's government acted in full compliance with the aspirations of the entire political elite. In addition to G. Muhammad, the leading positions in it were occupied by two people closely connected with the army. The first was retired Major General Iskander Mirza, a member of the colonial bureaucratic service, secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Pakistan, and then of the Interior, and the second was the first Pakistani to become the head of the army (ground forces), General Mohammad Ayyub Khan.

In October 1954, in order to prevent the Constituent Assembly from approving the draft constitution, which did not suit the ruling elite, the Governor-General announced its dissolution and the introduction of a state of emergency. Bogra agreed to stay on as prime minister, but his super-partisan government, dubbed the "cabinet of talents," had new people-Mirza took over as Interior Minister and Ayub Khan as Defense Minister.

This event ended a period of uncertainty about the fate of the parliamentary system in Pakistan. He was buried by the efforts of a small group of people who were then the real ruling (governing) elite. According to the calculations of the leading researcher and contemporary of the events, Canadian C. Callard, the number of people who held major positions at all levels of government during 1947-1954, alternating as in a deck of cards, did not exceed 20 people [Callard, 1957, pp. 25-26]. In addition to politicians from the Muslim League who were members of the Constituent Assembly and served as ministers, as well as civil and military bureaucrats who came mainly from the land-feudal aristocracy, the elite also included some leading representatives of the third branch of government - the judiciary. It was she who gave the appearance of legitimacy to the decree of the Governor-General on the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly. By the decision of the head of the Supreme Court, Judge Muhammad Munir, it was justified by applying the "concept of necessity", according to which measures that are not provided for by the legal framework include measures that are conditioned by the need to save the state [Pleshov, 2005, ch. 1; Iqbal, 2001, p. 64-71].

Having completed the process of replacing one Constituent Assembly with another, which in the summer of 1955 was elected in the same indirect way, by provincial legislative assemblies, G. Muhammad resigned. Ghulam Muhammad's rule would undoubtedly have lasted longer if it hadn't been for his illness. Because of her, he was not only limited in his omnipotence, but also became bilious and irritable. There was an opinion that he was the only one-

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He allowed himself to shout at Ayub Khan 5 . Iskander Mirza became the new Governor-General. In March 1956, when the Constitution was finally adopted, he was elected the first President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Replacing one bureaucrat leader with another made little difference to the authoritarian power structure. Although the Constitution contained some provisions characteristic of parliamentary democracy, such as the electability of Parliament and the responsibility of the Government to it, the functions of the President, who was indirectly elected by the votes of members of the central and provincial legislative assemblies, were broader than usual in constitutions modeled on those adopted in the Commonwealth [Callard, 1957, p. 150 - 152]. In fact, he was given many of the same powers that the Viceroy of India had during the colonial period [Gankovsky, Gordon-Polonskaya, 1961, p. 283].

An example of autocratic actions can be considered the merger of all the provinces of the western part of the country into one - West Pakistan, which was enshrined in the constitution back in 1955, as well as the renaming of East Bengal to East Pakistan. The Constitution also established equal representation in the unicameral Parliament from the two provinces, although the share of East Pakistan in the country's population exceeded 55%.

Despite the existing shock absorbers, the president did not rush the elections, believing that the illiterate people needed a "controlled democracy" 6 . Like other bureaucrats, Mirza believed that he knew the value of corrupt politicians. It is not without reason that one of the first laws passed by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan back in 1949 was the Act of Disqualifying persons performing public and Representative Functions for Inappropriate actions, primarily bribery and nepotism. The initiator of a kind of impeachment of political ministers in accordance with the act was the governor-General or provincial governor (with the adoption of the constitution - the president and governors), i.e. the bureaucracy that protects the moral foundations of the state and is itself above suspicion.

The permanent political crisis, which deepened due to the postponement of the constitutional elections, 7 ended in October 1958 with the President's "exit from the shadow". He declared martial law and appointed the Army commander as its chief administrator. The civilian bureaucracy tried to rule as before, with the military elite as its junior partner. But times have changed. During 1954-1958, the army in Pakistan grew stronger both in quantity and quality. Close contacts were established between its representatives and patrons from the United States. It was there that a new generation of military personnel began to receive special education. With Washington's approval, General Ayub Khan launched a second coup less than a month after the first. By unceremoniously dismissing Mirza and expelling him from the country, he became president himself.

FIELD MARSHAL FROM THE LOWER RANKS

Of the three contenders for the role of a possible head of the personalist-authoritarian regime, Ayoub was the youngest (51 years old) and the most modest in origin. He was born in the village, in a poor family of a retired military man, a Pashtun from SA-

5 Recording of the author's conversation with a professor at the State University of New York (Rochester) Salahuddin Malik, 26.11.1990.

6 The UNV newspaper quoted him as saying after the constitutional coup of October 1954: "The mass masses in this country are overwhelmingly illiterate. They are not interested in politics... The people of this country need a controlled democracy. He stressed that by this he does not mean a dictatorship. " by: Callard, 1957, p. 142].

7 At the last stage, they were hindered by the explosive political situation for the authorities, especially in East Pakistan [Gankovsky and Gordon-Polonskaya, 1961, pp. 331-333].

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He was educated in Aligarh, then went to England, where he graduated from the Military College at Sandhurst and was commissioned as an officer. During World War II, Ayub served with the Japanese forces in Burma, and shortly after the formation of Pakistan, with the rank of Major General, he was appointed commander of the army in East Bengal. The real success for him was the resignation of the Englishman D. Gracie from the post of commander-in-chief of the army. With the approval of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali, Ayoub took up the vacant post in early 1951. As noted above, he was a close confidant of Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad (who died shortly after his resignation in early 1956) and then Iskander Mirza, who undoubtedly shared the latter's views on the essence of possible democracy in Pakistan. As President, he tried to implement plans to introduce a model of "guided democracy" in the country [Talbot, 1998, p.393-394].

The activities of Ayyub Khan's authoritarian regime provide a vivid picture of the possibilities and limitations of the policy of transformation of society implemented from above. Backed by powerful support from two forces - the army and the bureaucracy inside the country, the United States, and the West as a whole, from the outside, Ayub ruled subjectively with good intentions and in a military manner clearly and consistently (see his autobiography [Khan, 1967] and the view of his closest adviser [Gauhar, 1996]).

Already in January 1959, he issued a decree on agrarian reform, which, for all its limitations, was a small real step towards modernizing relations in the countryside. In 1961, by another decree on the reform of Muslim family law, he tried to raise the status of women in the family and expand their inheritance rights. Welcomed by women's and progressive democratic organizations, the decree provoked a negative reaction from the Ulema (theologians and religious leaders) and encouraged the mobilization of religious forces [Talbot, 1998, p. 167-169]. In the political sphere, Ayoub introduced the institution of "basic democracies" by transforming the system of local self-government from public to state and granting the "basic democrats" elected by the population the rights of electors of the President and Parliament. He himself was indirectly elected to the post of president twice (in 1960 and 1965), and after the adoption of the new constitution, indirect parliamentary elections were also held in 1963. The Constitution was clearly presidential, leaving no room for a cabinet of ministers. Although parties resumed their activities, the elections were held on a non-partisan basis, and the parliamentarians, who were engaged in legislative activities, could not call the ministers to account.

Despite the fact that the economic success of the regime in the first half of the 1960s was indisputable (national income grew by more than 5% per year, large-scale industry - by an average of 12%), critical sentiments were growing in society. It increasingly felt alienated from the holders of power. Official praise for the general who became a field marshal only irritated the political elite and young intellectuals who were pushed away from the levers of power. The emergence of a group of monopolistic entrepreneurs who enjoyed economic independence as a result of the state policy of encouraging private investment led to the emergence of alternative centers of influence. The latter had press organs, and financially supported various opposition groups, parties, and trends. In general, the formation of civil society took place, but on a very narrow basis and in conditions when the authorities were not ready to put up with the growth of an effective opposition, because it threatened its foundations.

The fears of the ruling elite became especially serious after the unsuccessful war with India in August-September 1965 for Pakistan. Although the consequences of the war initiated by Pakistan did not immediately affect them, they were extraordinary for the regime of Ayub Khan personally. Not only did the attempt to stir up an uprising in Indian Kashmir come to nothing, it also exacerbated the ever-present problem of "two Pakistanis." During the Pakistan-India war, East Pakistan was completely unprotected, and military strategists ignored it. This did not go unnoticed in the province, and it has become a sredotochi-

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I eat the dull irritation of the authorities. In the west of the country, the intensity of the struggle increased as the economic situation worsened, largely due to the refusal of the United States to support Pakistan in its confrontation with India and the inability for them to provide as large-scale economic assistance as before in the conditions of being drawn into the war in Indochina.

Ironically, the mass protests that triggered the regime's fatal political crisis began in November 1968, just as official Pakistan was celebrating the" Decade of Development, " as the Ayub Khan era was called. At the end of March of the following year, after running out of resources to maintain constitutional order, Ayoub resigned, handing over the reins of power to another general, Army Commander-in-Chief AM Yahya Khan. At the same time, martial law was introduced in the country for the second time, the constitution was abolished, and all political activities were suspended. This was the crumpled outcome of the reign of one of the most well-intentioned individuals who led an authoritarian regime in Pakistan. Even on the eve of its fall, nothing seemed to foreshadow such a finale. It is not for nothing that a book published in 1968 by the then young American political scientist S. Huntington compared Ayub Khan to Solon or Lycurgus, "great legislators" in the Platonic style (Cohen, 2005, p.74).

A serious illness in early 1968 also played a role in Ayyub's political fate. It undermined his strength and energy, which the generals took advantage of, pushing him largely away from the levers of government. Meanwhile, Yahya Khan turned out to be a different type of person, less modest in his personal claims and more concerned with preserving power than using it for socially significant purposes. We can assume that Ayub Khan would have managed to keep the ship of Pakistani statehood afloat longer, but it is unlikely that the authoritarian regime, even under him, would have been able to scare away the tangle of complex problems that destroyed it.

The ban on political activity could not last long, as the international and domestic situation did not allow it. Yahya Khan's regime was also unable to return to the Ayyub model of indirect democracy, as it would have undermined its legitimacy. The only way out - a return to conventional wisdom and a long - delayed general election-was a road to disaster.

The elections of late 1970 brought victory to the East Pakistan Awami League party and its charismatic leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Since the equality of seats from the two parts of Pakistan, according to the rules of the provisional constitutional system introduced by the military authorities, was abolished, the complete victory of the Sheikh in East Pakistan gave him the necessary majority to form a national government. Thus, the worst fears of all the leaders who ruled the country for a quarter of a century came true : power was slipping from the hands of representatives of the western part of the state to the leaders of the eastern part, passing to Bengalis, who were considered culturally and socially inferior in the west of the country.

NATIONALIST AND POPULIST LANDLORD POLITICIAN

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the western "wing" of Pakistan that was created on his initiative in 1967, played the role of "savior" of the western "wing" of Pakistan from the claims of the eastern one. Pakistan People's Party (PPP). The TNG received the largest number of votes in the western part of the country (by decree of Yahya Khan, the province of West Pakistan was disbanded and four new/old provinces were established-Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan). During the negotiations on the fate of the federal Government held in Dhaka in February-March 1971, Z. A. Bhutto took a tough stance, not agreeing with the government.-

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agreeing to compromise with Mujibur Rahman (Talbot, 1998, pp. 205-206). This prompted the military to crack down on supporters of the latter, who on March 26 proclaimed the creation of Bangla Desh (the country of Bengalis). The humanitarian catastrophe that accompanied attempts by the Pakistani authorities to restore order in its eastern province, the flow of refugees streaming into India, gave its government the opportunity to intervene in the development of events. The government of the "self-proclaimed" Republic of Bangladesh operated on Indian territory, and in refugee camps, with the help of Indian military instructors, liberation army units (mukti Bahini) were trained. The undeclared war between the two states lasted for nine months and ended in an open and sharp clash in December 1971. Despite all attempts to protect East Pakistan by transferring regular units there and increasing their supplies, the military regime of Yahya Khan failed to do so [see: Jackson, 1975; Sisson, Rose, 1990].

At critical moments, Z. A. Bhutto invariably found himself with the military - on the eve of the war, he traveled to the PRC, persuading Mao Zedong to jointly act against India, and during the offensive actions of the Indians, as Deputy Prime Minister and head of the Pakistani delegation to the UN, he emotionally defended the country's violated integrity in front of his own and the world community. After the East Pakistani group surrendered in Dhaka on December 16, and the next day the clashes on the western Pakistan front stopped, the ruling military elite was forced to sacrifice their hapless leader and agree that Bhutto's authority was needed to save the country. He was offered both vacant posts-chief administrator of martial law and President.

Bhutto's persona stands out from other authoritarian rulers of the country for its colorful character. He was, in fact, the first representative of the local landlords ("sons of the earth"), who became the head of the state. The Bhutto family owned vast tracts of land in Upper Sindh as early as the establishment of British rule in the mid-19th century. His grandfather became famous as a romantic adventurer who hid from the law for a long time [Tasser, 1979], and his father, Shaznavaz Bhutto, became a well-known political and public figure in Sindh, one of Jinnah's associates. Bhutto's mother, a Hindu dancer from Bombay, converted to Islam in order to get married. The family still believed in horoscopes, which predicted Zulfikar Ali's unprecedented success until he crossed the threshold of 50 years [Wolpert, 1984, p. 19].

After graduating in the United States and earning a law degree in England, Bhutto returned to his homeland in the period leading up to the establishment of the Ayub Khan regime. The talents of a well-educated man from a well-known family were in demand. In 1959, he became the youngest (31 years old) minister in the military government, in 1963-1966 he held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was a member of the president's inner circle of advisers. The quarrel with him occurs after the signing of the Tashkent Declaration. As Foreign Minister, Bhutto participated in the negotiations, but managed to establish himself in public opinion as an opponent of the agreement with India. After leaving the government, he accused Ayyub of betraying the country's interests and took credit for turning Pakistan's foreign policy toward China (Talbot, 1998: 381-382).

Having assumed the post of President at a critical time for Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto showed great energy and mobility. The first hundred days of his reign were by far the most successful for him. One of the few people who knew how to attract the masses. It should be borne in mind that the political life of that period was characterized by widespread mass actions of students, workers, small merchants (bazarvala) and peasants. Only by taking into account the realities of that time can we understand the effect of Bhutto's speeches at crowded rallies of his supporters in Karachi and other cities, as well as his populist socialist reforms [Burki, 1980, p.72].

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During Bhutto's rule, Pakistan gained the current constitution. Being an autocrat by nature, he was inclined to the presidential model, but previous experience prevented this. According to the Constitution adopted in 1973, the Prime Minister received the main powers, relying on a majority in Parliament. However, unlike the British-type constitutions, it provided additional guarantees for the Prime Minister (Cabinet of Ministers) to retain power, complicating the procedure for passing a vote of no confidence [Burki, 1980, p.95]. The President was given only ceremonial functions. With Bhutto's transformation from president to prime minister, the nature of the regime has not changed. Behind the formally democratic facade was an authoritarian government that was not ready or not always ready to accept the voice of the people expressed through the verdict of the voter.

Bhutto's personalist rule did not last long, only five and a half years, but it paved the way for further political development of the country. With the loss of the eastern "wing", TA became geographically compact, more Muslim in confessional terms, and more"feudal" in social and political terms. Bhutto made a personal effort to do the latter.

As noted above, by the early 1970s, a layer of large bourgeois"monopolists"had developed in Pakistan. It does not matter that this stratum consisted mainly of" non-nationals " who came to Pakistan after 1947, members of mainly Gujarati trade and merchant communities [Levin, 1970, p.14-17]. Some of them rendered great services to the first leader of the new state, were themselves at its origins and enjoyed significant political influence, especially under Ayyub Khan (Talbot, 1998, p. 171; Cohen, 2005, p. 49).

Meanwhile, the mass movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s were held under the left-wing populist slogans of excessive concentration of wealth among a handful of ill-gotten people. Such was the mood at that time, not only in Pakistan, but also in many other developing countries, where a wave of nationalizations swept through. After coming to power, Z. A. Bhutto took full advantage of these sentiments.

Already in the first days of January 1972, he announced the nationalization of more than three dozen of the largest enterprises in 10 basic industries. This decision was followed by other measures to expand the public sector, in particular the nationalization of the largest banks. The near-total elimination of the network of private schools and colleges, as well as hospitals and clinics, also had serious consequences. If we add to this the losses that Pakistani big capital suffered in connection with the confiscation of its property by the authorities of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, then the real and sharp weakening of the position of the private sector and the economic power of the "oligarchs" becomes obvious (Levin, 1983). Bhutto also dealt a blow to the socio-political status of the latter. A number of the most active businessmen were arrested by him, and almost all of them were stripped of their foreign passports.

The acute phase of the crisis in relations between the state and business did not last long, however: those arrested were released, and members of the convicted" 22 families "of" monopolists " were given the opportunity to travel abroad [Cohen, 2005, p.81-82; Talbot, 1998, p. 233-234]. However, the consequences of the crisis were significant. The state, which took over the management of nationalized enterprises, clearly did not cope with the duties of a skilled owner. Labor productivity in industry fell, capital investment declined, and the rate of economic growth declined by an average of two percentage points, barely exceeding population growth in the first half of the 1970s [Pakistanskoe obshchestvo..., 1986, pp. 21-23]. Foreign capital ceased to be interested in Pakistan, and local entrepreneurs, and not only foreign ones, moved all or part of their business abroad (Levin, 1982). The areas of education and health, which were previously overlooked, have been further expanded by Bhutto's reforms.

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disorder. This, by the way, paved the way for the Islamization of education later.

The political consequences of the attack on the" monopolists " were no less long-term. If before it the informal elite group, united by a common understanding of the idea of Pakistan, had representatives of the financial and industrial oligarchy in its composition, then in the future they almost did not remain there. The main social stratum in the backstage "establishment"8 turned out to be hereditary landowners, feudal lords of a new type, combining the qualities of traditional masters in the countryside and modern masters in the city, as well as outside the country.

ISLAMIST GENERAL

Z. A. Bhutto is a truly tragic figure in the history of Pakistan. The system of personalistic authoritarian power he built collapsed under the pressure of various and multidirectional factors. Moreover, its collapse was from beginning to end a public spectacle, resembling a theatrical performance. Its main acts consisted of early parliamentary elections held in February-March 1977, in which Bhutto's party won a landslide victory. She was too confident. The opposition accused the authorities of fraud, and campaigns of mass protests and civil disobedience began. Bhutto was frantically looking for a way out of the impasse and had already agreed to a new election, but the military intervened. In early July, they carried out a coup d'etat, first depriving Bhutto of power, then of the mass support he still enjoyed, and finally of his life, bringing him to an unfair trial, which issued a medieval verdict (execution by hanging), carried out in April 1979.

By then, the regime led by General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq had been in power in Pakistan for almost two years. The General was in many ways the complete opposite of Z. A. Bhutto. Due to his extremely modest background (born in a Punjabi village, in a very poor family of Arains, hereditary farmers and gardeners), he also differed from other characters who were at the head of the country. Educated in Delhi during World War II, he joined the army and participated in combat operations against the Japanese. In 1970, he commanded parts of the Pakistani brigade that helped Jordan's King Hussein cope with the Palestinian uprising. In the spring of 1976, he was unexpectedly appointed chief of staff of the army (the post of commander-in-chief was abolished by Bhutto in 1972). And a little over a year later, a little-known career military man became the ruler of the state. Not only is that surprising, but he's been running it longer than anyone else.

Zia's main difference was her quirkiness. He was forced to do this by the circumstances of coming and holding power. Having broken his oath by committing a coup, Zia tried to make this step temporary. He promised to hold elections in 90 days and, having only strengthened himself by splitting the political elite, then postponed them indefinitely, forbidding them to leave.-

8 The characterization of the Pakistani establishment as a "tangible" ruling elite was given in 1996 by Nawaz Sharif, a Pakistani journalist and Minister of Information in the Government, and since 2000 by Senator Syed Mushahid Hussain. His analysis was actively used by the leading American historian and political scientist Stephen P. Cohen, author of the latest major Western work on Pakistan. Cohen attributes the development of the "idea" of Pakistan and its ideology to the "establishment", and, as he notes, the latter could change in detail over time, just as the composition and size of the shadow ruling group changed. In general, it was small (in the mid-1090s it was about 500). Membership in it did not depend on the position, i.e. it could not include other prime ministers, but included "bearers" of corporate ethics and culture who did not hold any posts [Cohen, 2005, p.68-73].

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tiv of the party and political activity. Zia ul-Haq proved to be a cruel ruler. His personalistic authoritarianism provoked worldwide condemnation and accusations of the sins of totalitarianism. In addition to Bhutto, he persecuted many hundreds and thousands of his supporters. The prisons were overcrowded, and it was torture to stay in them. To further intimidate them, demonstrative floggings were introduced in public places not only for ordinary activists of the Pakistan People's Party, but also for intellectuals - ideologists of the opposition [see: Bhutto, 1990]. However, Zia wasn't unreasonably cruel. At first, he had a formidable opponent - Bhutto, as a Nemesis, threatened with reprisals if he returned to power. Later, he was threatened by Bhutto's son, Murtaza, who created the Al-Zulfiqar terrorist organization. The hijacking of a Pakistani passenger plane in 1981 triggered a new crackdown. Meanwhile, Zia, when necessary, made concessions, and in personal contacts gave the impression of a modest person who highly values the opinion of the interlocutor and relies on the will of Allah in everything. Deep faith in God, coupled with other circumstances, determined the way to legitimize his power.

Islamization from above was a genuine ideological salvation for the regime, coinciding with the Islamic revolution in Iran, the rise of Islamism in the Arab world, and the global trend towards "God's revenge", which was barely visible at that time .9 Inside the country, the ground for Islamization was prepared by the Bhutto regime. Since the mid-1970s, Bhutto has been forced to resort more and more to Islamic slogans, make concessions to the demands of religious circles and introduce new Islamic rules of everyday life (Friday became a day off, a ban on gambling, alcohol sales, etc.). If Bhutto tried to get ahead of the clerics, then Zia acted mostly together with them. His closest contacts were with Jamaat-i Islami, a "new type" party that focused not on the number of voting supporters but on the number of active activists. The program and conceptual developments of this party, created by the leading theorist of Islamic fundamentalism A. A. Maududi, helped Zia ul-Haq to make a kind of cultural revolution in the country, to Islamize to one degree or another almost all aspects of public life in the country [Islamic Re-assertion..., 1986; Kurin, 1993].

However, Zia was not able to create an "Islamic state", and, apparently, did not want to. The close alliance with the Islamist party lasted until the mid-1980s and then collapsed, as it had, like the entire Islamization campaign, not only positive but also negative consequences for the regime. In particular, tensions between representatives of the Sunni and Shiite communities, as well as antagonism between Sunni schools, have increased. The Ulama of Jamaat-i Islami hoped that the military would share real power with them, and when this did not happen, they stopped providing them with unconditional support.

Nor should we forget that the longevity of the Zia ul-Haq regime was due solely to the favorable international environment. By the fall of 1979. Zia was a pariah on the world stage, he did not heed the requests of the leaders of leading states (including Leonid Brezhnev) to pardon Bhutto, while continuing, despite US pressure, the nuclear military program. The country's economy was on the verge of bankruptcy, and Washington came to the aid of the regime only when Soviet units entered Afghanistan.

Perhaps it was not by chance that Zia's luck turned against her after perestroika began in the USSR. The detente between the great Powers has forced him to soften his position on both domestic and foreign issues. However, he started maneuvers on the domestic front in advance, having secured a referendum in the United States.-

9 Much has been written about Islamization under Zia ul-Haq in foreign and domestic literature. Its various aspects and significance for the regime are described in detail in the generalizing monograph of the leading English Pakistani historian Ian Talbot [Talbot, 1998, p. 171-183].

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In October 1984, he was elected President for a five-year term and held parliamentary elections early the following year on a non-partisan basis. The new parliament adopted a series of amendments to the Constitution of 1973 (previously it was temporarily inactive under the military regime), which transformed it from a prime minister's office to a semi-presidential one. Martial law was lifted after the election, and a Cabinet of Ministers was created. Prime Minister M. H. Junejo by 1988 began to show independence, relying on the support of Washington. The Americans wanted to sign the Geneva Agreements on Afghanistan to guarantee the withdrawal of the Soviet army, and Zia did not want such an end to the war, because he hoped to bring Islamist Mujahideen to power in the neighboring country. On April 14, the prime Minister signed agreements in Geneva, and on May 29, the president dismissed him, dissolved parliament, and temporarily suspended political activity in the country, promising, as usual, to hold new elections in 90 days [Pakistan, 1991, p. 78].

On August 17, 1988, a C-130 military plane carrying Zia ul-Haq exploded in midair, killing not only the President, but also, among others, his chief deputy for the army, as well as the US Ambassador to Pakistan. The mystery of the catastrophe remains unsolved, and suspicions fall on various forces interested in eliminating Zia or in revenge for the evil he has done [see: Arif, 1990; Chishti, 1989]. Bhutto, who died on the scaffold (there are detailed records of the last hours and even minutes of his life) and Zia, who suddenly disappeared into the sky, are a contrast that reflects the personal qualities of themselves and the regimes they lead: the publicity and brightness of one, the closeness and ordinariness of the other.

A PRAGMATICALLY LIBERAL GENERAL

The end of the third military-bureaucratic regime was unlike the end of the first - Ayub Khan passed power to another general, and after the death of Zia ul-Haq, the president, in accordance with the constitution, became the chairman of the Senate, the upper house of parliament, Ishaq Khan. Moreover, the generals met the demands of democracy and decided not to interfere in the political process for the time being. In the autumn of 1988, parliamentary elections were held on a partisan basis, and the PPP government led by Z. A. Bhutto's daughter Benazir came to power.

Since then, the personalist-authoritarian type of the Pakistani political system has been manifested in a weakened form for 11 years. It itself has acquired a complex character due to the presence of three centers of power and influence - the government and parliament, the general staff headed by the Chief of Staff of the army, and the president, who relies on the highest civilian (executive and judicial) bureaucracy.

The conflict within the triangle periodically led to political crises. In 1990, President Ishaq Khan, with the support of the military, dissolved the Bhutto government, and an alliance of parties led by the Pakistan Muslim League won a snap election. The government was headed by Zia ul-Haq's protégé, Nanjabi businessman Nawaz Sharif, a representative of the family that suffered under Z. A. Bhutto. In 1993, Sharif did not share power with the president, and the army forced them both to resign, and Benazir Bhutto's party won a new early election. Although Farooq Leghari became president as a representative of this party, he opposed the government three years later, and the conflict ended for the third time with early elections and a new, more than convincing victory for Nawaz Sharif. Having obtained a qualified majority in Parliament, the Prime Minister made changes to the constitution, returning it to the Prime Minister's model [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 1998]. The concentration of all power in his hands did not suit the military, and the acute opposition to-

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The feud between the Prime Minister and the Army Chief of Staff culminated in the fourth military coup in October 1999.

Although both Benazir Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif had an unquestionable personality flair, it fell to General Pervez Musharraf to lead the next personalist-authoritarian regime in Pakistan. Unlike the vast majority of top military leaders, he is not of Punjabi or Pashtun origin, but is a Muhajir, i.e. comes from a family of immigrants from India (in his case, from Delhi, where he was born in 1943). Having chosen to serve in the army after graduating from college, he distinguished himself in the fighting with India in 1965.His personal bravery led to promotion, and his special background played a role in his appointment to the post of Chief of Staff of the army - Nawaz Sharif probably believed that this weakened his position among the generals.

Speaking about the personality of P. Musharraf, it is impossible to ignore his role in the mini-war with India in Kashmir in May-July 1999. By that time, he was already in command of it and was directly responsible for the actions of regular units in support of militants who had crossed the line of control in the Kargil sector [Mazari, 2000]. It is difficult to find an exhaustive answer to the question of the motives that prompted the army, apparently without coordinating its actions (in general or in full) with the Prime Minister, to begin preparations for the operation at the end of 1998. It is possible that the main reason was the desire to "substitute" the prime minister in order to weaken his dictatorial inclinations. At the same time, Musharraf, presumably, shared the general opinion in the army regarding the situation in Kashmir, hoped for China's support, especially after India's nuclear tests in May 1998, and set several goals for himself, of which only one was fully achieved - to appease the appetites of the prime minister and even take his place. Because the military coup was hardly carefully prepared in advance, it was rather a counter-coup, a spontaneous reaction to the attempt of Prime Minister Sharif to dismiss Musharraf, and then make changes in the leadership of the army, putting it under his control [Moskalenko, 2003, p. 308].

There is much to say about the army's reluctance to assume full responsibility for the situation in the country in the late 1990s. And this is understandable: it was too painful at that time, and the reputation of the army would have been too much at risk in case of failure. But the regulation obliges. And Musharraf, as the "chief executive" (a new name for the old position), acts quite decisively, although he chooses the direction of politics by touch, sometimes stumbling and retreating.

In the economic field, he decided quickly, inviting a high-ranking official from the American "Citibank" Shaukat Aziz to the post of his financial adviser. With his help - Aziz later became Finance Minister and Prime Minister in 2004-Pakistan embarked on the path of economic liberalization, which, it must be said, was repeatedly tried before, but the inertia laid down under Z. A. Bhutto and strengthened under Zia ul-Haq, which emerged over time, is closely linked to the development of the country's economy. the connection of representatives of the ruling circles, the very "establishment", with the interests of the public sector actively hindered this process.

But in the political, ideological and foreign policy areas, Musharraf was hesitant. On the one hand, he could not ignore the strength of Islamist and pro-Islamic sentiments in society as a whole and in circles close to state decision-making. Pakistan at the time was one of three countries that maintained diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and pretended to know nothing about the activities of the "Islamist international" (bin Laden and his "Al-Qaeda") directed from there.

He was also drawn closer to the Islamists by his policy in Kashmir and his harsh rhetoric against India. On the other hand, Musharraf was clearly not a fundamentalist by conviction. In this he differs from Zia ul-Haq and resembles Ayub Khan. Having initially banned political activity and restrained his passions, he began to probe the ground for conducting a political experiment.-

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renno pro-Islamic course. In one of his first public statements, he expressed his admiration for Ataturk's activities, which, as is well known, had a distinctly secular character [Cohen, 2005, p. 275].

The vacillation continued until September 11, 2001, although in August of that year he banned two of the most odious Islamist extremist organizations in an effort to reduce the severity of sectarian conflicts and bloody clashes in the country. However, it was only by supporting the US in the Afghan campaign that Musharraf became generally consistent in his domestic and foreign policies. In particular, he replaced the pro-Taliban elite of the influential Inter-Military Intelligence Service, and in early 2002 declared war on both relatively moderate and radical Islamists, banning a number of their organizations and temporarily arresting almost all political leaders of the pro-Islam movement. At the same time, he sought not to capitulate to Indian pressure and concentrated the bulk of his army along the border with it in response to similar actions of Delhi, provoked by terrorist attacks of Islamists linked to Pakistan.

The danger of war passed only in June, and in October Musharraf was faced with the problem of political structure after the parliamentary elections organized by him (by the way, the eighth in a row). The pro-presidential party received only a quarter of the votes, although it came out on top in terms of the number of seats. Success has been enjoyed not only by the parties of supporters of the two former prime ministers (especially Benazir Bhutto) who are in exile abroad, but also by the block of Islamist and pro-Islam parties Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA, United Action Front). They won 20% of the seats in the National Assembly, led the government in the NWFP and joined the ruling coalition in Balochistan. The head of the pro-Islamic faction later became the leader of the parliamentary opposition, and in the Senate, the MMA confidently took the second place in terms of the number of supporters after the government-run Pakistan Muslim League im. Qaid-i azama (M. A. Jinnah).

In early 2004, the regime managed to solve the problem of the legitimacy of Musharraf's presidency. Federal and provincial legislatures confirmed the legitimacy of his election as President in a referendum in April 2002 for a five-year term. The secular opposition voted against it, and the MMA representatives abstained, believing in the general's promise to fulfill their main demand by the end of the year - to "remove the uniform", i.e. to leave the post of army chief of staff. Under such a democratic pretext, they apparently hoped to weaken his position among the military and, by causing a split there, promote the coming to power of a more pro-Islamic general. However, Musharraf broke his promise and is going to hold two top positions - civil and military-until 2007. It is possible that after the expiration of his first term, he will run for president for the second time, and since the current deputies of the federal parliament and provincial assemblies must elect him in the spring of that year (parliamentary elections will be held only in the fall), the general has a real chance to remain at the head of state until 2012.

conclusion

So, the degree of authoritarianism, or personal authoritarianism, was not the same at different stages of the country's existence, but the presence of this component as highly characteristic of its political culture and power structure seems indisputable. Even today, the political system can only be considered nominally or formally democratic (Pleshov, 2003), while the real levers of government are in the hands of the ruler, who relies on the following principles:

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a group of advisors and assistants, and one that takes into account the opinion of the broader elite club.

According to authoritative political scientists, Musharraf is not a large-scale political figure [Cohen, 2005, p. 273-274]. He feels more confident in international affairs than in domestic ones. His leadership is characterized by declarative boldness, and little follows the announced plans and intentions. In general, his power is based on the consensus of elites and primarily depends on the consent of a dozen generals. In this sense, it is replaceable. The personalist power will remain, passing to another military one. Most likely, he will not be a reformer and at the same time is unlikely to side with the Islamists.

Meanwhile, there is no doubt that there is a need to reform many aspects of the country's social structure. Pakistan lags behind its neighbors in the region, primarily India, as well as the countries that it has become accustomed to look up to, such as Turkey and Iran, in a number of important indicators of social and economic development. It is particularly lagging behind in the field of education, which results in a low quality of the labor force and a lack of high-value-added goods that it could offer to the world market. Combined with the demographic pipeline (Pakistan's population has grown from 32 million to almost 160 million) this may lead the country to a dead end in the foreseeable future. To avoid a crisis, and perhaps even a catastrophe, it is probably necessary to carry out a deep reform of the educational system, give even greater scope for initiative and entrepreneurship, and modernize the agricultural sector. It is also necessary to abandon some of the stereotypes enshrined in the prevailing ideology, such as the desire to keep up with India militarily, to make the most of the Kashmir issue, and to assume that a favorable geostrategic position will always provide support from outside. Is the current regime capable of all this, or will an attempt to reform it undermine it and make the process of replacement inevitable?

Concluding and extending the particular case considered in the article to a wider range of similar tasks, it seems that the main dilemma should be highlighted, which is whether a different regime of government is possible in the conditions of a given political culture, or whether the formed political community is forced to repeat the steps characteristic of it. At the same time, the fundamental immutability and loyalty of the political community does not seem to eliminate the need to consider the prospects for the development of the associated society as a social and economic organism. And from this point of view, the statement that political culture generates a political system and that, in particular, at the expense of the countries of the East, there is a significant pluralism of the latter, in principle justified from an analytical point of view, cannot be universal.

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