The main directions of China's foreign policy in 2012 are considered, including the preparation of the international political platform of the XVIII CPC Congress; countering the "return of the United States to Asia" and three regional challenges (disputes over the ownership of islands in the East China and South China Seas, unresolved border issue with India), diversification of tools and areas of international trade. activities of China.

Keywords: China, foreign policy in 2012, decisions of the Party congress, challenges, diversification, tools.

The main features of China's foreign policy in 2012 were determined by the tasks of developing an international political platform for the XVIII Congress of the ruling Communist Party of China, the need for rapid response to dynamic developments on the world stage, and the need to diversify the country's foreign policy tools.

A good idea of Beijing's foreign policy priorities in the past year is provided by the contents of the monthly digest magazine "Chinese Diplomacy" ("Zhongguo Weijiao"), which publishes the most interesting or controversial articles from many Chinese socio-political and scientific publications covering the problems of China's positioning in the world and its relations with other countries.

In 2012, the journal published 117 articles, of which approximately half-55 - were devoted to general issues of the theory and practice of Chinese foreign policy, 24 articles-to various aspects of Sino - American relations, 13 articles-to relations with East Asian and ASEAN countries, 8 articles-to the "neighborhood environment" in general, 4 articles each - The European Union and Russia. Individual articles examined the policy of the People's Republic of China in relation to the countries of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, Turkey, etc.

I

The above statistics show that the problems of a general assessment of the balance of power in the world and an adequate description of the current international situation, directly related to determining the long-term tasks of the PRC in foreign policy, were in the focus of attention of the Chinese leadership and expert community.

Portyakov Vladimir Yakovlevich, Deputy Director of the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Economics, Professor. E-mail: portyakov@ifes-ras.ru.

* Prepared with the assistance of RGNF, project 12-03-00367 "The current foreign policy course of the People's Republic of China and the precepts of Deng Xiaoping".

This was directly reflected in the process of preparing the foreign policy section of the Report of the CPC Central Committee to the XVIII Party Congress.

In our opinion, the conceptual provisions that applied for inclusion in the Report were divided into two categories. Among the indisputable positions were: the statement of the independent and independent nature of China's foreign policy, its declarative commitment to the path of peaceful development and the idea of building a "harmonious world" addressed to the entire international community.

In the pre-congress period, these positions were widely promoted in the Chinese press. China's success in the international arena has always been associated with following the path of peaceful development.¹ And the concept of a harmonious world, along with the provision on "common gain", was qualified as "an important contribution to the prosperity and progress of human civilization" ².

The second category includes provisions that were discussed in the Chinese expert community before the congress.

First of all, this is, strange as it may seem at first glance, the traditional statement for Chinese diplomacy over the past two decades about the movement of the world order towards multipolarity. At the end of 2011, Lin Limin, editor - in-chief of the journal of the Chinese Academy of Modern International Relations "Modern International Relations" ("Xiandai Guoji Guanxi"), questioned its validity. In his opinion, the low rates of economic growth in Japan, the European Union and Russia, since the global economic crisis of 2008-2009, slowed down the trend towards the formation of multipolarity in the world and, on the contrary, stimulated the movement of world architectonics towards the formation of the "big two" in the face of the United States and China.³ A similar point of view was repeatedly expressed by one of China's leading international political scientists, Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, which was a logical development of his earlier idea of accelerating differentiation in the circle of great powers and the possible formation by 2020 of three groups with different degrees of influence - a superpower in the face of the United States, a "quasi-superpower" in the face of powers represented by "ascending" India and Russia and "descending" France, Japan, Great Britain and Germany " ⁴.

The idea of the emergence of a new bipolarity in the world with China as one of the poles was subjected to rather harsh criticism. According to Xue Fukang, China has no objective conditions for becoming "one of the two centers of the world", and in the interests of developing constructive relations with the United States in the future, it should reject the very idea of forming a bipolar world order.⁵

As a result, Hu Jintao's report to the XVIII CPC Congress was extremely lapidary: "the development of global multipolarity and economic globalization is deepening."

There was also a discussion about including certain characteristics of China's behavior in the international arena in the report, in addition to the determination to continue to "unwaveringly pursue an independent and independent foreign policy"⁶. Apparently, three options were considered:

1) give a sufficiently detailed formulation, but without mentioning the protection of the" fundamental interests "of the country, for example," China's foreign policy resolutely protects state sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, defends the interests of state development, serves the socio-economic development of the country, and protects the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and legal entities abroad " ⁷;

2) focus on protecting the "fundamental interests of the country", continuing the line of 2009-2011, when this category was actively promoted in the PRC (for example, in the articles and speeches of Dai Bingo, a member of the State Council of the People's Republic of China).;

3) it seems that the option with a focus on "core interests" has not received adequate support. This is indirectly evidenced by the criticism of this category on the pages of the Chinese press. Thus, the article by Shi Zhiyu, representing the Department of Political Science at Taiwan University, notes the lack of elaboration of the concept of "fundamental interests", its narrow applicability-in fact, to relations between the PRC only with the United States, but not with other actors, and the presence of an element of conflict in it ("if the fundamental interests of two states contradict each other, then who will should I give in?") ⁸.

As a result, the report included a reduced wording that had previously appeared in the Communique of the 5th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the XVII convocation (October 18, 2010): "We will protect the sovereignty, security and development interests of the state with unwavering steadfastness."⁹

In the post-congress period, in a number of publications that are usually characterized as guidelines, an attempt was made to consolidate this formulation. Thus, Deputy Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China Zhang Zhijun, in a speech at the 8th "Blue Lounge Forum" on December 28, 2012, stated: "In our foreign policy course, we have effectively protected the sovereignty, security, and development interests of the state, creating a generally stable and favorable external environment for our country to pursue a policy of reform and openness and implement the cause of socialist modernization." ¹⁰ Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi's article in Qiushi magazine, "protecting the sovereignty, security, and development interests of the state," was included in the list of major achievements of Chinese diplomacy in 2012 and illustrated, among other things, China's firm position on sovereignty over the Diao Yudao Islands in the East China Sea and Huangyandao Island. (Scarborough Reef) in the South China Sea ¹¹.

At the same time, the new General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Xi Jinping, used both the above wording and the category of "core interests" in his speech at the collective study of members of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee on January 28, 2013: "We need to resolutely follow the path of peaceful development, but we cannot... sacrifice the fundamental interests of the state. No foreign country can count on us... we will be able to swallow the bitter pill of harming the sovereignty, security, and development interests of our state. " ¹²

So, most likely, the plot with "indigenous interests" will continue.

Finally, the general assessment of the degree of favorability of the current international situation for China was also debatable. According to Ma Zheng, a well-known Chinese diplomat and former director of the Institute of International Affairs of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, some people in China have pessimistic assessments of the "serious deterioration" of the international environment and even doubts about the principles and course of the country's foreign policy. Recognizing the emergence of" some obstacles "to peace and stability in the neighboring environment of the PRC, Ma Zheng described them as" private problems", defending the thesis of maintaining a generally favorable international situation for the country. He supported his optimism by comparing the current situation with three periods of really serious deterioration in the international situation : in the early years of the PRC's existence, when the West tried to pursue a policy of political isolation and economic blockade of China, in the 1960s and 1970s, when the country found itself in a hostile environment on all four sides, and after 1989, when Beijing faced Western sanctions. Then the PRC was able to eventually change the situation and successfully overcome difficulties. Today, Ma Zheng declared, "there is no force in the world that can contain the rise of China." ¹³

In the congress report of the CPC Central Committee, "positive" prevailed: "The balance of international forces is developing in a direction favorable for the protection of world peace. There are even more favorable conditions for maintaining the overall stability of the international situation." At the same time, the negative was not forgotten: "...The world is still very restless... local shocks are becoming more frequent."

II

In 2012, the main challenges for China were one global and three regional international political challenges.

By global challenge, we mean the continued opposition to China's further rise on the part of the United States. This phenomenon has a striking specificity. Officials in both the United States and China prefer not to highlight the existing tensions and growing rivalry between the two powers in Asia. On the contrary, Beijing strongly emphasizes that although there are some negative factors in Sino-American relations, however, cooperation is the leading side in them, and "a clash between China and the United States is not an inevitable trend, much less a choice of two sides." ¹⁴ Moreover, the position of Hu Jintao's report to the XVIII Congress According to Yang Jiechi's article in Qiushi magazine, the CCP's message about "creating a new type of relations between major states" is addressed primarily to the United States: "The leaders of the two countries have reached an important common understanding on the need to continue to advance the construction of cooperation and partnership relations between the PRC and the United States, to jointly search for and create a new type relations between the Powers " ¹⁵.

Despite the criticism of China from US officials on a number of specific issues (joint vetoing of UN Security Council draft resolutions on Syria with Russia, the alleged non-market exchange rate of the yuan to the dollar, etc.), in general, Washington's declared policy towards Beijing looks quite correct on the surface, which, in particular, was clearly manifested in the United States. during the pre-election debates between Barack Obama and Michael Romney. No one seems to be talking about any "containment" of China.

However, the overall strategy of "returning the United States to Asia", the active promotion of the idea of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the "second wind" given to American military alliances in East Asia contain unmistakable anti-Chinese overtones. In this context, a number of well-known American Sinologists (Kenneth Lieberthal, Robert Ross) criticize Barack Obama's policy towards China. Thus, according to Ross, "unlike previous administrations, under Obama, the White House stopped considering China's legitimate interests in its border regions, including those that are not vital for US security." ¹⁶

Beijing welcomed the appointment of John Kerry as US Secretary of State, as he "criticized the tendency to demonize China and perceive it as the next big threat".17. However, the belief that the United States, despite its growing interdependence with China, still sees it as a potential adversary and will continue to strengthen Beijing's versatile deterrence remains widespread in the Chinese expert community.

So Sino-American relations are almost guaranteed to remain controversial even under Xi Jinping's political leadership.

Of the regional challenges, the conflict with Japan became the most acute in 2012. The direct reason for the aggravation of bilateral relations was the acquisition in September by the Japanese government of part of the disputed Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu), which were previously privately owned by China.¹⁹ Con-

the conflict became a litmus test, revealing a long list of mutual claims of countries to each other. Their main reason, in my opinion, is not only the difference in the interpretation of historical events, especially the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 and Japan's participation in World War II, but also the ongoing rivalry between the two countries for leadership in East Asia and Asia as a whole. Perhaps Japan's particular tenacity in the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) dispute is due, among other things, to the very painful reaction of Japanese society to the recent cession of the second place in the world in terms of gross domestic product to the PRC and the desire to demonstrate that Japan "still has gunpowder in its flasks" and that it is not going to hand over all new products to China positions.

The fact that the conflict has gone really far is evidenced by the apparent deceleration of East Asian economic integration between Japan, the Republic of Korea and China, which seemed to be moving forward confidently in the first half of the year.

With a certain time lag, political conflicts have negatively affected bilateral trade. In 2012, its volume ($329.45 billion) It decreased by 3.9%, including Chinese imports from Japan-by 8.6% ²⁰.

Disputes over sovereignty over the Spratly Islands (Nansha) in the South China Sea have taken a new turn. In the first half of 2012, the situation was most acute due to the Philippines ' attempts to assert its jurisdiction over Scarborough Reef (Huanyandao) on the grounds that geographically it falls within the scope of the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. China responded quickly and harshly, driving Philippine boats out of the conflict zone with its patrol vessels and launching a broad propaganda campaign on the issue of China's historical right to Huangyandao.²¹

In the second half of the year, the attention of the Chinese side shifted more to Vietnam, which tried to consolidate its rights to the Paracel and Spratly Islands in national legislation (on June 21, Vietnam adopted the "Law on the Sea"). In this regard, some Chinese media have complained that "Vietnam has gone too far" and "has forgotten the lessons taught to it by China"²² (referring to China's armed seizure of the Xisha Islands from the then South Vietnamese administration in 1974 and the forceful ousting of the Vietnamese from the Nansha Islands in 1988).

At the same time, unlike the situation with Japan, China's friction with the Philippines and Vietnam over sovereignty over the South China Sea islands did not lead to a decrease in bilateral trade. On the contrary, they have grown quite significantly: with the Philippines by 12.8% compared to 2011, up to $ 36.4 billion, and with Vietnam by 25.4% - up to $ 50.4 billion.²³ Here we can feel the desire of the PRC to use its main trump card to the maximum - the attractiveness of trade with it for the countries of the region as an important factor in their economic development. growth, which is ultimately intended to have a positive impact on their political relations with Beijing.

An important step was also taken to administratively consolidate the ownership of the islands of the South China Sea to China. Instead of the office of Xisha, Zhongsha, and Nansha Islands that had existed since 1959, the city of Sansha was established with the rank of a district ("diji") city. The city covers an area of 2.13 ^km2 and has a population of 2 thousand people, located on the largest island in the South China Sea, Yongxing ²⁴. The establishment of Sansha City is intended to "force foreign circles to adapt to China's resolute defense of its sovereignty in the South China Sea." ²⁵

At the same time, despite all the bravado and propaganda assertiveness, the PRC is well aware that disputes over jurisdiction over the islands and waters of the South China Sea will have a long-term protracted nature and that Beijing's position on this issue does not meet with support in the international community. It is significant that even in the context of a noticeable increase in nationalist sentiment in the PRC, people are finding-

there are people who take a sober position. In particular, the head of the Chinese Academy of South China Sea Studies, Wu Shicun, believes that China's strategic interests correspond to "rational self-restraint, restraint in matters affecting border areas." ²⁶

The third regional challenge, the Indian one, was not particularly acute in 2012, despite the 50th anniversary of the 1962 border conflict between China and India. At the same time, India's marked increase in oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea, Delhi's general desire to make Asia and the Asia-Pacific Region one of its main foreign policy priorities, and related measures to strengthen the Indian Navy are perceived in Beijing with obvious concern. However, there were also positive aspects associated with a certain cooling of India's relations with the United States and New Delhi's statements about its commitment to the doctrine of "strategic autonomy" - a kind of new version of the non-aligned polity27.

III

The year 2012 was marked by the obvious desire of the Chinese leadership to diversify its foreign policy tools and to strengthen ties with a number of regions that Beijing previously did not pay much attention to for various reasons.

The abundance of complex problems facing the People's Republic of China in resolving maritime and partly land borders with neighboring states, as well as the large length of the country's borders and coastline, have made border and maritime diplomacy an important independent direction of China's foreign policy. Established in March 2009, it has been activated. Department of Border and Maritime Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

Responding in April 2012 to questions from participants of the Internet Forum "Strong State" ("Qianguo Longtan"), the head of this department, Deng Zhonghua, stated that the PRC has disputes with all eight states "neighboring" it by sea. These are the DPRK, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia (we are talking not only about the disputed islands, but also about the delineation of overlapping sections of 200-mile special economic zones of various countries)²⁸.

In November 2012, China issued electronic passports for citizens of the country with an outline of the land and sea border of the PRC, which covered all disputed sea and land areas, which had a wide international resonance.

In 2012, not only China's border and maritime policies became more active, but also its overall policy towards its neighbor's environment. This was partly due to the need to smooth out the unfavorable impression that China's overly assertive foreign policy of the 2009-2010 model made on its neighbors. Even more important is the fact that, as Chinese experts rightly point out, the neighboring environment is the main area of China's development. Instability here undermines stability and strategic balance throughout Asia and even around the world.²⁹ Accordingly, in order to create a harmonious world, China must first create a harmonious atmosphere in its neighborly environment.³⁰

It is symptomatic that Hu Jintao's report at the XVIII CPC Congress confirmed the basic course of the PRC towards good neighborliness. "We will always treat neighboring countries with goodwill and partnership, strengthen relations of friendship and good neighborliness with them, and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation," Hu said.

Undoubtedly, China is also being forced to increase its attention to neighboring states by the activation of the United States in its "soft underbelly", not only in Japan and the Philippines, but also in Vietnam and even in Myanmar.

In 2012, the PRC intensified contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which in the previous twenty years did not attract any noticeable attention from Beijing. In April, Warsaw hosted the first-ever separate meeting between the leaders of China and the heads of State of this group. The China-Central and Eastern European Cooperation Secretariat has been established.

Apart from Russia, the Central Asian states remained China's priority partners in the CIS, but there have been some changes: Turkmenistan's role has significantly increased due to the rapid increase in gas exports to China. Its share in China's trade with the five countries in the region increased from 5.2% in 2010 to 13.8% in 2011 and 22.6% in 2012.

China's trade with Central Asian States in 2011-2012 (USD million)

Source: Chinese Customs Statistics [Haiguan tongji]. 2011. N 12. P. 3; 2012. N 12, P. 5.

China's interest in developing not only trade, but also investment cooperation with Ukraine and Belarus is also growing. Some Russian experts believe that Belarus is a "point of entry" for Beijing into the European and Eurasian markets, and in the future it may become an important segment of the China - Europe transcontinental transport corridor.³¹

China's trade with Ukraine and Belarus in 2011-2012 (USD million)

Source: Chinese Customs Statistics [Haiguan tongji]. 2011. N 12. P. 5; 2012. N 12. P. 7.

* * *

In 2012, the desire to "skillfully combine firmness and gentleness, determination and reasonableness"³² was more clearly and noticeably expressed in China's foreign policy than in the previous few years. This is due to the accumulation of experience in active foreign policy, sometimes acquired at a high price, and the preparation of the platform of the XVIII CPC Congress, and the very approaching departure from the leadership of the party and the country of the fourth generation of leaders of the CPC and the PRC, who, of course, wanted to leave their successors the most favorable legacy in

In its own way, it is significant that if at the beginning of the year there were calls in China to abandon Deng Xiaoping's formula of "keeping a low profile and doing something real" ("taoguang yanghui, youso tzowei")³³, then by the end of 2012, on the contrary, recommendations began to be given-

In the current difficult international situation, we should once again turn to Deng's command to "observe in cold blood, strengthen our shattered positions with self-control, cope with difficulties, keep a low profile and try not to show ourselves in any way, and at the same time do something real"³⁴.

Whether the new Chinese leadership will continue to adhere to the precepts of Deng Xiaoping and to what extent, its international activities will partly show this year, 2013.

1. Wu Qimin, Meng Xianglin. Peaceful development, brilliant success [Heping fazhan chengjiu huihuang]. URL: http://politics.people.com.en/n/2012/1010/c1001-19209634.html.

2. Wu Qimin, Wu Gang, Zhao Cheng. The 12th Commentary on Important Strategic Issues after the 16th CPC Congress: China's contribution to the ideas of creating a harmonious world and win-win development [Shiliu da ilai zhongda zhanliue shuping zhi shier: he shijie guning fazhan de Zhongguo gongeyan]. URL: http://people.com.en/18/n/2012/1104/c350833-19488806.html.

3. Lin Limin. Some new perspectives on International Politics in 2011 [2011 nian guoji zhengzhi de jige xin kand'ian] // Dandai shijie (Modern World). Beijing, 2011, No. 12, pp. 4-8.

4. Yang Xuetong, Wu Wenbing. What the rise of China relies on [Zhongguo jueqi kao shammo] / / Changsha. 2010. p. 21.

5. Xue Fukang. Bipolarization: unnecessary and impossible: Controversy with Rector Yan Xuetong [Liangjihua: wu biyao ye wu keneng-yu Yan Xuetong yuanzhang shangque] / / Shijie zhishi. Beijing, 2012. N23. P. 45. Yan Xuetong is the head of Tsinghua University's School of Contemporary International Relations Studies.

6. Hu Jintao. Firmly move forward on the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and fight for the complete construction of a middle-class society: Report to the XVIII National Congress of the Communist Party of China on November 8, 2012.

7. Wu Qimin, Meng Xianglin. Edict op.

8. Shi Zhiyu Get out of the trap of "core interests" [Zouchu "hexin lii" de xianjing] / / Zhongguo weijiao. 2012. N 12. pp. 21-24.

9. See: People's Daily. 2010. 19 Oct. The only difference is that the Communique uses the term "wogo" (our state) and the Report to the Congress uses the term "guojia" (state). The rest - "zhuquan, anquan, fazhan liyi" - is identical.

10. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/zt/ywzt/2011nzt/lantinglunan/t1001446.htm.

11. Yang Jiechi. In stability, make progress, expand exploration and innovation. Chinese Diplomacy in the Turbulent International Situation of 2012 [Wenzhong qiujin kaito chuansin / / Guoji fengyun jidangzhong de 2012 nian Zhongguo waijiao]. Qiushi. 2013. N 1. URL: http://www/qstheorg.cn/zxdk/2013/201301/201212/t20121227_202430.htm.

12. См.: http://politics.people.com.en/n/2013/0129/cl001-20361833.html.

13. Ma Zhengang. Current situation and foreign policy countermeasures [Danqian jiushi yu waijiao duice]. URL: http://theory.people.com.en/n/2012/0917/c40531-19025308-1.html.

14. Ibid.

15. Yang Jiechi. Edict op.

16. Ross R. Problema s razvorotom [The problem with U-turn]. Obama's new Asia policy is unnecessary and counterproductive. URL: http//www/globalaffairs.ru/number/Problema-s-razvorotom-15793.

17. Chen Weihua. Sino-US-ties in focus as Obama wins 2^nd term // China Daily. 2013. 22 Jan.

18. Yu Xintian. New features of American hedging policy and China's response measures [Meigo duichun zhengze de xin taedian yu Zhongguo indui] / / Zhongguo weijiao. 2012. N 12. P. 26.

19. The opinions of a number of reputable Chinese political scientists and international experts on the nature of the conflict and their recommendations on the behavior of the PRC in the current situation are published in a special selection in the journal "Shijie Zhishi "(2012. N 19. pp. 14-23).

20. Customs Statistics of the People's Republic of China [Haiguan tongji]. 2012. N 12. P. 5.

21. See, for example, the Russian translation of the article from the People's Daily of May 9, 2012 "Sovereignty over Huangyandao belongs only to China" in the magazine "China "(2012. N 6. pp. 28-29).

22. How to resist pressure from Vietnam [Gai zengyang indui Yuenan de jinbi] / / Huanqiu shibao. 2012. June 28.

23. Customs Statistics of the People's Republic of China [Haiguan tongji]. 2012. N 12. P. 5.

24. Upgrade set to boost island chains // China Daily. 2012. 2 July.

25. The city of Sansha tempers the spirit and determination of the whole of China [Sansha shi duanlian quan Zhongguo de yizhi he danliue] / / Huanqiu shibao. 2012. June 25.

26. Wu Shijie. China's strategy in the South China Sea should be to properly resolve the four contradictions [Zhongguo Nanhai zhanliue xu toshan chuli sidui maodun]. URL: http://www.world.people.com.en/n/2012/1221/c1002-19969550.html.

27. See: Makarov A. The elephant move. Many Indian military personnel from the air and land will have to reorient to water / / Kommersant Vlast. 2012. N 51. URL: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2088612.

28. Deng Zhonghua, Director of the Department of Border and Maritime Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, talks about the new situation in diplomatic work related to border and maritime issues [Weijiaobu bianhaisi sizzhang Deng Zhonghua tan xin xingshi xiade bianjie yu haiyang waijiao gongzo]. URL: http://live.people.com.cn/bbs/note.php?id=57120409110620_ctdzb_062, 10.04.2012.

29. Zhao Kejin. China's Rise and strategic support for the neighborhood [Zhongguo juetsi yu zhoubian dilyu zhanliue ito] //Dandai Zhongguo. 2012. N 10.

30. New features of China's diplomacy with neighboring countries and regions: expanding cooperation and "cooling" hot issues. URL: http://russianl.people.com.cn/95181/7733697.html.

31. Tikhonova S. V. Belorussia in the arms of the "soft power" of China / / China in the post-Soviet space, Moscow: ISI, 2012, p. 116.

32. This expression belongs to the Vice-rector of the Chinese Diplomatic Academy, international expert Qin Yaqing.

33. Zhang Hongxi. The controversy about the principle of "keeping a low profile" brings to mind Zhou Enlai ["Taohui" zhi zheng, shi ren xiangqi Zhou Enlai] / / Shijie zhishi. 2012. N 5. pp. 54-55.

34. Ma Zhengang. Edict op.

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