The 1997-1998 Asian financial and economic crisis was not, like the current global one, a purely cyclical one. As a rule, events of this kind! they turn into a search for mechanisms that are at least somewhat proactive or mitigate crises. Since at the turn of the century, the waves of upheavals are primarily in the monetary and financial sphere, it is natural to try to regulate it in a new way, both at the global level and at the regional levels. The Chiang Mai Initiative (HMI) is a prime example of regional financial cooperation in East Asia.

Her nomination was preceded by the plan of Miyazawa (1997), then Minister of Finance of Japan. At the height of the East Asian crisis, this prominent figure proposed the creation of a regional counterpart to the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Monetary Fund (AWF). Understanding the background of Miyazawa's proposal, it should be remembered that it was Japan's banks that carried out massive expansion into the region in the pre-crisis period and many of the loans they issued "hung" due to the insolvency of borrowers.

Vyacheslav Borisovich Amirov is a Senior researcher at the IMEMO RAS Center for Asia-Pacific Studies.

amirovvb@gmail.ru

The idea met with a negative reaction from Washington, which saw it as an encroachment on the prerogatives of the IMF. Nor did China support it. In November 1997, something known as the Manila Framework ^Group1 was finalized for regional monitoring of the economic, monetary and financial situation under the auspices of the IMF, with the participation of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

Less than a year later, in October 1998, Japan made a new move. The same Miyazawa announced his readiness to allocate $ 30 billion to the East Asian neighbors. Half of this amount was intended for medium - and long-term economic programs, while the other half was intended for short-term anti-crisis measures.² The case, however, was limited to the fact that by the end of February 2000, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines were issued a little more than $ 5 billion for five of them. At the same time, the Japanese Ministry of Finance announced that it had contributed to the recovery of the East Asian economies and that they no longer needed emergency assistance.³

In any case, the Asian crisis has shown that countries with weak finances do not receive effective assistance from multilateral structures - whether it is the IMF itself or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which is representative but has no serious powers. The position of the IMF left a particularly heavy impression. Writing out recipes for healing national economies "under a carbon copy", without taking into account local specifics, the Fund in a number of cases contributed to the exacerbation of the crisis, and not to the way out of it. Once convinced of this, a country like Malaysia went against the recommendations of the IMF - and, as it soon turned out, did not lose. The combination of these circumstances, combined with the economic rise of the PRC, which did not succumb to the crisis, contributed to the formation of the ASEAN+3 grouping (where the "troika" is represented by China, Japan and the South-

Korea). It has held annual summits since December 1997 and meetings of finance ministers since April 1999 to develop common approaches to regional cooperation. Let us emphasize at once: the very fact of the HMI's promotion, its gradual implementation and complication is directly related to the emergence of the ASEAN+3 format.

Already in December 1999, the third summit of this group decided that it was necessary to strengthen "self-help and support mechanisms in East Asia"⁴. And in May 2000, at their second meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers unveiled a plan to conclude a series of bilateral swap agreements. The meaning of each of them is in the agreements between the central banks of the two countries on the possible exchange (English - swap) of the national currency for a foreign one. Operations of this type are designed to maintain the exchange rate of the national currency or solve short-term liquidity problems in settlements between the countries of the region. Upon expiration of the agreed period, a reverse exchange takes place.

This decision (which, in fact, began the work within the framework of the HMI) was the first step towards creating a system of mutual support for East Asian states through monetary and financial lines. It was intended to avoid urgent requests for help from the IMF, but, as it was specifically emphasized, not from cooperation with it at all.

Bilateral currency swaps in the framework of the HMI were presented as a means to prevent sharp fluctuations in exchange rates and stock market panic typical of 1997-1998. Some experts were inclined to believe that the HMI is an analogue of the first steps towards a single currency made within the framework of the UES through the "currency snake" system (1972-1979). Others saw the HMI as a political declaration rather than an economic plan proper.⁵ Doubts were expressed about the feasibility of the agreements reached. It has even been said that the thesis that the Asian crisis could be mitigated if there were swap agreements or an AWF-type institution is ill-conceived and politically harmful. ⁶

What about the IMF? In 2001, H. Koehler, then managing director of the Fund, stated that swap agreements can promote regional economic cooperation, and he is not opposed to the formation of an Asian Monetary Union. However, in the process of regionalization, he stressed, East Asia should not oppose the IMF, but complement its activities, because it is a global institution7.

In any case, the development of coordination and cooperation processes within the HMI made the existence of such an IMF brainchild as the Manila Group unnecessary. It ceased operations in 2004, while the ASEAN+3 finance Ministers focused on increasing the scope and effectiveness of the HMI. At their eighth meeting in May 2005, they agreed to integrate the group's economic monitoring procedures into the HMI framework. Other decisions related to the activation of swap agreements and joint decision-making on their application, as well as a significant increase in the size of agreements.⁸ It was also decided that the share of the swap that can be used outside the framework of the IMF's support program for this country is increased from 10 to 20% ⁹.

You can judge for yourself how the volume of swap agreements grew in the following years. While at the end of 2004 they totaled $ 36.5 billion, by 2007 China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand had concluded 16 bilateral agreements worth $ 64 billion. And in October 2009, this figure was already approaching 90 billion. $ ¹⁰.

Against this background, the idea of moving from a set of bilateral swap agreements to a multilateral currency pool has been discussed since 2006 - and more and more in detail - ¹¹. The agreement on this issue took place at the very end of last year, and on March 24, 2010, the corresponding agreement entered into force. The essence of the new stage in the development of monetary and financial cooperation under the ASEAN+3 line is reflected in the new name of the "joint venture" - the Chiang Mai Multilateral Initiative (CMMI). While previously only eight of the 13 countries covered by the ASEAN+3 format joined the bilateral swap agreements, now they are joined by the "young" members of ASEAN - Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. However, so far their shares are rather symbolic in nature.

The basis of the $ 120 billion pool is the impressive contributions of Japan and China ($38.4 billion each). Half the amount allocated by each of these countries, but the South Korean contribution is still quite large ($19.2 billion). (Hong Kong is added to the list of parties to the agreement, which retains a certain monetary and financial independence, but for political reasons does not receive the right to make a separate contribution

There is a contribution from China. Hong Kong's share in the total Chinese contribution is $ 4.2 billion.)¹².ASEAN's founding member countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines - each contribute $ 4.77 billion. If necessary, any pool participant can count on an amount equal to their contribution multiplied by an individual multiplier. For example, according to this scheme, each country from the "top five" of ASEAN is entitled to claim approximately $ 11 billion.¹³

HMMI: contribution of participants and access to pool resources

Источник: http://www.mas.gov.sg/news_room/press_releases/2010/Joint_Press_Release_C MIM_Comes_Into_Effect.html

According to N. Shinohara, Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), giving the Chiang Mai Initiative a multi-pronged character has increased its effectiveness.-

It increases its significance for the region and is positive in nature. The IMF, he believes, should more actively support such regional agreements.¹⁴

Of course, the opportunities inherent in the HMMI and their implementation are not the same thing. Much will depend on mutual understanding between China and Japan, on the relationship of these countries as the main potential lenders with potential borrowers - the ASEAN countries, and possibly South Korea. A number of experts are inclined to think that the size of aid from the pool may be inadequate, while agreement between Japan and China is more easily achieved under the pressure of crises (for example, the current one) than in the absence of one.¹⁵

What should I say in response? Perhaps it should be noted that economic cooperation in the China - Japan - South Korea triangle, which is developing in parallel with the progress of the World Economic Forum, also increases the chances of success of the latter?

In addition, we know from the experience of the 1997-1998 crisis that short-term currency interventions do not always require large amounts of aid, especially to repel the first speculative attack. Speed and timeliness of assistance often play a crucial role (which affects the psychology of market players). If the time is lost, then very serious money may not be enough. It should be noted that to the extent that the process of providing assistance under the PMIS is linked to the IMF's procedures, it can be slowed down by them.

Although the state of most East Asian economies is not currently very worrying, critics say that monitoring of the economic situation in these countries is not yet optimal. There is also no clarity on the formation of the CMMI secretariat and its location. At a time when the Chiang Mai Initiative was based on bilateral swaps, such a body was not needed. In the case of a multilateral agreement involving collective decision-making on financial assistance, a bureaucratic apparatus is already needed-say, in the form of the same secretariat.

Be that as it may, it is obvious that the WMMI has a lot to offer the region. This is the opinion of Joel Rathus, an expert who follows its development. Although the direction of development of PMMI, he notes, is not yet "set in stone", the short-term trajectory of movement is quite obvious - in the direction of institutionalized relations between partners.¹⁶

Thus, the countries of East Asia - including the entire" top ten " of ASEAN-are consistently joining forces to protect the region from external monetary and financial shocks. An important motive for implementing the CMMI is to reduce financial dependence on global institutions.-

tutov and leaders (IMF, United States). At the same time, neither the termination of cooperation with them in the monetary and financial sphere, nor the strict refusal of their assistance is in question. In this sense, the CMMI is a regional initiative that fits into the global context. In the longer term, it may turn out to be a stage on the road to an Asian Monetary Union. The immediate goal is to bring the multilateral financial mechanism, officially established in 2010, to a working state.

Keywords: Chiang Mai Initiative (CHI), ASEAN+3, Chiang Mai Multilateral Initiative (CHI).

¹ The Manila Group includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, as well as China (plus Hong Kong), Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. In fact, this was the composition of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum at the time of its formation in 1989. http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/ele071.htm.

² См.: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/ele042.htm.

³ CM.:http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDP/is_2000_March_6/ai_59998149/.

⁴ См.: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/regional_financial_cooperation.htm.

⁵ See, for example: The Financial Times. 22.09.2000; The International Herald Tribune. 11.05.2001.

⁶ CM.: Silly scheming in Chiang Mai. Asia Times Online. 09.05.2000 // www.atimes.com/editor/BE09Ba01.html.

⁷ CM.: The Far Eastern Economic Review. 14.06.2001. P. 48 - 50.

⁸ CM.: Joint Ministerial Statement of the Eighth ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers' Meeting // http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/regional_financial_cooperation.htm.

⁹ См.: http://revistas.ucm.es/cps/16962206/articulos/UNIS0606230049A.PDF.

¹⁰ См.: http://revistas.ucm.es/cps/16962206/articulos/LJNIS0606230049A.PDF; http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/regional_financial_cooperation.htm; http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/release/adhoc09/data/un0910a.pdf.

¹¹ См.: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/regional_financial_cooperation.htm.

¹² См.: ASEAN, China, Japan, SKorea finalise crisis pact. Agence France-Presse. 03.05.2009; Joel Rathus. The Chiang Mai Initiative: China, Japan and financial regionalism. 11.05.2009 // http://www.eastasiaforum.org/.

¹³ See: Joel Rathus. The Chiang Mai Initiative's multilateralisation: A good start. 23.03.2010 // http://www.eastasiaforum.org/.

¹⁴ См.: Leading the Global Economy: The Outlook and Policy Challenges Facing Asia. Naoyuki Shinohara, Deputy Managing Director, IMF. Public Lecture hosted jointly by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy & Monetary Authority of Singapore. Singapore. 09.06.2010 // http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/060910.htm.

¹⁵ See, for example: Rathus Joel. The Chiang Mai Initiative's multilateralisation.

¹⁶ Ibid.; Rathus Joel. The Chiang Mai Initiative: China, Japan and financial regionalism. 11.05.2009.

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