What is happening in and around Central Asia? Is the geopolitical dynamics of the balance of power reviving there (and probably in the world as a whole), the clash of great powers (which ones?) are they fighting for control over the region (and why does each of them need such control?), or is the evolution of the international political environment here and in the world different in nature and direction? If the latter, which ones?

Proponents of the geopolitical approach seem to find the answers to these and similar questions self-evident. In the theses for this discussion, the geopolitical approach is stated as the main, if not the only correct one. Moreover, geopolitical terminology and views on the world are inherent in the official policies and doctrines of the Russian Federation in the 1990s and early 2000s, and the approach is generally shared and actively promoted by many experts who hold or have held influential positions in the structure of the executive or legislative power of Russia in the recent past. It turns out that it is extremely easy to untie the "knot of problems of the world economy and international relations that has been tied in Central Asia", and to do this "without forcibly redistributing the world". This requires only "a consciousness capable of' correctly seeing a problem of continental size' and the will to solve this problem without allowing any of the new contenders for the role of 'global hegemon' to stand 'across the road of world development' "(p.75)*.

Meanwhile, the knot of problems in Central Asia did not start by itself, but became a direct and natural consequence of Russia's policy. If we consider the former USSR an empire (or a reconstruction of the Russian Empire that preceded it), then, perhaps, for the first time in history, there was an empire that simply "threw away" all its possessions, either in the expectation of God knows what and where did the dividends come from, or out of greed ("eat up Russia"), or because of pathological unwillingness think more than half a step ahead. Unlike the Baltic States, the former Central Asian union republics of the former USSR did not seek to leave the Union, did not fight for "independence", and even after the collapse of the Union became a fait accompli, they clearly hoped for more than one year for the opportunities of Russia and the CIS.

"Give our empire back, we changed our mind" - sounds today, of course, prezanyatno. But why moan - take it, if for this purpose nothing is needed beyond the consciousness that sees the problem (it undoubtedly exists) and the will (this is really a fog)! No resources, no army, no economy, no local elites completely dependent on the imperial center-nothing! However, along the way, the task arises not to allow applicants for global hegemony to "stand in the way" of world development...

But first, how many of these applicants are there? Definitely not one if the number is plural. And not frail, I must think, guys, if they are aiming at hegemony, and not at Central Asian - global one. Secondly, if someone wants to stand across the road, even with the best intentions-then does it mean that there is a "road of global development"? And it is known at least to those who want to block it - otherwise, where to get up? Third, if such a road exists and is known to someone, then what is the nature of the relationship between the "road of world development" and the "contender for the role of a hegemon" (especially "global")? as phenomena? Obviously, the hegemon, by definition, is not the last participant in the movement on this road. A global hegemon can either lead the global development process or be at the forefront of it - then to prevent it would be to fight against development itself. But a hegemon in principle

* Here and further references to "Extended theses for discussion" are given directly in the text.

(c) 2003

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it is capable of being the main obstacle on the path of development (if, I repeat, there is such a path and it is known). What criteria allow us to more or less reliably distinguish a hegemon-a useful leader from a hegemon-an obstacle? Finally, if the hegemon is an obstacle, how can it be practically moved out of the way of world progress "without a violent redistribution of the world"? In addition, in history, especially in its geopolitical part, world development has made its way through the violent redistribution of the world.

However, it is possible and sometimes necessary to fight hegemons. At the same time, it would be worthwhile to understand not only the arguments in favor of such a struggle, but also the specifics of the environment and conditions of its hypothetical conduct, as well as the likely consequences of winning it - no matter how problematic the struggle itself may seem, and even more so the victory in it even to its supporters themselves.

The main argument in favor of the "geopolitical interpretation of history" (not of international relations, we note, but of history itself, i.e., of that very world development) is not so much the expediency as the almost inevitability of such a struggle. It clarifies :" such an understanding of the historical process, which is centered on the change in the forms of territorial and political power within the geography of the planet " (p. 65).

In fact, this statement makes an application to replace the formational approach to explaining History with a geopolitical one, which, logically, denies the very idea of development: if everything is determined by geopolitical factors, then history is a Brownian movement, a continuous change of hegemons, but not development in the philosophical sense, as the change of one qualitative state by another.

Further. Geopolitics doesn't explain international relations, much less their history. At best, it helps to better understand the foreign policy of the leading imperialist powers of its time, such as Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and the United States at various times; at worst, it acts as an apologist for such a policy. One may or may not accept this social service, but one must admit that in this capacity, geopolitics played the role of the forerunner of official foreign policy and strategic doctrines of the second half of the twentieth century, no more.

To the extent that geopolitics is able to explain something, it is in fact only the inter-imperialist relations and rivalries of the corresponding era that can explain it. In the past, Russia may have struggled with British penetration in Central Asia, but now it is forced to resist American penetration. In both cases, no one was interested in the opinion, interests and aspirations of the peoples of Afghanistan, Iran, Uzbekistan and other states of the region. They are nothing more than objects of "big politics", pawns on the "Grand Chessboard" of players - empires.

Let it be so: in the end, it is possible to pursue an openly imperialist policy, even to achieve success on this path. But then (if only for the sake of this very success) we must honestly admit that an imperialist policy is effective only if it is carried out by an imperialist state; that for such a policy to be conducted and successful, the state must be organized as an empire. In history, such a balance was established naturally, spontaneously. In today's highly competitive world, Russia simply doesn't have time to wait for its internal structure to regain its imperial appearance and quality. A number of authors (especially A. G. Dugin) speak of the need to revive imperial Russia. At least they are consistent in this part of their views.

Geopolitics still requires the presence of comparable players and obviously excludes "lightweights" from the game in the most important area for this segment of history. But is the geopolitical scheme of relations possible in conditions of a significant gap?-

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th player even from the nearest rivals? Are we not dealing here not with a geopolitical system of relations, but with a global empire-not eternal in the historical and philosophical sense, but very real in the concrete political sense? But the empire is no longer international relations, but a certain integrity within which relations that were previously international have passed into intra - imperial ones. A global empire is a single and integral world, although the political quality of such a world would be rejected by many.

Let's not moralize and consider the return of Russia to the empire and imperial policy as a hypothetically acceptable option. In history, empires were created not so much by choice (although it was always present in appropriate cases), but by a combination of circumstances. For modern Russia, turning to empire would mean a deliberate and deliberate choice. Therefore, before making it, it is logical-at least in the order of the very first approximation - to understand what is necessary for its return to the empire (desire and will alone, apparently, may not be enough); what would be the chances of success in such an undertaking; what type of empire would make sense to return (Finally, what Russia would have received if it had succeeded, and what would have been the penalty for the failure of its neo-imperial undertaking.

The world after World War II (not after the collapse of the USSR, but after 1945) is a world of undisputed US dominance. In relative economic terms, this dominance is steadily declining. For half a century, the USSR surpassed the United States in terms of accumulated weapons; Russia still surpasses its nuclear forces in terms of stored ammunition. But in absolute terms, American power only grew in the 1940s and 1990s. Most importantly, no other state or group of states is comparable to the United States in terms of a set of parameters (military potential, level and range of scientific and technological development, volume and quality of the economy, finances and the role of the dollar in the world, mass cultural influence abroad, etc.). Moreover, the gap between America and the countries closest to it in terms of these indicators continues to widen.

This is the world today. There are no players that are geopolitically comparable to the United States. Neither Japan and the EU countries, which have long been financially and economically integrated with the United States, nor China, whose capabilities are growing impressively, but are still far from the level of the developed world in many respects, especially given the population of the PRC, are suitable for this role. Russia is comparable to the United States only in terms of accumulated strategic weapons; the shares of these two states in the global gross product are about 1.5 and 20%, respectively.

What kind of geopolitical game is possible in such a world? In my opinion, at the global level-none. At best, the countries of the next level after America will be able to work together to adjust Washington's position and policy on specific issues in one direction or another (not necessarily in the direction of greater restraint). At the regional and sub-regional levels, "local geopolitics" is possible in one of three cases: if for some reason it directly suits the United States and/or a group of leading states; if it does not interfere with the policies of these states and does not affect their interests; if the resources and capabilities of America and countries close to it are geopolitically stretched in such a it means that this or that region will simply run out of energy and attention.

A direct and frank policy of building a new empire (a mechanical return to the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th century or to the USSR is obviously impossible) would be met primarily with powerful opposition from the United States.

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throughout the 1990s, my American interlocutors (including those in Congress, the US Department of Defense, and the US State Department) told me dozens of times and with one voice that the United States can still come to terms with the economic reintegration of the post-Soviet space, provided that it takes place on a market basis and absolutely voluntarily on the part of all its participants. But America will not put up with military and political reintegration and will oppose it by all means - the word "all" was especially emphasized-available to it.

Therefore-and also because of the acute shortage of all types of resources (political, financial, economic, and military) - Russia's neo-imperial strategy would have to be neither direct nor explicit. It would be reasonable to bet on the weakening of the United States as the main enemy from within under the weight of their internal contradictions; on stretching America's obligations and involvement (preferably military) in various parts of the world; or on a combination of the former and the latter. Disguising such a strategy would require maintaining outwardly correct, and preferably friendly relations with the United States (not excluding, of course, the possibility of temporary and private disagreements-it would be more plausible).

Nevertheless, the strategy of betting on the weakening of the main opponent from within and with his own hands and forces does not guarantee either the desired result, or even an approximate time frame for its receipt. It is more akin to the well-known Eastern saying, the meaning of which is-do not fuss, but wait for the corpse of your enemy to be carried past your house. You may not be able to wait... What would speed things up would be an alliance with other weak (but ambitious) forces against an overall superior enemy. But such an alliance would make the actual strategy visible. The main thing is that it requires the interest and consent of other weak people if they have the necessary ambition - and smart "weak" people are either ambitious or successfully hide it. In other words, the chances of Russia's success on the path of building a neo-empire in the historical and philosophical sense are there; but in practical terms, such chances do not lend themselves to operational assessment. Apparently, they will largely depend on what type of empire will become the goal of Russian policy (if such a goal is set).

There is no way to develop a historical typology of empires. For us, a fundamental "moral" is important here: empires are different. And if Russia intends to build an empire according to the standards of early colonialism, it is possible that it may receive the implicit support of even the same United States, which may need police countries in different parts of the world, provided that such states act in the general direction of America's strategy of "programming global leadership". But an empire of the "obsolete" type would firmly anchor Russia itself somewhere in the rearguard of world development. The existence of such an empire could only amuse the ego and complexes of those who, in the words of the American proverb, believe that it is better to be first in the village than second in the world. The" empire of the future", if such an empire is possible, will only appear on the simplest informational, technological, economic, ideological and political basis - the very one that Russia is still striving to create (at least verbally). In history, each successive wave of empires did not repeat the previous one, but reproduced the "idea of empire" at a qualitatively new stage of development.

One gets the impression that the world has outgrown the imperial forms of organization of physical and social space, and with them it has outgrown geopolitics; that the geopolitical model is no longer applicable to the description and understanding of today's world, and even more so tomorrow's. If so (I will make a reservation - if), the call to geopolitics means, in a spiritual sense, the risk of finding yourself in the midst of an ideological and political reaction, and in a spiritual sense, the risk of finding yourself in the midst of an ideological and political reaction.

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In applied politics , there is a danger of condemning your country's foreign policy to inefficiency at best, and to the most serious strategic miscalculations at worst.

It appears in the light of the above: when analyzing the driving forces, prospects of the world and the place of Russia in it, it is impossible not to rely on a different model of explanation - the globalist one. If the geopolitical model considers the world and international relations as an arena, process and result of eternal confrontation, the globalist model, on the contrary, emphasizes the formation of the world and the system of relations in it as a single whole. Of course, both are models that reflect certain trends in international life in the past and present.

Globalization can be defined as a trinity of rather far-reaching processes of forming an integral global economy, relying on transnational corporations as subjects of global (based primarily on global, rather than national-country markets) economic relations; developing (but still at the very beginning) international political registration of this integrity, which objectively means a qualitative limitation of sovereignty (already significantly eroded during the second half of the twentieth century) of states, especially those that rank from the second and lower in the actual hierarchy of subjects of international relations; and the aspirations of economically leading states (primarily the United States and Great Britain) to take advantage of globalization, orienting it and certain aspects of this process in the most favorable socio-economic direction. There are no models of such countries.

In any interpretation of globalization as a phenomenon and its starting point, the answers to two interrelated questions are particularly important: what changes does globalization make in the world, in international relations, and in world politics? And what international-political forms can it take, what kind of world order can it be cast into (while the existence of such an order is not felt, the concept of "US-centric world" does not characterize this order, if it exists, in any way in essence)?

Those international relations with which the world has entered the era of globalization, over the past 350 years, have been built and functioned on the basis of the postulate of the state as a special and main (according to many researchers - the only one) subject, the main feature of which was and nominally remains the presence of sovereignty. International relations were understood as the relationship of sovereigns, whose very position does not allow for any higher authority over them, except Providence. In other words, international relations over the past three and a half centuries (actually longer) have been identified with interstate relations, and the main feature of the state was recognized - and in fact was - sovereignty (the "Westphalian system of international relations"). Subjects of a non-State nature began to appear in international relations only after the Second World War, mainly from the turn of the 1960s. Their formation was the beginning of an era of world politics in the truest sense of the word.

Over time, in the political organization of that part of the space that was under the indisputable sovereignty of States, processes should have objectively begun, inevitably leading to a deep evolution of the very foundations of the Westphalian and all its derived systems of international relations. These processes have been (consistently) the emergence of two superpowers and their confrontation, especially since the early 1960s; the growing interdependence of States in parallel with the rapidly growing gap between the richest and poorest countries during the late 1950s and mid-1980s; and globalization itself,

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developed from the beginning of the 1970s and at the end of the 1980s, it entered a qualitatively new stage.

Globalization in the political and strategic sense is the process of forming a supra-national (not to be confused with supranational, which is institutional) social community, the established actual norms and rules of life of which (including legal ones) claim priority over state and intra-country ones.

Such a community can be formed in three ways: naturally, under the influence of increasing exchange of all kinds between states, as well as between them and transnational corporations, and as a consequence of their collective rule-making (this model of globalization is largely "ideal"); directionally, under the influence of the interests and ideas of the most developed part of the world, due to its development of in globalization and seeking to introduce the latter into a controlled and jointly directed framework; forced, under the determining influence of the interests and ideas of one or more subjects of global relations (this is the nature of globalization since the early 1990s, but especially since the early 2000s).

Paradoxically, the United States, on the threshold of the twenty-first century, had the opportunity (whether it will eventually be realized is another question) to realize the dream of the Habsburgs and many ancient rulers of creating a super-empire. Their separation in terms of economic, but especially military-technical and scientific - innovative indicators (which characterize the potential and capabilities of states in the modern world) creates a material and psychological basis, at least for attempts by some American circles to impose neo - imperial forms of international political organization on the United States and the world in the course of globalization in the present and its future transformations.

Globalization is driven by the most developed countries. In the minds of elites and society, in political life, they collide here (so far rather in rather vague, intuitive images than in a clearly verbalized form). three models of globalization.

At the mass level, this is a "spontaneous democratic globalization" that is outwardly represented or portrayed as anti-globalism. Its slogans - "globalization in the name of man, for man and with respect for all human rights" - are attractive, but so far they are poorly supported practically, organizationally and are of little significance even in election campaigns. Time will tell how and where, and in support of what forces and demands this still amorphous movement can be turned (in particular, whether it will become one of the pillars of a theoretically possible ochlocratic model of globalization).

The oligarchic model of globalization in the leading Western countries is not advertised, but it is clearly visible in the minds of elites and in politics. Such a model would mean the presence of several "centers of power" around the United States that are allied to them, but limit the limits of the US's self-will and, possibly, tyranny, but under no circumstances do they enter into a direct confrontation with America for leadership in the Western and/or "big" world. The role of such oligarchic centers is claimed with varying degrees of justification (but, in the strict sense, they are not yet) by the members of the G8 and the EU. In the United States, the actual commitment to the model of oligarchic globalization can be traced in the words and actions of democrats; in Europe, it is more supported by parties and forces of the center-right orientation.

A rigidly authoritarian model of globalization led by the United States (there are no other contenders for this role in the foreseeable future), in a number of (especially external) parameters, would have politically dangerously much in common with the scenarios of the "global empire of the United States" and/or the "global neocolon".-

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neither the US/NATO alliance." In the United States, such a model follows organically from the positions of Republicans and the course of the George W. Bush administration. In Europe, the prospects for global neo - colonialism under the auspices of the United States and NATO are supported by a significant part of the social Democrats and those forces that advocate strengthening the role and expanding the functions of NATO as opposed to unilateral actions and influence of the United States.

The international political formalization of the globalizing world coincides and is interrelated with two other processes (but not identical to them): the formation of the "world society" and the "international community", with the subjects of the former being considered people (individuals), and the second - states.

Obviously, in the first case, it should not be about people in general, but about the current national and country elites. It is the participants of such elites, who in their daily activities are "closed" to serving state structures, transnational banks and corporations, international organizations, communications, etc., who are the first to be directly and directly drawn into globalization processes and begin to feel more and more like "citizens of the world", and not just their own countries. In the second case, the international political organization of an increasingly globalized world occurs (should occur) primarily in the sphere of relations between States.

The interweaving of these two levels / processes of globalization is one of the most important consequences of the emergence of the problem of the subject and objects of coordination and management at the global level (all international organizations had to deal with this at one time). Human loyalty in the structure of this coordination and, increasingly, management is being diversified. An employee whose personal savings are linked to the global economy and are often located abroad and / or in foreign currency; an administrator whose appointment and functions are subject to the internal rules of a multinational corporation or are significantly related to them; a politician who must take into account not only the interests of his electorate at home, but also the positions of various forces and trends in a regime whose legitimacy is initially linked or in real time largely depends on the forces and processes of the external world - all these and many similar phenomena, widespread and commonplace in the world even in the last quarter of the twentieth century, would be unthinkable in the system of geopolitical relations and incompatible with it.

The spread of globalist tendencies puts national and country elites in an ambiguous position. On the one hand, it is the elites who are the first to receive the benefits of globalization and therefore are more interested in joining it than others and act not so rarely to the detriment of their countries and peoples (which people usually feel and understand). On the other hand, national-country elites are caught in a" pincer movement " between the demands of local Orthodox christians to preserve their way of life, faith, traditions and way of life and the demands of the world community (global elites?). open up the economy and social relations of their countries to the increasing penetration of globalization in them.

Finally, there is the problem of the practical capacity of those States that are usually classified as underdeveloped, poor and the poorest. The low social efficiency, and often complete incapacity of such states, is also explained by the lack of material resources, but also-especially-by the corruption of local elites, their immersion in clarifying relations between their own clans and groups. At the same time, having no forces in their countries that constrain and limit their aspirations, such elites forget about everything and stop at nothing, deliberately inciting ethnic conflicts if necessary.-

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(this is exactly how the union and republican elites behaved in the run-up to and after the collapse of the USSR; a similar situation, in essence, is typical for most countries of the "third world"). In the geopolitical coordinate system, the socially irresponsible behavior of local elites is a boon and goal for any empires that are invariably based on the principle of"divide and rule". But in a globalizing world, it is also the strongest threat to the stability and security of this world and a challenge to the basic interests of new, global elites; moreover, a challenge that requires a quick, decisive and effective response. Otherwise, globalization risks being pushed far back.

At the same time, the emerging global elites (and they are formed on the basis of the elites of the leading countries of globalization) bring to life a new and derived from globalization international conflict. These are primarily conflicts related to the desire to retain the place and role of the leading State in the system of international relations for the long term. Such an aspiration requires maintaining not just a gap between the leader and the countries closest to him, but a gap that is practically insurmountable for the latter in real (i.e., non-historical) time scale. An extrapolation of this scenario for the future gives the following picture: first , a gradual slide of an increasing number of countries into a state of stagnation of development and / or zero or even negative development, and then-the risk of a revolt of the feral majority against the new, "global" elite that has sharply and far separated from the masses. These are also conflicts related to the desire to use them as a pretext and material for building the political formalization of the global world (global world order). Here, the approach of "programming leadership" (USA) and the call for "enlightened neocolonialism" (EU) successfully complement each other.

There is a peculiar counter-movement: the political formalization of globalization and its intermediate outcomes requires the presence (or creation) of" directed conflicts", the course and outcome of which can be regulated in order to achieve political goals that go far beyond such a conflict. At the same time, forces have matured in many countries, calling more and more loudly: "Master, come and judge!" Unlike in the past, the latest wave of "colonialism" (within the framework of the rigidly authoritarian model of globalization) is driven largely "from below", including the elites or future elites of the countries of the lower strata of the socio-economic hierarchy of states.

The policy of "divide and rule" at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries found many interested supporters primarily among potential objects of division - which suggests that after the phase of weakening (and in some cases, destruction) of the "former" state, a change (renewal of the social and personal composition) of local elites and the restoration of the "new" state are likely"more capable and strong in solving internal problems, but with an elite that is firmly oriented towards globalization (or countering its specific models, directions, trends). In this regard, any further evolution of the situation around Iraq and especially its long-term consequences will be extremely interesting (among which I would place first in terms of their significance the opportunities opened up by this artificially created situation for advancing the process of international political consolidation of the principles and mechanisms of avoiding legal restrictions (a kind of "globalization in terms of concepts", not in terms of 2) the dominance of a single "global empire".

I will not draw conclusions in relation to the situation in Central Asia and/or Russian policy towards this region: the reader can formulate his own position, accepting or rejecting the considerations and assessments I have presented.

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Which model of the world and its transformation is still considered more correct, closer to reality - geopolitical or globalist?

My answer: neither one nor the other can be taken as an absolute and followed blindly and mechanically, as if the world development was built exclusively on textbooks studied in the first or second years of university. In fact, the geopolitical and globalist models of the modern world are extreme positions (thesis and antithesis) of the most complex dichotomy that underlies the worldview of the "white man" at the beginning of the XXI century; a worldview that itself is undergoing profound changes now and will continue to experience in the coming years. "White man" - because this dichotomy does not include and does not reflect the spiritual positions of that significant and diverse part of the world, which in the context of globalization will inevitably turn from an object of geopolitical aspirations of the great powers of the past into a subject of globalization processes.

The specificity of modernity lies in the transition from the former dominance of geopolitics to the new one, which is now designated by the concept of "globalization". Every transition means a combination of the old and the new - in this case, both the residual effects of geopolitics, and the signs and trends of globalization. Every transition, moreover, does not lead to the complete and unconditional final triumph of the "ideal model" under the influence of which and for the sake of implementing which it was started, but stops before reaching it by the last order of magnitude. Therefore, globalization is likely to be completed after some time, not by the unification of the entire world under a "world government" and not by its disintegration into some kind of international political chaos, but by a clearer design of international regions and their role in the world economy and politics. But-regions, not empires.

The choice of the model that will actually guide Russia's policy in general and in relation to Central Asia in particular will be determined not by science (there has been no such precedent in history so far), but by the real interests of the ruling elites (including the global components of such interests). But in a situation of choice, it must be made consciously, taking into account all relevant considerations, on the basis of up-to-date information and on its understanding. Everything else gives the right and opportunity to choose to others.

Intellectual sovereignty, the ability and readiness in foreign policy and all other spheres to act fully armed with world experience and knowledge, but independently reading them - this is what we would like to see in demand in Russian politics. Not only in relation to Central Asia (although there, too).

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