WHAT IS AN OLIGARCHY?

I want to make a reservation from the very beginning that the term "oligarchy" is not indisputable from a scientific point of view. It consists of a number of similar terms, such as "wild capitalism", "wild market" , etc. In their own way, researchers will be right if they claim that these and similar concepts represent certain phases and even aspects in the development of early, immature capitalism. But, as we know, there are quite a few terms in social science, as well as phenomena, such as the" Asian mode of production", around which there have been disputes for a long time and still no agreement has been found, but science itself does not lose, but rather wins.

Anyway, the original meaning of the term "oligarchy" comes from the Greek words "oligos", which means" few", and" arche " - "power". Hence, an oligarchy is the concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals. Who are these"few"? A large encyclopedic dictionary published in Soviet times emphasizes that these are the "richest individuals" 1 . In the BES, reissued in 1997, the words "the richest" are replaced by "a narrow group of people", and in parentheses are added: "the rich, the military, etc." 2 . The definition of an oligarchy given in the Oxford Dictionary is not very different from this latter: "a government consisting of several powerful people", respectively "a country or state governed in this way". But since the English word oligarchy has many meanings, it also means people who run a country or state in this way, i.e. oligarchs3 .

In other words, the concept of "oligarchy" has not become a well-defined category. Yes, it did not really occupy the minds of scientists in developed countries, since it applied exclusively to underdeveloped countries, primarily to Latin American countries, partly to Asian countries, and only in recent decades with a certain degree of conventionality can we talk about oligarchy (or rather even pseudo-oligarchy) in relation to individual African countries, for example, Zaire. Probably, in a number of cases, we can talk about oligarchies in developing countries in the same way as we started talking about such social phenomena as classes, parties, etc. in these countries, starting in the 60s, when we began to study the processes taking place in them more deeply, including on the basis of field research that is, phenomena that are not yet fully formed, but are at the stage of their origin and development, and which we defined as protoclasses, quasi-classes, and protoparties, quasi-parties. Accordingly, we can talk about proto-oligarchy, quasi-oligarchy.

But what do we really know about the oligarchy?

The idea of an oligarchy was formed mainly on the basis of the Latin American experience, although not without the influence of the experience of individual Asian countries. What social forces actually form an oligarchy or an oligarchic regime? These are large landowners of the traditional or early capitalist type: lati-

page 134

Fundists (in Latin America), landlords, feudal lords (in Asian countries), influential tribal leaders (in African countries). These are already quite bourgeois landowners and traditional rulers. These are government-linked financial speculators, other nouveau riches, and corrupt government officials.

This is, of course, the top of the army, police, security service, and other law enforcement agencies. In many developing countries, especially in Latin America and in a number of Asian countries, the officer corps had strong caste characteristics. It traditionally consisted primarily of people who came from large land owners, wealthy segments of the population in general. An officer's rank was, and in some of them still remains, a very prestigious and comfortable way of existence, taking into account the prospects of promotion through the ranks.

But the close connection between large landowners and the army elite, and more broadly, the officers, was established and contributed to the emergence of an oligarchy mainly where clans and influential families, often connected by kinship relations, traditionally played a large role in public life. The influence of family ties and the resulting clans was sometimes so great (for example, at one time in the Philippines) that entire regions could be dominated by people with the same surname. This influence was so ingrained, if you will, so familiar, natural for the local population, that not only the government, but also the regime could change in the center, and the clans retained their positions. They sometimes managed to preserve them even when, albeit in modified forms, the new regime was carrying out seemingly revolutionary reforms that changed the face of political power and property relations.

Thus, the oligarchy sometimes manages to preserve itself even after deep political and social cataclysms. She shows the ability to mimicry, and even to "rejuvenate". But we'll talk about this in more detail below.

Returning to the army, it should be said that as the most organized force in society, it not only enjoyed (and still enjoys) authority and political influence in many third world countries, but also often assumed (and still does) directly political functions, carrying out a military coup, including under the flag of the struggle against terrorism. oligarchic, corrupt and other stagnant regimes and for the modernization of society based on universal principles. It was thanks to the direct participation of the army in the leadership of many countries (South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, etc.) that they, these countries, "managed to ensure the political stability necessary for modernization, mobilize the bulk of the population to implement government programs, and achieve a certain harmony and unity in society based on national development priorities." 4

Indeed, in most former colonies and semi-colonies, the socio-political foundations of society - classes, parties, trade unions, and other socio-political entities-are not fully formed, and there are strong centrifugal tendencies of an ethnic, religious, and other nature, on the one hand, and resistance from corporate-clan, feudal - communal, and oligarchic groups On the other hand, the institutions of representative democracy inherited by these countries from the colonial powers were obviously doomed to complete collapse, and only the army could preserve the integrity of the country and create conditions for its modernization, and ultimately for the maturation of socio-economic and other prerequisites for the development of democracy. (And South Korea is an example of this. Although the example of this country suggests that

page 135

the military itself is the least inclined to think about democracy, and the democratic forces have to fight hard for it.) In some cases, it was the army leadership that became the basis for the formation of an oligarchic regime after a military coup, as, for example, in Indonesia. This is not to mention the fact that when the army came to power, "authoritarianism of development"did not always prevail. It has happened, and not infrequently, that military regimes have established "authoritarianism of stagnation", pursuing a disastrous political course for the country or imposing a dead-end path of development on it. Examples of Libya, Burma, and some other countries speak about this.

RUSSIAN OLIGARCHY: MYTH OR REALITY?

It is not necessary to confuse the emergence of an oligarchy as such with the emergence of clan-corporate ties, which only under certain conditions can lead to the formation of an oligarchy. Such connections made themselves felt already in the first years of Russian reforms, when the redistribution of property began. If you believe the deputy of the State Duma Alexander Korzhakov, who for many years was not just the head of the personal security of the first president of the Russian Federation, not only held a high post in his administration, but also one of the closest confidants of the Yeltsin family, then the first sprouts of oligarchic ties grew truly from small things in terms of the scope of executive power, as a gift of the future oligarch, and then an unknown small businessman from the resourceful heads of Boris Berezovsky's presidential daughter Tatyana Dyachenko, first Niva cars, and then Chevrolet. Berezovsky realized that "Tanya adores gifts" and "decided to act through Tanya Dyachenko." 5 Then Berezovsky took on the mission of publishing Yeltsin's book Notes of the President in the West. According to Korzhakov, Yeltsin began to receive monthly " interest from an account in an English bank - sixteen thousand dollars each." 6. Berezovsky gradually became a close friend of the Yeltsin family.

And since no one from the Yeltsin family refuted Korzhakov's claims, they can be trusted. In particular, how the Yeltsin family gradually got closer to the country's rich people, including oligarchs, such as, until recently, the unknown Roman Abramovich, and now the richest man in Russia, whom some of our "Kremlin experts", including the same Korzhakov, dubbed the "family wallet". And this series could be continued, at least by mentioning Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of NTV, who played a crucial role in the formation of the oligarchy as a phenomenon.

But the" entry of the nouveau riche into the president's family " is the most important, but by no means the only source of the emergence of oligarchic ties. Perhaps an even more important source of not so much political as economic power of those who will be called oligarchs was the policy of the "young reformers", quite consciously aimed at creating a class of rich and super-rich mainly from among people close to themselves in the shortest possible time by redistributing both the national product and the huge national economy in their favor. property ownership. First of all, privatization was aimed at solving this problem, following the model of the then First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais, when public property, sometimes estimated at billions, if not hundreds of billions of dollars (such as oil fields in areas particularly rich in these hydrocarbons), was almost gratuitously transferred to private hands. Secondly, the issuance of quotas and licenses for the export / import of scarce goods, the sale of which, due to the large price difference in the domestic and world markets, often brought fabulous profits to people close to the authorities. Third, introduction to the practice of transferring money from the state budget (intended for export).-

page 136

salaries, pensions, allowances, etc.) to individuals and organizations not through the state treasury system, but through so-called authorized commercial banks. During a period of extremely high inflation, these banks, with a friendly attitude towards them, the authorities practiced such a simple trick: before sending public funds to their intended destination, they put them into circulation and after two or three months received a one-hundred-percent profit.

Accidentally opened thanks to the efforts of journalists (and perhaps not only them!) from the camp of Chubais ' opponents, the so-called "writers' case " showed at least some degree of mutually beneficial ties between those who headed the State Property Committee, the organization that held the levers of privatization in its hands, and those who fabulously enriched themselves at the expense of "criminal privatization". The essence of this "case" is that for each article in 10-15 pages of the yet unwritten collection on privatization in Russia, the leaders (mostly former) State property committees received about $ 100,000 each, a truly fantastic sum even by the standards of the richest countries.

Russian and foreign analysts regarded such generous fees as a kind of "gratitude" to those who, on extremely favorable terms for themselves, acquired large state property thanks to the assistance of their people in power. But they, the analysts, cautioned against jumping to the conclusion that the entire amount of "gratitude" becomes public. On the contrary, this is only a small part of it, which is intended, so to speak, for small everyday expenses. Accounts in foreign banks are the main result of corruption ties and embezzlement.

Observant people also noticed that almost all government officials who were somehow connected with the implementation of economic policy in the governments of Yegor Gaidar and Viktor Chernomyrdin, as well as those who justified and defended this course in the media and otherwise, ended up either very wealthy or"well-established" people. Some former ministers have become prominent bankers. Many people began to head various kinds of funds, centers, institutes, etc. created with unknown money. They are often invited to Western countries, especially in the United States, to give lectures on the progress of reforms in Russia (in fact, failed, disastrous for the country), one-time fees for which often exceed the income of major Russian scientists for several years. Even the declared incomes of some former "superintendents of market reforms" from Soviet heads of labs and medical research institutes, current leaders of semi-mythical organizations, could be envied by the heads of Western research centers.

After all, the oligarchy needs a certain political, social and moral atmosphere, which is spontaneously formed or consciously formed in society. In our case, it was created quite consciously through the media that were in the possession of the Nouveau riches or under their influence. This was facilitated by many of the "young reformers". And yet, I repeat, those were still just the beginnings of an oligarchy. An oligarchy is a more or less integral system that grows out of the fusion of business and government, subordination of the corporate and clan interests of the media, state institutions, and first of all law enforcement agencies (the army, security service, police, prosecutor's office), and the formation of illegitimate authorities. Nothing like this has ever happened in the first years of Yeltsin's presidency, and it never could have happened. In fact, there was still no organized, powerful, or influential business community.

For the first time, the oligarchy, then probably still a quasi-oligarchy, declared itself in the year of the presidential elections in 1996. At that time, as you know, a critical situation was developing for the new ruling class, for the entire post-Soviet regime. Prezi Rating-

page 137

Yeltsin's dent was so low compared to Gennady Zyuganov's high rating that even many of his active supporters were looking for ways to save themselves after the Communist leader's seemingly inevitable victory in the presidential election. For example, one of the current leaders of the Union of Right Forces, Boris Nemtsov, who was then governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region, openly stated that he was not afraid of Zyuganov's coming to power, and he would continue market reforms even under a communist president.

It was the real threat of losing what was left in the course of "criminal privatization" that forced the top of the "new bourgeoisie" ("new Russians"), and above all bankers and leaders of financial and industrial groups, to jointly seek a way out of the dangerous situation. But the first serious step in this direction was taken not on Russian soil, but in Davos, Switzerland, in February 1996, during a meeting of world business and political leaders. And a key role in this was played by Boris Berezovsky, who managed to persuade leading Russian bankers to stop their infighting and unite in the face of a common threat. Let me remind you that at that time there was a sharp struggle between the leading groups of the "new bourgeoisie" for the division of public property and influence on the highest authorities, a struggle in which almost all the leading mass media were involved .7 Anatoly Chubais, the "architect of Russian privatization" who enjoys special trust in the West and especially in the United States, for his part, at the same meeting managed to convince the leaders of Western countries to bet on Boris Yeltsin for the upcoming presidential election, whom they already looked at as a fatally doomed politician.

At the same time, the famous "Statement of the Thirteen" (named after the number of people who signed it) appeared, in which the new masters of life, in fact for the first time, publicly declared themselves, offering to look for a compromise solution to the problem of power. What the authors of this statement were driving at was not completely clear at first, but soon it became known about the idea of postponing the presidential and parliamentary elections for two years. It also became known that some prominent bankers and Kremlin officials have already held talks on this issue with leaders of various political forces, including the Communists.

However, as it has now become absolutely certain, Boris Yeltsin did not intend to transfer power to the winner of the presidential election, at that time he had already decided to dissolve the State Duma and not hold elections at all for several years. And only the resistance of the leaders of the security forces, who were afraid of not coping with the situation in the event of a mass protest against such a step by the president, on the one hand, and the firm assurance of the top of the "new bourgeoisie" that if they rely on their resources and the support of the West, Yeltsin will be able to win the presidential election - on the other, by solving the problem of extending the term of his presidency. This was stated a few years later in an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta by former Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov .8

Having felt their strength, the leaders of the "new bourgeoisie", essentially the new ruling class, wanted to have a guarantee that the funds they spent on Yeltsin's victory would be more than returned. They considered such a guarantee not only the promises of the first president of the Russian Federation to meet their demands regarding the further redistribution of public property in their favor, including in the media sector, but also the expulsion from power of opponents of radical liberal reforms, supporters of strong state power in Russia led by First Deputy Prime Minister O. Soskovets9 . As it later became known from a documentary made for Western viewers, this demand was actually made to Yeltsin.

page 138

in an ultimatum form. Either he fulfills this condition, and then they will provide him with full support during the election campaign, or, if he refuses, the media outlets dependent on them will launch a revealing campaign against him in order to destroy him politically. Knowing his weaknesses, which became public knowledge, and how, for example, NTV is able to beat them, Yeltsin (according to some reports, under strong pressure from his inner circle, including family members) accepted the ultimatum. From this moment, in fact, the formation of the oligarchy in Russia begins.

However, the completion of this process will occur after Yeltsin's victory in the presidential election, and before that, it was too early to talk about the oligarchy as an obvious reality even then. With a certain degree of exaggeration, it can be argued that representatives of the top of the "new bourgeoisie", and to be more precise, mainly the financial speculative bourgeoisie or, as they were called in the media, "semibankirschiny" (according to the number of bankers who financed Yeltsin's re-election, and by analogy with the well-known "semiboyarschina" from Russian history), de facto seized power in the country.

First, they achieved almost everything they demanded of President Yeltsin. A new major redistribution of public property began in their favor. NTV received the entire fourth TV channel at its disposal, and Berezovsky, by the decision of the president, became the de facto host on ORT. Secondly, representatives of large financial capital directly entered the government. In particular, they received the position of First Deputy Prime Minister in the federal government, which was banker and major entrepreneur Vladimir Potanin. As the bankers themselves put it, they delegated their own person to this position. Their own man, Anatoly Chubais, became the head of the presidential administration, and the administration itself was greatly updated at the expense of people close to our "main privatizer".

However, perhaps the main thing that dramatically accelerated the formation of the oligarchy in the country, its transformation into a powerful illegitimate institution of power, which sometimes played a greater role in making fundamental state decisions than the legitimate government, was that Boris Yeltsin, due to a serious illness, was permanently disabled and in fact spent the entire second presidential term he could no longer be a full-fledged acting president, who, according to the Constitution, is endowed with the broadest powers. Therefore, someone had to take over its functions. In countries with developed democracies, such cases are well spelled out in the constitutions, and the political culture, ethics of behavior of political and state figures, and the very atmosphere in society require a civilized way out of such situations. Either the first person in the state resigns and early elections are held, or he transfers a large or smaller part of his functions to the official who has the constitutional right to do so, i.e. either the vice-president or the Prime Minister.

We are, as you know, a country of "young democracy", not burdened with democratic traditions, and Boris Yeltsin acted in the spirit of those traditions that turned out to be more akin to his mentality. He created a kind of regency, where a key role was played by his daughter Tatyana Dyachenko, a special confidant of the Yeltsin family ("family writer") Valentin Yumashev and many of those who have come to be called oligarchs, especially Boris Berezovsky. This is how the notorious "family" emerged as the top of the oligarchic pyramid. A very influential member of the "family", especially in the first time after the presidential election of ' 96, was Chubais, Berezovsky's rival for influence over the highest authorities. The oligarchy in general is characterized by the presence of contradictory tendencies and interests in its clan, which often result in acute clashes.-

page 139

in general, up to open hostility. So, Korzhakov claims that Berezovsky constantly came up with different ways to eliminate Gusinsky 10 .

WHAT IS COMMON AND SPECIAL IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF OLIGARCHY

Since, as already mentioned, oligarchy as a social phenomenon has in each individual case both typological and specific and even unique features (respectively, both general and special prerequisites for its emergence), it makes sense to consider it from this point of view. Let's start with what is common.

First, it is a transitional state of society. As a rule, this is a transition from a pre-industrial or, if you prefer, pre-capitalist to an industrial (capitalist) society. In Marxist terms, the starting point for such a transition can be feudal, feudal-capitalist, or feudal-communal relations (Philippines and Indonesia, respectively).

Secondly, it is a state of crisis in a transitional society. It can be the result of prolonged political instability, prolonged economic stagnation, acute conflicts on social, ethnic, religious or other grounds, or both at the same time.

Finally, these are what are called national - specific conditions in the language of Marxism, i.e. features of the cultural and civilizational character, historical past, traditions, geopolitical position of the country, etc. This, in fact, is also not special, but common to countries where oligarchic regimes have emerged. However, sometimes it is difficult to separate one from the other. However, let's look at some examples of this.

Let's start with the Philippines, where, as far as I know, no serious researchers dispute the existence of an oligarchy. The country is located on more than 7 thousand islands, inhabited by representatives of various ethnic groups and religious communities, passed through Spanish and American colonization, Japanese occupation and civil war. The Philippines, like most Latin American countries, is, so to speak, a country of Spanish culture. Spain began colonizing the Philippine archipelago in the second half of the 16th century, so it is not surprising that traditional Philippine society resembles Latin American society in many ways. Probably, the reasons for the emergence of the oligarchy are also common. Apart, of course, from the fact that the landlords ' (Latifundist) possessions scattered over many Philippine islands were largely dependent on themselves by the will of circumstances, and tended to be autonomous and self-sufficient.

This, first of all, explains the fact of the emergence of close ties and kinship relations between landlords, the emergence of clans and, on this basis, the emergence of an oligarchy. It also explains the fact that large landowners had "private armies", which was not the case in other countries where oligarchies have ever existed. A number of other factors also contributed to the emergence and preservation of private armies, not least the partisan movements of left-wing extremists, the insurgent movements of Muslims, etc. It is important to note that not all private armies could be called "funny", sometimes they reached several thousand people each. In total, they numbered hundreds of thousands of people, several times more than the number of the country's armed forces. Thus, after President Ferdinand Marko declared a state of emergency in the country on September 21, 1972, and announced the concentration of all power in his hands, which in fact meant the removal of the old oligarchy from power, more than half of the total number of private armies was withdrawn.

page 140

500 thousand firearms 11 . The Philippine Army at that time numbered 58,000 men .12

It is not my task to consider the reasons why President Marko, after 7 years of presidency, decided to resort to openly authoritarian forms of government, thereby erasing the democratic political system copied from the American one. However, I can't help but say the following. First, the democratic procedures copied from a developed society did not seem to interfere with the existence of the oligarchy, although it hindered the economic development of the country, preserved long-obsolete social relations, contributed to the aggravation of social conflicts, the growth of separatist movements, etc. Secondly, if this is the case, it is hard to imagine how the oligarchy, armed to the teeth, could have been defeated in any other way.

However, what is clearly part of my task is to emphasize that oligarchy, again using the Marxist conceptual framework, is a phenomenon of a superstructural rather than a basic order. And as long as the old basis remains, the revival of the oligarchy is quite possible. Although I am not inclined to absolutize this thesis, one way or another Marcos not only failed to put an end to the oligarchy, but a new oligarchy emerged in place of the old one. In principle, the introduction of a state of emergency based on the army and with its active participation in the modernization of the country on the basis of a pre-developed program of the "new society" at that time did not represent anything out of the ordinary. First, it was precisely when relying on dictatorships - military (South Korea, etc.), party (Taiwan, etc.), and party-bureaucratic (Singapore) - that the neighboring countries of the Philippines showed fantastically high growth rates, which literally led them out of the zone of underdevelopment into a number of medium-developed industrial countries. Second, Marcos ' program for building a "new society" was developed by Western-trained Filipino technocrats inspired by the "new industrial society" theory of the American economist John Galbraith, which was just as fashionable then as Milton Friedman's theory of neoliberalism is now.

Third, Marko, by and large, went in the right direction, striking at political forces that expressed the interests of stagnant traditionalism, at economic and social archaism, clearing the way for the development of capitalist relations and the entry of the Philippines into the world economy. His ideas of "better reforms from above "than" revolution from below", "third way of development" based on a "mixed economy", etc. corresponded with widespread sentiments in the world. And yet, I repeat, a new oligarchy emerged under him, and he discredited himself so much over the years of many years of rule that eventually a conspiracy arose against him in the army. Marcos was turned away by many in his inner circle, including some who were related to him, and the case ended with tens of thousands of Filipinos openly speaking out against him in February 1986 in Manila, the capital. As a result, Markoe resigned, and the speech was called a "people's revolution" .13 It must be said that the United States was interested in Marcos's departure from the presidency, which, having its military bases in the Philippines, no longer wanted to associate itself with the country's leader, who had become odious in the eyes of his fellow citizens and had a bad international reputation.

Again, it is not my task to analyze the reasons for the inglorious political demise of one of the prominent ideologists of the "revolution from above" Ferdinand Marcos, but it is worth talking about the reasons for the emergence of a new oligarchy. Moreover, the opposition leader Corazon Aquino, who replaced him as president, was perceived as a very dangerous person.

page 141

in the country and abroad, as a fighter for democracy, she did not eliminate, but only renewed the oligarchy at the expense of her supporters, who mostly represented the old oligarchy. But in a nutshell, what did the Filipinos accuse Marcos of? That patronage, favoritism, nepotism, and corruption flourished under his rule; that Marcos and his wife Imelda embezzled public funds, committed arbitrariness, and so on. 14 According to Philippine and world press reports, the Marcos family stole from the state between $ 4 and $ 12 billion.

What, however, is the survivability of the Philippine oligarchy? First, in the power of tradition. At one time, many of us painted such beautiful features of traditional society and, in particular, the community, such as solidarity, mutual assistance, mutual assistance, respect for elders by juniors, etc., without losing sight of the reverse side of these fascinating human qualities. Namely, the desire to please your relatives, friends, fellow countrymen, fellow tribesmen, the attraction to patronage, etc. Secondly, if the government is illegitimate and is perceived as such by public opinion, cannot rely on the force of law, then it is willy-nilly forced to rely on its own people. I do not presume to say that Iraq is ruled by an oligarchy, but at one time the local government was dominated by immigrants from the village of Tikriti, where the country's ruler Saddam Hussein hails from.

Third, social development has certain cycles. Most likely, neither F. Marko nor C. Aquino, being themselves a product of the oligarchic regime, objectively had the opportunity to rely on those political forces and those politicians who were formed outside of oligarchic relations. They were still weak at that time. But the next president, career General Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), enjoying public confidence and being himself free from clan-oligarchic ties, relying on the democratic constitution adopted in 1987, managed to achieve a turning point not only in the fight against the oligarchy, but also in the search for ways to achieve civil harmony and boost the country's economy. 15 .

And finally, the last thing. The Portuguese and American colonization of the country also had a beneficial effect on Philippine society. It is much more tolerant than the societies of neighboring countries, and this is probably a special merit of the Catholic Church. In any case, the Philippines is not aware of the brutal repression practiced or practiced in many other Asian countries against the opposition. And Marcos ' authoritarian rule was actually relatively mild. Perhaps that is why, after the president left office, his opponents did not seek to uproot the socio-political base created by him. Despite all the grave accusations of the Marcos family. Imelda soon returned from exile, and not only was she not repressed, but she was once again involved in public life.

To say, however, that there was peace and quiet in the Philippines after the fall of the Marcos regime would be misleading. There have been several military coup attempts. In some cases, the Aquino government even had to seek help from the United States16 . But if, say, in Iraq, where there were even more such attempts, the conspirators were definitely waiting for the death penalty, and in most neighboring countries their fate would have been unenviable, then in the Philippines, under the rule of Ramos, many conspirators, as well as members of rebel organizations of communists and Islamists, in accordance with the president's program on national reconciliation they were rehabilitated and reinstated in the service. Moreover, they were paid monetary compensation, and the leader of the mutiny, during which 111 people were killed, Colonel G. Onasan, was elected to the Senate .17

The formation of an oligarchy in Indonesia has its own characteristics. This country is also located on many islands, it also often had to deal with separatist movements, rebellions, and the army played no less, if not more, a role in it.

page 142

It played a larger role in the country's life than in the Philippines, and was gradually politicized. But this Muslim country does not have the socio-economic and other background that naturally nurtured the oligarchy in the Philippines. Therefore, frankly speaking, the Indonesian oligarchy, rather even quasi-oligarchy, is not of great interest to the researcher. How should I put it more precisely, its origin is rather banal. There, the decisive role was played not so much by tradition as by force, so there the oligarchy can just as quickly disappear into oblivion as it appeared.

Let me remind you that after the military led by General Suharto came to power (officially on March 11, 1968, but in reality almost immediately after the failed coup d'etat launched in September 1965 by the left forces and resulted in the death of half a million to a million mostly innocent people) 18 the regime of the "new order" was established, essentially a military dictatorship, which over time transformed into a regime of "directed democracy" of a strictly authoritarian nature.

The oligarchic attitude arose on the basis of the real power of the military in the center and in the field. Generals and officers appointed to high administrative posts became the de facto masters of the situation. They were able to redistribute part of the social product in their favor as a result of embezzlement and corruption, but especially at the expense of the Chinese community. Not only has it been and remains the richest country in Indonesia (with about 4% of the population, according to some Russian researchers, it plays a dominant role in the country's economy), but it also suffered pogroms during mass repressions directed against Communists and their supporters. Ethnic Chinese businessmen, fearing the next pogroms, under pressure and even on their own initiative invited high military officials who held key administrative posts to serve on boards of directors, as consultants, etc., created joint ventures with their participation, gave them undisguised bribes, etc. And so it went on for more than 30 years. And since Indonesia is rich in minerals, including oil, thanks to the income from which an economic boom began in the country over time with the active participation of foreign capital and technology, there was something to rob.

But President Suharto's huge family-sons, daughters, sons-in-law, and other close and distant relatives-was particularly successful in the robbery. According to some media reports, the Suharto clan was in the hands of about a third of the country's economy, and their personal wealth was estimated at $ 40 billion (At the same time, our researchers and, in particular, L. F. Pakhomova, consider these data exaggerated, but agree that the Suharto family stole many billions of dollars).19 And no wonder, Suharto, who actually established the regime of personal power, was "elected" president of the country six times in a row and ruled indisputably. He even intended to run for president for the seventh time in March 1998, but was prevented by the financial crisis in Asia, which hit Indonesia hardest, as the least developed country, but with large external debts, and the most corrupt of the countries that have shown high economic growth for many years in a row. which made this country one of the ten most developed countries in the world in terms of GDP production20 by 1996 . The 10-fold increase in per capita income during the years of Suharto's rule immediately declined sharply, which had the most negative social consequences.

And then the events unfolded according to a scenario similar to the Philippine one, although not according to the event series, but according to the ending. Representatives of city councils began to join the student-initiated protests against the dictatorial regime.

page 143

looting ensued, numerous cases of vandalism, including arson of houses and shops, pogroms of ethnic Chinese (which is believed to have been the work of the Lumpen people who came out on the street), retaliatory measures of the law enforcement forces, as a result of all this - the death of many hundreds of people, but eventually the departure of Suharto from the post of president. The flight of capital from the country also began, including, if not primarily, the capital of ethnic Chinese. However, the ending wasn't exactly the same. The military wanted to keep power in its hands at all costs, and it, the power, initially passed from the president to one of the ministers of the Suharto government, Yusuf Habibi. However, the political boat continued to rock, and in October 1999, the Indonesian People's Consultative Congress (the country's legislature) elected a civilian with no ties to the military or the Suharto clan, the leader of the Nahdatul Ulama Islamic movement, Abdurrahman Wahid, who is considered a moderate Muslim politician.

If in the Philippines the successful mass demonstrations against Marcos were called the "people's revolution", in Indonesia they were called the "May Revolution", since they took place in May 1998. If the family clan created by Suharto loses its former sources of illicit enrichment, including numerous benefits and privileges, and even reimburses the state for what was misappropriated, loses its former sources of enrichment, and the top of the military is out of politics, then the oligarchy, or rather, I repeat, quasi-oligarchy, will be over in Indonesia. Perhaps there will remain separate oligarchic entities at the regional level.

GENERAL AND SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE RUSSIAN OLIGARCHY

In conclusion, let us ask the question: what does the Russian oligarchy have in common with the oligarchies of other countries, on the one hand, and what fundamentally distinguishes it from them, on the other?

First, the presence of a shadow, illegitimate government. In our country, this is the notorious "family", the key figure of which was the president's daughter Tatyana Dyachenko, in the Philippines, under President Marcos, this is his wife Imelda (who was a very prominent figure on the political scene, in public life, etc.), and in Indonesia - a whole family clan. However, even in this clan, a woman stood out, the daughter of President Tutut, who was trained for the role of the second person in the state, but the "May events" prevented her. The shadow government is accompanied and at the same time strengthened by corporate-clan relations. In Russia, too, they made themselves felt. Figuratively speaking, the fattest pieces of the public pie (public property) went to people close to the "young reformers". And for some reason, hardly all those who distributed public property, like Anatoly Chubais, were from St. Petersburg.

Secondly, all oligarchies are related to embezzlement and corruption. Corruption in the Philippines and Indonesia has already been discussed. And in recent years, almost the entire world press has been talking about corruption in the highest echelons of the Russian government. Accounts and credit cards of specific individuals from Yeltsin's inner circle began to appear in the world media. It got to the point that US President Clinton, who had long been considered a "friend" of "Boris's friend" (Yeltsin) and therefore found himself in an awkward position (on the principle: tell me who your friend is and I'll tell you who you are), in a telephone conversation with President Yeltsin, strongly advised him to " give explanations on a case-by-case basis," as required by the code of conduct for the highest official in any democratic country. Our first president contented himself with saying: "reports about this are not confirmed." It is clear that the Americans considered such an answer not just unconvincing, but unacceptable for an official of this rank. According to their concepts, the President,

page 144

a person whose inner circle, including family members, is accused of economic crimes must either publicly and evidently refute these accusations or immediately resign.

Third, all the cases I have mentioned are characterized to a greater or lesser extent by the arbitrariness of the authorities. To begin with, the top officials seem to adjust the constitution in advance. Suharto, rejecting the idea of former President Sukarno NASAK (relying on the main political forces of the country in order to achieve national accord), began to rely exclusively on the army under the cover of the principles of "pancha sila" laid down in the 1945 constitution (faith in one God, humanism, unity of the country, etc.). Markoe secured the adoption of a new constitution that served his interests in 1973, shortly after he declared a state of emergency in the country. Yeltsin - a year later, a few months after the dispersal of the legislative body represented by the Supreme Soviet, i.e. after the forceful resolution of the conflict between the legislative and executive authorities. As you know, Yeltsin corrected the draft text of the Constitution adopted in December 1993 in such a way that he became practically accountable to no one and beyond the jurisdiction of the tsar. However, they called him "Tsar Boris", which he clearly liked. Many of Yeltsin's actions in a democratic country would have cost him the presidency, such as the removal of Prosecutor General Yuri Skuratov, who dared to launch an investigation into suspected economic crimes by members of the president's inner circle.

Fourth, in almost all cases, the leader who allowed the emergence of an oligarchy ultimately fails as a politician and leaves the stage in disgrace. And with Yeltsin, it probably would have happened after the financial disaster of August 1998, if the government had not been headed by the well-trusted Yevgeny Primakov. The spontaneous and initially fragmented protest movement, due to months-long delays in the payment of salaries, pensions, and benefits, then took on an increasingly organized character and an increasingly pronounced anti-Yeltsin orientation, despite the fact that the date of the all-Russian protest movement was approaching.

Fifth, the oligarchy, however, does not automatically disappear after leaving the post of the head under whom it appeared. It continues to have huge economic opportunities at the expense of looted funds, political influence, many leading media outlets remain in its hands, its people continue to occupy many key positions in state authorities, public organizations, etc. Rarely anyone is held accountable for the huge damage that is caused to the state under the rule of an oligarchy. Much about the power and influence of the Russian oligarchy remains unclear.

The difficulty of completely eradicating the emerging oligarchy also lies in the fact that the economic mechanism created by it cannot simply be destroyed without causing damage to the country's economic development. It is easy to imagine what would happen if, say, our country began to review the transfer of large-scale state property into the hands of private individuals through the prism of their real value and what the new owners paid for it. Almost all the financial and industrial groups created in recent years would collapse. A new large-scale flight of capital from the country would begin. Western countries would probably take the side of the new owners and begin to adopt economic sanctions against Russia. Etc.

This rule applies to almost all countries with oligarchic regimes. For example, the Suharto family's business is closely linked to the capital of ethnic Chinese. The flight of this capital from the country has already caused considerable damage to it. If it is theoretically allowed to go away completely, it would mean paralysis of the economy.-

page 145

mics of the country. (This has already happened in some developing countries.) It is not a simple matter to declare war on ill-gotten capital, but it is much more difficult to prevent a sharp decline in economic activity, an increase in unemployment and a zone of mass poverty.

AND WHAT IS SPECIAL AND UNIQUE ABOUT THE RUSSIAN OLIGARCHY?

First. This is because it arose not in the course of spontaneous, progressive, but inversion development, i.e., in the process of the country's return from socialism to capitalism, as if to its original positions before the October Revolution of 1917. For the second time, Russia had to go through a phase of savage, uncivilized, brutal capitalism.

Second. The oligarchy appeared in a country of high level of development with a completely literate population, with tens of millions of people with higher and incomplete higher education, with a million-strong army of scientists and an almost complete absence of traditional, archaic ways of life and institutions.

The third. The oligarchs made their fortune not in the course of rapid economic development, as happened in Indonesia and many other countries, where, if desired, you can also find oligarchic formations, not to mention corruption, but in the course of a twofold decline in production and solely due to the redistribution in their favor of the national wealth accumulated in Soviet times. generations of people, often at the cost of losing their health and life itself. Despite the fact that two parallel processes were running at the same time: the sharp impoverishment of a huge part of the population, which is not typical for peacetime conditions, even to the point of social degradation, on the one hand, and, perhaps, the outflow of capital from the country on such a scale, which, according to various estimates, is measured from 300 to 500 billion dollars, on the other. Hence the unprecedented blow that the oligarchy has dealt to the Russian economy and society as a whole.

Fourth. In almost all cases, including those not considered in this article, as, for example, in Zaire, the oligarchy became a kind of continuation of the power of a strong president, who for a fairly long period of time, as a rule, played an objectively positive role in the country's history: he brought it out of deep stagnation, prevented disintegration, created conditions for the rapid growth of its economy, contributed to this growth, etc. Both Marcos and Suharto, in particular, have unquestionable services to their respective countries. Some critics of the Suharto regime have speculated that if his family had not plundered the country and he had not been involved in expensive, prestigious projects, production growth rates would have been at least 2% higher. None of this happened under President Sukarno, but the country was rotting on the vine and the economy was a pitiful sight. For example, academician Alexander Guber, who visited Indonesia in those years, told the author of this essay: "How they manage to survive is beyond comprehension. There is no economy as such."

In Russia, President Yeltsin was more an extension of the oligarchy than the other way around. Even when he was healthy, he was a weak leader (outside of what was associated with the destruction of the foundations of real socialism and the ability to hold power in his hands), who knew little about state affairs, and therefore no more than a witness to the formation of the oligarchy, and after losing his health - and its tool, hostage to the "family". According to Korzhakov, the president's chief bodyguard and twice "blood friend", who knew Yeltsin well for many years and continued to be aware of what was happening in his entourage until very recently, " our current plight is caused in many ways precisely by the fact that an old sick man is being forcibly held in power, not by the government." having even the physical ability to correctly assess the situation and make an independent decision-

page 146

new solutions. After all, it got to the point that Tatiana put notes in his pockets - what to do, what to say.. , "21 He, Korzhakov, testifies that it was the president's wife Naina Iosifovna and, especially, his daughter Tatiana who insisted that Yeltsin, who had already suffered four heart attacks, run for a second term at all costs. The latter, of course, could not stand the strain of the election campaign and suffered his fifth heart attack on the very eve of the second round .22

Fifth. The blame for the emergence of the oligarchy in Russia lies not only with the authorities, but also with the intelligentsia, which, like in no other country, since the time of Radishchev, plays an exceptionally large role in political life, in shaping public opinion and mass consciousness. But if the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia was distinguished by unselfishness and service to the people, then a considerable part of the current creative intelligentsia, let me clarify, the liberal Westernist intelligentsia, traditionally the most socially active, behaved quite differently. Someone himself sought to get rich quickly at the expense of the people and succeeded in this. Someone actively helped create the class of the "new bourgeoisie". And someone, and most of them, unable to resist the temptation of the "sweet life", went to the service of the nouveau riche, became an exponent and defender of the interests of the oligarchy. I take the liberty of saying that without the active participation of the intelligentsia, there would be no oligarchy in Russia, and there would be no reforms that brought the country to the brink of national catastrophe. After all, our "democrats" and" reformers " almost all come from the intelligentsia.

Sixth. Perhaps in no other country has the oligarchy sprouted so much crime as in Russia. It is sometimes very difficult to separate business in the conventional sense of the word from the shadow and even criminal ones. And Sergey Dorenko, a TV journalist closely associated with Berezovsky, is not far from the truth, who, speaking on ORT, commented on the institution of a criminal case against the head of the Media-MOST holding company, Vladimir Gusinsky, who was accused of fraud on a particularly large scale: "We need to rehabilitate businessmen, as the Yeltsin family was rehabilitated, giving it immunity, otherwise we will have to many prominent businessmen, well, literally all of them, will have to start criminal cases." The "criminal privatization" of huge public property, measured in trillions of dollars, for ridiculously small amounts of money could not have generated anything else. Its derivative was also the explosion of organized crime.

The government itself has sprouted criminality. According to Yuri Skuratov, when he was prosecutor General, many hundreds of officials, including the highest ones, who have accounts in foreign banks, are suspected of corruption and embezzlement. Long before the August 1998 financial crash, which, by the way, according to many Russian and Western economists, could have been either prevented or at least mitigated, if not for the self-serving interests of a large part of our "reformers", there was also the so-called "black Tuesday" (a sharp drop in the ruble exchange rate by the end of the year). against the US dollar) in October 1994. In a memo to President Yeltsin about its reasons, the heads of the relevant services gave a long list of well-known "reformers" who were personally interested in it .23

WHAT IS THE GENERAL CONCLUSION?

Of the three countries under review, Russia suffered the most from the oligarchy. Such damage that the oligarchy caused to the country-the economy, military potential, its positions and prestige in the international arena, the health of the nation, science, culture, public morals, etc., has never been seen anywhere and never before. In the Philippines, the oligarchy is effectively over. With the removal of the military from power, its position in Indonesia also sharply weakened. But the situation in the country, which is far from being stabilized, and the strengthening of centrifugal tendencies on its outskirts do not yet give an answer.

page 147

an answer to the question of the role of the army in the post-Cartesian era, and therefore the complete eradication of the oligarchy.

In Russia, however, the turning point in the fight against the oligarchy has not yet occurred at the time of writing. President Vladimir Putin has taken the right course to separate business from government, to reduce its political influence in society, and to strengthen the role of the state in governing the country and regulating the social process, which, of course, meets with sharp opposition from the oligarchy, which until recently felt like the master of the situation. However, the oligarchy still has a strong position in the media, its reliance on long-nurtured intellectuals who influence the formation of public opinion, on the parties and politicians that it has advertised in the press and financed in recent years, especially during election campaigns, as well as the support of some influential oligarchs from foreign forces under the pretext of defending freedom the press is hindering the process of" deoligarchization " of the country.

But, be that as it may, the struggle for the revival of Russia, which is precisely the goal of President Putin's activity, and the preservation of the oligarchy are incompatible things. Either one or the other. Let's hope that Putin, with broad public support, will soon be able to turn our oligarchy into a piece of history.

notes

1 Soviet Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1982, p. 936.

2 Bolshoy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar ' [Big Encyclopedia], Moscow, 1997, p. 840.

3 The Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English. L., 1958, p. 867.

B. A. Fedorov. 4 Army and Modernization in the countries of the East, Moscow, 1999, pp. 8-9. Alexander Korzhakov. Boris Yeltsin: from dawn to Sunset, Moscow, 1997, p. 284. Ibid., p. 136.

7 The feud arose on the basis of the redistribution of property and was between, relatively speaking, the clans of B. Berezovsky and V. Potanin - A. Chubais, B. Berezovsky and V. Gusinsky.

Anatoly Kulikov. 8 I don't participate in adventures. - Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23.07.1999.

9 Yeltsin's style of government was characterized by the fact that he had virtually no team of like-minded people. He chose people for his team in such a way that someone would definitely oppose someone. In the first years of his rule, both in the government and in his administration, there were representatives of two trends: liberal-democratic, pro - Western, on the one hand, and statist, patriotic, on the other. However, after his serious illness, which made itself felt in full force already during the presidential elections of 1996, the radical liberals clearly became the dominant force in power.

Alexander Korzhakov. 10 Boris Yeltsin: from Dawn to Dusk, p. 283.

O. G. Baryshnikova. 11 Economy of the Philippines in the present and future, Moscow, 1986, p. 7.

B. A. Fedorov. 12 Edict. soch., p. 123.

13 For more information, see: B. A. Fedorov. Edict, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

14 See for more information: Yu. O. Levtonova. Evolution of the political system of the modern Philippines, Moscow, 1985, p. 85.

15 For more information, see: O. G. Baryshnikova, Yu. O. Levtonova, G. S. Shabalina. East Asia on the threshold of the XXI century. - Vostok, N 2, 1999, pp. 125-135.

16 Some researchers believe that the United States actively sought to remove Marcos from office and that without their participation, Aquino would not have been able to control the situation in the country.

17 For more information, see: B. A. Fedorov. Decree, op. cit., pp. 131-136.

18 For more information, see: Indonesia. Spravochnik [Handbook], Moscow, 1983.

19 See for more information: L. F. Pakhomova. The Business World of ASEAN - Economic History. Entrepreneurship and Entrepreneurs, Moscow, 1999, pp. 166-171.

B. A. Fedorov. 20 Edict. soch., p. 101.

Alexander Korzhakov. 21 It is difficult to be an independent prosecutor in Russia. But you can. - Parliamentary Newspaper, 2.03.2000.

Alexander Korzhakov. 22 Boris Yeltsin: from Dawn to Dusk, pp. 398, 317.

23 Ibid., pp. 405-408.

Permanent link to this publication: