Oceania-the land of an infinite number of islands in the South Pacific - has long been considered a kind of "paradise" on earth, a place where peace and tranquility reigns. It was under the watchful eye of Western countries, primarily the United States of America, Great Britain, France, and Australia. After World War II, the strategic importance of the islands led to the dominance of American interests in the region, which made it possible to talk about the transformation of this part of the globe into an "American inland lake". With the end of the cold war, Oceania's strategic importance declined dramatically, and the region became" unnecessary "to its former patrons. The independent Oceanic States began to experience great economic and political difficulties, which led to internal instability and the aggravation of numerous ethnic conflicts.

SIZE MATTERS

According to the generally accepted system of international stratification, most of the States of Oceania belong to the class of "micro-states" ("dwarf states"), which have extremely weak economic potential and are not even able to protect their sovereignty on their own. If earlier internal stability in the region was provided by Western countries, then with the end of the cold war, the states of Oceania faced new problems. In the early 1990s, experts and political scientists tried to identify the prospects for small countries and microstates in a changed world. Among the many concepts and views on this problem, two opposing positions were distinguished.

The first was based on the well-known concept of F. Fukuyama wrote about the "end of history", according to which a certain harmony has come in the world, based on the victory of liberal and democratic values of the Atlantic Center. According to this logic, the world's leading powers have reached a consensus on the main problems of international relations, therefore, "the new world order will become rational and peaceful... and more favorable for small countries than the old order" (Herr, 1992, p. 249). Then the security of small countries will be ensured by stronger states, similar to the way the Entente countries guaranteed the security of small Belgium during the First World War. The events in the Persian Gulf, when the leading countries of the world and the UN unanimously stood up for small Kuwait, added optimism to the supporters of this direction.

The second was pessimistic. Its supporters believed that the end of the Cold war did not bode well for small countries. Back in the 1970s, Swedish Prime Minister Wilhelm Palme suggested that defusing tensions between the two countries should be a major step forward.-

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It can put an end to the independence of small nations [Herr, 1992, p. 249]. This risk has increased since the disappearance of the old world order, its ideological and political basis. It was ideological and political considerations in the context of competition between the two systems that ensured the processes of decolonization and served as guarantors of the albeit limited sovereignty of small States. After the Cold War, these states faced the prospect of either joining a larger union like the European Union, or finding themselves in the position of "banana republics" and falling into complete economic, and therefore political, dependence on strong countries, or becoming useless to anyone at all and finding themselves on the margins of world politics.

This primarily affected the States of Oceania. Their peripheral position made them "unnecessary" for the leading powers in the new historical conditions. As noted by R. Herr, there are signs that in the new world order, this region will be assigned the role of a "secondary, remote and isolated" area of the globe [Asia-Pacific..., 1998, p. 209]. Indeed, since the early 1990s, former metropolitan countries have suddenly stopped calling on Oceanic States to join them as partners in "advancing progress" and allies in "defending freedom" (Finin and Westley-Smith, 2000, p. 18).

The end of the Cold War also changed the economic relations between the former mother countries and the States of Oceania. Whereas earlier donor aid to the region was spent on maintaining the public sector and social services, new donors such as Japan and Taiwan, which replaced the United States and the United Kingdom, demanded investments in more rational economic development based on good governance and privatization. On the recommendation of the IBRD and the IMF, the Governments of Oceania States, instead of protecting local producers, began to carefully reduce protective tariffs, creating attractive conditions for foreign investment. They stopped supporting the development of national projects, started selling public assets and wholesale privatization of state-owned enterprises. However, instead of the expected economic growth, Oceania states received massive unemployment, increased immigration, social tensions and increased crime. Countries have experienced a sharp differentiation in income, which has increased social inequality and exacerbated the struggle for the distribution of national wealth. As noted by Professor S. Firth of the University of the South Pacific, "the trouble was that the new rules of the unifying world are set by people who have a very limited interest in small countries "[Pacific Islands Forum..., 2000, p. 178]. The standards created by them ignore the specifics of microstates and the special conditions of their development. In other words, in the words of the Australian scientist S. Lawson, in modern politics "the size of the state matters" [Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 10].

TOWARDS "AFRICANIZATION"

Since the late 1980s, a seemingly stable region has been rocked by numerous internal conflicts. The political situation in Fiji has sharply worsened, caused by relations between the two main ethnic groups - descendants of Indian immigrants and indigenous Fijians. In the country, two military coups were carried out in one year in 1987, which resulted in the rise to power of Colonel S. Rabuka, who represented the interests of the indigenous population. Similar events occurred in the Solomon Islands. After a fierce struggle between groups on the two main islands of Malaita and Guadalcanal, armed rebels seized control of the capital, Honiara, and placed Prime Minister Barto under arrest.-

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Lomea Ulafaalu. The situation on the border of Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Indonesia has worsened. Tens of thousands of Papuan refugees were fleeing the Indonesian army's crackdown on separatism in West Irian province. In turn, the PNG Government in 1989 was forced to send army units to the other side of the country to suppress the separatist rebellion on the island of Bougainville. A tense political situation involving armed confrontations and political assassinations has also emerged in Vanuatu and the Samoan Islands.

All these events changed the image of Oceania as an "oasis of democracy": it appeared as an "arc of instability" [Relly, 2000, p. 262]. Senior officials in Australia, New Zealand, and the United States "hastily began to view Oceania's security as a necessary condition for protecting against internal instability in Pacific island States" [Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 42]. G. Fry, a leading expert on regional security issues, suggested shifting the emphasis in the interpretation of the concept of "defense" from military significance to threats emanating from economic and political instability, human rights violations, and environmental degradation [Fry, 1999, p. 3]. Scientific and political circles are increasingly talking about the" Balkanization "of Oceania, the "island ethnic epidemic". A political scientist from the Australian National University B. Relly argued that the independent states of the South Pacific region are on the path of "Africanization", the main features of which are "growing tensions between civil regimes and the military, the relationship of ethnic identification processes with the struggle for natural resources, the weakness of democratic and political institutions, as well as the increased exploitation of natural resources by external forces" [Relly, 2000, p. 262].

Ethnic conflicts have become the main challenge to regional security and stability. The South Pacific region is the most ethnolinguistically complex in the world. There are about 1,200 languages and dialects in Melanesia alone. It is the differences between linguistic groups, between clans and tribes that become sources of ethnic conflicts. During the colonial period, the process of forcible inclusion of certain ethnic groups in State formations took place solely for political reasons. For example, 1 million Melanesians living in Dutch New Guinea were incorporated into Indonesia as the province of Irian Jaya. Such State entities as PNG, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu included hundreds of individual communities that "had nothing in common before independence and do not want to have anything in common after it" [Finin and Westley-Smith, 2000, p. 7]. It is not surprising that these States have faced the greatest number of challenges in terms of their own development. the number of problems in building a viable ethnic state. Leaders of the Bougainville separatist movement, for example, have long bemoaned their "miserable colonial history" that tied their political and economic fortunes to PNG. They see PNG as a modern colonizer who exploits its natural resources for his own benefit. This "primary identification" is typical for the population of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. Many residents identify exclusively with their island, their village, and their language group. American researchers D. Finin and T. Westley-Smith noted that "the problem of Oceanic states is not that they can separate, but that they have never really united" [Finin and Westley-Smith, 2000, p. 18].

ARMY NAMED AFTER A FOOTBALL CLUB

The main factor of tension in the independent states of the South Pacific region is the combination of ethnic self-determination with the struggle for self-determination.-

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troll over natural resources. Land ownership and land use have always played a major role in the economic and social development of the peoples of Oceania. In addition to providing food, land had a special social and spiritual value in this area of the globe. Any attempts to change this area led to sensitive problems for the islanders.

Landowners in Bougainville have resisted the opening of a copper mine on the island since the late 1960s. Although tempted by the high deductions from copper mining revenues, they succumbed to pressure from the PNG Government, it soon became apparent that no amount of interest could compensate for the countless social and environmental woes caused by the project. The free money only accelerated the social disintegration of the local community and contributed to a crisis that escalated into more than a decade of civil war.

The land issue was also at the heart of the events in Fiji. 83% of the land here belonged to indigenous Fijians, leading a traditional economy. Part of this land was leased to people from India who grew sugar cane for the sugar industry, which was the backbone of the Fijian economy. Attempts by the country's Government to extend leases sparked protests from the indigenous population and led to subsequent military coups.

The ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands has also focused on the issue of land. Over the previous decades, as a result of the ill-conceived imposition of the principle of private land ownership, communal areas around the capital of Honiara on the island of Guadalcanal began to be resold privately to migrants, mainly from Malaita Island, who sought to settle in a more prosperous metropolitan area. Representatives of a new generation of indigenous people, left without land and work, began to challenge the legality of these transactions. They not only demanded compensation for the loss of their land, but also "generally objected to the presence in their area of a large number of 'outsiders' who settled on their palm plantations, which undermined traditional local palm oil production "[Pacific Islands Report, 09.06.2000]. To protect their own interests, the residents of Guadalcanal united in the organization " Isatabu-Movement for Freedom "and created the armed people's militia"Revolutionary Army of Guadalcanal". In turn, the migrants created the organization "Power of the Eagle of Malaita", taking the name of the popular football club on their native island. In September 1998, the confrontation between the two sides escalated into armed clashes, accompanied by mass killings, burning of houses, violence and looting. According to Amnesty International, by the beginning of 1999, dozens of people had died and gone missing on the island, and the total number of refugees, mostly Malay, reached 32 thousand people [Radio Australia, 30.09.1999].

COSTS OF DEMOCRACY

The worsening situation in Oceania after the Cold War revealed the crisis of the democratic system in the island States. For a long time, as noted above, this region was considered an "oasis of democracy". With the exception of Tonga, the newly independent countries have developed republican forms of government with seemingly stable elements of Western-style democracy. American researchers have noted that the transition to democracy in the new formations went smoothly and "most island states adopted political systems based on the integration of local traditions and the British style of government" [The Pacific Islands: Politics..., 1993, p. 84; The South Pacific: Emerging..., 1999, p. 10-14; The South Pacific. Problems..., 1991, p. 10]. In the 1990s, the Oceanic "oasis of democracy" was increasingly criticized, even by Western countries that once considered it a model for democracy.-

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B. Reilly wrote that the distinctive feature of this "formal" democracy was the ability to " throw a large number of fraudsters through the electoral process." Unlike the authoritarian regimes of Africa and Asia, in the South Pacific, elections represented "an abundant trade turnover between weak political parties and ruling figures and governments", in which "the losers did not lose their basic privileges", which led to "a steady commitment to democracy among the elite of island states" [Relly, 2000, p. 262]. Professor V. Naidu of the University of the Pacific in Suva, Chairman of the Fijian non-governmental organization Constitutional Citizens ' Forum, said that the leaders of most states were unable to be responsible for human rights, equality of citizens, and fair distribution of resources. Instead, they "tended to fill their own pockets, abuse their social position, and mobilize their supporters to protect their own interests based on their hereditary status and ethnicity" [Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 27].

V. Naidu called Oceania the most corrupt region in the world, where there is not a single "clean" government. All attempts to prevent corruption were met with strong opposition from the authorities. Many regional and foreign experts, politicians and public figures have come to the unequivocal conclusion that corrupt government in Oceania states is the main threat to their security. "Riots, uprisings, separatist and civil wars, and the illegal overthrow of democratically elected governments," noted the participants of the South Pacific Security Conference held in Honolulu in 1999, "are the result of the dominance of corrupt leaders in island states" [Asia - Pacific Center..., 1999].

MY POLICE ARE PROTECTING ME

The lack of development of political systems resulted in a conflict between the civilian population and the military. Armed men in uniform, designed to protect the interests of the citizens of their country, have now become a source of constant threats to the civilian population itself. The phenomenon that is typical for African countries and earlier for Latin American countries, when the military turns into an independent political force, began to manifest itself in Oceania in the 1990s. V. Naidu noted that " security forces in island states are an oxymoron, since they themselves have become the main source of destabilization and insecurity in Fiji and Papua- New Guinea, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands "[Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 30].

In addition to Fiji, the military has gained a strong political influence in PNG. In March 1997, army units surrounded the Parliament and forced the country's Prime Minister, D. Chan, to resign in opposition to the Government's decision to use foreign military aid to resolve the conflict in Bougainville. In 1996, in Vanuatu, unrest broke out among soldiers of the paramilitary mobile forces due to the non-payment of promised money. The rebels seized the country's president and prime minister, forcing them to make concessions. Solomon Islands police have been accused of killing civilians during the Guadalcanal conflict and the subsequent military coup. According to Amnesty International, the local population feared armed policemen "more than armed rebels" [Solomon Islands...].

QUASI-STATES, OR THE "FAILED STATE SYNDROME"

The economic and political weakness of Oceanic States, the inability of local Governments and the South Pacific Forum (UTF) to cope with even a small number of challenges.-

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Internal conflicts have called into question the capacity of States in the region. At a conference in Honolulu, Japanese scientist T. Yoshiaki called the situation in Oceania "a syndrome of failed states" [Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 99]. At the same time, he referred to the concept of the famous Canadian political scientist Robert Jackson about "quasi-states". According to Jackson's theory, quasi-states look like states, they still have the same (formally, at least) rights: representation in the UN, a flag, like a real state. Even if their rulers are unable to control their own territory and use their power to provide social benefits for their populations, even if the government in such countries is absolutely worthless, they still receive international recognition, because this is what the countries that determine world politics want. In other words, quasi-states have all the formal characteristics of an independent state, but they do not have the internal capacity for self-government and therefore can never be considered full-fledged states [Jackson, 1999]. Many of the States of Oceania can easily fit into the concept of quasi-States. For example, the budgets of some Oceania countries are formed exclusively by foreign aid. However, most Western experts on the region do not share Jackson's point of view and continue to hope that the "promotion of democracy" will sooner or later bear fruit.

CHINESE "TRIAD"...

Since the early 1990s, the domestic situation, both in individual countries and in the region as a whole, has been influenced by China's actions. The Chinese began to develop the region since the middle of the XIX century. If earlier they tried to assimilate and adapt to the traditions of local society, then with the end of the cold war, the situation changed. The new wave of Chinese immigration that followed was more closely linked to their historical homeland and formed separate Chinese communities. The new Chinese were a serious competition for local residents in the field of business and trade. Many of them came from the territory of Oceania illegally and were closely associated with Chinese criminal circles. A third of all heroin intercepted by Oceania police was of "Chinese origin". Its delivery was organized by Chinese living in South-East Asian countries, and the local distributor was the Chinese diaspora in Fiji [BBC News, 29.10.2000]. In addition, Chinese entrepreneurs have been implicated in many corruption scandals almost all over Melanesia, in particular related to the issuance of licenses for the exploitation of natural resources and the illegal issuance of passports to Chinese immigrants.

So, numerous Chinese citizens traveled on fake passports to Nauru and Tonga, from where they could freely leave for Western countries [Migration News..., 6(10), 1999]. In the early 1990s, the Marshall Islands Government decided to issue 200 passports annually to ethnic Chinese in the hope of attracting investment to the country. In 1996, the decision was reversed, as it became clear that there was no investment and would not be. Over the past six years, more than 2,000 Chinese have received Marshall Islands passports, most of whom have left for Australia and the United States [Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 175]. Philippine authorities have noted an increased number of ethnic Chinese arriving in the country on passports illegally issued to them by officials in Nauru. In 2001, the Fijian authorities announced the existence of a whole underground network in the country, engaged in illegal immigration through Oceania. Similar criminal organizations also existed in Kiribati and Tuvalu. Even the American island of Guam was used for the transit of illegal immigrants. In 1998 and 1999 on Guam.

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The US Coast Guard identified 1,869 illegal migrants, mostly Chinese [Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 176].

The Chinese government has officially accepted responsibility for all ethnic Chinese living abroad. Given China's active interest in the Pacific region, any conflict between Chinese communities and local residents can trigger a response from the Chinese authorities. In this regard, R. Crocomb noted that " the Chinese government promotes Chinese immigration to the region, including illegal immigration, in order to ensure a long-term Chinese presence here to protect its interests "[Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 223].

...AND THE RUSSIAN MAFIA

In addition to the problem of illegal immigration and drug trafficking, Oceania attracted international organized crime as a profitable place for money laundering. Like most small States that do not have great economic opportunities, the countries of Oceania were forced to create favorable conditions for financial and banking operations in order to attract capital. Banking regulations in most Oceania countries contained minimum requirements for allowing registration of financial institutions and ensured high secrecy of deposits to customers. The creation of offshore zones was encouraged. At the same time, many countries in the region "did not want to cooperate with legitimate international organizations to combat money laundering" [Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 177]. Only in the small city of Niue, with a population of just over two thousand people, 5,500 international companies and banks were registered in 2000, including those belonging to the "Russian mafia". At the same time, "neither national financial institutions, nor local or foreign authorities can obtain any information about them" [Pacific Islands Reports, 10.03.2001, p. 14]. Another tiny country, Nauru, is considered the most convenient place in the world for money laundering. More than 400 offshore banks are registered here. In 1999, the region's mass media constantly published reports of money laundering by the "Russian mafia" in Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Samoa and Cook Islands [Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 181].

PACIFIC WAY-THE KEY TO SUCCESS?

By the beginning of the new century, it was clear to everyone in Oceania that the region's States would not be able to deal with their own internal problems, including ethnic conflicts. There was still hope for the effectiveness of regional and international cooperation, which was based on the so-called Pacific way, the essence of which was to create a kind of regional harmony, when Oceanic peoples make decisions only on the basis of full consensus.

The idea of the "Pacific way" was implemented through a network of organizations dealing with internal stability and security issues. The main one is still the UTF. The permanent secretariat of the Forum has staff dedicated exclusively to security issues. In addition to the Forum, security issues are discussed at the Regional Security Conference, which unites and coordinates the activities of internal affairs agencies, customs, migration services, etc. The Pacific Conference of Police Chiefs is held annually. The Oceania Customs Organization and the Organization of Directors of Immigration Services are constantly operating.

However, if earlier cooperation in the field of security satisfied the UTF participants, by the beginning of the XXI century. The Forum's ability to meet new challenges has been seriously tested. Members of the UTF understood the need to create new supranational structures in the region, but not all agreed with the transfer of a part of the free economic space to them.-

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its sovereignty. They expressed their attitude to regional issues through Forum Declarations, which set out the participants ' positions and recommended actions on specific issues. In 1992, the Forum adopted the Honiara Declaration. It recognized the need for deep integration on security issues and the fight against international economic crime. The Forum identified such threats as money laundering, terrorist recruitment, passport forgery, human trafficking, environmental crimes, drug trafficking, etc. To combat these phenomena, it was declared necessary to develop a legislative framework in the fight against crime, extradite criminals, jointly combat economic crimes and create a structure at the Forum that coordinates these actions. In 1997, the States of the region adopted the Aitutaki Declaration. It was aimed at strengthening coordination to address political and security issues and provided for the further development of" mechanisms for preventive diplomacy " through the Regional Security Committee. It was decided to hold meetings of the committee more than once a year, as well as in emergency cases. The Forum leaders agreed to develop an agreement on the presence of regional armed forces on their territories [Aitutaki Declaration..., 1997].

However, the adoption of national laws in accordance with the declarations of Honiara and Aitutaki was subject to certain difficulties. Many States, under the pretext of "bureaucratic difficulties", delayed the adoption of local laws aimed at strengthening regional security cooperation. N. Boister, a New Zealand legal expert, believed that regional leaders viewed these issues as "secondary", which "undermined the regional legal response to security threats" and reduced the "effectiveness of such a response" (Boister, 2001). Analyzing legal problems in the field of regional security, the organization "Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration", created in 2005 within the framework of the UTF, 1 noted that the delay in changing local legislation was caused by political reasons: the leaders of Oceania countries found it difficult to accept the need to prioritize regional interests over national ones [Enabling Environment...].

NEW CENTURY - NEW CHALLENGES

While the JUTF countries were adjusting their legislation to meet the needs of regional security, the situation in the region worsened. In May 2000, two military coups took place almost simultaneously: in Fiji and the Solomon Islands. Fiji's President Kamisese Mara declared a state of emergency after armed rebels seized the parliament building and took Prime Minister Mahendra Choudhry and some members of his cabinet hostage. The coup was led by Fijian nationalist businessman George Sprite. Its main demand was the transfer of power from representatives of the Indian community to a Government in which indigenous ethnic groups would be represented. It is noteworthy that Father D. Spraita was a close friend of Sitiveni Rabuka, who led the previous coup in 1987, after which Rabuki assumed the post of prime minister and retained it until May 1999. The coup was accompanied by murders, pogroms, hostage-taking and violence against Indo-Fijians. The Fijian security forces were not only unable to stop the atrocities, but "by their actions or inaction, they helped achieve the goals of the coup" [Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 237].

On June 5, 2000, two weeks after the Fiji coup, similar events occurred in the Solomon Islands. Who controlled the country's capital, Haniaru

1 Pacific Plan.

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Rebels from the Malaita Eagle Force organization, supported by local police, arrested the country's Prime Minister, B. Ulafaala, and demanded that Parliament elect a new prime minister. According to Malay leader E. Nori, his actions were caused by "the inability of the country's leadership to resolve the conflict" and "the loss of police control over security in the capital" [Solomon Islands...]. As in Fiji, the coup was accompanied by indiscriminate shooting, murder and violence, which continued even during negotiations with the government and international mediators.

It has become quite clear that regional efforts to resolve conflicts and the adoption of the Honiara and Aitutaki Declarations have not yielded positive results. Moreover, the UTF began to lose the trust of national leaders who were faced with the problems of armed uprisings. It is no coincidence that in June 1999, B. Ulafaalu, as a mediator for resolving the crisis in Guadalcanal, invited not representatives of the Forum, but the" undemocratic leader " S. Rabuka himself, who had carried out two military coups in Fiji. It is noteworthy that he arrived in the Solomon Islands as a special envoy of the Commonwealth of Nations, despite the fact that he was sent to the Solomon Islands as a special envoy of the Commonwealth of Nations. Rabuka declared Fiji a republic during his rule, and from 1987 to 1997 the country was not part of the Commonwealth. Through the mediation of S. Rabuka, two agreements were signed between the opposing groups, thanks to which the conflict was temporarily suspended, although the main problems were not resolved. France also offered its mediation services in resolving the conflict, which, under the pretext of "protecting human rights and democracy", sought to compete with the "Anglophone" Commonwealth in terms of control over the region, "which was part of its great global project" [Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 73]. France has previously established close ties, including military ones, with the Rabuka Government in Fiji.

The situation in Oceania has greatly alarmed the rest of the JUTF participants, especially Australia and New Zealand, which have been led since 1998 by forces that have been pushing for a more assertive policy in the region. At a regular meeting of the Forum in August 2000, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark and her Australian counterpart David Howard called for more effective measures to be taken against Governments in the region that violated democratic norms. As a result of the discussions, the Biketava Declaration was adopted. The Declaration proclaimed the principles of "good governance", "human rights", "democratic process" and "rule of law" while "respecting the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other JUTF member States" [The Pacific Islands..., 2000]. On the recommendation of New Zealand, it was also decided to establish regional police units to maintain peace and stability in the Solomon Islands. A representative delegation of the Forum was sent to the country, which contributed to the signing of the agreement in October 2000. The Toinsville Agreement, under which the conflicting parties agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force on Guadalcanal.

The leaders of Australia and New Zealand enthusiastically adopted the Biketawa Declaration. Australian Foreign Minister A. Downer called it "an important step forward for all Oceanic nations" [The Pacific Islands ..., 2000]. His New Zealand counterpart, F. Goff, saw the adoption of the Declaration as a recognition by the region's leaders of "a new era in which tensions in ethnic and other spheres will be given great attention" [A Move to succeed...]. However, many experts were skeptical about the possibilities of new security structures. D. Rolf expressed doubts about the ability of regional police forces to quickly and effectively effectively respond to emerging crises due to lengthy bureaucratic procedures for coordinating the management of these forces. "In addition, these structures do not guarantee that they will be served by-

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protect the interests of all, not the national elite "[Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 240]. S. Firth, a political scientist at the University of the South Pacific, believed that the region's security should not be based on strengthening the armed forces, but on creating "more transparent, more effective and therefore more legal and secure forms of government. Regional security should be linked to economic development, not militarism "[Security in Oceania..., 2003, p. 49]. Scepticism about the Biketawa Declaration was also expressed by JUTF Secretary General Noel Levy, who said that "the Forum has lost its way" by interfering in the internal affairs of Fiji and the Solomon Islands. He spoke out against tough actions taken to "return to democratic norms" [Pacific Islands Report, 15.09.2000].

WILL THE "AMERICAN SHERIFF'S ASSISTANT" HELP?

The difficulties in forming collective security structures were not only due to the fear of Oceanian leaders losing some of their countries ' sovereignty. The proposed model of collective structures provided for the creation of interregional forces to maintain peace and stability, which would be sent to crisis areas. Of all the countries in Oceania, only Fiji and Papua New Guinea had their own armed forces. But these countries were too busy with their own internal problems. So, the backbone of the future regional formations would be the military personnel of Australia and New Zealand. Given that the financing of future operations would fall on the shoulders of these two countries, ANZAC (as Australia and New Zealand are often called) would have the opportunity to fully dominate Oceania militarily and politically. As the American political scientist G. Fry put it, there was a possibility that Oceania would turn from an "American inland sea" into an "Australian inland sea" (Fry, 1999, p. 2).

According to the doctrine of the Prime Minister of Australia, J. R. R. Tolkien: According to Howard, the "green continent" should take on the duties of the "deputy of the American sheriff" to restore order in the South Pacific region. In 2002, under the influence of the events of September 11 in the United States, the JUTF adopted the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security and the Fight against Terrorism. In addition to preventing terrorism, law enforcement agencies in the region had to step up their fight against organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and even sexual violence. This work was to be supervised by the Attorney General's Office of Australia, and the direct executors were to be the police forces of Australia and New Zealand.

In 2003, a Regional Commission for Assistance to the Solomon Islands was established under the auspices of the JUTF. It was decided to send a peacekeeping force to Guadalcanal, the main backbone of which was made up of Australian military personnel. Peacekeepers arrested about 4 thousand people, including members of the Cabinet of Ministers, high-ranking police officials, and leaders of opposing groups. Under the protection of Australian police officers, about 2 thousand refugees returned to their former places of residence [Amnesty International...]. Satisfied with the result, the Australians reduced their military presence on Guadalcanal, but not for long. In December 2005, after the murder of an Australian police officer on the island, the peacekeepers returned. Tensions remain high on Guadalcanal.

If Australia's actions in the Solomon Islands can be called more or less successful, then the Australian intervention in resolving the crisis in Bougainville was not so successful. Most of the island is still in separatist hands. Negotiations between the PNG Government and the rebels, mediated by Australia, failed to produce results. Currently, the PNG army, armed and trained by Australians, controls only three points on the coast. The island, with the support of Australian forces, was placed under a severe blockade, from which it suffered

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200-thousand population. Even the delivery of humanitarian aid to the island was banned [Bougainville...]. However, these measures did not end the resistance. In the end, the PNG government, under pressure from Australia and the United States, was forced in 2001 to sign an agreement with the rebels to hold a referendum on independence, which should decide the fate of the island and take place in 10-15 years. In 2004, Bougainville was granted broad autonomy within PNG until a referendum was held on the island.

The ethnic conflict in Fiji is also far from being fully normalized. Although the country returned to democratic rule in 2001, and the rebel leader, D. Sprite, was arrested and convicted, representatives of the island's Indian community did not join the new Government. In 2003, negotiations to form a coalition Government failed. Leaders of the opposition Fiji Labour Party have refused to join the joint cabinet, dissatisfied with the division of ministerial portfolios. In July 2006, the country held regular elections. However, they did not change the political balance of power.

Ethnic conflicts in Oceania and the causes that caused them are not a problem exclusively for the South Pacific region. In the modern world, such phenomena are widespread. More and more" dwarf states " appear on the political map. A significant part of them are typical quasi-States that are unable to ensure their own territorial integrity and create acceptable living conditions for their citizens. The question arises: why do we need such states? What is their role in the modern world? Why is the right to self-determination recognized for some peoples (Eritrea, East Timor, Bougainville, Kosovo) and ignored for others (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Karabakh)? All these questions leave a wide field for discussion. In Australia, for example, there are already voices for re-taking some quasi-States in Oceania under "colonial patronage".

list of literature

A Move to succeed where Colonial Powers failed. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade // www.mft.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/speeches/goffcomment.html - 11k

Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation. Forum Secretariat. Twenty Eighth South Pacific Forum. Rarotonga. 19 September 1997 // www.dfat.gov.au/geo/spacifi/regional_orgs/spf28_annex2.html - 6k

Amnesty International. Report 2005 // http://web.amnesty.Org/report2005/slb-summary-eng#top

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Pacific Islands Perspectives on Security, Report on the Conference on Island State Security, 22-24 June, 1999, Honolulu // http://www.apscc.org/Publications/Report_Island_State_Security.html

Asia-Pacific in the New World Order / Ed. by A. McCrew and C. Brook. L. - N. Y., 1998.

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