At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the new system of international relations is being seriously tested for stability and security. On the one hand, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the collapse of the post-World War II bipolar system, liberal-idealistic predictions about the possibility of forming a homogeneous system of international relations based on common liberal interests and universal values for all its participants were not justified, and contradictions between them would be minimized. On the other hand, a new international system of the imperial type is being formed in the world, in which the only superpower, surpassing all other states in total power, is trying to dictate its own rules of the game to them. In the emerging system of international relations, there is no longer a clear dividing line between "friends" and" foes", between allies and opponents, and the behavior of small states, regional medium-sized and great powers is becoming much less predictable. The world is entering a period of uncertainty and increased risks, exacerbated by the actions of international terrorism and the continued spread of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other types of weapons, including the latest ones. The widespread adoption of Western values (such as market economy, pluralistic democracy, human rights, individual freedoms, and quality of life) in the former socialist countries of Europe and Asia has not only failed to strengthen the stability of the global international system by increasing its degree of homogeneity, but, on the contrary, has given rise to new conflicts generated by the clash of cultures. the loss of ideals, the undermining of traditions, the erosion of self-identity and the bursts of militant nationalism.

In the context of growing global instability, issues related to the specifics of the formation of a new system of international relations at the regional level, and in particular, the problems of the new alignment of forces in the East Asian region, where the interests of such great powers as the United States, China, and Japan collide in the changed geopolitical landscape after the Cold War, are of and Russia, states with different power potentials and different foreign policy ambitions in the XXI century.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and until the end of the Cold War, East Asia maintained a balance of power between the three great Powers - the Soviet Union, China, and the United States1 . However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the end of its existence as the world's second superpower, not only contributed to-

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It has also helped strengthen the position of the United States of America in the region as the only remaining global superpower, but it has also led to the strengthening of China's position. In East Asia, a new balance of power is being formed within the framework of a different bipolar system with the Chinese and American poles of power. This process is taking place against the backdrop of rapid economic growth in the region and is accompanied by increased military spending and unsatisfied national ambitions.

First of all, this applies to China, whose economy is developing very dynamically. According to data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China's annual economic growth rate exceeded 10% between 1985 and 1988 alone, and even reached 13.4% in 1993.2 In 2002, China ranked 5th in the world in terms of GDP - $ 1.2 trillion. Accordingly, allocations for military construction also grew. In the period from 1987 to 1999, according to official data alone, the military budget of the People's Republic of China increased 7-fold - from 5.6 billion to 39.9 billion dollars. ³ However, as early as 2003, the Government requested an allocation of $ 80 billion for defense needs. With these funds, the state actively purchases modern military equipment and technology for rearming the PLA.

China is firmly positioned in the new balance of power in East Asia. Unlike Japan, its potential competitor and rival in the region, it has its own natural resources, sufficient to independently support sustainable economic growth and ensure strategic independence. In 2002, China reached the level of the world's 3rd trading power (its external trade turnover exceeded $ 500 billion), receiving huge revenues from foreign trade and directing them to strengthen its national, including military, potential, as evidenced by the impressive size of its military budget. Export-oriented enterprises predominate in many regions of the country, providing an inflow of funds for the purchase of advanced foreign technology for the needs of modernizing the national industry and creating a modern production structure. Imports in China are strictly regulated by the state, which has a positive effect on its development and leads to budget savings.

China takes care of its fuel and raw materials resources, does not export them, but considers them as strategic reserves. It has the world's largest reserves of thermal coal, but the development of which, however, is still unprofitable due to the inaccessibility of deposits. Their active development will probably begin when the transport infrastructure in the field areas is modernized, and production becomes profitable. Thanks to an economic policy based on state regulation, China fully meets the country's current energy needs by importing oil. With the development of coal deposits, its industry can be transferred from the use of oil to the consumption of energy coals. At the same time, the PRC continues to actively conduct oil field exploration and increases capital investments in oil production and refining ^.4

The strong point of China's strategic potential as the second pole of power in East Asia is that the national economy is focused on a large domestic market in the long term. If the country maintains its current pace of development in the short and medium term, the purchasing power of the population will increase, which means that the domestic market will also grow rapidly. The state budget of the country will increase allocations for the development of science-and capital-intensive industries. At the same time, the growing population will allow maintaining a high level of labor productivity with minimal outflow of production.-

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It is not necessary, for the sake of saving on production costs, to look for areas of its application in countries with low labor costs, i.e. it will not follow the path that Japan or the United States of America followed in the second half of the twentieth century. China will develop the economy of its deep western regions, involving in the production of their large and low-wage labor resources.

Thus, while remaining a self-sufficient center of power, provided with natural, labor, technological and financial resources, China objectively has all the necessary conditions to guarantee its political, economic and strategic independence. The interior of the PRC is an important rear area, the defense potential of which several generations of Chinese leaders in the second half of the XX century consistently increased and strengthened. Thus, at the personal direction of Mao Zedong, for example, during the peak of tension in US-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese relations from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, the main production facilities of the Chinese military-industrial complex were evacuated from the coastal eastern regions to the interior of the country. The creation of a "third industrial defense belt" in the deep rear was at that time the most important task of strengthening national security ^.5

The presence of a deep-echeloned rear gives China, in the event of any complication of the military situation in East Asia, decisive strategic advantages over, for example, Japan and other East Asian countries that do not have such a rear. This means that even if the main production facilities of the country, concentrated in the east, in coastal areas, will be disabled by enemy missile attacks from the sea, its vast territory will allow you to create duplicate strategic production facilities in deep areas, far from the sea coast, seriously hindering the possibility of their destruction from the sea or from the air.

Having a complex of favorable geopolitical and geostrategic factors in comparison with other great powers of East Asia makes modern China a recognized continental center of power in the region. The dynamics of the development of the Chinese economy and the national military-industrial complex suggest that its power potential will continue to grow, and in the next 10 to 15 years it will be able to conduct an equal dialogue with the United States not only at the regional level, but also at the global level, especially since at the beginning of the XXI century the PRC, It maintained its position as the only great Power in East Asia capable of preventing any external forces from disrupting the status quo in the region.

China's power potential in the new system of relations in East Asia is balanced only by the strategic power of the United States of America, which, although geographically not part of the region, nevertheless has a huge naval potential here. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the weakening of the Russian Navy, America made great efforts to strengthen its strategic position as a great maritime power in the western Pacific. Its naval superiority in the region is determined by a combination of two favorable geopolitical factors: first, the geographical remoteness of the US national borders from the continent of Eurasia, whose countries, if they want to threaten America's security, must use intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines or space weapons. However, no East Asian country at the beginning of the twenty-first century had the capabilities to bring its aircraft carriers and rapid reaction forces closer to American shores. In the immediate vicinity of its borders, there is also no od-

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a foreign naval base. And, secondly, the strong position of the United States in the region is determined by the relative military weakness of East Asian countries at sea, where they have, in fact, no serious rivals left after the collapse of the USSR.

More than one generation of American leaders in the past and in the present have sought to strengthen the most important component of the national power potential -the navy. Already in the twentieth century, the US Navy was ready to move its "battle fist" directly to the borders of a potential enemy in Asia or Europe, many thousands of kilometers from national borders, and also exercise sole control over maritime communications in the Indian and Pacific Oceans ^.6 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, no East Asian nation, including China and Russia, had a navy equal to that of the United States in offensive power. This was due to the fact that the United States maintained its main strategic support bases in East Asian countries after the Cold War, taking advantage of the economic weakness of these countries and their strong dependence on American financial assistance. Moreover, the Americans bear most of the costs of maintaining military bases in the countries of the region.

At the beginning of the XXI century. The United States had at its disposal the most technologically advanced naval strongholds in most of the countries of Southeast and East Asia. Being interested not so much in the bases themselves, but primarily in ports on the territory of foreign countries, the Americans concluded bilateral agreements on the use of port facilities for military purposes with Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. Washington agreed with the Philippine government to deploy its military contingents in the country, which some military analysts saw as an attempt by the United States to restore its military presence at the former naval base in Subic Bay ^.7 And since no other great power in East Asia, including China, Japan, or Russia (the latter even voluntarily withdrew from its base at Cam Ranh in Vietnam), has military bases on the territory of other states, the conclusion is that the United States is the only great power that strategically dominates the waters surrounding Eastern Europe. Asia. And even China probably won't be able to achieve parity with them in the next decade. ⁸ Moreover, the US Navy now controls maritime communications in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, connecting the region's countries with the main oil-producing regions of the world, with the Middle East, which also significantly strengthens the US strategic position in the entire East Asian region.

However, the use of only one naval force, even the most modern and powerful, still does not provide a superpower with a dominant position in the region, the ability to control the strategic situation alone. Aware of this, the post-Cold War United States not only succeeded in technologically modernizing its air forces to equip them with 5th-generation aircraft, but also sought to deploy its military airfields in strategically important areas of the world, including Central and Southeast Asian countries: at the beginning of the twenty-first century, parts of the American Air Force They were deployed even on the territory of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, as well as on the territory of Afghanistan, Iraq, and a number of ASEAN countries.

The power potential of the United States in East Asia is not only a modern Navy and Air Force, but also huge reserves of industrial and energy raw materials, reasonably preserved until special circumstances, which allows America to minimize its energy dependence on external sources in a short time. The United States ' mobilization capabilities today are such that they can quickly re-engage with the rest of the world.-

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base large industrial enterprises of strategic importance in the interior of the country in order to minimize the devastating consequences of missile attacks by a potential enemy from the sea.

An important component of the US power potential is its powerful military-industrial complex, for the development of which, even after the end of the cold war, truly gigantic funds were allocated from the country's $ 350 billion military budget. The foundations of the American military-industrial complex were laid during the Second World War, by the end of which the United States could produce 16 times more military vessels than Japan. The war on two fronts undermined the German military-industrial machine, while the United States, relying on its military-industrial complex, not only withstood the war against Germany and Japan, but also provided significant assistance to its allies. The modern military-industrial complex of America is the production of high-precision weapons using the latest technologies. It is a developed military-industrial complex that will ensure the dominant position of the United States in the future, both in the global and regional balance of power. China, although it did not destroy the national military-industrial complex even during the years of the cultural revolution, cannot yet compete with America in the air, at sea ,or, even more so, in space. ⁹

An important feature of the American center of power is the presence of an independent resource base of national industry, and a relatively low share of imported raw materials and energy carriers in US energy consumption. According to this indicator, for example, Japan cannot be considered as a center of power, since Japanese industry and urban economy are almost 100% dependent on imported energy carriers. In the mid-90s of the XX century. The United States imported no more than 25% of the country's oil consumption. At the same time, the main consumer of imported oil and petroleum products in the United States is motor transport, and not military production. Strategically important sectors of the American economy have traditionally focused primarily on the consumption of domestic energy sources, including coal deposits and hydro resources, which are very significant in the United States. In general, the energy dependence of the US economy on external sources is much lower compared to other industrialized countries, although in China it is even lower than in the United States. At the same time, in the context of the formation of a new system of international relations in the XXI century. If the United States does not want to pursue a policy of global dominance, it will seek to ensure maximum control over strategic resources in other parts of the world, which are many thousands of kilometers away from the American borders.

In the new balance of power in East Asia, Japan has a fairly strong position. True, in the 1990s, the country's economic growth rate seriously slowed down, falling to 1% per year, but the resources accumulated in previous periods allow it to retain its position as the leading economic power in East Asia and the second in the world, after the United States. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Japan spent more than $ 40 billion on military purposes, and in this indicator it was the leader among other East Asian countries, not counting China ^.10 It is constantly upgrading its self-defense forces, equipping them with the most advanced military technologies. Japanese political circles are increasingly discussing the revision of the peace Constitution of 1947 and the rejection of the three non-nuclear principles, which, if implemented, will make Japan one of the leading military powers not only at the regional level, but also at the global level ^.11

Finally, South Korea became an important participant in the new system of international relations in East Asia after the Cold War. It is a dynamically developing regional power. Between 1986 and 1988, South Korea's economic growth rate was more than 10% per year, but in the 1990s it declined slightly, although

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and they were maintained at the level of 7-8%. According to data for 2000, its GDP was already $ 837 billion. Thanks to this, South Korea could afford significant military expenditures. In 1999. they reached $ 12.1 billion. ¹² Seoul's ongoing military reform primarily involves reducing the number of military personnel in the South Korean army and equipping it with high-precision and effective weapons ^.13

Thus, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, a new balance of power emerged in East Asia, in which the leading roles of the two great powers - China and the United States, and the secondary roles of Japan, South Korea and Russia-were clearly defined. The problem, however, is how contradictory the national interests of these countries will be in the regional system of relations, what means the participants of the East Asian "concert" will use to implement them, and what foreign policy they will pursue to maintain stability and security in this strategically important region of the world.

* * *

Many academic discussions on the new balance of power in East Asia, organized after the cold War, both in our country and abroad, are devoted to issues related to maintaining stability and security in the region, as well as discussing possible causes of rising tensions and conflicts here. Analysts tend to focus on two groups of problems: one involving various policy options of the United States of America in East Asia, ranging from the course of forming a unipolar world here and ending with the withdrawal of all American troops from the region, and the other related to the analysis of national interests and geopolitical ambitions of the leading actors in the new system of international relations in East Asia.

Scientists who study possible variants of US foreign policy behavior in the region usually identify a number of factors that objectively contribute to their strengthening their positions in East Asia in the XXI century, including with the support of force.

First, there is the presence in the region of a State that Washington considers an "axis of evil" and whose behavior in the production of weapons of mass destruction is under close attention of international organizations, primarily the IAEA. We are talking about the DPRK, whose authorities are accused of developing weapons programs that allegedly pose a threat not only to America's national interests, but also to its allies in the region, primarily Japan and South Korea. These arguments alone would have been enough for the Washington administration to get a UN sanction for "humanitarian intervention" against the DPRK and justify in the eyes of world public opinion the need to overthrow the Kim Jong Il regime. It is obvious, however, that US military actions against North Korea would provoke serious destabilization both on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia as a whole, since not only Japan, South Korea or China, but also Russia could be drawn into the conflict. At the same time, if the "humanitarian intervention" in North Korea were successful, the United States would seriously strengthen its position on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia, coming very close to the borders of China and Russia in the Far East.

Secondly, the low level of dependence of the American economy on the markets of East Asian countries is a factor that makes it easier for America to "humanitarian intervention" in the DPRK. This means that the possible risks associated with the costs to the US economy itself as a result of destabilization in the region are minimal. Moreover, American corporations could even benefit economically from the SVR.-

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the Government of Kim Jong Il and start exploring new markets where Japanese and Chinese capital have traditionally been active. An example of the rapid penetration of American companies into a new market after the "humanitarian intervention" can be considered the oil market of Iraq, which they began to develop immediately after the end of the war against this country in the spring of 2003.

Third, the American leadership obviously takes into account the lack of powerful and influential international institutions in East Asia that could actually oppose US actions to use force against a sovereign state if the situation worsens. Americans still have fresh memories of the mass protests of the European public and a number of organizations that strongly condemned the "humanitarian intervention" against Iraq. This US action was not supported even by such NATO members as Germany, France and Belgium.

The only force in East Asia that could really prevent the United States from carrying out a "humanitarian intervention" against the DPRK is China. It, like America, claims to be a regional superpower, and therefore is not interested in strengthening its strategic position in the region. In the process of creating a new balance of power in East Asia, China's position on Taiwan, for example, has already come into conflict with the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the United States. In the long run, the aggravation of this contradiction may itself cause a major regional conflict, which S. Huntington wrote about in the mid-1990s ^.14

Washington, however, is currently not interested in going into direct conflict with Beijing in order to strengthen American positions in East Asia. Moreover, the ruling circles of the United States understand that such a conflict may not so much arise as a result of the clash of American and Chinese "civilizations" for the redistribution of spheres of influence in the region, but rather become a consequence of the unstable balance of power that is actually forming here, based simultaneously on the unipolar (with the American or Chinese pole of power) and bipolar (with the chinese poles of force) systems.

A forceful confrontation with China is not in the national interest of the United States. Understanding this will keep American politicians from violating the status quo in East Asia, but how long they will refrain from the temptation to use force in the region will soon show. In July 2003, the US Secretary of Defense, D. Rumsfeld officially issued strict demands to the DPRK authorities to immediately abandon all nuclear programs, as well as the production of medium-and long-range launch vehicles. Otherwise, America will be forced to apply other measures of influence, but it will certainly force the North Korean leadership to return to the framework of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, from which the DPRK withdrew in early 2003. In turn, as the Japanese news agency Kyodo Tsushin reported on July 19, 2003, the North Korean authorities, in response to US threats to use force against their country, issued an order to put on alert medium-range missiles capable of hitting targets (US military bases) in Japan ^.15 The Chinese authorities, in the event of a sharp escalation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, will undoubtedly do everything possible to deter the United States from using force and prevent the emergence of a hotbed of tension in the region.

China, as a regional superpower, is interested in maintaining a stable environment in order to solve its problems in East Asia. The Chinese leadership sees the new balance of power in the region as a historic chance to realize its geopolitical plans, namely, to annex Taiwan by all means. China has repeatedly expressed concern about the provision of US military assistance

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to strengthen Taiwan's military capabilities, emphasizing that they should not interfere in the internal affairs of China, of which the island is an integral part. The fundamental differences between China, the United States and the Taiwanese authorities over how to deal with the reunification issue, which have noticeably intensified in recent years after nationalist forces came to power on the island, may become a serious destabilizing factor in East Asia in the near future. Taipei's declaration of political independence from China will prompt Beijing to use force to prevent such a development. Conflict in this case will be difficult to avoid. Russia, as a strategic partner of China, may be drawn into it.

After the end of the Cold war, Japan also demonstrates its ambitions for a leading role in the region. In an effort to achieve these goals, Tokyo relies on both its economic and financial strength, as well as its accumulated power potential. Japan has the largest military budget of any country in the East Asian region. Huge funds are being spent on modernizing weapons, equipping the Japanese army with the latest weapons, this is the main component of future contactless wars. Tokyo has made no secret of its ambitions to play a more active political role at the global and regional levels. Many modern Japanese politicians are convinced that it is high time for Japan to "become a normal country with its powerful army." It plays a prominent role in UN peacekeeping operations and strives to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council as soon as possible. Japanese warships are sent to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, many thousands of kilometers from national borders, for rear support of the US Army, as was the case during military operations against Afghanistan and Iraq, and are used as a convoy of oil tankers bound for the Land of the Rising Sun.

In the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait, the Japanese self-Defense Forces will have to take direct part in combat operations for the first time since the end of World War II. This will be required of them by the United States of America, which prudently "bound" Japan in the second half of the 1990s with a series of new treaties and agreements obliging it to actively cooperate with the United States in maintaining stability in East Asia ^.16

While the new system of relations in East Asia is still not fully formed, a number of countries in the region would like to have time to solve the remaining territorial problems from the Cold War period. Such problems primarily exist in relations between China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the ASEAN countries over the ownership of islands in the South China Sea. China and Japan, for example, are contesting the Senkaku Islands. Tokyo also claims the South Korean island of Takto and the South Kuril Islands belonging to Russia. As the new system of relations develops in East Asia, disputes between the countries of the region over territorial issues are especially dangerous, as their claims are put forward in the context of rapidly gaining strength of nationalism.

The question arises as to how realistic it is that a power conflict will arise in East Asia as a result of the struggle to fill the "power vacuum" that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of a new system of international relations. To determine the power capabilities of each participant in the new system of relations in East Asia, it is possible, in our opinion, to use an aggregate indicator of the country's power potential, which is called the Correlates of War (COW). This indicator consists of the following bases:-

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such as the volume and structure of GDP, the total population, and the size of military expenditures ¹⁷ . At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the power potential of each participant in the system can be significantly increased due to the country's entry into coalitions and alliances with other states ^* .

During the Cold War, the power potential of the leading East Asian powers was as follows::

Table 1 Index of national power of the leading powers of the East Asian region in 1974

Источник: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1967 - 1976. N.Y., 1978.

20 years later, according to available data for 1993, i.e. at the time of the end of the Cold War, these indicators were as follows::

Table 2 Index of national power of the leading powers of the East Asian region in 1993

Источник: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1994 - 1995. L., 1996.

Data from the table. 1 and 2 show that, first, the balance of power in the East Asian region changed significantly in the 20 years from 1974 to 1993. The Soviet Union ceased to exist and left behind a "power vacuum". The position of the United States as the sole superpower has noticeably strengthened. Japan's potential has almost doubled. The index of China's power potential, although it has not changed significantly over the past 20 years, has become the most powerful power in East Asia, since the United States is not geographically an East Asian country. South Korea has also doubled its power potential.

^* The National Power Index is calculated as the sum of each country's shares in aggregate GDP, military spending, and population.

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Although the figures in the tables are relative in nature, they do not only provide insight into the changing balance of power in East Asia, but also suggest to analysts which powers can enter into coalitions with each other to strengthen their positions here in the twenty-first century. First of all, this applies to China, which may be objectively interested in forming a coalition with another or other participants in the system of relations in East Asia for the sole purpose of balancing the total power potential of the United States. It can be Russia, but it can also be Japan or a united Korea. Of course, any attempts to balance the power potentials and balance the regional system of relations that the Chinese authorities will undertake may cause resistance from America, which is interested in maintaining the post-cold War status quo and its dominant role here.

For objective reasons, China needs a strong alliance with other countries in the region. The fact is that Beijing still retains a sense of dissatisfaction with the non-recognition of China's status as a great economic power. China's membership in the G8 is blocked by the United States and Japan. Beijing is seriously concerned about the continued US policy of strategic deterrence in East Asia. Sooner or later, China will openly oppose such a situation that violates its interests, and therefore, tensions in Sino-American relations will increase and may even escalate into an armed conflict, which, however, both sides would like to avoid.

The conflict in East Asia may be triggered by the weakness of Russia, whose deterrent potential, according to many researchers, has been so undermined over the years of reforms that in the near future the country is unlikely to be able to actively influence events in the East Asian region. This circumstance can be used by the United States, China or Japan to solve their tasks of strengthening their positions in the emerging system of relations in the region.

The aggravation of the strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula may occur both through the fault of Pyongyang, which may overestimate the country's power potential and make a miscalculation regarding its support from the PRC or Russia in the event of a conflict, and because of Washington's decision to "humanitarian intervention" against North Korea, whose behavior allegedly threatens America's national interests in the future. the region. The DPRK is indeed in no hurry to abandon its nuclear and missile programs and return to membership in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the same time, the North Korean leadership does not want to remain in international isolation, and will seek to develop dialogue with its neighbors in the region, as well as with the United States.

A dangerous disruption of strategic stability in East Asia could trigger the withdrawal of US troops from the region and Washington's reneging on its obligations to its allies to maintain security guarantees ^.18 The partial withdrawal of American troops will encourage the formation of a multipolar system in the region, which will be supplemented, in addition to the two superpowers-the United States and China-by a third pole of power, militarily strong Japan. Tokyo will be forced to assume much of the responsibility for maintaining stability that Washington currently bears, will have to seriously strengthen its self-defense forces with offensive weapons, build aircraft carriers and, possibly, start producing nuclear weapons. At the same time, a multipolar system of international relations, whether at the regional or global level, in which "everyone does not trust everyone", is extremely unstable in itself. It easily provokes the emergence of conflicts, for which there are plenty of reasons in East Asia. Further destabilization in the system of regional relations may cause

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complete withdrawal of US troops from the region. Then a new bipolar system will be formed in East Asia with two regional superpowers-China and Japan. In this case, small countries will form alliances and blocs with one of the two great Powers, which, in turn, will increase the level of distrust, cause tension and spur an arms race.

A strong and militarily independent Japan may increase distrust of its foreign policy on the part of its former ally, the United States of America. At some stage of accelerated military construction, it, as a naval power, can create the potential for a decisive strike on the territory of the United States, which in the history of the XX century. This was already the case when its navy and naval aviation attacked the American military base at Pearl Harbor in December 1941. At the beginning of the XXI century. The Japanese Navy played a supporting role in the US Navy's rear operations in the Indian Ocean. However, as soon as the United States withdraws its troops from East Asia, the scope of responsibilities of the Japanese naval forces will expand, and they will have the right to operate independently not only in the Indian Ocean, but also in the Pacific Ocean. Then the American side will be forced to develop additional security measures to deter the Japanese Navy. Even today, the US military does not fully trust Japan's military policy, just as Americans do not have confidence that expanding combat capabilities and giving full freedom of action to the country's navy will not lead to the restoration of its offensive potential, and will not threaten America's national interests in the Pacific. As a result of this development, the rivalry between the two countries may escalate, and their geopolitical interests in the struggle for influence over the maritime countries of East Asia may not coincide. This will lead to a sharp reduction in bilateral trade and the scale of industrial cooperation. The United States will be forced to increase defense spending in the Japanese direction.

Thus, a complete or partial withdrawal of the United States from East Asia can lead to a disruption of the balance of power and increase instability. The US abandonment of the role of a superpower and the transition to a multipolar system in the region can only increase tensions in Sino-Japanese, Sino-Russian, and Japanese-Russian relations. ¹⁹

The cost of leaving East Asia may be quite high for America. Then it will be undesirably dependent on Japan for ensuring stability and security guarantees in East Asian countries, as well as for the defense of maritime communications in the western Pacific. The United States may lose its strategic positions in the region's maritime countries, i.e. weaken its potential to deter China and Russia from the sea. This means that the responsibility for America's security is partly transferred to Japan. But if the Japanese side, for various reasons, including economic ones, is not interested in continuing military cooperation with the United States, then America will be forced to fundamentally reconsider its strategic relations with China and Russia, which today looks unlikely. In this scenario, America runs the risk of being left at a strategic loss.

The dangerous uncertainty in the development of the situation in East Asia in the event of the withdrawal of American troops encourages the main actors in the regional system of international relations to prepare in advance for such an unfavorable outcome and establish a dialogue with each other. It is not surprising, therefore, that Japan's ruling circles are actively groping for ways of military cooperation with Russia, and it, in turn, is consistently developing a strategic partnership with China.

It seems that, from the point of view of Russian interests, maintaining the presence of American troops in East Asia in the near future is preferable to their withdrawal. The US military presence in the region will help

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maintaining the status quo will deter regional leaders from trying to accelerate the arms race. In addition, according to experts, the cost of staying their troops in this part of the world for the American side will be much lower than the total cost of ensuring security, in the event of their withdrawal. ²⁰ Moreover, the growing defense spending in the US budget from year to year firmly cements its strategic superiority at sea and is quite sufficient to maintain the regional balance of power for at least another 15-20 years.

In our opinion, the mutual deterrence of the United States and China in East Asia, balanced within the new bipolar regional structure of international relations, should be considered as a factor that best meets Russia's national interests. This configuration of the system of international relations in the region significantly saves Russia's own spending on strengthening its defense capability in the Far East. The bipolar system currently emerging in the region meets the national interests of many East Asian countries, as it guarantees security and maintains stability in the overall situation. Of course, provided that the US ruling circles themselves do not initiate its destabilization and disruption of the balance of power.

The nature and scale of threats from China in the emerging system of relations in East Asia do not pose a great danger to the United States, given its overwhelming superiority over China in the field of nuclear missiles, as well as high-precision weapons, including space. Washington may well maintain a cooperative and cooperative relationship with Beijing, not only for the sake of maintaining strategic stability in the region, but also, more importantly for both sides, to maintain the stable nature of bilateral trade and economic ties. It was this stabilizing factor that was absent in relations between the United States and the USSR during the Cold War, when mutual contacts in this area were of secondary importance for both sides.

In conclusion, I would like to note that the process of forming a new balance of power that is unfolding in East Asia after the Cold War, the uncertainty in the development of the situation, the emergence of new centers of power, the possible withdrawal, in whole or in part, of American troops from the region - all this taken together directly affects the interests of Russia's national security in the Far East. After all, whether the issue of Taiwan's annexation to China or the issue of Korean unification will be resolved in the near future, whether through political dialogue or the use of force, and how the contradictions in relations between the United States and the DPRK can be resolved, ultimately depends on whether Russia will be able to do so. involved in another regional conflict or not.

The peculiarity of Russia's current attitude to the East Asian region in strategic terms is such that for objective, primarily economic reasons, it cannot play the role of a center of power here, which the Soviet Union once played in the Pacific and in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the East Asian region is not yet a priority area of Russia's foreign policy. The attention of the Russian leadership at this stage of the country's historical development is primarily focused on increasing the economic and power potential on the ways of rapprochement with the former Soviet republics along the perimeter of the Russian borders, as well as strengthening Russia's western borders, directly finding itself in geostrategic contact with NATO countries.

I would like to hope that as Russia strengthens its economic, scientific and technological potential in the twenty-first century, it will certainly assert itself as a great Pacific power, begin active development of the Far East and Siberia, restore its power potential, and once again play an important stabilizing role in the system of international relations in East Asia.

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notes

¹ For the relations within the" strategic triangle " of the USSR, China, and the United States in East Asia during the Cold War, see: Snyder G. and Deising P. Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in the International Crises. Princeton, 1977. P. 462 - 470; Goldstein J. and Freeman J. Three-Way Street: Reciprocity in World Politics. Chicago, 1990; Ross R. (ed.). China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War. N.Y., 1993; Dittmer L. The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretic Analysis // World Politics. Vol. 31. N 4. July 1981. P. 485 - 515; Rummel R. Triadic Struggle and Accommodation in Perspective // Kim Ilpyong (ed.). The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. N.Y., 1987; Kim W. Power Transition and Strategic Stability in East Asia // Asian Perspective. Vol. 21. N 1. Spring-Summer 1997. P. 159.

² Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI Yearbook. 1994. P. 156.

³ An International Comparison. Japan 1989. Tokyo, 1989. P. 85; Japan 2002. Tokyo, 2002. P. 31.

^{Sinton J., Fridley D.} 4 and Dorian J. China's Energy Future: The Role of Energy in Sustaining Growth // China's Economic Future. N.Y., 1997; Blumenthal D. and Sasser G. Fuel for the Next Century // China Business Review. July-August 1998. P. 34 - 38.

^{Naughton B.} 5 The Third Front: Defense Industrialization in Chinese Interior // China Quarterly. N 115. September 1988. P. 351 - 386.

^{Overy R.} 6 Why the Allies Won? N.Y., 1995. For the history and development of the US Navy and its participation in World War II in Europe and the Pacific, see Gray C. The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power. N.Y., 1994.

⁷ In 1975, the United States lost its naval bases in Thailand, and in 1991 it was forced to leave the Philippines. However, these losses were later compensated for and did not weaken the American naval potential in East Asia in any way. The Pentagon's naval strategy in the region is analyzed in the East Asia Strategy Report (Washington, 1995). See also Jane's Defense Weekly on restoring the US military presence in the Philippines. November 18, 1998. P. 15.

^{Wolf С, Yen K., Henry D.} 8 and Kennedy M. Long-Term Economic and Military Trends 1994 - 2015: The United States and Asia. Santa Monica, 1995. P. 3 - 7.

⁹ The basis of the Chinese Air Force is still made up of relatively outdated Soviet-made Su - 27 aircraft in terms of their tactical and technical data. See: Allen K., Krumel G. and Pollalc J. China's Air Force Enters the Twenty-First Century. Santa Monica, 1995; Godwin P. PLA Doctrine, Strategy, and Capabilities toward 2000 // China Quarterly. N 146. June 1996. P. 464 - 487.

¹⁰ An International Comparison. Japan 2002. Tokyo, 2002. P. 31.

¹¹ See M. I. Krupyanko for more information. Japan after the "Cold War": national Security Policy, Moscow, 2001, pp. 85-109.

¹² An International Comparison. Japan 2002. Tokyo, 2002. P. 15.

¹³ Defense White Paper, 1994 - 1995. The Ministry of National Defense. The Republic of Korea. Seul, 1996. P. 27 - 28.

^{Huntington, S.} 14 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London, 1996, Ch. 9. Пессимистические оценки развития ситуации в Восточной Азии высказывают также: Friedberg A. Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia // International Security. Vol. 18. N 3, Winter 1993/94. P. 5 - 33; Betts R. Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War // International Security, Vol. 18. N 3, Winter 1993/1994. P. 34 - 77; Kupchan C. After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity // International Security. Vol. 23. N. 2. Fall 1998. P. 62 - 66; Segal G. East Asia and the Constraint of China // International Security. Vol. 20. N 4. Spring 1996. P. 107 - 135; Stuart D. and Tow W. U.S. Strategy for the Asia-Pacific: Building a Multipolar Balance of Power System in Asia // Adelphi Paper. N 229 of London International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995. L., 1995.

¹⁵ Asahi shimbun. 19.07.2003.

¹⁶ See more about this: Krupyanko M. I. Japan after the "Cold War": national Security Policy, Moscow, 2001, pp. 110-137.

¹⁷ См. об этом: Singer D., Bremer S. and Stuckey J. Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820 - 1965 // Russett B. (ed.). Peace, War, and Numbers. N.Y., 1972.

^{Layne C.} 18 From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy // International Security. Vol. 22. N 1. Summer 1997. P. 86 - 124; Layne C. Less Is More: Minimal Realism in East Asia // National Interest. N 43. Spring 1996. P. 64 - 78. For the content of the discussion on the main directions of American foreign policy after the Cold War, see: Posen V. and Ross A. Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy / / International Security. Vol. 21. N 3. Winter 1996/97. P. 5-53.

^{Huntington S.} 19 Why International Primacy Matters // International Security. Vol. 17. N 4. Spring 1993. P. 68 - 83.

^{Wolf C., Yen K.} 20 and Kennedy M. Op. cit. P. 3 - 7.

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