Criticism and bibliography. Reviews

London-New York: Zed books. 2005. 185 p.*

The publication of Mohamed Sharfi's book was a significant event not only for the Arab East, but also for the entire Muslim world. It is based on the 1998 work of the same name, published in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia. This publication is supplemented with an understanding of the events of the turn of the XX-XXI centuries, which showed that militant Islamism has grown from a threat to the security and progress of individual Eastern countries to an object of concern and concern for the entire world community.

Born in Tunis, Mohamed Sharfi is known both at home and abroad as a prominent scholar, public figure and statesman. In the 60s of the XX century, while receiving a law degree in France, he was a member of the leadership of the General Union of Tunisian Students, and after returning to his homeland, he always participated in the speeches of democratic groups, was vice-president, and then president of the Tunisian League for the Protection of Human Rights (1981-1989). At the University of Tunis, Mohamed Sharfi became known as the author of solid research on legal and other issues. In 1989-1994, he served as the Minister of Education and carried out a large-scale reform of the education system in the country, but under pressure from opponents of the reform, he was forced to resign.

Mohamed Sharfi continued the work of those Muslim reformers who in the XIX-XX centuries made efforts to free the mass consciousness from the stagnant stereotypes of the Middle Ages in their "traditionalist" version. While the ulama (theologians and jurists) turned to scholastic apologies for the "sacred heritage of their ancestors", the reformers practiced methods and methods of ideological and theoretical opposition to Islamism with its appeal to the "fundamental" values of "pure" Islam (i.e., Islam from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his closest followers-the righteous caliphs).

In the introduction to the book under review, the author notes that the "phenomenon of Islamism", which was revealed in a number of Muslim countries as acts of "terror, violence and injustice", was not perceived in the West as a global threat for a long time. Western "intellectuals and humanitarian organizations" have shown a lack of understanding of the dangers of Islamism, including leaders of militant Islamic groups in the category of fighters for democracy and freedom, on the grounds that initially these groups were gaining strength in the fight against authoritarian regimes in a number of Muslim countries. Moreover, the leaders of countries whose modernization efforts were met with resistance from Islamic extremists were subjected to a barrage of accusations of human rights violations. Violations were mainly seen in the fact that during the anti-Islamist repressions there were facts of ill-treatment of prisoners, torture, etc. All this took place against the background of almost a general belief that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism, "international relations between the United States and the United States will continue.

* Mohamed Sharfi. Islam and freedom. A historical misunderstanding. London-New York: Zed Books, 2005. 185 p.

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they will enter a calmer channel. The key to this was seen in the establishment of "free enterprise as an economic system of production and democracy as a political management system" (p. 1).

The" black day of unprecedented tragedy " on September 11, 2001, opened a new stage in the policy of the United States and its allies, according to Mohamed Sharfi. This time, there has been a shift from "one extreme to another": from the previous underestimation of the danger of religious extremism to actions that create the impression of growing Islamophobia in the Muslim world. The author cites the example of the occupation of Iraq, during which facts of illegal and inhumane treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prisons and at the US Guantanamo base were made public.

The problem of fighting Islamism cannot be solved as a result of the occupation of individual states and the export of new ideas there, Mohamed Sharfi believes. Muslim peoples should be brought into the modern worldview by their own elite. Foreign powers will be able to help it, but only if they move away from two fundamentally erroneous ideas: mixing up such categories as Islam and Islamism, and attributing to Islam the inability to develop in relation to the needs of our time.

In the first case, Western observers are baffled by the fact that Islamists insist on implementing Sharia law. Many of its standards, developed by the Ulama more than a thousand years ago, are in " direct conflict with the legal consciousness that is formed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." In the second case, it is overlooked that similar standards were observed among adherents of other religions (including Christians and Jews)during the period of patriarchal-traditional foundations.

Islam, according to Mohamed Sharfi, "is no less capable of evolution than Christianity and Judaism" (p. 4). This is confirmed by the activities of "enlightened thinkers and reformers", who in some countries encourage the state to take on the functions of a" locomotive of change " (pp. 4-5). In this case, the traditionalists, led by the Ulama, cease to play "a decisive role in shaping public opinion and state policy" (p. 5). Nevertheless, the general situation does not give reason to believe that Muslim peoples have already emerged from the Middle Ages, fully integrated into the orbit of modern life, that they know how to adapt to the needs of the world. modern times, while remaining committed to their religion. Recent events show the "fragility" of the ongoing changes: "political, legal, economic and social structures are undergoing significant restructuring, but little has changed in the sphere of political thought, in its historical and cultural basis" (p. 5).

The most important miscalculation of the Muslim reformers was that the development of the general education system envisaged by the modernization strategy followed not so much qualitative as quantitative indicators: the traditional study of Islam was supplemented by the teaching of foreign languages and the introduction of separate general education disciplines. There was no question of showing the essential differences between medieval and modern principles of the organization of society and the state. There was no understanding that "the emerging nation is not the same as the Ummah (Muslim community); that the new political regime, which should be based on the sovereignty of the people, has nothing to do with the caliphate; that the modern legal system differs from the Sharia one both in origin and content" (p.5). Information about such differences was not only not explained to the broad strata of the Muslim community, but also practically not communicated to them. Therefore, the innovations did not receive universal recognition and were perceived as imported from the West and in principle alien to Islam.

The masses of believers were forced to choose between Islam and modernization. As a rule, they found it quite logical and well-reasoned to say: "Muslims should follow Islam in the form in which they inherited it and studied it." This kind of discourse, notes Mohamed Sharfi, "could not help but sound militant and uncompromising about regimes that are corroded by corruption and have failed in their promised development" (p. 6).

A number of state leaders of Muslim countries followed the course of modernization, but in the face of the Islamist opposition, trying to stay in power at all costs, they demagogically used Islamic terminology. Others were primarily concerned with Reali-

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This is due to the combination of various civil political projects (which ultimately failed to materialize and resulted in a slowdown in the pace of social transformation). In search of mass support, they resorted to expanding cooperation with Muslim clerics. Great concessions were made to them, especially in the sphere of upbringing and education of the younger generation. The strengthening of "traditionalists" in this area was not slow to bear fruit: the first forges of Islamist cadres were educational institutions where Islam was studied in the traditions of medieval scholasticism. However, the greatest obstacles to the modern development of Muslim countries were created, according to the author, by authoritarian leaders who openly declared themselves modernists. "The authoritarianism they practiced in the name of modernization aroused suspicion and even disgust" (p. 12).

Mohamed Sharfi is firmly convinced that the future of Muslim countries is linked to creating conditions for a democratic debate in which all points of view, including Islamist ones, can be freely represented. The scientist places certain hopes on the formation of a secular state. At the same time, he prefers the example of Tunisia, rather than Turkey, where the French principle of separation of state and religion is taken as a model.

The Tunisian State, taking into account the social reality and peculiarities of the Islamic faith, assumes responsibility for religious education and the state of mosques. At the same time, the Constitution of this country, unlike many other similar acts of the Muslim world, does not proclaim Islam as the state religion, and Sharia is the main source of law or one of its sources, or a source of rule - making. It asserts the principle of freedom of conscience (Article 5) and the principle of civil equality (Article 6), which directly "contradict the Sharia law". According to Mohamed Sharfi, all this allows "a sincere Muslim to be a sincere secularist" (p. 13).

The first chapter of the book ("Islamic Fundamentalism") It opens with a description of acts of Islamist terror committed in Muslim countries, and then spread to the West. The author defines what Islamists seek as "one of the forms of totalitarianism characterized by the suppression of individual and collective freedoms, the stifling of the incentive to literary and artistic creativity, the prohibition of discussions, the curtailment of intellectual activity, and the creation of space for discrimination against women" (p. 19). Reminding the reader that "certain Western politicians and intellectuals openly hailed Islamist leaders" as fighters against the oppression of the people by undemocratic regimes, he noted that the world's historical experience that "religious rule cannot be democratic" and that "religious dictatorship is the worst of dictatorships" was thus forgotten (p. 15).

To a certain extent, the support of Islamist leaders in the West was made possible by their ability to communicate with a Western audience in the "language of democracy and human rights" (p. 16). As for ordinary extremists, by suppressing and persecuting others, they believe that they are carrying out jihad against " infidels "and acting in accordance with the will of God, that violence is" the best of prayers"," the most beautiful testimony of piety", which will ensure their place in Paradise. This is the result of a "special kind of education", the foundations of which were laid during the formation of the Arab-Muslim civilization.

Modern Islamists, says Mohamed Sharfi, are "direct descendants of the forces that resisted progress" (p. 24). During the Middle Ages, they were the epitome of"militant conservatism and obscurantism." By directing their efforts to suppress the rationalistic trend in Islam, whose representatives relied on ijtihad (the principle of rational independent judgment), they predetermined the decline of Arab-Muslim civilization and the subsequent lag of Muslim countries behind Europe. Meanwhile, the European Renaissance, emphasized Mohamed Sharfi, " was largely due to the discovery of the ancient heritage. And it took place thanks to the Arabs, who not only translated many works of ancient Greek scientists, including philosophers, but also enriched science with their own achievements " (p. 20).

In modern times, the successors of the progressive trend were the forerunners of the ideas of spiritual and cultural uplift of the Muslim world, overcoming the backwardness that made it defenseless against the pressure of European colonialists. Reformers and their followers (the organizers of the national liberation movement) turned to ijtihad as a way to renew their ideological and political positions and a source of such cultural development, with the help of which they were able to develop the National Liberation Movement.-

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However, reliance on traditional cultural heritage does not exclude positive borrowing of the achievements of other civilizations.

Meanwhile, the Ulama (theologians and jurists) emerged as the main carriers of the conservative tendency: "locked in their own narrow world, they arrogantly ignored everything that happened outside of it, everything that did not concern Muslim law and Arabic grammar" (p.27). By emphasizing the need for strict compliance with Sharia law, conservatives often collaborated with colonialists for their own interests.

Describing the place of Islamism as a "socio-cultural phenomenon" in the context of the historical development of Muslim countries, Mohamed Sharfi stressed that their modern social, economic, and cultural life has little in common with the events of the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, the Islamist program still demands that the State be given a religious character and introduce Sharia law as its legal system. To do this, it is no longer considered sufficient to return to the "fundamental" foundations of "pure" Islam from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the righteous Caliphs, to discard everything that happened before and after that time. Today, Islamists claim that " a person is free when he obeys only God." Among political parties, they recognize only the "party of God"; all others are "parties of Satan or evil despots" (p. 32). Particular importance is attached to the postulate of contrasting Dar al-Islam ("the abode of Islam", i.e. the lands under the jurisdiction of the Islamic State) and Dar al-Harb ("the abode of war", i.e. all other territories). The history of Islam thus appears as an eternal confrontation between the forces of Good and Evil. Translated into the realities of modern life, this means opposing " pure Muslims "not only to the West (i.e., imperialism, Zionism, and materialism), but also to" bad Muslims " (p.36).

Such a claim to the possession of absolute truth, to the right and even the duty to assert it by violent means, is anti-democratic in its ideological orientation, says Mohamed Sharfi. For a Muslim, unlike an Islamist, Islam is precisely a creed that contains the answer to the question of "life and death", gives hope for justice and happiness in the afterlife. In its literal meaning, Sharia means " the way." This is what a Muslim should follow, guided by morality and ijtihad, in order to best adapt to the demands of the time. Islam, the author emphasizes, is a religion, and "not a legal system, a state, or a political reference point." At the same time, modern legal statehood, in his opinion, should be based on the principles of "democracy, general elections and popular sovereignty" (p. 35).

In the second chapter ("Islam and the law") Mohamed Sharfi analyzes the Islamist position on sharia law, contrasting it with a modern and reformist approach to Muslim law and its fundamental sources - the Koran and Sunnah. They noticed that Islamists "agree to forget" some of the Sharia regulations (first of all, outdated land ownership regulations from the Middle Ages), and "would like to forget"some of them (for example, regulations on slave ownership). They intend to fully implement a number of Sharia regulations (from the field of criminal law). They generally support the establishment of sharia regarding personal status (as it is traditionally defined in most Muslim countries).

At the same time, Mohamed Sharfi emphasizes that, being the result of centuries-old law-making by the Ulama, these prescriptions in their Islamist perception and justification are generally anti-humane, anti-democratic and discriminatory. Thus, a woman in the family and society is put in a low position compared to a man, and non-Muslims are assigned the status of second-class citizens, which in principle is unacceptable for a modern state.

Attacks by Islamists on freedom of conscience, which are taking place under the auspices of the fight against "apostasy", Mohamed Sharfi believes, increasingly indicate the revival of the practice of medieval reprisals against political opponents. Among the first victims of such massacres is the prominent Sufi thinker al-Hallaj (922), and among the victims of Islamist crimes of relatively recent times-Farag Fuda, author of works critical of fundamentalism, founder of the Egyptian Educational Association, who was killed in the summer of 1992.

Considering it necessary to "re-read" the sources of Muslim law, taking into account the historical circumstances of their origin, from the point of view of following not only the letter, but also the spirit of legal norms, Mohamed Sharfi agrees with those reformers who have different views on the sources of Islamic law.-

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The main sources of Muslim law (the Qur'an and Sunnah) are highlighted. In their view, the Qur'an is a truly sacred source, since it contains the word of God transmitted to Muhammad by the angel Gabriel. The traditions of the Prophet's sayings and deeds (hadiths) included in the Sunnah are another matter. The latter are considered a "controversial" source, since not all of them are recognized as reliable. But it is the reliance on these hadiths and their literal interpretation that figure prominently in the Islamist appeal to Muslim law. The time has come, concludes Mohamed Sharfi, to put an end to the fruitless debate about this or that alleged legal provision of the Koran. Instead, a clear distinction should be made once and for all between the sphere of law and the sphere of religion.

The third chapter ("Islam and the State") focuses on criticizing the concept of the" Islamic State " that formed the basis of militant extremism. The creation of a caliphate is not only considered by adherents of this concept to be a direct religious duty of a Muslim, but also equated with a "pillar of faith". In this regard, Mohamed Sharfi notes that Islamists tend to try to "re-read the holy texts" and fill them with their own speeches. At the same time, he does not doubt the basic commonality of the Islamist concept of the state and the traditional apologetics of the caliphate emanating from the Ulama. This commonality is manifested in the "embellishment and idealization" of the history of Islam, in giving an aura of "sanctity" to the caliphate, in attributing to Muhammad the role of the creator and head of the"Islamic state".

Referring to the Qur'an, Mohamed Sharfi proves that Muhammad is not named anywhere as either a caliph or a ruler. His mission was to preach Islam, not to command people. Muhammad was the religious leader of the community of his followers (ummah), which was based on moral rather than political principles. Neither in Mecca nor in Medina did the Muslim community have the important attributes of statehood in the form of a civil service, permanent courts, prisons, and security forces. In the Quranic texts, there is no mention of the state as such, there are no instructions on the methods of appointing rulers, the mechanism for controlling their activities, and finally, the rules for regulating political rivalry and legitimizing power. Mohamed Sharfi believes that the Koran's silence on these vital issues leads to a "logical and reasonable" conclusion: "the state and politics concerning life in the earthly world have nothing to do with religion." After all, God emphasized in the Qur'an (6: 38): "We have not omitted anything in the Book" (p.105).

Leading the reader to the idea of the need for a reading of the history of Islam that is free from the centuries - old layers that distort it, Mohamed Sharfi proves that the caliphate owes its origin only to human efforts, and above all to the first caliphs, "great political strategists".

Speaking about the fact that in recent decades there has been a fierce debate in Muslim countries between those who advocate democracy and human rights, on the one hand, and ulema and Islamists, on the other, Mohamed Sharfi notes that the latter do not shy away from resorting to demagogic techniques and open falsification. Thus, they actively impose on the Muslim public the idea of secularization as an atheistic option for separating religion from the state, which implies the initial hostility of the secular state to Islam.

Meanwhile, the author of the book notes, the specifics of the Sunni trend in Islam is that the state is traditionally not exempt from such religious obligations to Muslim believers as building mosques and maintaining them in order, and establishing religious schools. Muftis and teachers of Muslim universities were officially appointed, they gave advice to those in power on religious issues, and such activities were always considered as "public service". In the light of this specificity, Mohamed Sharfi believes that "the development of democracy in its legal meaning should include not only the separation of the spheres of Islam and the state, but also the internal differentiation of state, religious and political functions" (p.127). However, this is hindered, on the one hand, by Islamists, and on the other - by the ruling circles of states following the course of modernization, when "they use religion for political purposes or interfere in purely religious affairs" (p. 128).

Mohamed Sharfi considered it necessary to warn the authorities against deluding themselves about the possibility of controlling " mosques and the religious sector as a whole "(p. 130), if the official-

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but recognized representatives of the Muslim clerical class ("functionaries of Islam") are committed to" traditional erroneous theories " that are incompatible with the foundations of modern statehood. If State efforts are directed only at arresting terrorists, then it is not the disease itself that is being treated, but its symptoms.

When the authorities come to an understanding of this obvious fact, Mohamed Sharfi believes, constitutional reforms and legislative acts designed to create mechanisms to ensure the "non-political nature of mosques and religious organizations" will be in demand. Then the Supreme Constitutional Court will oversee the political neutrality of religious organizations, being entitled to liquidate them if they deviate from the principle of separation of the spheres of politics and religion. But such a turn of events requires, in turn, rational changes in the cultural image of the Muslim world, and above all in the education system.

The fourth chapter ("Education and modernization") opens with a brief summary of facts drawn from the past and present of various countries around the world, showing that" people of religion "have always and everywhere claimed a monopoly in educating the younger generation," putting training in the most orthodox versions above all else " (p.136). On the example of Tunisia, which began to emerge from the "three-hundred-year state of socio-economic and cultural slumber" in the mid-19th century (p. 138), the objective and subjective factors that caused the long-term dominance of "traditionalists" in the system of education and upbringing are analyzed. It is noted that the Tunisian reality has broken the patterns and trends common to all Arab-Muslim countries, and that there is no reason to predict a better future in the present.

Pinning his hopes on "a new reading of Islam in the light of modern concepts of state and law", Mohamed Sharfi emphasizes that in this case, the theory should be supported by practical measures. These include the use of parliamentary elections and the parliamentary rostrum (even where the policies of the ruling regimes prevent fair and regular elections) in order to "remove legislative power from the Ulema and entrust it to representatives of the people", so that by law "the sphere of public relations is separated from religion" (p. 155).

Mohamed Sharfi is a proponent of such "civic education", which contributes to the formation of ideas about the mechanism of functioning of the modern state and its individual elements: about the specifics of local and regional government; about the separation of branches of state power (including the relations between the executive and legislative branches, about the independence of the judiciary); about the principles of public administration. and forms of democratic elections; on basic individual and collective freedoms, rights and duties of citizens; and in general on the history of legal and political thought in different historical epochs and in different regions of the world.

As for teaching public or private law, civil or criminal law, personal status or international law, it should be conducted in accordance with the guidelines of "enlightened Muslim thinkers". The most important of them are: "Islam is quite consistent with modernity," but "revision of Sharia law is the most important requirement of our time" (p. 156).

Mohamed Sharfi suggests organizing the study of Sharia by children in the context of mastering history or in the framework of such religious education that meets modern requirements.

The Arab-Muslim world, according to Mohamed Sharfi, should combine advanced self-knowledge not only with the development of foreign technologies and scientific achievements. "Learning the language of Shakespeare and Moliere", in particular, is necessary not only to master modern terminology, but also to "master the knowledge of other cultures and civilizations" (p.156). After all, "cultural underdevelopment is much more dangerous than outright ignorance" (p.163).

Mohamed Sharfi concludes his book by describing the" tragic problem " of the Arab-Muslim world as follows: while society needs social and political consensus, systematic development of education, and constant political discourse, it is being attacked by Islamists without proper "protective resources". In most countries, they are not provided either by government policies or by local intellectuals and democrats who exist "in conditions of lack of freedom of speech and action" (p. 167).

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