The purpose of the article is to try to assess the balance of power in East Asia against the background of the residual phenomena of the global economic crisis and determine what are the chances of traditional and new leaders of the region to improve their positions in a situation where efforts to overcome the consequences of the crisis are constrained by the activity of the most powerful powers. At the same time, small and medium-sized states represented by the ASEAN countries are more actively asserting themselves as political actors, and the status quo in the regional economy as a whole remains.

As a result of the crisis, the traditionally influential world power centers-the United States, the EU, and Japan-experienced a deep recession and faced serious structural problems in the economy. At the same time, a number of East Asian countries, primarily China, managed to maintain positive development dynamics after overcoming a decline in growth rates comparable in scale to that observed in the US and European economies.¹

At the same time, the United States and Japan remain predominant in the region, but they can no longer increase it in contrast to China. Japan's economic presence in the Asia-Pacific region is fundamental, and it determines many basic parameters of the region's development. But there is an impression that this country is defending its previously acquired positions rather than attempting to acquire new ones. Against this background, the literature actively discusses the growth of the Chinese presence in East Asia. China is also trying to" replace " Japan in the American economy, performing the function of saturating the American market with high-quality cheap goods. In this sense, the economic interdependence of China and the United States has developed, which helps to reduce the severity of their possible contradictions.

Although Russia cannot yet be considered a full-fledged regional player, its presence in East Asia has stabilized over the past decade and is no longer declining. At the same time, the Russian presence is effectively no longer independent, in the sense that it is increasingly just a function of China's economic presence. The Russian Far East is already integrated into the regional economic system, but not on Russian terms and not as an independent entity.

The countries and territories of East Asia (Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asian states, and China) are undergoing a complex process of internal political transformation, which will inevitably affect the regional situation.² At the same time, East Asia as a traditional geographical region is acquiring new international political dimensions. Its geographical boundaries are "spreading", and in terms of content, it "absorbs" problems related to neighboring regions.³ In addition, the situation in East Asia can be seen as a reflection of global trends in limiting the power of individual players. While individual States continue to strengthen their pos-

Consequently, their ability to act completely independently decreases ⁴.

The geostrategic balance of power is becoming more complex. In the 1950s and 1960s, the region as a whole showed features of emerging classical bipolarity. In the 1970s and 1980s, this structure began to erode, which was associated with the promotion of the PRC to the position of an independent regional player. The distancing of smaller states from the leading countries and the reorientation of the former towards solving the problems of internal development, mainly economic, also added political pluralism to ^the regional system5. In recent decades, the subjectivity of small and medium-sized countries in the region, represented by ASEAN, has consolidated and is much more pronounced in politics and security than a decade and a half or two ago.

The global financial and economic crisis could not fundamentally change the balance of positions in the region. At the same time, the economic area of interaction in the region is still a priority over the political one, and within the latter, small and medium-sized countries (primarily ASEAN) still actively use blocking on a group basis in order to confidently conduct a dialogue with more powerful regional and non-regional players.

1

Throughout the 1990s, Japan acted as the source of guiding economic trends in the region, acting, in effect, in alliance with the United States. Moreover, by creating a network of enterprises in East Asia linked to large Japanese enterprises and reproducing in their structure capitalist relations of a special, Japanese type, Japanese political circles themselves managed, according to American researchers, to "preserve" the situation inside the country, delaying the need for internal reforms for almost a decade.⁶

From an economic point of view, a hierarchically structured export - oriented model was created in the region, which was not only vulnerable to the crises of 1997 - 1998 and partly 2008-2009, but also to some extent generated them. Japan exported to the NIS countries (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan) not only capital, but also technologies that were not already the most advanced for the Japanese economy, but could be successfully applied in countries with a lower technological level. The NIS countries, in turn, having achieved a new stage of development on the basis of Japanese technological "feeding", then began to transfer simple technologies borrowed from Japan, but already well mastered by them, to the group of "Asian tigers of the second wave" (Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines), and those-to Indonesia and the coastal regions of China. Such a "chain" has received the name "formation of flying geese" in the literature.

Finished products were exported to Western countries, and to a large extent to the United States. In addition, throughout the 1990s, Japan was the main State providing economic assistance to the countries of the region on a bilateral basis. It also served as an absolute leader in terms of foreign direct investment (especially in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia), and Japanese specialists provided significant consulting assistance to ASEAN countries in the 1980s and 1990s in developing economic development programs7, which was quite satisfactory for small and medium - sized regional players.

A process of so-called real integration ⁸ has developed, covering the main part of the region. Its peculiarity was that the integration process developed faster than its formal institutional and legal forms were formed. In other words, preferential economic relations developed more actively than the creation of state bodies.

and organizations to manage them. The institutional aspect of integration processes was "late".

In the late 1990s, this system was seriously tested. The 1997-1998 financial crisis undermined Japan's economic position in the region. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, regionalization had ceased to serve as a safety net for Japanese corporations, which had previously preferred to move their production outside Japan rather than engage in the reform of the domestic economic system9.

A certain self-withdrawal of the United States, including in economic terms, from the affairs of the region during the administration of George W. Bush (2001-2009) also played a role in the transformation of the regional situation. The emphasis on the bilateral format of relations at the expense of multilateral ones and the active use of force in US foreign policy have led to disagreements even among traditional American allies in the region10.

Meanwhile, China has ceased to be one of the links in the economic chain built by Japan. Gradually, the PRC moved to the position of a new economic power center and began to interfere with Japanese economic dominance, violating the " vertically structured model of regional development. "The formation of flying geese "" is broken.

We can talk about the transformation of China into one of the main shopping centers in East Asia. At the same time, it should be noted that over the period of the 1990s, China's strategy in the region and its attitude towards it have undergone quite significant changes. By the mid-1990s, China was no longer perceived as a revolutionary force in the region, having abandoned its support for left-wing anti-government movements in Southeast Asian countries. For the first time, it was considered a profitable economic partner for both Southeast Asian countries, as well as for the United States and Japan. At the same time, China focused on creating a "belt of good neighborliness"¹². This meant that interaction with medium and small countries in the region became a priority for him. China's image was positively influenced by the financial assistance it provided to Southeast Asian countries during the 1997-1998 crisis. As a result, attitudes towards China have evolved from distrust to a vision of China as a worthy partner.¹³ The Chinese leadership itself put a lot of effort into this, ideologically underpinning its practical actions with the idea of harmonious development, which, unlike the concept of "peaceful rise", turned out to be much more attractive to China's environment.¹⁴

International trends have contributed to the deepening of economic ties between China and East Asian countries. Throughout the 1990s, China improved relations with all the countries of South-East Asia15 and ASEAN. The first official contact with the Association was established in 1991. In 1996, China was granted the status of an ASEAN dialogue partner. In 2002, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area Agreement was signed, and in 2003, China joined the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. In the same year, the Joint Declaration of China and ASEAN on Strategic Partnership was signed. The establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992 created additional conditions for the subsequent significant expansion of economic ties, so that just a decade later, South Korea ranked fifth in terms of foreign direct investment in China.

At the turn of the 1990s and 2000s, China joined the multilateral formats of cooperation in the region and even put forward a number of its own economic initiatives, including the creation of the Boao Forum (the Asian equivalent of the World Economic Forum in Davos). Later, Beijing proposed projects to provide massive economic assistance to Southeast Asian countries during the cri period-

vms of 2008-2009. At the Boao Forum in 2009, China proposed the formation of a $ 10 billion China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund to jointly fight the crisis and finance major bilateral investment projects. The implementation of these projects was primarily aimed at increasing the interconnectedness of the ASEAN countries and China. They discussed resource extraction, energy, communications, and the expansion of the regional and sub-regional transport network connecting the Association countries with China.¹⁶

China's economic penetration into the region was also due to the development of relations with regimes that Western counterparts did not want or could not deal with for ideological reasons. The Chinese side has demonstrated a special approach to the North Korean issue, the essence of which is to strengthen the DPRK's economic dependence on China and prevent the complete isolation of North Korea.¹⁷

China also sought to strengthen its position in economic relations with Myanmar. In 2009, the Chinese and Myanmar sides signed a memorandum of understanding, which formalized an agreement on the construction of an oil and gas pipeline from Myanmar to China. The practical implementation of the project was entrusted to the Chinese National Oil and Gas Corporation and the Myanmar Ministry of Energy ¹⁸. According to the agreement, the pipelines will stretch 1,100 km from the western coast of Myanmar to the city of Kunming, the administrative center of the Chinese province of Yunnan. The pipelines are planned to transport oil and gas to China from Middle Eastern and African countries, as well as gas from Myanmar itself. This infrastructure project is designed to reduce China's dependence on the transportation of these types of natural resources through the Strait of Malacca. China is also active in Cambodia and Laos, where the implementation of railway projects with Chinese participation is aimed at integrating the entire region into a single infrastructure network connected to the PRC and essentially representing the transport support network of China.¹⁹

2

At the same time, the economic situation in East Asia cannot be adequately assessed only through the prism of growing Chinese influence. Despite the obvious expansion of its presence, China is still far from the only strong economic player in the region, which leaves room for maneuver for small and medium-sized countries. In addition to China (11.6% of trade turnover), the main trade partners of the ASEAN countries also include the EU (11.2%) and Japan (10.5%). The United States lags slightly behind (9.7%) (see chart 1).

China's economic position is strong, rather, due to trade and partly-infrastructure projects. The bulk of foreign direct investment continues to come from the EU (21.1%), Japan (11.5%) and the United States (10.1%). The above statistics indicate, first of all, the significant success of the EU countries in this area. The past crisis has not seriously affected Japan's investment positions. At the same time, China's share is three times less than that of Japan and the United States, and six times less than that of the EU (see Figure 2).

Technological leadership in the region's economic system is still the prerogative of the United States and Japan. It is the United States, not China, that continues to be a major supplier of high-tech goods to the ASEAN countries. ²⁰ Moreover, it should be borne in mind that China's economic expansion may eventually prove to be a tool for demodernizing, rather than modernizing, the countries with which the PRC interacts, due to the significant resource component of these relations. ²¹ In other words, ties between the two countries may with China

Chart 1

Major ASEAN Trading Partners (2009)

Source: ASEAN Trade by selected partner / country, 2009 [Electronic resource] / The ASEAN website. Access mode: http://www.asean.org/18137.hlm

Chart 2

The main source countries of foreign direct investment in the ASEAN countries (2007-2009).

Источник: Top ten sources of foreign direct investment inflow to ASEAN [Electronic resource] / The ASEAN website. Access mode: http://www.asean.org/18144.htm

they encourage the production of raw materials rather than finished products in small countries.

China's economic position is not absolute and is partially balanced by regional projects involving the United States, Japan, and India. As an example, the process of creating bilateral free trade zones (FTZs)initiated in 2002 can be cited The Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, launched in response to the China-Asean Free Trade Area Agreement signed in the same year. Relations with Japan have been governed by the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership since 2008, and the ASEAN - India Trade in Goods Agreement since 2009.

For the Mekong Basin countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam), Japan has been implementing a special partnership program since 2008, which includes official development assistance for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, as well as for the Mekong sub-region as a whole (about $ 5.5 billion for 2010-2012).²². In terms of infrastructure development, Japan, as well as China, is participating in the development of the Indochina Peninsula transport network. First of all, we are talking about the Southern Economic Corridor of the Mekong sub-region, connecting Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Ho Chi Minh City and other industrial centers of Thailand and Vietnam, as well as the West-East route, which stretches from the coast of the South China Sea to the Andaman Sea and passes through the territory of Vietnam (from the port of Da Nang), Laos, Thailand and Myanmar (final destination-Molamyain Port).

As a result, the economic balance of power in the region suggests not so much a confrontation between competing systems (Chinese and Japanese-American), but rather a struggle within one already existing system. In it, the United States and Japan retain technological dominance, which is recognized by China and meets its interests. However, within the system itself, China is trying to increase its role to a decisive one, using all possible methods. The ASEAN countries do not dispute China's aspirations in this regard. Japan and the United States view such a situation as potentially dangerous, but so far it does not pose a real threat. That is why they seek not to oppose China, but to integrate it more closely into the already established system, while saving their own resources and extracting economic benefits from interaction with it.

3

The analysis of military and political trends allows us to present a slightly different picture of the regional situation. From the point of view of security in East Asia, the absolute predominance of the United States remains. Among all the regional players, it is the United States that has shown a significant increase in military spending throughout the 2000s (3-4% of GDP). For China, this ratio is maintained at the level of 1.8-2% of GDP, for India-2-3%, for Russia-3.5 - 3.7%. In absolute terms, the United States exceeds China by more than seven times in defense spending, Russia by more than ten times, Japan by thirteen times, and India by nineteen times (see Table 1).

Since the Cold War, the United States has relied on a system of alliances in East Asia with key partners such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Traditional alliances with Japan and South Korea, as well as recent new partnerships with India, are being used by the United States to contain China and avoid a head-on collision with it. However, the overall situation in East Asia and the outcome of George W. Bush's policy. The situation in the region seems to be forcing the American leadership to supplement its bilateral alliances with new mechanisms for regional cooperation.

Table 1

Expanded East Asian countries ' defense expenditures (USD) US $ at constant exchange rate (2008, mln), % of GDP)

Source: Facts on International Relations and Security Trends Database [Electronic resource] / Access mode: http://first.sipri.org

After the events of September 11, 2001, the United States used the need to fight terrorism as the main justification for its foreign policy steps, both at the global and regional levels. Initially, this line met with support among the countries of the region, especially in connection with the terrorist bombings in Indonesia in 2002. However, since then, the region has become increasingly wary of the global anti-terrorist war declared by the United States. In this case, the states of Southeast Asia had to take into account the factor of a significant Muslim population, as well as the specifics of internal political conflicts and problems that the countries of the region did not want to internationalize. We are talking about the separatist movement in the south of Thailand, the south of the Philippines, conflicts inside Indonesia (West Java, Aceh, Central Sulawesi). The concerns of small and medium-sized countries were also raised by the excessively one-sided and straightforward approach of the United States to its partners in the foreign policy arena on the principle of "either with us or against us". As a result, by the end of the presidential term of George W. Bush. Support for the United States ' war on terrorism in the region has clearly declined. At the same time, the US policy under the Republicans indirectly caused the countries of Southeast Asia to turn to new formats of interaction.-

trends in a broad regional context with the participation of the People's Republic of China.

A general reassessment of George W. Bush's unilateral policies. It prompted the Obama administration to seek ways to change the nature of the US military presence in the region and to engage more actively in the activities of multilateral regional institutions.

As one of the options for transforming the network of bases, the American side plans to strengthen elements of the distributed basing system, which could give the United States more freedom of maneuver in the region. Such a system does not imply the conclusion of full-fledged allied agreements, but it makes possible more operational agreements on the use of individual infrastructure facilities in the countries of the region by the United States for military purposes. Singapore, the Philippines, and Australia, in particular, have followed this path of building military-political relations with the United States.²³

The United States ' position on dialogue formats in East Asia has also changed. Such structures as the ASEAN Regional Security Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAC), and meetings of ASEAN defense ministers and dialogue partners are beginning to be perceived by the United States as a convenient mechanism for multilateral maneuvering and keeping small and medium-sized countries in the region from moving towards China. Within this logic, shared by both the United States and Japan, Russia's participation in these formats is desirable (and even necessary) and serves the purpose of preventing its rapprochement with China. It is worth noting that this approach objectively limits the anti-Russian attitude of Japan.

China itself does not dispute the military-political dominance of the United States in the region, but it is much more active tactically. In particular, Beijing is increasingly trying to push the United States away from solving the Taiwan problem, moving it to the level of exclusively Sino-Taiwanese cooperation. China is trying to gain a position of superiority in all territorial disputes: both with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku) in the East China Sea, and with Southeast Asian countries over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. In addition, China has consistently strengthened its role as the main mediator in the situation with North Korea. It is also in China's interest to keep Russia from moving closer to the West.

The mentioned steps of the Chinese side make foreign analysts say that China has stopped adhering to the wait-and-see formula of Deng Xiaoping and is beginning to actively project its power outside. Examples include: the aggravation of the situation in the South China Sea in the spring of 2010, when in response to the entry of American ships into the exclusive economic zone of China, the Chinese side declared the South China Sea a zone of its key interests; China's special position on the North Korean issue; active modernization of the Chinese armed forces ²⁴.

Meanwhile, the growth of concerns is based more on expectations than on real steps taken by the Chinese leadership. China's military-political line in the region is fundamentally different from the US strategy and is based on the postulate of non-interference of the PRC in the internal affairs of other countries. In the context of this position, we can also consider the fact that there are no Chinese military bases on the territory of other states. Even the steps to establish a series of strategic points in the Indian Ocean (Gwadar ports in Pakistan, Sittwe ports in Myanmar, Habantota ports in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong Ports in Bangladesh) are still within the scope of this doctrine.²⁵ In its quest to consolidate the belt of good neighborliness with small and medium-sized countries along the entire perimeter of its borders, China is much more active not on the Quiet-

in the Pacific direction, and in Central Asia within the framework of the SCO, thus trying to strategically eliminate the danger of a "second front" of competition with the United States.

It is in the interests of small and medium-sized countries in the region to maintain a dialogue with all major regional and non-regional players. It is for the purposes of developing such a dialogue that they use both the ARF and other structures created around ASEAN. Competition between different centers of power without a clear predominance of any of them allows small and medium-sized countries to develop economic integration and protect themselves from China.

However, unlike Japan, which in its 2010 Defense Strategy focuses on the perception of China as a potential foreign policy threat, ²⁶ small and medium-sized regional players are unlikely to identify China as a military-political problem so clearly.²⁷ Military cooperation with the United States is not openly defined by them as a way to respond to the strengthening of China. Interaction with Washington is explained by the multiplicity of goals and the need to jointly combat transnational problems (maritime piracy, terrorist threats to sea lines of communication in the region, natural disasters). Examples of such cooperation include joint US naval exercises with Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the US-Thailand military exercise Cobra Gold, and US-Vietnam military ties.

One should also take into account the fact that over the past two decades, the region has shifted its priorities from the problems of "hard" security to the issues of the relationship between politics and economics.²⁸ Production networks and mutual investment flows have become real factors for strengthening regional interdependence, and any major interstate conflict is economically unprofitable. Representatives of East Asian countries at the highest level emphasize that the nature of threats has changed. Although such chronic hotbeds of instability (the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan issue, the complex territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas, bilateral interstate contradictions in Southeast Asia) remain important, new threats have become more urgent than traditional ones.

At the same time, it should be understood that the emphasis on new security aspects avoids open discussion of military-strategic threats and at the same time uses the strategy of creating limited alliances without full-scale commitments.²⁹ For example, Thailand, which is actively developing ties with China, simultaneously has the status of a"US non-NATO ally". There is also a reverse process of developing military contacts between the countries of Southeast Asia and the PRC at different levels. At the same time, as former Philippine President Fidel Ramos notes, they want to see the United States as a "good neighbor" who will maintain its presence, but will not interfere while other countries solve their own internal problems.³⁰ The same approach allows small and medium-sized countries to develop military ties not only with the United States and China, but also with Russia, India, Australia, and the United Kingdom.

In the current situation, as a guarantee of their security, the ASEAN countries would definitely like to maintain their intermediate position between non-regional players in East Asia. It is no coincidence that Thai Prime Minister Aphisit Vetchachiwa, in his address to regional leaders at the opening of the 14th ASEAN Summit in February 2009, stressed that ASEAN will continue to occupy a special position among the growth poles in the Asia-Pacific region31.

Earlier, the expert community discussed the idea that the countries of the region should not

They seek to counterbalance the growth of China's influence by developing relations with other powers, but, on the contrary, they try to extract their own benefits from the strengthening of the PRC's economic power.³² The events of 2010 in the South China Sea, on the contrary, became the basis for a whole series of publications about the danger of Chinese activity, which pushes the countries of the region to seek alliances with non-regional players.³³ In reality, the ASEAN countries still rely on their own dialogue structures and adhere to the normative principles collectively known as the" ASEAN Way ^{" 34}. It is in this context that the invitation of Russia and the United States to participate in the EAC, issued by the decision of the 5th East Asia Summit in Hanoi in 2010, should be evaluated.

* * *

The current post-crisis situation in the region is characterized by the tactical activation of China in both the economic and political spheres. But in the foreseeable future, the PRC is unlikely to have complete freedom of maneuver in East Asia. In military and political terms, US superiority in the region remains, but the ways to maintain it are undergoing changes. For the first time, multilateral formats of cooperation are beginning to seem more effective to the United States than the system of traditional alliances, since they allow us to establish a dialogue with China. At the same time, the United States is even ready to accept the presence of Russia in them. Under these conditions, it is advantageous for small and medium-sized countries to support the competition of China, the United States and other players in the region, as this allows them to solve the problems of economic development and maintain their own political autonomy. Their successful efforts to maintain such competition contribute to the consolidation of ASEAN's political subjectivity and the formation of a leader-free system in East Asia.

The lack of leadership in this case means that there is no clear struggle for political influence in the region among the most powerful players. At the same time, however, there is a redistribution of economic opportunities within the East Asian subsystem. In addition, economic competition, which unfolds against the background of a rather weak political confrontation, is mitigated by economic integration processes. In total, these factors do not yet give grounds to consider the conflict scenario of regional development as probable.

Resume

The article analyzes the economic and political situation in East Asia after the crisis. The positions of the main major players - the United States, China, Japan, as well as small and medium-sized countries in the region-are considered. The conclusion is made that the post-crisis situation is increasingly favorable for the tendency to limit leadership aspirations in East Asia, which is facilitated by both the political and economic strategy of the main regional players in relation to each other, and the growth of the political subjectivity of small and medium-sized countries represented by ASEAN.

Keywords: East Asia; USA; China; Japan; Russia; EU; ASEAN; regional leadership; regional system.

Abstract

The article analyses economic and political situation in East Asia after the crisis. Positions of the major players (the US, China, Japan) as well as regional smaller and middle range states are examined. The author comes to a conclusion that the post-crises situation is getting increasingly conducive for the restriction of the leadership aspirations in East Asia. Both the political and economic strategy of the main regional players towards each other, as well as the rise of political subjectness of smaller and middle-range states united in ASEAN do contribute to such a restriction.

Keywords: East Asia; the USA; China; Japan; Russia; the EU; ASEAN; regional leadership; regional system.

Notes

¹ In particular, according to the World Bank, China's economic growth rates in 2008 and 2009 were 9.6% and 9.1%, respectively, having experienced a decline of more than 4% compared to the pre-crisis year. The US economy grew at a rate of 0.0% and -2.6%, respectively, over the same period (a decrease of 4.5% compared to 2007, World Bank data, available online).: http:// www.worldbank.org). GDP growth in the EU was 0.1% and -4.5% [data from Eurostat, available at: <url>]. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/). Japan's GDP growth is -1.2% and -5.2% (World Bank). Estimates of East Asian economic growth in 2010 are 8.9% (World Bank), 2.9% in the United States (Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, available at: <url>). http://www.bea.gov EU - 1.5% (Eurostat). Thus, in 2010, the growth rate of the East Asian economies is three times higher than that of the United States and almost 5-6 times that of the EU countries.

² For more information, see East and Politics: Political systems, political cultures, political processes: Scientific method. complex / Ed. by A. D. Voskresensky, Moscow: Aspect Press, 2011. pp. 6-90, 349-568 [Vostok i politika: politicheskie sistemy, politicheskie kul'tury, politicheskie processy: Nauch. -metod. Kompleks / A.D. Voskressenskiy. M.: Aspekt Press, 2011. P. 6 - 90, 349 - 568].

³ In this regard, it is not accidental that new terms such as "Central and Eastern Asia" have appeared, reflecting the parameters of the relationship between processes occurring in Eastern and Central Asia (See: Bogaturov A.D. Central and Eastern Asia in modern International Politics/A.D. Bogaturov // East (Oriens). - 2005. - N1. - С.102 - 119 [Bogaturov AD. Central'no-Vostochnaja Azija v sovremennoj mezhdunarodnoj politike // Vostok (Oriens). - 2005. - N1. - P. 102-119]), or "Greater East Asia", which focuses on the growing interdependence of East Asia and its surrounding regions (See: "Greater East Asia": World Politics and Regional Transformations/ A. D. Voskresenskiy, Moscow: MGIMO-Universitet, 2010 ["Bol'shaja Vostochnaja Azija": mirovaja politika i regional ' NYE transformacii / AD. Voskressenskiy. Moscow: MGIMO-Universitet, 2010]).

⁴ This trend was contradicted by the political line of the United States under J. R. R. Tolkien. However, the crisis that coincided with the coming to power of the Obama administration is precisely a reaction to this contradiction.

⁵ For more information about this period, see: Bogaturov HELL. Great powers in the Pacific. Bogaturov A. D. Istoriya i teoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy v Vostochnoi Azii posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny (1945-1995) [History and Theory of International Relations in East Asia after the Second World War (1945-1995)]. Istorija i teorija mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij v Vostochnoj Azii posle vtoroj mirovoj vojny (1945 - 1995) M.: Konvert-MONF, 1997].

^{Hatch W.} 6 Asia's Flying Geese: How Regionalization Shapes Japan/W.F. Hatch. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010. P.2 - 7.

⁷ Ibid, P.96.

⁸ The terms "real" (or "deep") integration were introduced into scientific use by A. A. Rogozhin [A. A. Rogozhin. South-East Asia and Integration/A. A. Rogozhin// East/The West: Regional Subsystems and Regional Problems of International Relations/ Edited by A. D. Voskresensky, Moscow: MGIMO, ROSSPEN, 2002, pp. 358-359. Jugo-Vostochnaja Azija i integracija // Vostok/Zapad: Regional'nye podsistemy i regional'nye problemy mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij / A.D. Voskressenskiy. - M.: MGIMO, ROSSPJeN, 2002. S.358 - 359]).

^{Hatch W.} 9 Op.cit., P.5.

^{Pempel T.J.} 10 How Bush Bungled Asia: Militarism, Economic Indifference and Unilateralism Have Weakened the United States Across Asia/ T.J. Pempel // The Pacific Review. Vol.21, No.5. P.566 - 569

^{Hatch W.} 11 Op.cit., P.4.

¹² For more information, see Mamonov M. S. System of foreign policy priorities of modern China/M. V. Mamonov// Sovremennaja mirovaja politika: Prikladnoj analiz/AD. Bogaturov, M. V. Sistema vneshnepoliticheskih prioritetov sovremennogo Kitaja // Sovremennaja mirovaja politika: Prikladnoj analiz / Moscow: Aspect Press, 2009. M: Aspekt Press, 2009. S.415 - 437].

¹³ For example, public opinion polls conducted in Thailand in the mid-2000s showed that 76% of respondents identified China as a good neighbor and ally, while only 9% rated the United States as such (Keliher M. Dragon seizes market share/M. Keliher// Asia Times. 10.02.2004)

¹⁴ For more information, see: Galenovich HUME. The motto of Hu Jintao: social harmony in China, Moscow: Monuments of Historical Thought, 2006, pp. 7-12; Borokh O., Lomanov A. Modest Charm of China//Rgo et Contra. 2007. Volume 11. N6, p. 42

[Galenovich J.M. Deviz Hu Czin'tao: social'naja garmonija v Kitae. M.: Pamjatniki istoricheskoj mysli, 2006. P.7 - 12; Borokh O., Lomanov A. Skromnoe obajanie Kitaja//Pro et Contra. 2007. Tom 11. N6, P. 42].

¹⁵ In 1990, relations were normalized with Indonesia and Singapore, and in 1991 with Vietnam and Brunei. In 1991, China also withdrew its support for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

¹⁶ China Sets Up $10 bn Fund for SE Asia// The Bangkok Post. 18.04.2009; ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations [Electronic resource]/The ASEAN website. Access mode: http://www.asean.org/ 5874.htm

¹⁷ Discussion at the second MGIMO-IFANS-KIMP Trilateral Conference [Seoul, 22.11.2010].

¹⁸ MOU Signed on Myanmar-China Oil Pipeline. 19.06.2009[Electronic resource]/Website of the China National Oil and Gas Corporation. Режим доступа: http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/ press/newsreleases/MOU_signed_of_Myanmar %EF%BC%8DChina_0iLPipeline.htm

^{Pomfret J.} 19 China's billions reap rewards in Cambodia/J. Pomfret// The Washington Post. 20.11.2010.

²⁰ Asia Development Outlook 2010: Macroeconomic Management beyond the Crisis. Mandaluyong City: ADB, 2010. Р.15.

²¹ This fact was kindly pointed out to the author by the Director of the MGIMO ASEAN Center, Doctor of Historical Sciences V. V. Sumsky.

²² Japan Vows $5,5 bln. Aid to Mekong Region at Summit/Reuters. 6.11.2009.

^{Ciorciari J.} 23 The Balance of Great-Power Influence in Contemporary Southeast Asia/ J.D. Ciorciari// International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. 2009. Vol.9. P.166;Sheridan G. Keeping US Interests in Place Suits Us/G. Sheridan// The Australian. 06.11.2010.

²⁴ According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in 2008, 25% of the Chinese navy could be considered modern (compared to 7% in 2004), 46% of the submarine fleet (compared to 10% in 2004). 20% of the Chinese air force consisted of fourth-generation fighters, which is twice as high as in 2004 (The Military Balance. L: IISS, 2010. P. 377). The resonance was also caused by reports about China's development of the fifth-generation J-20 fighter, which appeared just on the eve of the visit of US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to China (the Pentagon raised a Chinese fighter in the air/ Nezavisimaya gazeta. 12.01.2011 ].

^{Kostecka D.J.} 25 Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy's Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean/D.J. Kostecka//Naval War College Review. 2011 (Winter). Vol.64, No.1. P.59 - 78.

²⁶ Summary of National Defense Program Guidelines. Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010 (provisional translation) [Электронный pecypc]/Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet web-site. Режим доступа: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/ kakugikettei/2010/summary_ndpg_e.pdf

²⁷ As far back as the late 1990s, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad remarked, " Why should we be afraid of China? If you define a country as your future enemy, it will become your present enemy" (Quoted in Ciorciari J. Op. cit., p. 166).

²⁸ Подробнее см. Bitzinger R.A. Why East Asian War is Unlikely/ R.A. Bitzinger, B. Desker// Survival. 2008. Vol. 50, No.6. P.105 - 128.

^{Ciorciari J.} 29 Op.cit., P.168.

^{Ramos F.} 30 Obama, the Pacific President?/F. Ramos// The Guardian. 08.02.2009.

³¹ Statement by His Excellency Abhisit Vejajiva Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand at the Opening Ceremony of the 14th ASEAN Summit Cha-am/Hua Hin, 28 February 2009[Electronic resource] / The ASEAN website. Access mode: http:www.asean.org/22319.pdf

^KangD.C. 32 China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia/D.C. Kang. N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2007. P.3 - 17

³³ See, for example: Caryl C. Panda-Hugger Hangover / C. Caryl/ / Foreign Policy. August, 2010.

³⁴ The "ASEAN Way" refers to the special approach of South-East Asian countries to inter-State relations and is based on their acceptance of two basic behavioral norms, expressed in the Indonesian terms "mushawarah" (consultation) and "mufakat" (consensus). This approach does not imply the creation of a mechanism for solving problems, but rather aims to avoid conflict situations both in relations between the Association countries themselves and in the Association's relations with external players. Подробнее см. Weathenbee D.E. International Relations in Southeast Asia: the struggle for autonomy/D.E. Weatherbee. Lanham: Rowman&Littlefield publishers, inc., 2009. P.128 - 129.

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