In connection with the 150th anniversary of the birth of the Korean politician and statesman, Korean Envoy to Russia in 1900-1905 Lee Bomjin (1852-1911), which is celebrated in September 2002, there is a growing interest in the fate of this Korean diplomat in Russia and Korea. This article is a brief history of his life in 1906-1911, from the time of the closure of the Korean mission in St. Petersburg to his tragic death. This is the most poorly understood period of Lee Bomjin's life and activities.

Lee Bomjin was born into a family related to Korean Wang Kojong. Bomjin's father was widely known in Korea as a famous warrior who led the Korean struggle against French aggression in 1866.

Lee Bomjin himself, who passed the public office exam with flying colors in 1872, first rose to prominence in the political arena in 1884, when he became a supporter of prominent Korean reformers Kim Okkyun and Park Yongho. During and after the failed coup d'etat of December 4, 1884, when Chinese troops entered Korea and overthrew the reformist government. Lee Beomjin and his supporters, by their decisive actions, prevented the Chinese from capturing Wang Kojong and his family and sending them to China. Since then, Lee Bomjin has enjoyed great honor and special patronage from the Korean wang. The latter appointed him to the post of head of the state archives, which usually only people from the highest aristocratic families were nominated for.

From the second half of the 1980s, especially after the signing of the second Russo-Korean land trade Treaty in 1888, Lee Bomjin began to adhere to a foreign policy orientation towards Russia. He becomes one of those political figures who formed the core of the emerging pro-Russian group in the ruling circles of Korean society. It was not yet a "Russian party," as Russian diplomats sometimes mistakenly called it. It was a small group of Korean statesmen and public figures that had not yet formed (unlike the pro-Chinese and pro-Japanese ones), who believed that only Russia could protect Korea from the aggressive aspirations of Japan, China and the Western powers, primarily England. Wang Kojong's wife, Min Myung - sung, played an active, if not leading, role in this group. In this connection, the statement of the Russian General P. F. Unterberger after the murder of the Japanese on October 8, 1895, is not without interest. Min Myung-seong: "Gifted, according to those who knew her personally, with a brilliant mind and a subtle feminine instinct, she was firmly convinced that the good of Korea depends on the friendship and patronage of Russia, and this idea she carried out everywhere for the rest of her life, without hiding it to anyone." ¹

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Figures who focused on Russia in their foreign policy were also supported by Wang Kojong himself, who, however, acted indecisively, and sometimes, under pressure from Japan, was forced to pursue a line that did not meet the interests of Russia.

Lee Bomjin and other supporters of the Russian orientation were particularly active after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, when Japan, after defeating China and achieving the declaration of Korean independence from China under the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty, decided to establish its undivided political and economic dominance on the Korean peninsula. During the Japanese attack on the Gyeongbokgung Wan Palace on the night of October 7-8, 1895, and the murder of Min Myung-seong, Lee Bom-jin was in the palace and fled from there, first to the American and then to the Russian diplomatic mission, where he testified to the Charge d'affaires of Russia in Seoul, K. I. Weber, regarding the Japanese attack on the palace. by relaying Wang Kojun's request for help to him.

While in the Russian mission. Lee Bomjin organized a detachment of several thousand Korean soldiers and officers loyal to Kojong and moved it to the palace on November 28, 1895, to free Wang from Japanese captivity. However, this attempt failed. The detachment was dispersed by Japanese soldiers. Then Lee Bomjin, along with other pro - Russian figures - Park Jungyan and Lee Yunyeon-began to draw up a plan for Kojong's escape from Gyeongbokgung Palace to the Russian mission building. At the same time, he convinced Kojong to appeal to K. I. Weber and A. N. Speyer, who was appointed as the new Charge d'affaires of Russia in Seoul, with a request to shelter him and his heir in the mission. The Russian representatives in Seoul went along with Wang's request. On February 11, 1896, Kojon secretly left his palace and, together with his heir, took refuge in the Russian mission, where he remained until February 20, 1897.

Upon arriving at the Russian mission, Wang Kojong formed a new government, in which Lee Bomjin first served as Vice Minister of the court and Minister of Agriculture and Trade, and then, at the insistence of K. I. Weber, was appointed Minister of Justice. After taking up such high-ranking positions in the government, Lee Bomjin was primarily involved in the investigation of Min Myungseong's murder. Under his leadership, a second investigation was conducted into the murder case, as a result of which the decision of the Japanese court in Hiroshima in January 1896, which left all participants in the attack on Wang's palace and the murder of Min Myung-seong without punishment, was revised, and on the basis of a huge factual material, it was proved that the organizers of the plot and The Japanese arrived, led by Miura Goro, the envoy to Seoul.

In the following years, Lee Bomjin switched to diplomatic work. In 1896, he was appointed Minister to the United States, and in 1899 - to Paris. From there, in 1900, Lee Bomjin arrived in St. Petersburg as an Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary at the court of Nicholas P.

From the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 and the occupation of Korea by Japanese troops, the Japanese government imposed a series of agreements on the Korean government, according to which Korea became an ally of Japan in the war against Russia. On February 23, 1904, the Japan-Korea Protocol was signed. The essence of it was that Japan and Korea pledged to provide each other with mutual support in the war against Russia and that Korea became an "enemy of Russia".

In this situation, on March 2, 1904, the Korean envoy to St. Petersburg, Lee Bomjin, visited the Russian Foreign Minister, V. N. Lamsdorff, and informed him that a few days ago he had received a telegram from the Foreign Minister in Seoul ordering him to leave St. Petersburg, but that he had decided to remain at his post until he received it. direct instructions from the Emperor of Korea. On the same day, a telegram was received in St. Petersburg from the envoy in Beijing, P. M. Les-

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sarah, in which he informed about the request of the Korean emperor to convey to the Russian government that the order for Lee Bomjin to leave St. Petersburg was given under pressure from the Japanese and that the emperor would like his representative not to leave St. Petersburg ² . Lee Bomjin and members of the Korean mission were allowed to stay in St. Petersburg. On a note written by V. N. Lamsdorff on March 2 regarding Lee Bomjin's request, Nicholas II noted: "Of course, he can stay and ignore the orders of his traitorous superior. Adjutant-General Kuropatkin thought of taking him with him to the army, where in time the envoy might be of some use to us in our advance into Korea." ³ At the same time, in response to Lee Bomjin's request for monetary assistance, Nicholas II ordered that "7,325 rubles be allocated for the maintenance of the Korean mission every three months until the legal status of the named person is finally clarified." ⁴

While staying in St. Petersburg, Lee Bomjin tried in every possible way to assist Russia in the war against Japan. So, in September 1904, he informed the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops A. N. Kuropatkin that in the north of Korea "a Russophile party is organized on solid foundations", whose activities extend to the entire area between Seoul and Hamgyong Province, and that "the Korean emperor and his government still rely on Russian help and await the arrival of the Russians They are firmly convinced that " the presence of Russian troops will not be accompanied by the acts of violence that Koreans now suffer from the Japanese." Lee Bomjin himself, in response to a request from Korea sent in connection with the Japanese statements about Russia's intentions to occupy Korea and turn it into a Russian province, replied that "Russia wants the liberation of Korea, just as it liberated Bulgaria and Serbia in the Turkish war," and advised his compatriots "not to listen to Japanese insinuations." ⁵ .

On the night of November 17-18, 1905, the Japanese colonialists forced the Korean government to sign the "Treaty of Patronage", under which Korea transferred to the Government of Japan and its diplomatic representatives abroad the management of foreign relations of the country, and at the Korean court a resident general was appointed as a Japanese representative to manage diplomatic and other affairs. The articles of the treaty formalized the transformation of Korea into a Japanese protectorate. In this regard, Lee Bomjin conveyed to the Russian government that the Korean emperor was protesting against the treaty imposed on Korea and therefore refused to ratify it.

After learning that Japan had imposed a protectorate treaty on Korea, the Russian Foreign Ministry ordered all Russian representatives abroad to bring this to the attention of foreign governments. "The Emperor of Korea," said a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, " through his representative in St. Petersburg, reports on the outrageous violence committed against him by the Japanese in order to obtain a protectorate over Korea. Hayashi, the Japanese envoy to Seoul, General Hasegana, and Marquis Ito entered the emperor's palace during the night with a military force and demanded that he sign the protectorate document. When the Emperor refused to do so, these individuals broke into the monarch's private quarters and seized the seals of the Imperial and Foreign Ministries to attach to the act they had drawn up, which the Tokyo government passes off as a protectorate agreement between Korea and Japan. The Emperor of Korea continues to refuse his signature and vigorously protests against Japan's violence and violation of the basic laws of international law that ensure the independence of the Korean State." ⁶

But the Western powers supported Japan. At the end of November 1905. They recognized the Japanese protectorate over Korea and recalled their envoys from Seoul. In creating-

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Under the current circumstances, the Russian Foreign Ministry tried to resume the activities of its mission in Seoul, which undoubtedly showed the desire of the Russian government to nullify the terms of the protectorate treaty and restore the status of an independent Korean state. But the Japanese government's categorical refusal to allow a Russian representative with the rank of a diplomatic agent to enter Seoul forced Russia to agree to appoint only a consular agent to Seoul. In early 1906, the Korean mission in St. Petersburg was also closed.

In connection with the changed situation, Nicholas II ordered to give Lee Bomjin "another 5,016 rubles.for the costs of returning the entire Korean mission to their homeland." At the same time, Lee Bomjin was awarded the Order of St. John the Baptist. Stanislaus, 1st Class, and his son Lee Wijon (First Secretary of the Korean Mission) with the Order of St. John the Baptist. Stanislav of the 3rd degree. But then, after receiving a "request from Kojong to detain Lee Bomjin for a while longer" in St. Petersburg, Nicholas II ordered that "the allocated amount should not be given out in full, but monthly, in subsidies of 100 rubles each." ⁷

After that, the financial situation of Lee Bomjin, who found himself in Russia in the position of a political emigrant, sharply worsened. Together with his secretary and servant, he moved into a small apartment he had rented in the New Village suburb of St. Petersburg. He was also dependent on the family of his son Li Wijon (also known as Li Vladimir Sergeevich), who in 1905 converted to Orthodoxy and married a Russian citizen, Baroness Elizabeth Nolken. In 1907, Lee Bomjin instructed his son to join the Gojong envoys Lee Joon and Lee Sunsol who arrived in St. Petersburg and go with them to the international peace conference in The Hague and expose Japan's aggressive policy in Korea. ⁸

Finding himself in a difficult situation, Lee Bomjin wrote to Nicholas II on January 31 (February 12), 1908, saying that he had received a letter from his Emperor Gojong, thanks to the courtesy of the Russian Consul General in Seoul. The emperor, " although a prisoner of the Japanese in his palace, still turns his eyes to the north, in the direction of Russia, which he has not ceased to look at as the future liberator of his and his people." Lee Bomjin reported that the Emperor of Korea addressed him with the words: "You, my dear nephew, although you are in a difficult financial situation, still remain in St. Petersburg and ask for help from the powerful Emperor of Russia; even after my death, you will remain in St. Petersburg. I can't help you financially, because the Japanese control all my income and expenses."

"I was deeply saddened by this letter," Lee Bomjin continued. "My own property in Korea was confiscated by the Japanese. The Japanese, hating me and my son for our steadfast belief that Russia is a true friend of Korea, threaten us both with execution upon our return to our homeland. My son, who has remained in Russia, has converted to the Orthodox faith, married a subject of Your Imperial Majesty, and has a child by her. Thanks to the grace of Your Imperial Majesty, at the request of the late Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Lamsdorf, I have received a monthly subsidy that allows me to live modestly in my New Village. Now diplomatic relations with Korea have ceased, Count Lamsdorff has passed away, and I do not have the honor of seeing the new Foreign Minister. And it is only my concern for the existence of my children that makes me appeal directly to Your Imperial Majesty. My son graduated from a military school in St. Petersburg, speaks French and English, knows a little Russian, and is familiar with the history of Europe and Asia. He is eager to work in the service of Your Imperial Majesty, so that he can feed his family with his work." The letter ended with a request to give his son "an opportunity to work hard.".. in Saint Petersburg

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or in Vladivostok", because he is "happy to serve everywhere", no matter where he is appointed ⁹ .

In response to the request of the Minister of the Court, Baron V. B. Fredericks, who personally accepted Lee Bomjin on behalf of Nicholas II, to grant at least part of his request, Foreign Minister A. P. Izvolsky said that Lee Bomjin continues to receive a monthly subsidy of 100 rubles appointed by the emperor and that after the conclusion of peace with Japan, out of the total amount of 5 016 rubles. he was given 2,600 rubles. "As for the petition for the arrangement of his son's fate," Izvolsky wrote," I would not have encountered any obstacles to it, but I would have considered it more convenient not to give him a place in our Far Eastern suburbs, and in general I would have considered it desirable, if possible, not to make this matter unnecessarily public. " ¹⁰ The fact was that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was afraid of causing criticism from Japan if Lee Bomjin's son was appointed to any official position.

Meanwhile, Lee Bomjin's monthly subsidy of 100 rubles was due to expire in February 1910. In this connection, S. D. Sazonov, who by that time had been appointed Foreign Minister in Izvolsky's place, not wanting to leave Lee Bomjin without means of support and not finding it possible either to raise the issue of a pension for him from the Russian government or to suggest that he return to Korea, instructed the Consul General in Seoul A. S. Somon to find out the question of The Korean government awarded Lee Bomjin a pension of 1,200 rubles a year. Sazonov informed Somov that the Korean envoy Lee Bomjin, who has not left St. Petersburg since the breakdown of relations between Russia and Japan, is currently "in an extremely difficult financial situation, because, according to him, the Japanese confiscated his personal property, as a result of which he does not have any money", which is still the case today. Lee Bomjin was living "on a paltry subsidy (100 rubles per month)" and that when the subsidy expired, Lee Bomjin was likely to apply "for a lifetime pension in the same amount".

"Meanwhile," Sazonov wrote, " the satisfaction of this petition presents at the present time more significant difficulties than before. The need for an explanation of the reasons for the allocation of this sum by our legislative body will somewhat reveal the mystery of the present question and may attract the very sensitive attention of the Japanese. The latter are extremely hostile to Mr. Chin-pom-I's stay in St. Petersburg, considering the latter a secret agent of Korea in Russia. Given the current state of affairs in the Far East, it is advisable to avoid any causes of misunderstandings on this ground and try to eliminate the slightest reasons for this. In view of this, I consider it untimely to re-initiate the issue of a pension from the Russian Government to Mr. Chin-pom-I.

On the other hand, it is incompatible with our dignity to leave the said Korean without material means of support.

Under such conditions, and taking into account Mr. Chin-pom-yi's categorical refusal to return to Korea, where he fears for his safety, the only way out of this situation would be to force the Korean Government to grant Mr. Chin-pom-Yi an annual pension of at least 1,200 rubles a year. His long service in the diplomatic field might serve as a just reason for allocating this sum to him.

It would therefore be advisable for you to raise this matter confidentially, if necessary, in a conversation with Viscount Sone (Resident General of Japan in Seoul. - B. P.), giving your appeal a personal character and not mentioning it at all

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about monetary subsidies received by the now named Korean from the Imperial Government. You could have confided to the Resident General that the Imperial Government, concerned about the speedy elimination of all sensitive issues that remained unresolved after the war, would like to find a way to resolve the present case as well." ¹¹

In the government circles of Russia, which after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese war was not ready for revenge by a new military conflict with Japan, a group began to gain the upper hand, which took a course to improve relations with Japan in the context of the brewing world war. In this vein, we should also consider the question of the Russian government's attitude to the fate of Lee Bomjin. Lee Bomjin's subsidies should not be considered purely philanthropic, charitable assistance. This was a tribute to a man-a politician and diplomat who devoted his entire life to fighting against Japan's aggressive aspirations on the Korean peninsula, in the name of protecting the sovereignty and independence of the Korean state, relying on the support of Russia.

The Russian government, which until the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 was in favor of maintaining the status quo in Korea and was forced to retreat on the Korean issue after the war and accept the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over Korea, saw in Lee Bomjin a true and staunch supporter of Korea's rapprochement with Russia and was ready to provide all possible assistance and assistance. But it also had to look back at Japan, which saw Lee Bom-jin as its ardent enemy.

In compliance with S. D. Sazonov's order, A. S. Somov, in the absence of the Sone Resident General, requested his deputy Ishizuka about the possibility of assigning Lee Bomjin a pension from the Korean government. The latter replied that he couldn't get a pension for Lee Bomjin. According to him, the Korean envoy in St. Petersburg "not only showed disobedience", but allegedly also seized 3,000 rubles sent to him for the trip, sold the state furniture for 6,000 rubles and appropriated 2,000 rubles of state money, and thus, according to the calculations of the resident general, the Korean envoy has already received about 11,000 rubles. Meanwhile, he said, many other Korean officials who are less culpable do not receive pensions. However, the Korean government agreed to allow Lee Bomjin to "return to Korea, while promising not to hold him accountable for old misdeeds." However, Ishizuka added, he will be "under surveillance." When Somov asked what this supervision would mean, the source said that Lee Bomjin "will enjoy full freedom, but in case of departure, travel or absence, he must notify about it and ask for permission."

The Russian Consul General did not trust the representative of the general residency and believed that, despite all these assurances, if Lee Bomjin agreed to return to his homeland, it was necessary to "secure a formal promise from the general residency regarding its complete inviolability", because the Japanese, as he reported, still consider Lee Bomjin "the main inspiration of a hostile war". the parties will use him and very possibly find a pretext to bring him to justice for some minor event. " ¹²

In May 1910, the Japanese General Residence in Korea announced to A. S. Somov that it was ready to provide Lee Bomjin with guarantees of inviolability. Somov telegraphed to St. Petersburg on this occasion: "The Japanese residency does not find it possible to grant pensions to Lee Bomjin, but if he returns to Korea, it guarantees him full immunity and is ready to allocate a travel allowance. The answer is given with the knowledge of the Japanese Foreign Minister. We are grateful for your friendly initiative." When this telegram was shown to Lee Bomjin, he stated,

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what " refuses to return to Korea for two reasons: 1) out of fear for his immunity and 2 )in view of his assumption that the former Korean emperor would not like him to leave Russia. " ¹³

Meanwhile, in St. Petersburg, the issue of extending the grant to Lee Bomjin was resolved. The chief administrator of the Imperial Chancellery wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on this occasion: "The Sovereign Emperor, following my most recent report [on] the request of the former Korean Envoy to the Russian Court, Prince Chin-pom-I, to extend the grant he received until February 1 of this year, has most graciously ordered: to make Prince Chin-pom"And, out of His Imperial Majesty's own sums, a top secret allowance, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of one hundred rubles a month, for two years."

Informing you of this Supreme command, and transmitting the two hundred rubles that are to be paid out for the period from February 1 to April 1 of this year, I humbly request that you inform me of the receipt of these rubles. As for the further production of the said allowance, it will be sent monthly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the 20th day of each month. " ¹⁴

Lee Bomjin was most distressed by the news that on August 22, 1910, the Japanese imposed on the Korean government the treaty of annexation of Korea by Japan. Deprived of any opportunity to oppose the treaty, and unable to find any other way to take revenge on the Japanese for the violated honor of their homeland, Lee Bomjin, in desperation, decided to commit suicide in protest against the annexation, following an old Korean custom. From the report of the Mayor of St. Petersburg, Major-General Wendarf, dated January 13, 1911, it follows: "On January 13, at 12 o'clock in the morning, the former Korean Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Your Imperial Majesty, Chin-pom-I, 59 years old, who lived in the house No. 5 on Chernorechenskaya Street, was deprived of save yourself by hanging" ¹⁵ .

After the suicide, three telegrams were found in the apartment of the deceased, addressed to Emperor Nicholas II of Russia, former Korean Emperor Gojong and his eldest son, who remained in Seoul with his mother and sister. All of them were of similar content. This became known from a telegram from Lee Bomjin's second son, Lee Wijon, who remained in St. Petersburg, to his older brother in Seoul with the notification of his father's death, which was sent by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Consul General Somov for transmission to Lee Bomjin's eldest son. "My dear father," said the telegram, " committed suicide and left me a small sum to live on. After his death, telegrams were found, one addressed to our former emperor, the other to you. The contents of the telegram addressed to you are as follows: "Our country has perished, and His Majesty has lost all power. I'm desperate that I can't take revenge and punish our enemies. That's why I have to commit suicide today. " ¹⁶

The news of the desperate step of Lee Bomjin, a dedicated fighter for the independence of his homeland, an ardent enemy of the Japanese enslavers of Korea, who defended the independence and independence of the Korean state as the Korean envoy to Russia and at the same time advocated the strengthening of Korean-Russian relations, shocked Seoul. Somov described how this news was received in Korea and how the Japanese authorities reacted to the death of Lee Bomjin very expressively in his report: "The news of the suicide of the Korean envoy in St. Petersburg, Yi - pom-Chin, spread all over Seoul with lightning speed and made the most difficult impression.

Only a brief article about the suicide appeared in the local newspapers. Yet the details were not, of course, leaked by the censors.

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Oddly enough, suicide was the biggest nuisance that the former envoy could have done to the Japanese. If he had previously killed dozens of Japanese, the resentment would not have been so great... According to Korean and Japanese concepts, such revenge is both rude and imperfect and unworthy of an educated person. For revenge to be cruel and humiliating to your enemies, you need to do exactly what I-pom-Chin did. He threw a stain that couldn't be washed away. To refute the suicide of the former envoy, committed so openly, is not possible, and all the shame, according to Japanese concepts, fell on the Japanese. It is clear, therefore, that they are making every effort to hush up and silence this deplorable and offensive matter for them. " ¹⁷

St. Petersburg reacted quite differently to the news of Lee Bomjin's suicide. The incident was immediately reported to Tsar Nicholas II, Chairman of the Council of Ministers P. A. Stolypin, and Foreign Minister S. D. Sazonov. The Russian government allocated 500 rubles for the funeral, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as reported by the newspaper "St. Petersburg Vedomosti", took over "all the trouble for the funeral" ¹⁸ . The Russian public reacted with great understanding to the tragic death of a Korean diplomat who remained faithful to the idea of Korea's rapprochement with Russia until the end of his life. Almost all major metropolitan newspapers - Rech, Birzhevye Vedomosti, St. Petersburg Vedomosti, and Novoe Vremya-published reports about the tragic death of the former Korean envoy to Russia. The earliest responders were the St. Petersburg Vedomosti, which in its issue of January 14, 1911, in the "Chronicle" section, included the note "Suicide of the former Korean envoy in St. Petersburg": "On January 13, at 12 o'clock in the afternoon, in an apartment at 5 Chernorechenskaya Street, in Novaya Derevnya, in the dining room, he hanged himself A 59-year-old former Korean envoy to St. Petersburg, Prince Qing-pom-yi, is wearing a belt attached to a lamp hook... The deceased left a letter addressed to the bailiff of the Novoderevensky district, in which he asks not to blame anyone for his death and informs that he is dying in good health and firm memory, as he is unable to bear the loss of independence by Korea and cannot take revenge on its enemies, as well as two telegrams: addressed to the Sovereign Emperor Nicholas II and the Korean Emperor" ¹⁹ .

notes

¹ At the dawn of the XX century. Analytical materials of Russian military orientalism. Edited by Major General V. A. Zolotarev, Moscow, 1994, p. 134.

² Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (hereinafter-AVPRI). F. Kitaysky stoll. Op. 491, 1904 g. 53. L. 182.

³ Lamsdorff's all-important note of February 18 (March 2), 1904 / / Ibid.

⁴ Secret communication of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Izvolsky to the Minister of the Court Baron Fredericks No. 247 of February 18 1908 // In the same place. F. Japanese table. Op. 493, 1900-1911. d. 69. l. 30-31.

⁵ Copy of a letter from the Korean Envoy in St. Petersburg to Adjutant-General Kuropatkin. September 23, 1904 / / Ibid. F. Kitaysky stoll. Op. 491, 1904, d. 60. l. 149-150.

⁶ Draft secret telegram to Russian representatives abroad. Tsarskoe Selo, November 14 (27), 1905 / / Ibid. Op. 491, 1905, d. 73. l. 51.

⁷ AVPRI. F. Japanese table. Op. 493, 1900-1911. d. 69. l. 31.

⁸ See: B. D. Pak. Russia and Korea, Moscow, 1979, pp. 221-222.

⁹ Letter of the former envoy in Petersburg Tshin-Pom-Yi to His Imperial Majesty, St. Petersburg, January 31, 1908 / / AVPRI. F. Japanese table. Op. 493, 1900-1911, d. 69. l. 28-29.

¹⁰ Secret letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Izvolsky to the Minister of the Court Baron Fredericks No. 247 of February 18, 1908 //Ibid., l. 27, 30-31.

¹¹ Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to the Consul General in Korea Somov dated January 12, 1910 / / Ibid. l. 34-35.

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¹² Report of the Russian Consul General Somov to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov. Seoul, April 24, 1910 N 100 // Ibid., pp. 48-49.

¹³ Ibid., l. 43.

¹⁴ Ibid., l. 44.

¹⁵ Ibid., l. 77.

¹⁶ Secret telegram to Somov in Seoul, St. Petersburg, January 15, 1911.

¹⁷ Report of the Russian Consul General in Seoul Somov to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov. Seoul, February 11, 1911 / / AVPRI. On. 493, 1911. d. 21. l. 13-14.

¹⁸ St. Petersburg Vedomosti. 14.01.1911.

¹⁹ Ibid.

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