In 1905, Japan imposed a humiliating Protectorate Treaty on Korea, depriving the country of the right to an independent foreign policy. Emperor Kojong, who refused to sign the treaty, linked his last hope of preserving independence, like many Korean patriots, with the conference of the world's leading powers that opened in The Hague in the summer of 1907. To inform the world community of the truth about Japan's aggressive policy in Korea and to get international help for his country, the Korean emperor secretly sent a delegation to The Hague on a secret mission.

The Peace Conference held in The Hague in June-October 1907 occupies a prominent place in the history of international relations. It made decisions on important and still extremely relevant issues of world politics (on the peaceful settlement of international conflicts, on the laws and customs of land warfare, etc.). A remarkable feature of this conference is that the fate of Korea was to some extent connected with it.

As you know, the defeat of Russia in the war of 1904-1905 opened the way for Japan to finally capture Korea. The biggest step on this path was the forcibly imposed Protectorate Treaty on Korea, which placed the country under the control of the Japanese resident General and deprived it of the rights to foreign relations. It was signed on November 17, 1905, after several days of persuasion and threats, by several Korean ministers. The Prime Minister and, most importantly, Emperor Gojong refused to do so. Usually indecisive and weak-willed, Kojohn showed fortitude this time and told the Japanese official Ito Hirobumi, who was forcing him to sign the bonded contract: "Accepting your offer would mean the death of my country, and therefore I would rather die than accept it" [McKenzie, 1920, p.90]. At the end of November 1905, in a secret message to Tsar Nicholas II, he reported on his "energetic" refusal to sign the Protectorate Treaty and asked to inform the governments of the United States and European countries about this, which was done by Russia through diplomatic channels [Pak, 2004, p.381].

The protectorate period (1905-1910) was a time of unprecedented growth in the Korean people's liberation movement. In many places of the country, uprisings broke out, and partisan detachments, traditionally called the "Army of Justice" (Yiben), operated. Korean political, cultural and educational organizations fought the colonialists with their own methods. Only by brutally suppressing the desperate resistance of the Korean people was Japan able to annex Korea in 1910. During all these simultaneously heroic and tragic years, Emperor Kojon was practically a prisoner of the Japanese, locked up in his palace, and still relied only on the intercession of other powers, primarily the United States and Russia.

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As early as October 1905, Kojon sent a letter with the American missionary G. B. Halbert to the President of the United States, T. B. Halbert. Roosevelt, in which he reported on Japan's plans to forcibly establish a protectorate over Korea. Referring to the US-Korean treaty of 1882, under which the United States pledged, in the event of "injustice" and "despotism" of other powers in relation to Korea, to provide "good services" and thereby show "friendly feelings" to it, Kojon asked the United States to help Korea "in this hour of national danger." The emperor apparently did not know that shortly before this, in July 1905, the United States, in a secret agreement with Japan, agreed to the transfer of Korea to Japanese control in exchange for its abandonment of claims to the Philippines. Therefore, the US administration in every possible way postponed the delivery of G. B. Halbert's letter to Kojohn to the president, and after November 17 refused to accept it on the grounds that, according to Japanese representatives, Korea "voluntarily" accepted the Protectorate Treaty. Although his request for help was ignored, Kojon continued to expect it from the United States [McKenzie, 1920, p. 98-103].

Kojon did not abandon the hope of Russian support even after losing the war with Japan. Meanwhile, since 1906, Russia has been moving from confrontation to reconciliation with Japan for various reasons in its Far Eastern policy. The result was the signing at the end of July 1907 (just during the Hague Peace Conference) of the Russian-Japanese Fishing Convention, the trade treaty and the Convention on the Status Quo in the Far East. The last agreement contained a secret part, in which Japan recognized Northern Manchuria as the sphere of influence of Russia, and Russia, in turn, recognized South Manchuria and Korea as the sphere of influence of Japan [History of Diplomacy, 1963, p.610]. It is clear that in such a situation, Russian assistance to Korea was out of the question. Moreover, the Russian envoy to Seoul, G. A. Planson, convinced the Gojong confidants that Korea should accept the situation and "wait for better days", because "any attempt to resist only worsens the situation "(Pak, 2004, p. 394).

Kojong's hope of outside help for Korea was revived when he learned of the upcoming convening of a peace conference in The Hague in the summer of 1907. Russia, which was responsible for organizing and holding this conference, sent an invitation to Korea in September 1905 [Pak Chong-hye, 1997, p. 250]. It is clear that Korea, which was then being "driven" under the protectorate of Japan, was not up to the conference, and after November 17, 1905, it was deprived of the opportunity to respond to the invitation. The Russian ambassador to the Netherlands, N. V. Charykov, who was involved in the preparation of the conference, mentioned Korea among the countries that did not respond to the invitation to participate in the conference in a letter to the local Foreign Ministry in April 1906 [Koen De Ceuster, 2007, p. 57]. Subsequently, the question of inviting Korea was no longer raised, since the organizers and participants of the Hague Peace Conference took note of the Protectorate Treaty, which transferred Korea's foreign relations to Japan, although they knew about the sharp rejection of what happened to his country by Emperor Gojong.

Despite everything, Kojong continued to believe that his representatives would be able to draw the world's attention to the plight of Korea from the rostrum of the Hague Conference and thus defend its independence. He was supported in these hopes by the American G. B. Halbert. On behalf of the Emperor, officials Yun Tae-hyun and Koo Shin-mok appealed to the Russian Consul G. A. Planson at the end of April 1907 with a request to facilitate their trip to The Hague. They were refused on the grounds that: 1) the Korean problem is not included in the program of The Hague Conference, so the powers preoccupied with other matters will not want to consider it; 2) the conference program has already been fully developed and approved; in these circumstances, the promotion of new issues depends more on other participants than on Russia; 3) the untimely initiation of the Korean question under the current circumstances will worsen the-

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boo of Korea. Another attempt by Koreans to come to The Hague with the assistance of the Russian authorities was equally unsuccessful [Khan, 1961, p. 48].

Still, Kojong managed to send envoys to The Hague. They were Vice-President of the State Council (Euijeongbu) Lee Sang-sol (sometimes mistakenly referred to in the press as Vice-premier and even Prime Minister) and High Court investigator Lee Joon. Both of them participated in the anti-Japanese resistance, were part of the emperor's inner circle, and left their posts to protest the Protectorate Treaty. After secretly passing through Vladivostok, Kojong's envoys reached St. Petersburg. There they were joined by the former secretary of the Korean Mission in Russia, Lee Wee-jong, the son of the Korean envoy Lee Beom-jin, who refused to return to his homeland after the establishment of the Japanese protectorate over Korea. Lee Beom-jin was a distant relative of Emperor Gojong, so in the materials about The Hague Conference, his son Lee Wee-jong was often referred to as"the prince".

Before leaving Seoul, the delegation received the following letter of instruction from the Emperor:

"I declare:

Our country is recognized by all the powers. I, the Emperor, have signed protection treaties with representatives of various states, so the International Conference must accept, and Korea can send a delegation and participate in the Conference. Despite this... Japan violated international laws and forcibly entered into an agreement with us.

It has robbed us of our diplomatic rights to communicate with other States and interrupted them.

Japan deceived us and began to look at us with contempt. In the future, this will affect not only us, but also other countries. She does whatever she wants. This is contrary to humanity and international laws.

I, the Emperor, constantly think about it and worry about it.

I can't stand this torment, so I'm sending both Song Sol (Lee Sang Sol), Joon (Lee Joon), and Woo Jung (Lee Wee Jung) (Secretary of the Korean mission in St. Petersburg) to show the world the difficult situation in Korea and that we need to rebuild the necessary infrastructure. diplomatic rights and the old friendly relations with other Powers again.

I think that you (the Korean plenipotentiaries) treat me well and therefore, at my request, will work with dignity at the Conference" [Park Chung-hye, 1997, p. 253-254].

The delegation brought with it to St. Petersburg a letter from Kojon to Nikolai P. "At present," the letter said, " my situation is becoming more and more difficult and I have nowhere to appeal. Fortunately, the international peace conference has now opened. At this conference, I can make a statement about the outrageous treatment of my country. Before the Russo-Japanese war began, Korea declared its neutrality to all countries. This is common knowledge all over the world. The current situation causes deep indignation. Your Majesty is particularly well aware of the plight in which my country is placed without any justification, and you can give me the opportunity to send my mission to a conference that will clarify the situation of my country. And if I manage to do this, I hope that then I will be able to restore the sovereignty of my country" [Pak, 2004, p.395].

From the fact that Kojong's letter was delivered to Nicholas II, it is clear that the Korean "secret mission" was by no means secret from the Russian authorities. They could easily have prevented her from going to The Hague. And if they didn't, it was probably in response to Kojon's request to Nicholas P. stated above.,

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perhaps, what they could have done in the conditions of reconciliation with Japan that was taking place at that time.

Fearing complications with Japan due to possible contacts between Russian representatives in The Hague and Koreans, Russian Foreign Minister A. P. Izvolsky warned the ambassador in Paris A. I. Nelidov, who was to preside over the conference: "According to information received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two Koreans-Yi Shang Shen-have just arrived in St. Petersburg (Lee Sang Sol) and Yi Zun (Lee Joon), of whom the former refers to himself as a former vice-president of the State Council, and the latter as a former judicial investigator at the Korean High Court. These persons are said to be carrying a letter from the Emperor of Korea to President Roosevelt, and on their way to America they are apparently going to visit The Hague, in order to make an attempt to present to the powers the present situation in which Korea is now placed.

In view of the fact that the above-mentioned Koreans cannot be considered to be provided with any official position or mission, and that nothing reliable is even known about their identity, I consider it my duty to point out the fact that the Japanese Government gave us to understand its intention at The Hague Conference to be particularly sensitive to everything related to the situation I considered it my duty to warn Your Excellency about the situation in Korea and in general on issues related to the last war, so that you could refrain from communicating with them in case they actually arrived in The Hague and asked for your cooperation" [Pak, 2004, p.397].

The International Peace Conference opened in The Hague on June 15, 1907.The Korean delegation did not reach this city until June 25. It is located in a modest hotel near the railway station. First of all, the Korean national flag was displayed in the window of their room. Japanese journalist Shingoro Takaishi, who often saw Koreans in the hotel and on the sidelines of the conference, noted that they were very much in need of funds (their trip was financed by the emperor) and impressed with their sincerity, patriotism and determination to sacrifice personal interests for the sake of their country [Murase Shinya, 2007, p. 8].

The day after arriving in The Hague, the Korean delegation began to seek contacts with the organizers and leading participants of the conference. First of all, the members of the delegation turned to its chairman, representative of Russia A. I. Nelidov. But he, following instructions from his minister, refused to receive the Koreans and rejected their request for admission to the conference on the grounds that only delegations invited by the Dutch Government could attend. The country's Foreign Minister, Van Tet, also avoided a meeting with the Korean delegation, citing that it was not included in the list of invited guests by Russia.

After some time, the head of the US delegation, J. Choat, together with the US Ambassador to the Netherlands, D. Hill, still received Lee Wee-jon, but only to tell him: "I can't do anything about the Korean delegation, because I don't have instructions from my government and because the Korean issue is out of question." programs of the Peace Conference. I have the greatest sympathy for Korea, but I can't do anything" [New York Times, 13.07.1907]. Other participants of the conference, with whom the Korean delegation wanted to talk, behaved in a similar way. Even representatives of China, whose "Asian solidarity" Koreans were counting on, refused to support her.

On June 27, the Korean delegation sent a letter to the conference participants informing them that it was sent here by the Emperor of Korea, and reminding them that the independence of this country is recognized and guaranteed by all the powers of the world. Japan, the letter went on to say, disregarding international laws, armed force

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It forced Korea to cut off friendly diplomatic relations with other countries. The substance of the complaint that the delegation intended to address to the Conference was set out in three paragraphs: 1) the Japanese acted without the consent of the Emperor of Korea; 2) to achieve their goal, they resorted to armed violence against the imperial government; 3) the Japanese acted without any respect for the laws and customs of Korea. The letter ended with the following request: "Since the diplomatic relations between Korea and other countries were severed not by the will of Korea itself, but rather as a result of the violation of our rights by Japan, we have the honor to appeal to Your Excellencies and urge them to kindly intervene so that we can participate in The Hague Conference and defend our rights here, Japanese behavior " [Source Materials, n. d., p. 34-35].

Both written and oral requests from the Korean delegation to be allowed to attend the peace conference and speak out in defense of their country's independence went unanswered. Koreans were not allowed to attend the conference. Naturally, they were extremely annoyed by this. The Russian representative, A. I. Nelidov, was particularly offended by the neglect. "Mr. Nelidov's refusal to accept us," Lee Wee Jong said, "was surprising and unpleasant for us, since our relations with Russia, as well as with America, were so good that we believed that they could not refuse to help us" [New York Times, 30.06.1907].

The Hague Conference thus showed complete indifference to the troubles of Korea and the troubles of its representatives. The London Times believed that with the important work that was being done at the conference, it had no time for losing cases that could disrupt the harmony so necessary for the implementation of its tasks [Nelson, 1946, p.278]. The reason was probably different: the conference was set by the colonial powers, who allowed much of what Japan did in Korea in their dependent countries, and the protests of the Korean delegation were no less dangerous to them than to Japan. Of course, the corresponding "work" of the Japanese delegation at the conference also had an impact. Its representative said that Korea had handed over all matters related to diplomatic relations with foreign countries to Japan and therefore could not be represented at the conference by a separate delegation. The Japanese did not ignore the behavior of the conference participants, in particular the Russian delegation. "The Japanese First Commissioner," A. I. Nelidov reported to St. Petersburg, "who follows the movements of Koreans with concern, warmly thanked me for the correct attitude of the delegation to these envoys" [Pak, 2004, p.397].

The rostrum of the Hague Peace Conference was inaccessible to representatives of Korea. But their voice, though not loud, still rang out. An English journalist, a member of the international pacifist movement, W. T. Steed, showed interest in the Korean delegation. During the conference, he published an unofficial newspaper in The Hague, the Courrier de la Conference de la Paix, which covered the course of the meetings, and organized public events of a pacifist nature during the conference. It was W. T. Steed who helped the Koreans print and distribute the above-mentioned letter to the conference delegates and published it in his newspaper.

The youngest member of the Korean delegation, Lee Wee - jong (only 22 years old), was in the center of attention of those who watched the conference. In the foreground, he was put forward by belonging to the imperial family of Korea (as already mentioned, he was called "prince") and the Russian nobility (he was married to Baroness E. V. Nolken), but most importantly - a good European education (he knew several languages), orientation in international politics, ability to communicate with the audience.

W. T. Steed published an interview with Lee Wee John on the front page of his newspaper in early July 1907. W. T. Steed himself was skeptical about the work of the conference, where high words are pronounced and there are no actions, expressing the opinion that it is useless to do so-

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if you don't have the will to implement them. Lee Wee Jong responded to this remark as follows:: "What are contracts? I'll tell you, I know! Why is Korea not allowed to attend this conference? Because contracts are made only to be violated!"

Lee Wee Jong interviewed W. T. Steed as an experienced politician and patriot, a supporter of the decisive struggle for the independence of the Motherland. "You're what they call a pacifist, right? - he said to the interlocutor. "So you see me as an utter denial of your faith." Korea was a country without weapons. Korea has no aggressive ambitions. Korea only asked to be allowed to live in peace and privacy. We do what you preach. So where are we now?...

We were a peaceful people. We had no more than 7,000 soldiers in the whole country. And what is the result? The fact that I am here, sitting at this door (to the reading room - Yu. V.) is only a symbol of what awaits this country, which believes in the God of Law, Justice and Peace more than in its own sword!" [Koen De Ceuster, 2007, p. 61].

On July 8, W. T. Steed organized a meeting dedicated to Korea. Upon learning of this, the Japanese Embassy tried to "instill" in him the need to treat the problem "objectively" and not harm the interests of Japan. It appears to have succeeded, and Ambassador Keiroku Suzuki reported in Tokyo that he was "quite successful in preventing Steed from becoming an anti-Japanese." In any case, W. T. Steed's speech at the opening of the meeting, as described by the Japanese ambassador in his report, was somewhat ambiguous: "Although he (Steed - Yu. V.) sympathizes with the Koreans, he should remind them that a mouse that is already in the cat's teeth should no longer annoy him. Neither the conference nor the Arbitral Tribunal is open to them. The Dutch government acted correctly in refusing them. He and the others gathered could do nothing but protest, and he would be happy if that protest didn't speed up the final annexation of Korea. The onus of responsibility should rest entirely on the Prince (Lee Wee Jong - YW) if he decides to take this risk."

This speech, which effectively blamed the consequences of the Korean protest on Lee Wee Jong, did not faze the young Korean politician. Calmly and with dignity, he delivered a speech entitled " A Plea for Korea." Informed about this by the Japanese journalist Sh. Takaishi, Ambassador K. Suzuki reported to the Foreign Ministry: "Lee Wee Jong spoke to a rather crowded gathering at a semi-official meeting last night. He spoke French fluently for about an hour and fiercely attacked Japanese politics" [Murase Shinya, 2007, p. 10-11].

Lee Wee Jong's speech did not leave the audience indifferent. They proposed a resolution condemning Japan and supporting Korea. W. T. Steed had to work hard to emasculate the anti-Japanese focus of the project. He argued that both sides of the conflict were not being listened to, that hostility to Japan should not be stirred up, that it was not doing anything different in Korea from what Britain and other countries were doing in other parts of the world. As a result, the following resolution was adopted :" Meeting of the Internationalism Group, after listening to the heartfelt and moving speech of Prince Lee... Expresses its deep sympathy for the suffering of the Korean people and expresses its fervent desire that the International Court of Justice be quickly established in The Hague, where such matters can be dealt with with impartiality, where the truth can be established and justice can be done "[Koen De Ceuster, 2007, p. 62].

The activities of the Korean representatives in The Hague received a significant response. "Among the public," N. V. Charykov noted, " the Korean delegates had considerable success." "At a meeting of the International Pacifist Club," he wrote, " they gave a detailed account of the oppression inflicted on their homeland by the Japanese, and they apparently spoke the truth, just as they did when they claimed to be supplied with weapons of mass destruction.-

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full powers of the Korean Emperor." "Although these revelations," N. V. Charykov continued, " may not lead to the intercession of any government for Korea, they probably will not remain without influencing the mood of European public opinion towards Japan. In any case, they prove that the situation of Japanese penetration into Korea is not as good as one might think" [Pak, 2004, p.398].

One of the largest Russian newspapers, Novoye Vremya, announced the arrival of the Koreans in The Hague and wrote: "The Country of Morning Rest is a sovereign state, and its right to participate in the general peace council of the powers of the entire globe cannot be subject to the slightest doubt. Its geographical location between Russia, Japan and China gives it a particularly important international significance. In terms of its territory and population, Korea surpasses many of the Powers whose representatives occupy seats at the conference table. The level of its ancient culture is not lower than many states that have received an invitation to the council...".

The newspaper considered A. I. Nelidov's refusal to accept the Korean delegation "tactful":"The Dutch government is the host of The Hague, and it is not the guest who has the right to correct its omissions and mistakes." But she was in favor of Russia facilitating the admission of Koreans to the conference, and she believed that Britain and France would do the same. This was a naive assumption, but even more naive was the newspaper's hope that Japan would support Korea at the conference. Referring to the statement issued by the Korean delegation that Japan violates the sovereignty of Korea, Novoe Vremya stated: "In order to eliminate any complaints in this regard, Japanese representatives will undoubtedly support the harassment of the people they protect and will insist on inviting Korea to participate in the conference "[Novoe Vremya, 18.06.1907].

It did not take long for the newspaper to realize the fallacy of its hopes: "We once suggested that Japan, which has assumed the role of patron of Korea, would not consider it worthy to prevent the harassment of the Korean delegation, because representatives of Japan almost daily spoke in The Hague with the most generous offers, but reality was not slow to expose the true state of affairs. The Japanese representatives not only did not assist the Korean deputation in its just wishes, but did everything they could to prevent even a simple discussion of these wishes at the conference..."

"Tomorrow," the newspaper continued ironically, " Reuters will inform the world that Japanese representatives at The Hague Conference have made a dozen new proposals for the sake of ensuring the highest justice and law in international relations. And representatives of the great and small powers will be present at this comedy and seriously discuss each proposal point by point. This is the Dichtung und Wahrheit (fiction and truth) of the Hague Peace Conference "[Novoe vremya, 9.07.1907].
Japan, of course, did not limit itself to opposing Kojo-na's envoys in The Hague. She used the news of the Korean delegation's arrival there to launch a new offensive against Korean sovereignty. On July 3, Japanese Resident General Ito Hirobumi formally interrogated the Korean emperor, threatening that "his intention to abandon the Japanese protectorate by such insidious means is the shortest way to declare war on Japan" (Vasilevskaya, 1975, p.45). The terrified Kojon assured that he had not sent anyone to The Hague, that they were some impostors, etc. The Korean delegates were sympathetic to this behavior of the emperor who sent them. "To admit that he has instructed us to represent him in The Hague would probably mean for him to be dethroned or even killed," they said [New York Times, 7.07.1907]. In one of the newspapers was placed

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a photocopy of the delegation's credentials with the imperial seal attached (Nelson, 1946, p. 277).

The Japanese connected the Korean government created from their henchmen to the pressure on Kojon. It met several times in the presence of the emperor, demanding that he either sign the Protectorate Treaty and go to Tokyo with an apology, or abdicate the throne. Kojoon refused both, cut off all official contacts, and took refuge in one of the residences. In Seoul, meanwhile, there were mass demonstrations of the population in support of the emperor, but he, as before, shunned his people. The Japanese government sent Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasa to Seoul to demonstrate the seriousness of its intentions. The combined efforts of Japanese representatives and the Korean authorities eventually succeeded in breaking Kojong's resistance. Early in the morning of July 19, 1907, he signed a manifesto abdicating in favor of his eldest son Sungjong, who became an obedient puppet in the hands of the Japanese.

By removing Kojong, who defended his country's independence as best he could, Japan took further steps towards the final annexation of Korea. On July 24, 1907, the latter was forced to sign the so-called Seven Articles Treaty, which transferred the main levers of Korea's internal administration to the Japanese Resident General. The Korean army, which for all its weakness still represented the sovereignty of Korea, was dispersed by the Japanese on August 1, 1907. These new aggressive actions of Japan were accompanied by a brutal suppression of the protests of the Korean people.

The governments of the world's leading powers were not without approval of what Japan was doing in Korea: after all, they themselves did something similar in other dependent countries. For example, the New York Times described the reaction of the participants of the Hague Conference to the overthrow of Kojong: "The abdication of the Emperor of Korea was the main topic of conversation among the delegates of the Peace Conference today. Most of them were inclined to believe that even if the emperor was dethroned, it should be considered a necessary measure to give the Japanese a free hand in creating a modern system for developing Korea's resources.

Lee Sang Sol, the former Prime Minister of Korea, who is here with the delegation, said after reading the cable about the abdication:: "This is another Japanese meanness that 20,000,000 Koreans will soon take revenge for."

One plenipotentiary who is skeptical about the work of the Peace Conference said: "The abdication of the emperor is the only result achieved so far by the conference" " [New York Times, 20.07.1907]. The international press, including the Russian one, covering the events in Korea, showed some sympathy for the Korean people, but nothing more.

For Koreans in The Hague, the drama of the situation at home was deepened by a tragedy in their own midst: in mid - July 1907, one of the delegates, Lee Joon, died. The circumstances of his death are not entirely clear. In Korean historiography (both in the North and in the South), the prevailing view is that Lee Joon committed suicide, protesting against the indifference of the powers to the fate of Korea and out of despair that it was not possible to fulfill the emperor's order. Apparently, the reasons for this point of view were given by the first responses to the tragedy in Korea itself. The Seoul newspaper Taehan meil shinbo, in an emergency issue on July 18, 1907, under the headline "Suicide of a fighter for justice", reported that Lee Joon, "unable to withstand the indignation in his heart, committed suicide, spilling blood in front of envoys from different countries...". On the same day, another capital newspaper, Hwangseong sinmun, reported that Lee Joon, "unable to overcome his indignation, opened his stomach" [Choi Dok Soo, 2007, p. 10-11]. The sources of such information are difficult to identify.

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In foreign publications of that time, there are references to the death of Lee Joo-na, but its nature is not specified. It seems that if he had committed suicide, and even in such an unusual way for Europe, it would not have passed by the sensationalist journalists. Nor did Lee Wee Jong, who often spoke to the press, mention suicide. However, some hint can be seen in his statement published by the New York Times after the conference. Lee Wee Jong has stated that he has no intention of returning to Korea. "There is now no one but the Japanese and traitors," he said bitterly, " and nothing to fight for. I'm not going to commit hara-kiri - which would be the same thing - to please the Japanese" [New York Times, 13.08.1907].

There is another version of Lee Joon's death, which denies that he committed suicide. Referring to reports in Dutch newspapers and the Courrier de la Conference, some historians claim that Lee Joon had an abscess on his left cheek, which led to erysipelas after surgery, which led to death. After a corresponding survey conducted by experts, this conclusion was published in 1962 by the Government of the Republic of Korea [Murase, 2007, p. 6, 12]. The version of Lee Joon's death due to a serious illness is also shared by some Russian historians [Pak, 2004, p. 399]. But, without a doubt, such a sad result was predetermined by the extremely difficult moral state in which Lee Joon and his comrades were in The Hague.

On July 31, 1907, the Korean delegates left The Hague for London. In an interview with Reuters, Lee Wee-jong assessed the results of the delegation's activities as follows:: "I can't say that the mission in The Hague was not successful. We are still carrying out an important task that has not yet been fulfilled. We were sent by the Emperor not only to The Hague Conference, but also to all the governments of Europe and America to protest against the treatment of us by Japan, and in particular to declare that Korea would never renounce independence or accept a Japanese protectorate. In particular, the delegates of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States have testified to us their sorrow over the situation of Korea. They assured us that they would help us as much as possible" [Novoe Vremya, 12.07.1907].

From these words of Lee Wee-jong, it can be concluded that the Koreans still managed to get in touch with representatives of certain powers at The Hague Conference (Russia, unfortunately, was not among them), but they only got off with expressions of sympathy and non-binding promises.

In the same interview, Lee Wee Jong reported: "We are now going to the United States, where I hope to see the president. We also expect to visit major cities in the United States and return to England in a few weeks."

Korean delegates reached New York on August 1. By this time, it was known that the new Emperor of Korea, Sungjong, had ordered them to go on trial. Lee Sang Sol was sentenced to death, and Lee Wee Jong was sentenced to life in prison. It was clear that this was the work of Japan. Upon arriving in the United States, the delegates told the New York Times that they were " sentenced to death by the Japanese for their part in communicating Korea's grievances to the world." "The Prince (Lee Wee Jong - YW)," the newspaper reported, " although not afraid of being killed, described his situation in this way: "Anyone who arrives in this country (Korea) is considered dead. I know this, and it doesn't matter if the blow comes now or later, but it has to happen." A little later, he returned to this topic: "We are under a death sentence, but although I think it is better to stay away from Korea and work, I will come back tomorrow if I think that my death will be useful to her cause" "[New York Times, 2.08.1907].

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In this interview, Lee Wee Jong once again spoke positively about the activities of the Korean delegation in The Hague. "Although (we) were suspended from the conference, our mission was not unsuccessful, as we drew the world's attention to Japan's treacherous behavior, and I do not exaggerate if I say that we won the sympathy of the world. We have received personal assurances of this fact. I know that we have the sympathy of America, England, Germany and France." Lee Wee-jong's bitter words about the world's indifference to the fate of Korea do not fit in with such a clearly inflated assessment of the sympathy of these powers for Korea. "My country is ruined and trampled into the mud," he exclaimed, gesturing. - The ruler is surrounded by traitors and troops of another country, the rights of the people are violated, and the world is an indifferent spectator. Korea can't fight, it even has its army taken away. The world should say stop, but the world is sleeping."

In this interview, Lee Wee Jong expressed the belief that some Koreans still believe that the United States is a "selfless friend" of their country. "We want America,"he said," to do for Korea what France did for it when thirteen states fought for independence here." Lee Wee-jong announced that the Korean delegates would seek an audience with President Roosevelt to explain to him the problems of Korea, and expressed confidence that "the history of their disasters will arouse worldwide indignation, which will force this (i.e., the United States - Yu. V.) or any other country to stop Japanese plans in Korea."

Reality destroyed the naive hopes of the Korean delegates. Shortly before their arrival in the United States, the New York Times suggested that the news would "be viewed with some apprehension and alarm" by the State Department and create a "difficult dilemma"for it. After all, there were then Japanese officials in the United States who claimed the status of representatives of Korea in accordance with the Protectorate Treaty. Meanwhile, Korean delegates arrive with a mandate from their emperor, although already deposed, intending to protest to the US government against this treaty and declare that Korea will not give up independence and will not accept the Japanese protectorate. While still recognizing Japan as the" de facto "ruler of Korea, the newspaper urged, "we should modify our recognition of it as such 'de jure '" [New York Times, 26.07.1907].

Shortly after the Korean delegates arrived, the New York Times wrote:: "We said the other day when it was announced that Korean Prince Lee Wee Jong, who was denied access to The Hague Conference because he did not represent a sovereign state, was on his way to Washington with his 'case', that he could create a difficult dilemma for our government. It's probably good for the peace of mind of this administration if, when he arrives in Washington, he doesn't find anyone at the State Department who could and would listen to him...

One can't help but sympathize with the probably friendly and patriotic Korean. But at the same time, there is a general American belief that nations are not defeated or annexed or "divided," nor do they sign treaties under pressure or threats, giving up their sovereign rights, except for some serious reason. If Korea is destroyed, we can assume that this destruction was inevitable " [New York Times, 3.08.1907].

Naturally, with this approach, the Korean delegation met with a very cool reception in the United States. She was housed in a second-rate hotel in downtown New York, where traveling representatives of commercial firms usually stayed, and she lived more than modestly. A trip to Washington for a few days did nothing: the president and the Secretary of State were not there, and no one in the US administration received them. Although the newspapers emphasized that Lee Wee Jong belongs to the royal family ("prince"), and Lee Sang Sol is a prominent statesman of Korea, they did not receive any official attention. Even the city authorities

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New York did not honor them with a visit. In late August and early September 1907, both Korean delegates returned empty-handed from the United States to Russia, where they joined in promoting the national liberation movement in Korea.

Emperor Gojong's dispatch of a delegation to the Hague Peace Conference in 1907 is a small but important episode in Korean history. It was a desperate attempt to draw the world's attention to the disastrous situation of Korea, which was on the verge of being completely taken over by Japan, and to gain international support in defending the country's independence and sovereignty. It was a continuation of the long-standing line of the ruling circles of Korea to intercede for the great powers against the aggressive actions of Japan, while neglecting the real potential of resistance of their own people. Like all previous attempts, this one was unsuccessful. It was obviously in vain to expect that the organizers of the Hague Conference would provide a platform for representatives of one of the enslaved countries and allow them to condemn Japan for what other powers were doing, that someone would really want to stand up for Korea.

From this point of view, the history of the Hague Conference is instructive for the present time. Now, when Korea is facing vital and difficult tasks of reunifying the country and developing it in the most difficult conditions of the modern world, it is necessary to strengthen its national unity in every possible way, solve all issues by the Korean people themselves and exclusively in their interests, without counting, as it was in the past, on the benefits of the "powerful of this world". We can only welcome the intention to move in this direction, which was shown during the historic summit meetings between the North and South in 2000 and 2007.

When describing the events connected with the stay of the Korean delegation in The Hague in 1907, it is sometimes suggested that this did nothing for Korea and only brought it closer to the final capture by Japan. It seems that Japan, even if the "Hague incident" had not happened, would still have taken on all the levers of government in order to overcome the resistance of the Korean people, especially since the first step towards this was taken by the Protectorate Treaty of 1905. Something else is important. The" Hague incident " gave Japan an excuse to get rid of Emperor Kojon, who, no matter how critically evaluated, created tangible obstacles to its aggressive plans. Replacing him with the weak-willed and obedient Sungjong provided Japan with an additional and very significant opportunity to put the annexation of Korea into legal form.

One can probably agree with Lee Wee-jong, who claimed that the Korean delegation's trip to The Hague was not unsuccessful. Indeed, the voice of protesting Korea abroad was first heard in 1907, and at an international conference, which attracted the attention of the world community. Japanese propaganda, which was instilling around the world, taking advantage of the isolation of Korea, that order and justice reigned there, was dealt a serious blow, and the information blockade in which Korea was located was partially broken.

In conclusion, it is impossible not to mention the Korean delegates themselves. It took a lot of courage and bravery, loyalty to the motherland and its monarch, to take on the secret assignment of the emperor, fraught with severe repression by the Japanese authorities and "their" government. They successfully made it to The Hague, where they represented Korea with dignity and did everything they could for it. Their names are respectfully etched in Korean history. The death of Lee Joon, for whatever reason, is perceived as one of the tragic victims of the Korean people in the struggle for freedom and independence of their homeland. North and South Korea celebrated the 100th anniversary of the Korean delegation's trip to The Hague Peace Conference in 2007 as an important memorable date in Korean history.

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History of Diplomacy, vol. II. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1963.

Pak B. D. Rossiya i Koreya [Russia and Korea], Moscow: IV RAS, 2004.

Park Jung Hye. Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and Korea. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 1997.

Khan M. Liberation struggle of the Korean people in the years of the Japanese protectorate (1905-1910). Moscow: IVL, 1961.

Choi Dok Soo. Taehan chegukki onronyi sege inshik kwa Pyeonghwa khweyi (Understanding the world in the utterances of the Korean Empire period and the Peace Conference) // Minjok munhwa yeonguwon chhansol 50 chunyong kinem kukche haksul khweyi chaechip "1907 nen Hyigi pyeonghwa khweyi wa Taehan cheguk, kyrigo yelgan" (Collection of materials of the international scientific conference dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Institute of National Security and National Security) culture, "The Hague Peace Conference, the Korean Empire and the Great Powers"). Seoul: Institute of National Culture, 2007.

Koen De Ceuster. The Dutch Government and Media Reaction to the Korean Mission to the 1907 Hague Peace Conference // Minjok munhwa yeonguvon chhansol 50 chunyong kinem kukche haksul khweyi chaechip " 1907 nen Hyigi pyeonghwa khweyi wa Taehan cheguk, kyrigo yelgan "(Collection of materials of the international scientific conference dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Institute of National Culture, "The Hague peace Conference, the Korean Empire and the Great Powers"). Seoul: Institute of National Culture, 2007.

McKenzie F. A. Korea's Fight for Freedom. N. Y. -Chicagc-L. -Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1920.

Murase Shinya. The Presence of Asia at the 1907 Hague Conference // Colloquium of The Hague Academy of International Law. 6 - 7 September 2007.

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