During the Cold War, Japan's security policy in East Asia was limited, on the one hand, to strengthening the military alliance with the United States within the framework of the Security Treaty, to fulfilling its obligations under the treaty, including participating in the policy of deterring China and the DPRK, while on the other, Japan carried out "quiet diplomacy" in relations with the United States. in the region, it maintained an economic dialogue with them within the framework of the Pacific Trade and Development Forum, established in 1968, as well as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (RECC), which began its work in 1978 [Korhonen, 1994, p. 167-181; Deng Yong, 1997, p. 36].

At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, tensions in the regional system of international relations subsided somewhat: the cold War was ending, the Soviet Union began to reduce its military presence in East Asia, in 1989 Soviet-Chinese relations, which had previously been in a state of confrontation, were normalized, and in 1991 - 1992. The United States has withdrawn from its military bases in the Philippines. At the same time, the countries of the region, perhaps for the first time in all the years after World War II, felt the need to establish regional security cooperation acutely as the relatively stable bipolar system of international relations was destroyed, the Soviet bloc was disintegrating, and inter-country contradictions in East Asia began to escalate. This was due to the fact that the ideological block confrontation of the Cold War period gave way to the formation after its end of more dangerous threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity, i.e. problems began to arise that were fraught with military conflicts and local wars. The latter, in turn, implies increased attention to ensuring security at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

The conflict problems of the East Asian region inherited from the Cold War period, such as the division of the Korean Peninsula into North and South Korea, the unresolved status of Taiwan, territorial disputes between China, Taiwan and Japan over the ownership of the Senkaku Islands, disputes between South Korea and Japan over the Takeshima Islands, as well as unresolved territorial disputes between the two countries. The contradictions between Russia and Japan over the South Kuril Islands have added new threats, primarily the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region and international terrorism. Energy problems, rising prices for oil and petroleum products are straining relations between the countries of East and South-East Asia due to territorial isolation-

Ending. For the beginning, see: Vostok (Oriens), 2007, No. 1, pp. 87-101.

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There are many islands in the South China Sea and their shelves rich in oil resources. This applies to disputes between China and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, and between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines over the Spratly Islands. China is involved in almost all territorial disputes, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Its position in these disputes is determined by the power capabilities and political will of the Beijing leadership to solve disputed territorial problems by force. Therefore, each East Asian country individually is more clearly aware that it is necessary to combine efforts on a collective basis in security issues in order to avoid destabilization of the situation in the region and avoid the risk of armed conflicts.

After the Cold War, Japan actively strengthened not only its military security. Its ruling circles also developed measures to protect national interests from threats in the economic field, which were produced by the process of globalization. The countries of the region, especially China and South Korea, developed particularly rapidly in the 1990s. The level of interdependence of East Asian states, including Japan, has significantly increased. At the same time, globalization, as we know, contributes to the emergence of additional tensions in inter-country relations as TNCs challenge the rights to national sources of energy raw materials and other types of resources, destroy the national environment, and upset the financial system of sovereign states with their activities. The latter can be seen in the devastating consequences of the 1997-1998 financial crisis in a number of countries in East and South-East Asia, which in general seriously affected the national economy of South Korea, partly-China and Japan. Economic tensions and contradictions of East Asian countries among themselves, as well as with TNCs, are destabilizing the situation and creating new security threats in the context of globalization.

In their post-cold War security policy, Japan's ruling circles attach particular importance to participation in various regional economic structures. It should be noted that the creation of such new regional structures as the Asia - Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC or ARES-Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), although it does not directly imply the responsibility of its members for maintaining political and strategic stability in the region, nevertheless contributes to the expansion of inter-country dialogue on security issues and eases friction over disputed territorial issues. It also facilitates the resolution of other regional issues, thereby strengthening economic, political and military stability.

Japan is certainly interested in expanding both bilateral and multilateral security dialogue with East Asian countries. However, even after the Cold War, Japan's security cooperation with East Asian countries has served as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, its strategic partnership with the United States. Moreover, a new post-Cold War cooperative relationship with regional powers on security matters has generally been possible for Tokyo only within the framework of the Japan-US security treaty and to the extent that meets US interests in this area.

In 1994, the Japanese authorities officially announced for the first time that they intended to apologize to the countries of East Asia for their colonizing past and begin to form new relations of trust and cooperation with the countries of the region. In fact, the Department of National Defense and the Japanese Foreign Ministry tested this approach in relations with the ASEAN countries, South Korea and China in the early 1990s. Japan managed to dispel some of the suspicions of East and South-East Asian countries about its foreign policy when Japanese peacekeepers took part in the 1992-1993 war.-

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participation in a large-scale international UN operation to restore peace in Cambodia. Japanese soldiers participated in a peacekeeping mission abroad for the first time since the end of World War II.

Japan has successfully developed relations with South Korea, actively exchanging military visits and participating in joint military maneuvers since 1992. It is significant that military cooperation between the two countries is developing in conditions when Seoul actively opposes the revival of Japanese militarism. Japanese-South Korean military cooperation is being formed against the background of the implementation of the DPRK's nuclear program and the development of new missile technologies. An important incentive for Tokyo's development of security cooperation in East Asia is Washington's policy aimed at creating a trilateral partnership in this area between Japan, South Korea, and the United States to counter the potential threat of destabilization on the Korean Peninsula, as well as to contain China [Yamaguchi, 1999, p.3-24]. In October 1998, for example, Japan and South Korea issued a joint declaration after North Korea's successful launches of intermediate-range missiles, expressing concern about possible destabilization on the Korean peninsula and calling for the development of military cooperation between the two countries and the intensification of direct consultations on security issues.

Against the background of progress in the development of Japan's dialogue with South Korea on security issues, a similar process is being slowed down in the development of its cooperation with China. All attempts by the Japanese side to draw the attention of the Chinese leadership to the problems of strengthening security in East Asia, which Tokyo has been making since the mid-1980s, go unnoticed in Beijing. Japan insists that China make its military budget and plans for military construction more transparent, refuse to export missile technology, comply with the missile technology Nonproliferation regime (MTCR), and also refuse to conduct nuclear tests.

The Japan-China security dialogue was interrupted by the Tiananmen Square events of 1989, as well as by China's nuclear tests in 1995. At the same time, Tokyo is interested in direct talks with the Chinese leadership on topical issues of security and stability in East Asia, but Beijing always ignores Japanese initiatives and thereby unwittingly pushes Tokyo to deepen its strategic partnership with the United States. The Japanese authorities are once again convinced that strengthening cooperation with the United States and using the opportunities of the Japan-US security treaty are more in the national security interests than the unproductive search for security compromises with China.

For the sake of objectivity, it should be emphasized that after the end of the confrontation period in East Asia, more favorable international conditions were formed for establishing a multilateral dialogue on issues of cooperation to strengthen security. The first President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, took initiatives in this area as early as 1988; in 1990, the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Australia formulated a proposal to convene a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia, taking as a model the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The leading military powers in East Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States, were initially opposed to any proposals to organize multinational security agencies in the region. American politicians, for example, viewed the activities of such organizations as ineffective, preferring instead bilateral security systems. China, for its part, also feared that the creation of any multinational security organization in East Asia would be a serious obstacle to the implementation of Beijing's claims.

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the disputed territories in the South China Sea, in particular the Spratly Islands. The ASEAN countries feared that the formation of another multilateral structure in the region could significantly weaken their position as the leading regional player responsible for security and cooperation in East and South-East Asia.

Japan took a similar position to the United States on this issue: Tokyo believed that the creation of a multinational body responsible for maintaining security in the region would negatively affect the existing system of bilateral security treaties and reduce its role, although this system proved to be effective and viable throughout the Cold War period [Leifer, 1996, p. 16 - 20, 23 - 24, 37 - 38; Nishihara Masashi, 1994, pp. 60-74]. In July 1990, the then Prime Minister of Japan, Toshiki Kaifu, frankly acknowledged that the time had not yet come to organize multilateral security cooperation in East Asia, similar to the OSCE in Western Europe.

At the same time, in June 1991, the ASEAN Institute for Strategic Studies and International Relations developed proposals according to which the Association's Ministerial Conference could become the basis for launching an international dialogue of the region's countries on collective security issues. Among the most pressing international issues, the conference participants were invited to discuss the issue of maintaining the US military presence in the region and develop measures that prevent the United States from reneging on its obligations to maintain peace and security within the framework of bilaterally concluded security treaties. In addition, it was proposed to discuss the issue of China's growing military power and the consequences for security and stability in the region.

The Japanese authorities, having corrected their initial position on security cooperation, began to show cautious interest in expanding multilateral dialogue in this area with East Asian countries. This happened after Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April 1991 and the collapse of the USSR in December 1991. Tokyo then decided that Moscow's actions were sending a signal that it was ready to significantly improve Japanese-Russian relations and that it would no longer consider the Japan-US security treaty as a threat to its national interests. In July 1991, Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro supported the idea of convening a Conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, stating that he sees it as a body for discussing mutual security issues of all East Asian countries. Taro's statement received a restrained reaction in the capitals of the ASEAN countries, but it helped to change the negative position of the United States on the creation of a multilateral security body in East Asia by 1993. In July 1993, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established as part of this initiative. Since 1994, the organization has held annual meetings to discuss the most pressing issues of politics, economy and security in East and South-East Asia.

Within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum, three main stages of step-by-step cooperation in security issues were developed, starting from the development of confidence-building measures between participating countries and the implementation of preventive diplomacy, and ending with the settlement of conflicts in case of their occurrence. The pace of transition from one stage to another is determined by each ASEAN member's understanding of security threats and willingness to address the challenges of strengthening security collectively. In addition, the dialogue of the Association countries on security issues on a collective basis is supported by bilateral agreements concluded both at the intergovernmental level and through non-governmental organizations, which are implemented within the framework of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Russian Federation.

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ATP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific - CSCAP). At the beginning of the sixth meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1999, the body included, in addition to the 10 core ASEAN members, Japan, China, South Korea, Mongolia, Russia, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. Representatives of China have attended all the meetings of the forum since 1994 and have greatly influenced its work. At the same time, by 2006, the participants of this regional security organization had not reached the level of agreements on coordinated actions to conduct preventive diplomacy: China has torpedoed progress in this direction, since it is not satisfied with the content of the concept of "preventive diplomacy", which it sees as a potential threat to its interests.

Japan, in turn, is interested in the successful work of the ASEAN Regional Forum and actively participates in all its meetings. It shares the idea of collective security cooperation and supports the efforts of the ASEAN countries to build peaceful relations among its members, which were never confrontational or violent in the first place and did not pose a threat to Japan's own interests. Collective security is understood in Tokyo as cooperation not against anyone, but as cooperation between the countries of the region, aimed at resolving controversial issues by political and diplomatic means, excluding the use of force [Kamiya, 1997, p.23-24]. In addition, Japan is quite happy that the ASEAN Forum does not oblige its members, even formally, to protect each other in the event of an attack on one of them. For Japan, this means that by participating in the Forum, it does not violate its Constitution, which prohibits it from cooperating for defense purposes with other countries and allows it to maintain bilateral security relations within the framework of the Japan-US security Treaty.

Thus, the ASEAN Forum provides ample opportunities for Japan's participation in strengthening the regional security system. Representatives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the National Defense Administration regularly attend meetings of the ASEAN Forum, take part in discussions on peacekeeping and confidence-building measures in the region. Representatives of Japan's academic and political circles also regularly participate in meetings of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (Dobson, 1999, pp. 152-171).

At the same time as participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum, Japanese authorities have been organizing regular seminars on security in the Asia-Pacific region since 1994, inviting experts from China, South Korea, Russia, and the United States to discuss regional security issues and build confidence. Supporting the idea of collective security in East Asia, in 1997 the Japanese Government initiated the quadrilateral security dialogue involving the United States, China, Russia and Japan, as well as the six-party talks on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

Japan's participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum has become an integral part of its regional security policy. At the same time, Japan has become more aware of the difficulties it may face in implementing a policy in this area on a collective basis, taking into account its obligations under the Japan-US security treaty, which Tokyo is not going to withdraw from. The Japanese authorities, while participating in regional organizations for security and cooperation, see their activities as an application, albeit an important one, to the fundamental relations with the United States. The leadership of the UNO and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan never overestimate the role of the ASEAN Regional Forum as a guarantor of security in the system of regional relations, and see its limited opportunities-

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features. This is due to the fact that the ASEAN Forum is primarily an advisory body, rather than making practical decisions in the field of security. It is not in a position to influence, for example, the DPRK authorities to suspend the implementation of their national nuclear and missile programs. (The DPRK joined the ASEAN Regional Forum in mid-2000) The ASEAN Forum cannot resolve disputed territorial issues that persist in relations between its participants. This also applies to the problem of the Spratly Islands, the Taiwan problem, the transformation of the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, and other controversial issues of regional international relations [Yamakage, 1997, p. 302].

Japanese politicians remain loyal to the Japanese-American security treaty, considering it as the basis of national security. The United States puts pressure on Tokyo to control Japan's foreign policy in East Asia, limiting its participation in regional collective bodies to its geopolitical and geostrategic interests. It is characteristic that the attempt of a group of Japanese Prime Minister's defense advisers in 1994 to suggest that the country's leadership should step up its activities in regional collective security agencies, while reducing its participation in the security treaty with the United States, immediately received a sharply negative response in Washington. The continuing uncertainty in resolving the DPRK's nuclear issue and the risk of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait force the Japanese authorities to actively support the United States in its policy towards the countries of the region. It is these considerations that can explain the sequence of Tokyo's course towards strengthening the Japan-US security treaty and maintaining the US military presence in the region.

The Japan-US Treaty continues to play an important role in the implementation of Tokyo's post-Cold War regional security policy. As you know, at the beginning of the Cold War, Japan was extremely interested in concluding a Security Treaty with the United States, fearing negative consequences for national security of two crises in East Asia - the Korean War and tensions in the Taiwan Strait after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. In the mid-1990s, at a new historical turn, Japan again faced a similar situation of rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, which stimulated the strengthening of its strategic relations with the United States.

However, even in the early 1990s, there were doubts in Japan's ruling circles about the expediency of continuing the country's participation in the security treaty. These doubts were reinforced by rising trade and economic tensions between Japan and the United States, Tokyo's reluctance to send troops to support the United States in its first war with Iraq in the early 1990s, and uncertainty about the future status of American military bases in Okinawa. Japan wanted to strengthen its security independence from the United States.

However, the 1994 crisis over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs once again convinced Japan's ruling circles of the importance of preserving Japanese-American military cooperation, although it revealed a number of new problems. The fact is that according to Article 6 of the security treaty, the Japanese government is obliged, after preliminary consultations with the United States, to provide its territory for the deployment of American military bases capable of operating outside the Japanese Islands, including, for example, the territory of South Korea. In this case, the United States expected that if the situation on the Korean Peninsula worsened, they would send their military units to South Korea from the territory of Japan. However, after the Cold War, the Japanese authorities are not interested in being drawn into a new war in Korea, while at the same time they are forced to respond to the insistent demands of the United States by bo-

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It is necessary to actively support their actions in the Korean direction in the event of an escalation of the situation. In particular, Washington insists on providing logistical support for American troops in the event of a crisis, i.e. it expects Japan to actively participate in collecting intelligence information, ensuring the repair of US Navy ships stationed in the Pacific, as well as providing opportunities to use Japanese civilian ports and airports for US military needs. In addition, the Pentagon calls on the Japanese self-Defense Forces to prepare for the naval blockade of the DPRK, as well as to send destroyers of the Japanese Navy to mine the waters of the Korean Peninsula [Hughes, 1999, p. 93-96].

The Japanese authorities are not able to adequately meet all US requests for logistical support for American troops in the event of a crisis in East Asia. Even the new document on Japanese-American defense cooperation, namely, "Basic Directions of Japanese-American defense cooperation", signed by the parties in 1997, does not specifically specify Japan's obligations to provide defense services to America in the event of emergencies in the region. Tokyo is concerned that any actions by the Japanese side, for example, to directly join the conflict on the Korean Peninsula on the side of the United States, will be a clear violation of the country's Constitution, which prohibits, in particular, participation in collective defense. Therefore, Tokyo is forced to warn the American side in advance that although it is ready to allow America to use the territory of Japan for the needs of the American army in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, at the same time it is not ready to provide the United States with logistics services or participate in the blockade, as well Of course, Japan fears that such a position will create a lot of doubts in the US ruling circles about the feasibility of continuing to cooperate with it on security issues: it gets a lot from such cooperation, and America cannot even count on providing logistical support to its troops in potential conflict zones in East Asia. At the same time, Japan thinks differently: the conflict zone is located in the immediate vicinity of its territory, and direct involvement of Tokyo in military actions can have the most negative consequences for the country's national security interests [Hughes, 1999, p. 94-95].

To Japan's satisfaction, the tension that arose in 1994 on the Korean Peninsula due to the DPRK leadership's tough stance on the implementation of nuclear and missile programs was resolved by political means. At that time, it failed to demonstrate in practice its capabilities and limitations in providing allied support to the United States in emergency situations. However, Japan's extremely cautious behavior during the 1994 crisis itself dealt a serious blow to its reputation as an ally in the eyes of the US military and politicians. Japan's inaction then raised new doubts in the United States about the usefulness of further military cooperation with Tokyo.

Japan was interested in restoring as quickly as possible the credibility that had been shaken in Washington's eyes as a strategic ally. In April 1996, it signed a joint Declaration on security issues with the United States, and in 1997, the "Main Directions of Japanese-American Defense cooperation", which were approved in parliament in May 1999. After the attacks of international terrorists on US cities in September 2001 and the beginning of the American aggression in Iraq, the Japanese government hastened to send the following documents to the United States: Iraq is part of the self-defense forces to support the anti-Iraqi coalition, which was positively assessed in American political circles.

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The persistence of permanent tensions in the Taiwan Strait also contributes to strengthening Japan's strategic partnership with the United States. Not only Japan, but also other East Asian states are concerned about the rapid pace of military construction in China, the growth of its military budget, the opacity of this budget, and the increase in the PLA's offensive potential. Japan is particularly concerned about conducting nuclear tests in China, as well as exporting missile technology from China to neighboring countries. Japanese military and political circles are clearly aware that even a small navy is sufficient for China to threaten Japan's maritime communications in the South China Sea. China's active military preparations, demonstrated on the eve of the presidential election in Taiwan in March 1996, when Beijing conducted naval maneuvers using missiles in the Taiwan Strait, further prompted the ruling circles of Japan to look for adequate measures to neutralize the potential threat posed by the PRC. At that time, the United States was even forced to send the Independence aircraft carrier, located at the US Navy base in Japan, to the area of naval exercises of the Chinese Navy, in the Taiwan Strait, which was supposed to serve as a signal to Beijing about America's readiness to intervene in the conflict and, if necessary, protect Taiwan's interests.

The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 showed that China is ready to defend its interests in the Taiwan issue, including by force of arms. Japan then drew appropriate conclusions, the main one of which was the conclusion about the potential possibility of being drawn, against its will, into the US-Chinese conflict over Taiwan. After all, whether Japan wants it or not, it has placed foreign military bases on its territory, where Chinese aircraft will launch missile attacks in the event of an escalation of the situation. The crisis in the Taiwan Strait once again highlighted for the Japanese authorities the real danger of being held hostage to a potential conflict in the region. For Tokyo, this means that strategic containment of China's growing military power is in its security interests and that the best way to implement this policy is to strengthen the US military presence in the region and strengthen Japanese-American military cooperation.

The explosive situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait contributes to the formation of a firm belief among the Japanese leadership that the most reliable way to ensure national security is to strengthen its military alliance with the United States, and not to cooperate within the framework of collective security at the regional level. At the same time, the Japanese ruling circles continue to strengthen relations in the "Japan-USA-South Korea" triangle, as well as in the "Japan-USA-China"triangle. Security cooperation within these geopolitical configurations should, according to Tokyo's plans, reliably guarantee stability in East Asia in any escalation of the situation.

However, security cooperation between Japan and South Korea has its own "limiters". They are determined by the historical memory of Koreans about Japan's imperialist policy during the colonial period, their negative attitude to its participation in solving security problems on the Korean Peninsula, including sending Japanese soldiers to the peninsula, as well as constitutional restrictions on the country's participation in collective defense. Nevertheless, official representatives of Japan, South Korea and the United States hold regular meetings and consultations, meet at APEC meetings, organize trilateral meetings of the defense ministers of the above-mentioned countries since 1997, and organize meetings of the trilateral commission for monitoring the situation in the DPRK since 1999. This commission includes top officials from the Foreign Ministries of Japan, South Korea and the US State Department. On the eve of meetings of the trilateral commission, meetings are usually held on a bilateral basis.

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based on representatives of academic circles specializing in security issues in East Asia.

The conclusion of a new Japan-US security agreement in 1997 increased tensions in Sino-Japanese relations. The most controversial point was the point that fixed the borders of responsibility of Japan and the United States in East Asia - the so-called shuhen zone. These boundaries are determined not so much by geographical criteria, but by situational criteria. This is in marked contrast to Japan's approach to establishing a framework for joint action in the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty, in which they had a clearly defined geographical area of joint responsibility, which included the Japanese Islands proper, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines. In the new agreement on joint defense of Japan and the United States, approved by the Japanese Parliament in May 1999, the area of responsibility of the two countries includes a vast region, the boundaries of which are blurred and determined depending on the development of a particular crisis situation.

The "situational" approach to determining the area of responsibility makes it easier for the Japanese military and politicians to solve at least two operational tasks. First, they can, if necessary, extend the area of responsibility of the Japan-US security treaty far beyond the traditional geographical boundaries of East Asia stipulated in the 1960 security Treaty. Today, for example, the entire Asia-Pacific region is included in the area of responsibility, as stated in the Joint Japan-US Declaration of 1996. And secondly, the "situational" approach to security cooperation creates for Japanese politicians conditions of strategic uncertainty in the interpretation of "New Areas of Defense Cooperation", in which China is not designated as the main opponent of Japan and the United States in the East Asian region. Under the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty, the area of joint responsibility of Japan and the US in East Asia, as noted above, included Taiwan. Events in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 They showed that tensions in Sino-Taiwanese relations remain relevant in the context of the Japanese-American strategic partnership in East Asia and after the Cold War. At the same time, neither Japan nor the United States is interested in making China an object of joint attack by their armed forces, and they avoid driving it into a corner and depriving it of the possibility of broad international cooperation. On the contrary, Washington and Tokyo are interested in the policy of integrating China into a broad international dialogue, including on security issues in East Asia, without, of course, abandoning the policy of its strategic deterrence.

The "situational" approach is, in the opinion of Japanese officials, the best way to solve the problem of deterring China. On the one hand, it allows you not to consider Taiwan as a zone of responsibility of the Japanese-American military alliance, i.e. not to include it in Xiuheng, while, on the other hand, in the event of an aggravation of the situation in the Taiwan Strait, units of the US and Japanese Navies can use their combined power to deter an attack from the PRC. However, the Chinese side does not recognize all these linguistic tricks in the text of "New Directions for Defense Cooperation" and considers any attempts by Japan and the United States to contain China in the Taiwan Strait area as interference in its internal affairs. Moreover, China is concerned about Japan's participation in the implementation of the US program for creating a theater of military operations (Theater of Operations) missile defense system in East Asia, designed to deter China's nuclear and missile deterrence in the event of a possible complication of the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing also suspects Japan of aiding Taiwan in strengthening its independence from China if the Theater missile defense system is successfully tested and put on combat duty.

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All these factors taken together increase tensions in Sino-Japanese relations after Tokyo signed the "New Directions for Defense Cooperation" with the United States in 1997. Beijing does not miss the opportunity to express its negative attitude to strengthening its strategic partnership with the United States in East Asia, which has a pronounced anti-Chinese orientation, at all bilateral meetings with Japanese representatives.

The political activity of the ruling circles of Japan in the post-Cold War period has been more or less reoriented to strengthen the military component of national security, as well as to rethink the Japanese-American military partnership. However, Tokyo has never reduced its policy of strengthening security in East Asia solely to building up the power component. Japan's ruling circles pay equal attention to non-violent security methods, and above all to the development of broad economic cooperation with the countries of the region. They are convinced that economic progress and interdependence are important guarantees for the peaceful and stable development of the East Asian region and its security. It is in the economic sphere that Japan is interested in being active in East Asian affairs. This applies to the resolution of the 1997-1998 financial crisis, to the problems of reducing social inequality, and to environmental pollution, i.e., to everything that constitutes a problem of "humanitarian security", which can be largely solved by economic methods.

However, the countries of East and South-East Asia criticize Japan for being slow in providing them with financial assistance. However, as follows from Prime Minister Obuchi's speech at the Japan-ASEAN Summit in Hanoi in December 1998, "Japan is ready to actively cooperate economically with all countries in the region to strengthen stability and security, to solve the problems of 'human security'. It is ready to increase food and medical assistance to all East Asian countries in need" [Asian Crisis and Human Security..., 1998]. The anti-war norms of the Japanese Constitution are still in demand after the Cold War in the form of maintaining broad economic cooperation aimed at strengthening the interdependence of the countries of the region, at creating an image of Japan among regional powers not as a military power, but as an economically developed state ready to share financial and technological assistance with other countries.

Thus, during the Cold War, Japan's security policy in East Asia was shaped by three decisive factors: the bipolar system of international relations, the Japan-US Security Treaty of 1961, and the anti-war norms of the Japanese Constitution. Japan's contribution to regional security was mediated by its participation in the Japan-US military alliance; it did not participate in any of the regional security organizations. Throughout the years of the Cold War, Japan purposefully increased its industrial, technological and financial potential, gradually turning into an industrial and financial superpower, and thus hoping to maintain regional stability and security.

After the Cold War, changes in the structure of international relations and the dismantling of the bipolar model of the world stimulated the Japanese authorities to expand the dialogue on security and stability in East Asia with other countries in the region. However, in this area, Japan has faced serious restrictions on its activities, which are imposed on it by the strict framework of the Japan-US security treaty. Its relations with the countries of the region are primarily determined by the position of the United States towards these countries. By the level of its political and military dependence-

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With a distance from America, Japan is somewhere at the level of 1951. At the same time, Tokyo is trying to expand ties both with US allies in the region and with countries that were part of the Soviet zone of influence in East Asia during the Cold War. The Japanese authorities are trying to compensate for the lack of multilateral security ties with regional powers with an effective economic policy and the development of broad contacts in the field of trade. Tokyo sees the growing economic interdependence of regional States as an important factor in strengthening national security.

After the Cold War, Japan has been actively fighting for recognition of its status as a regional power and has shown an interest in distancing itself from the image of a strategic ally and sidekick of the United States in the region. Japan's informal recognition of a new, more independent and independent status took place at the 1997 ASEAN + 3 summit in Kuala Lumpur. Japan played a central role in this meeting. It managed to make significant progress in discussing the progress of the region's countries towards political and economic integration, as well as security issues. During the summit, Japanese leaders demonstrated their willingness to overcome the barriers created by the Cold War and move together with other regional Powers on the path of progress and mutual understanding. Japan was then able to significantly weaken its negative image as a pre-war and wartime colonial empire by extending a cooperative hand to China, South Korea, and the ASEAN countries.

Four basic principles underpin Japan's post-Cold War regional policy: anti-militarism, preserving the security treaty with the United States, pan-Asiatism, and economic progress for the development of all countries in the region. Japan has significantly improved its relations with its neighbors in the region. Thanks to its diplomatic and economic efforts, it has become possible to maintain a broad dialogue in various areas of regional cooperation, including sensitive issues such as security. Many East Asian countries today look to Japan as an authoritative regional leader. In the political sphere, Japan initiates the creation of a closed regional club of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), whose task is to create an economic and later political association of East Asian countries. In the economic sphere, the Asian Bank recognized Japan's leadership in providing financial services to countries in the region. In the area of security, the ASEAN Regional Forum invited Japan to play a more active role in regional security issues, going beyond the security treaty with the United States.

Of course, Japan's post-Cold War leadership bid in East Asia is being seriously challenged by China and the United States, as well as other regional players. This can explain its certain constraint in the work of the East Asian Economic Conference, as well as the Asian Bank. Japan itself is also not interested in openly demonstrating its ambitions for leadership in East Asia, so as not to incur accusations of pursuing a neo-imperialist policy. She is more attracted to the role of organizing a regional community of countries based on pan-Asiatism and internationalization. In addition, Japan would like to avoid increasing tensions in its relations with China and the United States, which will inevitably arise as soon as Japan becomes the head of any regional structure.

At the same time, following the Cold War, Japan has conducted careful, soft diplomacy to build bridges with all regional players, and has succeeded in maneuvering its relations with East Asian countries, pursuing the ultimate goal of forming and leading the East Asian community of countries. It doesn't bother her not to-

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the effectiveness of the work of two structures - the East Asian Economic Council and the Asian Bank, in which it plays an important role. Japan expects to lead these regional organizations in the long term and extend its influence throughout East Asia. For it, it is important to sow seeds that will eventually give positive shoots - the unification of the states of the region into the East Asian community of countries under its own auspices.

After the Cold War, the Japanese authorities have pursued a consistent policy of restoring ties with the countries of the region in the political, economic, and security spheres that were lost during the existence of the bipolar world. This task is still far from being completed, but Japan is not losing hope and is gradually stepping up its activities in the ASEAN + 3 Regional Forum, East Asia's most representative regional organization for cooperation and security.

list of literature

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