JAMA'AT AT-TABLIGH AND THE REVIVAL OF RELIGIOUS TIES BETWEEN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT 1

Studying the reasons for the ongoing "revival" of Islam in Central Asia, researchers are used to building a typology of factors of this phenomenon. As a rule, internal factors are identified - local traditions, confessional politics, etc., as well as external factors related to the activities of foreign states and Islamist organizations that have most influenced the transformation of Islam in Central Asian countries, including religious influence from Arab countries, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. At the same time, they often forget about the currents coming from India and Pakistan, which, however, had a strong and lasting influence in the region.

The role of Islam in relations between the two regions can only be understood through their history, especially in the era of intense interactions under the Mughals. Turning to history will help us understand the nature of modern Islamic movements originating in the Indian subcontinent and their development in post-Soviet Central Asia. These movements are not numerous - the Naqshbandiyya Sufi brotherhood, the Ahmadiyya and Jama'at at-Tabligh movements. The latter is discussed in this article.

Key words: Islam, Jama'at at-Tabligh, India, Central Asia.

HISTORICAL MILESTONES OF ISLAMIC INTERACTION BETWEEN CENTRAL ASIA AND INDIA

Before the arrival of Islam, Central Asia had intense religious contacts with India. Buddhism that came from there acquired peculiar forms in Central Asia, which influenced both its existence in China and the subsequent development of Islam in Central Asia [Fussman, 2007; Fussman, 2009; Leriche and Pidaev, 2008, p. 163]. With the spread of the Muslim faith in India, first under the influence of the campaigns of Mahmud of Ghaznevi (997-1030) and the Ghaznavid conquests (975-1187), and then the Ghurid conquests (1148-1215), especially under the leadership of Mu'izz al-din Muhammad (1173-1206), Islam followed a similar path.2 The most intense impact of local traditions was during the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526).

The establishment in India of the Mughal dynasty originating from Central Asia (1526-1858) further strengthened these interactions. Influenced by personal, religious, and political reasons, many Central Asians followed Babur to India, beginning mass population movements between the two regions. 3
1 The author expresses his deep gratitude to Elena Muratova for translating the article from English into Russian, and to Sergey Abashin and Vladimir Bobrovnikov for their scientific editing of the translation.

2 On the spread of Islam in India, see [Gaboricau, 2007; Schimmcl, 1980].

3 For the history of India's relations with Central Asia, see the special issue of Cahiers d'Asie Centrale (No 1, 1996), http://asiccentralc.rcvucs.org/index400.html; [Beisembicv, 2007, p. 260-274].

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This led to cross-cultural influences and borrowings in literature, miniature art, music, astronomy, and architecture (Rasulzadeh, 1968). Due to the religious freedom that prevailed in India, many Central Asian mystics and ordinary believers found refuge there during periods when the political and religious situation in their region was difficult [Foltz, 1998, p. 190]. Even more important is the fact that many Mughal rulers, beginning with Babur (1526-1530), were followers of Naqshbandi sheikhs and maintained personal ties with the Muslim rulers of Central Asia.4
The history of the Naqshbandiyya brotherhood in Central Asia reflects the dynamics of Islamic interaction between this region and India. At the initial stage, the proto-brotherhood, which dates back to Khwaja 'Abd al-Khalik Gijduvani (d. 1220), and the Naqshbandiyya brotherhood itself, named after Baha' ad-din Naqshband (1318-1389), were poorly organized.5 Khwaja ' Ubayd Allah Ahrar (1404-1490), the third important figure in the brotherhood's history, centralized the movement and spiritually strengthened it. Like other political sheikhs, Khwaja Ahrar was not shy about flirting with the authorities, and was involved in state and economic affairs [Gross, 2007, p. 233-259]. The numerous waqfs he controlled allowed him to consolidate his position and enter into relations with rulers who needed to legitimize their power. This tradition of strong ties between political leaders and Sufi sheikhs continued under the Mughals.

The penetration of the Naqshbandiya brotherhood into India took place in several stages. The first is related to the alliance of Babur and Sheikh Khwaja Baqi bi-Llah (1563-1603), apparently one of the ablest successors of Khwaja 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar. Both Babur in the political and social sphere and Khwaja Baqi bi-Llah in the spiritual sphere were the link between Central Asia and India under the Mughals. Subsequently, other Sufi teachers and their followers found themselves in India. Some were fleeing the political pressure of the Sheibanids, 6 others were attracted by the political and economic opportunities of India, some were seeking spiritual search, and some were heading for the Hajj to Mecca through the port of Surat (present-day Gujarat province).

The next stage in the spread of Naqshbandiyya in India is associated with the activities of Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624). He is considered the next most important spiritual leader after Baha' al-din Naqshband, known among his followers as Mujaddid - i alf-i Sani (the renewer of the second millennium). In 1599, Ahmad Sirhindi stopped in Delhi on his way to Mecca and received ijaza (permission to conduct mentoring activities in the brotherhood). Shortly thereafter, he founded his own branch of the brotherhood, known as Naqshbandiyah-Mujaddidiyah. In the 17th century. It was the first Sufi brotherhood of Indian origin to have an impact on Central Asia. The successor and descendant of Sirhindi, Sheikh Habibullah, sent his successors (caliph) to the region, as a result of which the Naqshbandiyya activity in it intensified. Under the influence of these initiatives, the sheikhs of Bukhara began to come to India to receive ijaza and, returning back, spread a new direction of the brotherhood there [Gross, 2007, p.233-259].

The decline of the khanates of Khiva and Kokand, as well as the Emirate of Bukhara, which emerged from the Timurid empire, along with the emergence and subsequent establishment of Russian rule in Central Asia, did not interrupt the religious and cultural contacts of the region with India. At the same time, awareness of the superiority of the Russians and new challenges

4 Babur was a follower of Khwaja ' Ubayd Allah Ahrar, who gave the emperor a new Muslim name, Zahir al-din Muhammad.

5 This periodization is given in [Algar, 1990, p. 3-44]. For a more recent and complete study of the fraternity, see [Wcismann, 2007].

6 The Genghisid Dynasty, which conquered Central Asia during the Timurid period and dominated most of it from 1529 to the beginning of the 18th century.

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Relations with the Muslims of the Russian Empire and beyond gave rise to a reform movement in the region, known in Russian and Western literature as the Jadid movement. Its ideological inspirers were rather the Turkic-speaking intellectuals of the Russian and Ottoman empires, rather than the Muslim spiritual elite of India, whose languages of expression were Farsi and Arabic.7 However, in a later era, reformers from India had a certain influence in the region: both their secular wing, centered in the city of Aligarh,and the more conservative school from Deoband. This influence also took place in the Soviet era in the context of persecution of religion in general. 9
Under Soviet rule, Central Asia still had its own religious centers. Many of the future leaders of Islamist groups of various trends, from moderate to the most radical, were trained there. Among them was Mukhammadzhan Rustamov, known as Domulla Hindustani (1895-1986), who was born in Kokand (in present-day Uzbekistan). He often visited India and Afghanistan, where he learned Hindi and Urdu, languages that he later taught at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Tajik SSR in Dushanbe (Babadzhanov, Muminov, Olcott, 2004, pp. 43-59). Although he cannot be considered a representative of the Deoband school, Hindustani was nevertheless influenced by it. In the face of anti-religious persecution, he founded an illegal private school (khujra), 10 whose influence is still felt in Central Asia. His grave, located next to that of Maulan Yaqoob Charkhi (another important figure of the Naqshbandiyya brotherhood) in the central mosque of Dushanbe, is visited by numerous pilgrims from all over Central Asia.

RESUMPTION OF POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN STATES ' TIES WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD AFTER INDEPENDENCE

A certain liberalization of society during the Perestroika era, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent states on its ruins had historical consequences for the fate of Islam in Central Asia. Now nothing interfered with the practice of Muslim worship. The activities of traditional Muslim spiritual elites in the region have resumed. Moreover, the new authorities in each of the States of the region sought to show favor to Islam and welcomed its involvement in one form or another in the new political identity. In some cases, such as in Uzbekistan, the new elites did not hesitate to use Islam to legitimize their power. Such an approach to religion, however, did not relieve the authorities ' sense of unease with Islam, which stems from the fear of the impossibility of its comprehensive control [Olcott and Ziyayeva, 2008, p. 52].

7 There is an extensive literature on the Jadid movement, which occupies a significant place in the history of socio-political ideas of the Muslim peoples of Central Asia. See, for example: [Le réformisme..., 1966, p. 242].

8 For more details on the complex relationship between the Dsobandi system and the Aligarh, see [Kucukcan, 1994, p. 48-58].

9 Modern studies of the situation of Islam in the Soviet era note the relative nature of its suppression and the contradictory nature of state policy towards it. The repressions of the 1930s did not prevent the authorities from turning a blind eye to covert and illegal Islamic activity in the following decades. In this regard, we should refer to the research of Stephane A. Dudoignon on the significance of holiness and saints (auliyah) in modern and contemporary Islam ("Islam et sainteté") and on the religious and political consequences, cultural and socio-economic prerequisites of the RS-Islamization of rural communities in Soviet and post-Soviet Central Eurasia in the second half of the XX and XX centuries. at the beginning of the XXI century. The project was carried out by a group of Western and post-Soviet researchers led by S. A. Dudoignon and Christian Noak from the University of Amsterdam with the support of the Volkswagen Foundation. Most recently, a collective monograph was published based on its results [Dudoignon and Noack, 2014].

10 Secret and informal Islamic study group.

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One of the consequences of these changes in the region was the emergence of various Islamic influences from the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey. Islamic groups in the Indian subcontinent have also had some influence in post-Soviet Central Asia. Three Islamic movements sought to establish themselves in the region. These include the Naqshbandiyya tariqa, whose historical significance for the region was noted above, the transnational movement of Indian origin Ahmadiyya, and the Jama'at at-Tabligh, which first appeared in Central Asia.

The revival of Sufism in Central Asia has already been the subject of a number of studies." Experts note that this Islamic trend has skillfully taken advantage of the controversial policy of the Uzbek leadership. Although Uzbek President Islam Karimov has extolled the virtues of Sufism as a modest and tolerant trend in Islam and seen it as a model for achieving social harmony in the country, he has also expressed concern about its possible transformation into a competing political force [Olcott, 2007, p.42]. In the early 1990s, with the financial support of the leadership of Turkey, which was then in good relations with Uzbekistan, I. Karimov participated in the restoration of the mausoleum of Baha' al-din Naqshband in Bukhara, which turned into a huge complex accommodating thousands of pilgrims. This support of the local Naqshbandiya brotherhood enabled him to establish contacts with the latter's branches abroad, especially in Turkey, where the legacy of the tariqa was particularly prominent.

It is not surprising that under such circumstances, one of the Naqshbandi mentors, Sheikh Muhammad Zulfiqar Naqshbandi Mujaddidi from Lahore, achieved great success in Central Asia. He visited Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where he managed to gain 12 followers. Among the students of the Pakistani sheikh was Salim Bukhari, a man with a modern secular higher education, who received a diploma in Germany. In 2008, he became Director of the Baha' al-din Naqshband Foundation in Bukhara, which studies Sufism and Sufi culture (Olcott, 2007, p.42). The main goal of its activity was to activate the study of the Naqshbandiyya heritage. However, later, fearing his success, Tashkent refused to grant him a visa, and the scientist did not return to Uzbekistan again [Olcott, 2007, p.26]. It had a great influence on the development of the religious situation in Central Asia, especially in Tajikistan, where the attitude of the authorities towards Islam was more lenient.

The second religious movement of Indian origin that has been present in Central Asia for a number of years is the Ahmadiyya. It was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1838-1908) in 1889 under the influence of the penetration of Protestant missionaries into British India and the emergence of the Arya Samaj reform movement. 13 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad declared himself both the predicted Messiah (mahdi), the renewer of the faith (mujaddid) and the reincarnation of Jesus, who came to "revive" Islam and its final reformation. wins. It is noteworthy that he introduced elements of Hinduism into his teaching, in particular the figure of Krishna. One of the main tenets of his teaching was to replace armed jihad with language jihad (jihad bi-l-lisan), which meant spreading Islam through preaching and peaceful actions [Friedmann, 1989; Servan-Schreiber, 2002, p. 8-12]. Having borrowed missionary techniques and organizational structure from Protestants, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad gained followers in many countries of the world over several decades.

After his death, there was a split in Ahmadiyya, as a result of which two directions were formed, the border between which is rather conditional. A large group of followers, called Kadiani (after the name of a city in India), insists on

11 See Zarconc, 2000, pp. 297-323.

12 For the hsu spiritual genealogy, see: http://www.tasawwuf.org/shaykh/silsilah.htm.

13 For this sect, sometimes characterized as a reformist movement, see Chamupati, 2001; Lai and Sharma, 1993.

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on the prophetic status of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and on the fact that the leadership of the community after his death should pass to his successors, the caliphs. A smaller section of followers, known as the Lahore School, believe that the founder of the movement was just a restorer with no prophetic authority and that the community should be led by a body of chosen people (anjuman). Both wings of the movement are subject to persecution in the Muslim world, especially in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, where they have been recognized as heretical and, as a result, are not allowed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca [Kennedy, 1989, p. 71-99].

Despite persecution in most Muslim countries, Ahmadiyya followers have managed to spread the movement around the world - in Africa, Europe, and the United States. They have achieved notable success in Albania, a country known for its isolationist and anti-religious policies. Among the Central Asian countries, Ahmadiyya is successful only in Kyrgyzstan. One of the main reasons is religious freedom, which distinguishes this state from neighboring strict regimes.14 Although the Ahmadiyya movement was met with hostility by orthodox Islam, it was officially registered by the Kyrgyz Ministry of Justice in 2002. However, the registration was later cancelled "for security reasons". In 2011, members of the community again applied for registration, but were refused by the State Commission for Religious Affairs. Despite this, the religious community continues to develop its activities. There are no signs of an official presence of this movement in neighboring countries.

JAMA'AT AT-TABLIGH - A NEW ISLAMIC COMMUNITY OF INDIAN ORIGIN

To date, an influential Islamic movement of Indian origin is the Jama'at at-Tabligh. It was founded in the late 1920s in the Indian province of Mewat by Muhammad Ilyas Kandhalavi (1885-1944), a famous Indian Sufi. It should be noted that there are different opinions as to whether his preaching had Sufi roots. 15 The word Tabligh means "delivering [the Islamic call]," and Jama'at at-Tabligh seeks to revive this practice, which is considered a fundamental duty of every Muslim. The members of this organization strictly follow the rules of Islamic law. They observe religious dogmas and norms of religious practice. Their activity is limited to the Muslim community, and their main goal is to awaken Muslims around the world. The movement is apolitical in nature, thus following the instructions of its founder, Muhammad Ilyas, who sought to keep his community from political debate in India, where there were contradictions between Muslims and Hindus.

Initially, the movement focused primarily on Indian Muslims, trying to strengthen their faith and purify their religious practices that were mixed with pre-Islamic beliefs. Later, the missionaries of Jama'at at-Tabligh spread their activities all over the world, including Western Europe and especially France.16
The Jama'at al-Tabligh stands out among other Islamic organizations by the notion that the religious mission of Da'wa is open to every Muslim, not just to the Muslim community.

14 For the Kyrgyz authorities ' attitude towards Ahmadiyya muslims, see: http://www.forum18.org/Archivc.php?articlc_id=322.

15 This is a complex issue that has divided researchers. Even modern followers of the movement cannot agree on the general attitude of their movement towards Sufism. In this regard, we can refer to the following paper: [Gaboricau, 2006].

16 It has been active there since the 1960s, especially among immigrants from North Africa. For example, the well-known organization Foi et Pratique, active in the poor suburbs of France, is an offshoot of Jama'at at-Tabligh. On this issue, you can refer to the work: (Khcdimclla, 2002, p. 20-21].

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to a narrow circle of scholars and clerics [Ilyas, 1944]. Preachers who, in accordance with the fundamental rule of Jama'at al-Tabligha, travel around the world to spread Islam are volunteers who independently finance their activities. Most of them are men of different social and professional levels. Missionaries are trained in courses of varying duration - from three, ten, twenty, and forty days to four months, which corresponds to the spiritual needs of each individual [Metcalf, 2004; Masud, 2000, p. 200]. Each novice must complete several short courses to complete the four-month course and earn the title of kadim, which means " one of the elders in the house."

Jama'at at-Tabligh has its own concept of missionary activity. The traditional concept of Islamic invocation, dating back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, was an integral part of the spread of Islam and was associated with jihad. Conversion to Islam was considered a collective responsibility of the Islamic State rather than an individual. Muhammad Ilyas Kandhalavi undertook a radical reform of this concept: he transformed jihad into a peace process, a call that became the personal responsibility of every believer. In order to be a good Muslim, a member of the community must devote part of their energy and time to missionary work.17
According to some members of Jama'at at-Tabligh, followers of their community first arrived in Central Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. This was a small group of Indian students who came under Soviet scholarships during the period of good relations between the two countries [Horn, 1982, p. 235]. This was the first attempt by Jama'at at-Tabligh to establish a connection with the region. The main activity of this community is connected with the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Central Asia became open to foreign Islamic movements. Jama'at al-Tabligh's journey to Central Asia was not easy, as the most influential Islamic movements in the region were originally from the Arab world and especially Turkey. Among other things, Turkish Islamic communities used the factor of linguistic affinity with the peoples of the region [Balci, 2007, p. 367-390].

Although it is difficult to accurately date the time of the establishment of Jama'at al-Tabligh in the region, it was only after September 11, 2001 that its presence took real shape in the cities of Central Asia. Those tragic events were largely decisive, as they prompted the regional Governments to start persecuting religious organizations that they perceived as political and/or radical. Since Jama'at al-Tabligh was a non-political and non-radical organization, it was considered by the local authorities (at least by some of them) as a potential means of controlling young people, some of whom sympathized with radical Islamist organizations. Due to this tolerance and the fact that members of the community in Pakistani dress (shalvar kamis) went from house to house calling people to prayer, Jama'at at-Tabligh soon became a prominent phenomenon and simultaneously a subject of interest from religious leaders and researchers.

Jama'at at-Tabligh is not present in all Central Asian states. At the moment, the movement is barely active in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, quite noticeable in Kazakhstan, most successful in Kyrgyzstan, and absent in Turkmenistan.

The Uzbek authorities, in an effort to fully control Islam in all its manifestations, considered Jama'at at-Tabligh a potential threat to the country's national security. They officially banned the organization's activities, despite the fact that one of the most respected and charismatic religious leaders in the country, the former Mufti of the republic, Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yusuf, stated that,

17 For various forms and concepts of proselytism, including the concepts of da'wa, tabligh, and jihad, see [Masud, 2000, pp. 79-121].

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that Jama'at at-Tabligh is a non-political and harmless organization (Rotar, 2003). Several activists who tried to develop their activities were arrested [Saidazimova, 2012]. In its fight against any form of radical Islam, the Uzbek regime associates any Islamic movement that has not been officially registered with the Ministry of Justice with radical Islamism, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)18 or Hizb-ut-Tahrir 19.

In Tajikistan, Jama'at al-Tabligha activists also have no legal status, and the official position towards them fluctuates between tolerance and repression. This happens in conditions when the authorities show favor for Islam as a result of the legal participation of an Islamic political party (Islamic Renaissance Party/IPV) in political life. In August 2009, when I was in Dushanbe, there was a crackdown, during which several activists were jailed for belonging to an illegal Islamist movement [Tajikistan jails..., 2009]. According to an expert on Islam in Tajikistan, paradoxically, the ban on Jama'at al-Tabligh was initiated by Islamists in the Tajik elite. The IPV sees Jama'at al-Tabligha as a potential competitor, while the secular part of the government is basically ready to co-exist with these movements.20
In Kazakhstan, Jama'at at-Tabligh is tolerated, but not legally registered. The authorities do not allow him to be officially registered with the Ministry of Justice and the State Agency for Religious Affairs. By denying him legal status, the authorities are trying to prevent his politicization. This means that members of the congregation can meet, but they can be banned from preaching at any time. However, members of the Jama'at al-Tabligh are not persecuted and preach openly. However, in some remote cities, they are sometimes arrested and interrogated by security officials (Rotar, 2012).

Kyrgyzstan is a kind of paradise on earth for Jama'at at-Tabligh activists. They are allowed to operate legally throughout the country. The community is present in Bishkek and Naryn, but it is more active in the south of the country, in the center of the Ferghana Valley - in Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken-regions where the population's religiosity has traditionally been high. A number of factors may explain the significant presence of Jama'at al-Tabligha in Kyrgyzstan. In addition to greater religious freedom, some features of Islam preached by Jama'at al-Tabligh also contribute to success. Members of the organization, who are called da ' vatchilar (those who are engaged in conscription), are poorly educated in religion and rather amateurs in their field [Toktogulova, 2009]. Therefore, they offer a "minimalist Islam". Traffic tends to reach-

18 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is one of the most radical jihadist organizations in the country. It was established in the first years of independence. Consisting of various Islamist groups active in the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley in the early 1990s, the party transformed into an influential paramilitary organization that caused concern to the Uzbek authorities. During the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997), the IMU took refuge there, using the territory of this state as a springboard for its activities. After national reconciliation in Tajikistan, the movement moved to Afghanistan, where it became close to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This proved fatal for the movement, as the movement's military leader, Juma Namangani, was killed during the US bombing campaign in Afghanistan in November 2011. Tahir Yuldashev, the political leader of the movement, survived, but was never able to revive the movement. According to some reports, he is in a difficult situation in Pakistan. For the history and development of this political military organization, see [Terrorisme..., 2008, p. 32].

19 Hizb-ut-Tahrir is an Islamist party founded in Jordan in the 1950s and headquartered in London. It emerged in Central Asia in the 1990s. The party calls for the revival of the caliphate to unite all Muslims of the world. Although the CE activists do not resort to violence, they have a rather radical discourse on the Central Asian regimes, which ultimately resulted in their harsh persecution. Due to the secretive nature of the party, there are only a few serious studies about it. Among them: [Chaudct, 2006, p. 113-125; Farouki, 1996; Karagiannis, 2005, p. 137-149].

20 Interview with Said Ahmad Qalandar, a Tajik researcher. Dushanbe, July 2009.

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knock on the door of young people, turn them away from harmful habits (alcohol and drugs) and teach them the basic pillars of Islam, in particular prayer and reading the Koran, involve them in missionary activities, which would allow them to attract new members of the community.

According to my field research in Osh, where half of the population is Uzbek, the members of the Jama'at at-Tabligh are almost exclusively Kyrgyz. A possible explanation for this (which, of course, needs to be confirmed) is that this movement is mainly aimed at "inexperienced" Muslims and therefore does not have success among more religiously knowledgeable Uzbeks. This argument is supported by the theory held by all experts on Jama'at al-Tabligh: the movement is successful among Muslims who are poorly informed about their religion, and among those communities that have weak social ties. Indeed, Kyrgyz society is poorer than other Central Asian societies, and it was only relatively recently and superficially Islamized.

In all regions where the movement is present, the same method of preaching is observed. It was inherited from the founders of Jama'at al-Tabligh and is distributed by members of the movement who have been trained in India, Pakistan and even Bangladesh. So, usually after the Friday prayer, a small group (often four people) sets out and moves from door to door, inviting people to religious meetings held in the nearest mosque. During my last trip to Bishkek in October 2010. I was invited to take this route, which in the language of the community is called gasht (Persian, "patrol"). After the end of the prayer, several groups of four people, led by the elected leader, went to explore the surrounding area.

In exactly the same way, community cells everywhere organize three-and forty-day preaching tours. Small groups go to a certain town or village, spend three or forty days there, during which they "patrol" the territory, attracting as many believers as possible. Identifying community leaders is difficult, as the movement tends to be egalitarian and non-hierarchical [Reetz, 2008, pp. 98-124]. Each member of the Jama'at al-Tabligh must devote three days a month and forty days a year to this missionary activity, which has become a kind of "pillar" of Islam for them.

Meetings of followers of the movement are held on the territory of a mosque in a particular area, since the Jama'at at-Tabligh does not have its own premises. After the end of the "patrol", the activist reports to the leader, called the amir. A member of each group reports on how many homes they visited and how people reacted to their call. After that, the amir reads a long sermon called bayan, which usually focuses on commenting on a passage from the Qur'an or hadith.21
JAMA'AT AT-TABLIGH AND OTHER ISLAMIC GROUPS IN CENTRAL ASIA

Analyzing the relationship of Jama'at al-Tabligh with other Islamic movements and organizations is not an easy task. Although all Islamic actors may be geographically located in the same places, they keep to themselves, and in some cases ignore each other altogether.

The first Islamic actor that Jama'at al-Tabligh encountered in Central Asia was official or state Islam. This legacy of the Soviet regime is part of the state's attempts to control religion through institutions: the State Committee for Religious Affairs, which is part of the State Duma.

21 Musa Khadimallah, who has studied the activities of this movement in the French countryside, observed the same missionary practice. See [Khcdimcllah, 2001, p. 5-18].

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government, and a spiritual administration headed by a mufti, qadi, or sheikh-ul-Islam. In all the Central Asian states, the movement has poor relations with official structures. The style of dress worn by members of the Jama'at at-Tabligh (Shalwar Qamis)and their long beards is enough to irritate the representatives of the state who adhere to the Western external style. 22
Official Islam is somewhat concerned about the activity of this movement, which is represented by young uneducated activists who are quite successful in their missionary search, as can be seen from the filled mosques in a number of cities. But even if official religious leaders do not like the movement, they are forced to tolerate its followers. This is because Jama'at at-Tabligh activists are difficult to expel from the mosque, as they follow the laws and do not commit any wrongdoing. In Kyrgyzstan, the movement, having a legal status and official registration, has advanced so much that the Spiritual Administration has created a special conscription department to coordinate missionary activity. Therefore, such issues as the number of people in each "patrol", the territories they cover, the amount of money allocated for this, etc. are discussed by representatives of official Islam with members of the Jama'at al-Tabligha. The state even tried, though unsuccessfully, to impose its own style of clothing on them. However, the missionaries of Jama'at at-Tabligh preferred garments brought directly from India and Pakistan23.

Jama'at al-Tabligh is not the only Islamic organization that is independent of the authorities and develops missionary activities. There are other movements that are illegal, as they are considered political and radical. One of them is Hizbut Tahrir. Having a presence in some cities of Central Asia, especially in the Ferghana Valley, party members operate in secret. The party has a utopian political program, which is based on the revival of a worldwide caliphate, which will once again unite all the Muslims of the world into a single Ummah. This political project was banned and persecuted in all Central Asian states, especially in Uzbekistan, where the party had a fairly strong position in the early 2000s.

Many local experts claim that there are almost no links between Jama'at al-Tabligh and Hizb ut-Tahrir, but this is difficult to confirm empirically, since the latter organization is closed for research. However, it is clear that its organizational structure and ideology contradicts Jama'at al-Tabligh. This suggests that there is no secret cooperation between them. If you ask the opinion of the activists of Jama'at at-Tabligh, you can hear disagreement with the methods of Hizb-ut-Tahrir. They will point out that the leaders of their movement have banned political activities that are perceived as fitna, a source of discord and discord in the Muslim community.

Other Islamic movements in the" market " of Central Asian Islam are mainly represented by those groups that came from Turkey and whose activity in the region is supported by their linguistic proximity to the local Turkic peoples and the good relations between Ankara and the capitals of most states in the region. They do not compete much with Jama'at al-Tabligha, which is aimed at a different audience.

22 In Kazakhstan, during my trip in July 2009, I witnessed a strange situation. Although the members of the Jama'at al-Tabligh prayed behind the imam of the grand Mosque five times a day, he had no idea who they were or what they were doing. During my interview with the imam, he stated that he did not want to communicate with them. However, he asked me to tell him about the purpose of Jama'at at-Tabligh. As a result, I spoke more than the imam I came to interview, and I got the impression that I told him a lot of interesting things about his co-religionists who are under the influence of Jama'at at-Tabligh.

23 Interview with Ravshan Eratov, employee of the draft sector of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan.

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First of all, they are followers of the Naqshbandiyya tariqa. One of the brotherhood's leaders, Osman Nuri Topbash, opened several madrasas in Central Asia.24 His works have been translated into several Central Asian languages, as well as Russian, and can be easily found in most shops near mosques in the region's big cities (especially in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan). Another Turkish Islamist movement, Suleymancilar, named after its founder Suleyman Tunahan (1881-1959), is present in Central Asia through several Quranic schools operating without official authorization. 25 Finally, the neo-Sufi Nurjular Brotherhood, founded by Said Nursi (1876-1960), is active in Central Asia. One of the modern branches of the brotherhood is led by Fethullah Gulen (b. 1938).26 This Turkish movement is characterized by a less aggressive proselytism and a focus on long-term goals.

The Gulen community does not conflict with Jama'at al-Tabligh. The same can be said about other Turkish Islamic movements. Turkish movements are aimed at more educated people and operate within areas of Turkish influence, such as in the education or commercial sectors. One gets the impression that Turkish and other Islamic organizations do not know about each other and are even indifferent to the discourse and actions of other people's supporters. In other countries, such as Azerbaijan, there are similar trends in the development of Islam, but there, unlike in Central Asia, the Caucasus Muslim Board regularly organizes dialogue meetings between different movements.

Finally, it is important to consider the current links between Jama'at at-Tabligha cells in Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. As noted above, Jama'at al-Tabligh was introduced to Central Asia through preachers from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh who arrived in the 1990s and early 2000s. In recent years, only a few Jama'at al-Tabligha activists have come from there to continue the work started by their predecessors. On the other hand, field studies in October 2009 in New Delhi, Deoband, and Lucknow revealed a well-established route for Tablighians to travel from Central Asia to India.

The historic center of Jama'at at Tabligha is located in the traditional Nizamuddin quarter of New Delhi. It continues to attract Tablighovs from all over the world, including Central Asia. I went there for a few interviews. On a daily and hourly basis, followers of the movement arrived there and were received by the center, which to an outside observer may seem devoid of any organizational structure. Visitors arrived there as part of their three-and forty-day, as well as four-month training courses. Spiritual guides preached sermons to them every evening, which were translated from Urdu into Arabic, Russian or English, depending on the groups of visitors. 27
Pilgrims from the countries of the former USSR, apparently, should be many, since even during my presence there were at least ten people and newcomers were constantly arriving. Young Kazakhs, Kirghizs, Tajiks, Tatars and Chechens came

24 The following three sites will provide an overview of the ideas of the leader of this fraternity and his community. Website in French www.tcrrcdcpaix.com, in Turkish www.altinoluk.com (monthly traffic journal) and a website related to the local community, - www.gonuldunyamiz.com.

25 One of the movement's leaders, Suleymanjilar, whom I met in Bishkek in July 2009, reported on 19 institutions of the movement in Kyrgyzstan and 42 in Kazakhstan. The size of these establishments varies. A madrasah can include as many as 20 students or as many as 300. Website www.tunahan.org provides information about the ideas of the spiritual leader of the movement Suleiman Tunahan.

26 For the missionary work of the followers of Said Nursi and Fethullah Gulen, see [Balci, 20031.

27 During my presence at the center, a young man of mixed French-Moroccan descent translated into French for a group of French, North African and Turkish speakers.

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they went there to listen to sermons in Urdu, which were translated for them by a Tatar, apparently connected with this center. To my surprise, there were also two Uzbeks from Kokand who happened to be in the center. Interviews have shown that the movement of followers occurs mainly in one direction. Central Asians go on pilgrimage to India, but Indian missionaries no longer see the need to travel to the former Soviet Union to spread their teachings.

After spending a few days or weeks at the Nizamuddin Center, visitors continue their pilgrimage to other Jama'at al-Tabligha centers, especially Deoband, Kolkata, Mumbai and Lucknow. However, I did not find any Central Asian students enrolled in long-term studies at religious institutes in these cities. Officials I met, including the rector of the largest madrasah in Deoband, explained that since September 2001, the Indian authorities have not allowed them to accept foreign students for extended periods, except for a few Malaysians and Indonesians. Therefore, the missionaries of Jama'at al-Tabligh arrive in these cities for a three-day period, after which they go to other points in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Deoband, in a house built specifically for visitors (dar az-zuyuf), I met several Tajik pilgrims who were planning to continue their pilgrimage to Lucknow.

In comparison with other Islamic groups in Central Asia, the Jama'at al-Tabligha groups do not conduct trade relations. Thus, the young people met in these Indian cities did not engage in any business activities in parallel with their religious activities. Only Uzbeks were forced to enter India's trade relations with their country in order to obtain a visa to India. Those I met received Indian business visas and were involved in the delivery of car parts that are not available in Uzbekistan.

conclusion

Several Indo-Pakistani groups contributed to the Islamic revival in Central Asia. Jama'at at-Tabligh sent a significant number of missionaries there and managed to attract young people for their spiritual purification. The movement has been particularly successful in cities in Kyrgyzstan where poverty and unemployment are high and where the Jama'at al-Tabligh has been able to operate more easily due to the relatively high level of religious freedom.

Although the presence of Indo-Pakistani Islamic influence in Central Asia is becoming increasingly visible, its role should not be overstated. It is no more important than Turkish or Arab influences. The modern religious elites of the region were formed to a greater extent under the influence of the Arab world and Turkey, rather than the Indo-Pakistani movements. Central Asian students go to study more often in Egypt, Syria (at least before the unrest there) and Turkey than in Indo-Pakistani madrassas. Moreover, the presence of Indo-Pakistani Islam has not affected Central Asia's political relations with the Indian subcontinent. Appealing to marginalized youth, Indo-Pakistani Islam has no influence on elites and no political ambitions.

Because of these circumstances, Islamic organizations in India and Pakistan, especially Jama'at al-Tabligh, should be considered as transnational organizations. Their influence is growing. But at the same time, Jama'at al-Tabligh has no political weight, mainly because of the apolitical nature of the organization from the very moment of its foundation. However, its spread throughout Central Asia and proselytizing among young people may in the coming years lead it to move beyond the marginal sphere and start operating among the elites. Its apolitical position at the moment does not mean that it will not become politicized in the future, especially if the socio-economic situation in the region worsens.

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