The article examines the problems associated with the influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on the development of the jihadist movement in the countries of Southeast Asia, where more than 250 million people live. muslims. The presence of well-equipped bases, strong leaders who are ready to pledge allegiance to the ideas of ISIS, and social strata of society that are receptive to the ideology of this organization increases the danger of strengthening its position in the region, which poses a threat to the security of Southeast Asia.

Key words: ISIL, Southeast Asia, jihadists, radical Islamic extremists, terrorist organizations.

The article was received by the editorial office on 20.07.2015.

The reverberations of the events that took place in the Middle East also reached the countries of South-East Asia (SE) and gradually turned into a threat to their security. And whether the local Muslim majority, numbering more than 250 million people, maintains religious tolerance or swears allegiance to jihad, depends not only on the future, but also on the present of the region.

In September 2014, the ASEAN countries issued a statement condemning the ISIL terrorist group and expressing solidarity with international actions against it. And this was done not so much under the influence of the international community, which is concerned about the spread of the threat, but rather based on the interests of its own security in the light of the growing influence of radical jihadists in the region. Malaysian Defense Minister Hishaudin Hussein openly announced the possibility of activating the activities of ISIL in Southeast Asia, and the Philippine authorities do not rule out the possibility of new terrorist attacks inspired by supporters of this organization. But Indonesia is the most vulnerable country. And not so much because Islam is the dominant religion there, but because terrorist Islamic groups of a jihadist nature have long been operating in this country1, which have long-standing contacts with international terrorist structures such as Al-Qaeda. Today, these structures are ready to pledge allegiance to ISIL, which was demonstrated in video messages of their leaders posted on the Internet. These leaders include: Abu Bakar Bashir ² the founder of the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (the one behind the Bali bombings), and later the leader of the extremist Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) that broke away from it; Aman Abdurahman, the organizer of the militant camp in Aceh province, who is currently serving time in prison; radical preacher Halavi Makmun from Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and the most famous terrorist is Santoso from Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), which is today the most dangerous terrorist group in the country.

Recently, the activity of another structure lobbying for the interests of ISIL in Indonesia, which stands for masso, has intensified-

Natalia ROGOZHINA, Doctor of Political Sciences, Leading Researcher, Center for Development and Modernization Problems, IMEMO RAS, 23, Trade Union Street, 117997 Moscow, Russian Federation (ngrogozhina@mail.ru).

¹ The jihadist movement dates back to the radical Islamist movement Darul Islam, which emerged during the anti-colonial war against the Netherlands in 1945-1949.

² Bashir is the patriarch of Indonesian Salafi extremism. In 1972, together with Abdul Sungar, he founded the Pesantren al-Mukmin school, where he preached the ideas of Salafi Islam and political extremism. In the early 80s, they moved to Malaysia to avoid arrest. In the mid-90s, they formed Jemaah Islamiyah and returned to Indonesia after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. Bashir was accused of organizing the 2005 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, but spent only 18 months in prison and, after being released, founded a new organization, Jama ' ah Ansharut Tauhid. He was again convicted on charges of organizing a jihadist military camp in Aceh in 2011. He is currently serving a 15-year prison sentence.

Forum Aktivis Syariat Islam (FAKSI), a youth forum for Sharia activists. Back in March 2014, they issued a statement on Twitter in Arabic, saying: "The Islamic State will soon come to Indonesia, thank Allah, and change the name of the country to the Islamic State of Southeast Asia" [1, p. 12].

A total of 18 extremist organizations in Indonesia expressed solidarity with ISIL.³ They are mainly adherents of the Takfiri ideology and firmly believe that anyone who denies the laws of Islam and works for the government of the country is an "infidel" [2, p. 7].

In Malaysia, which has never been threatened by terrorist attacks from local Islamic radicals, largely due to the successful actions of anti-terrorist forces, there is a real danger of activation of Islamic extremists inspired by the idea of creating a "super-Islamic" caliphate. Local Islamists have formed new groups known only by their acronyms-BKAW, BAJ, Dimzia and ADB. The country's authorities believe that the Islamists are linked to extremists from the Indonesian terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiah and the Malaysian Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia ^{4, which is close to it}, and are recruiting fighters for ISIL, who were trained in rebel camps in Thailand and the Philippines.

As for the Philippines, members of the Abu Sayyaf⁵, led by its leader Isnilon Hapilon ⁶, who is hiding in the jungle of the Sulu archipelago, have expressed their loyalty to ISIS. Members of the terrorist Islamist organization Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (Biff), a breakaway from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, also declared their commitment to the ideas of ISIS. It was supported by another terrorist organization, Jama ' at Ansar Al-Khilafa (JAK), which said in a video message that it would wage jihad until Sharia law is established in the world, and its members are ready to die in order to achieve this goal.

The synchronicity of video messages posted by Filipino and Indonesian jihadists on the Internet confirms the existence of close contacts between them, established at the time when Jemaah Islamiah participated in training militants in a camp located in the southern part of Mindanao Island, where terrorists from Indonesia and Malaysia still find refuge. They are linked by their commitment to the Salafi jihadist ideology shared by Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

ISIL's efforts to create a Salafi caliphate have a special meaning for local jihadists and are perceived by them as a clear proof of the triumph of their ideology, embodied in concrete forms. All jihadists are Sunni and extremely hostile to Shiites, reflecting the emergence of new trends in the development of radical Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia. And if at the beginning of the XXI century jihadists fought against Christians, Jews and an external enemy - the West, which threatens the "Christianization" of Islam, now Shiites are also among the main enemies (in Malaysia they were traditionally treated with hostility, and in Indonesia - until recently very tolerant). Their very existence, according to jihadists, is a danger to the Muslim community.

All these terrorist organizations are united in their rejection of the democratic system of government, which, according to their ideas, should be replaced by a Sharia state. This, however, does not exclude the existence of differences of opinion between them, especially between Indonesian extremists, regarding the time of jihad - "today" or" later " [3]. The position of supporters of the first concept is strengthening against the background of the turbulent events taking place in the Middle East.

Terrorists are calling on Southeast Asian Muslims to take up arms and fight alongside ISIL, which currently has between 200 and 600 Indonesian citizens in its ranks^.,

^{Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), Jamaah Ansharuut Tauhid (JAT), Ring Banten} 3 и др.

^{The Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM),} 4 or Malaysian Mujahideen Movement is a terrorist organization that advocates the overthrow of the legitimate Government of Malaysia and the creation of a pan-regional Islamic state. The Government, which is actively fighting the Malay Mujahiddin movement, has arrested more than 70 extremist members of the organization.

^{Abu Sayyaf} 5 is listed as a terrorist organization by the United Nations. Since its inception in 1991, its members have committed many acts of terrorism; it has been involved in extortion, kidnapping, and murder, which, according to the militants, is part of the struggle for the creation of an independent Islamic province in the southern Philippines.

⁶ In 2006, Hapilon was listed as a "most wanted terrorist" by the FBI.

⁷ Some Indonesian students studying in Turkey, Yemen, or Pakistan join ISIS.

60-80 - from Malaysia and 100-from the Philippines. Singapore citizens are also fighting for ISIS. Many of them were part of a special Malay-speaking militant group (Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah)⁸, created in order to establish cooperation with Indonesian Islamists. These militants, as a rule, do not speak either Arabic or English and are forced to coordinate their activities through Malays who speak English. These are young people in their 20s and 30s, educated and fairly affluent ⁹, inspired by the idea of creating an Islamic caliphate. And the fact that the fight for it is already underway in Iraq and Syria reinforces their belief that they made the right choice. According to analysts from the Jakarta-based Institute for Political Analysis of Conflicts, this choice is based on eschatological ideas, according to which the last battle before the end of the world will take place in the country of Sham - as Syria is also called in Islamic literature [4, p. 2].

There are also women among ISIL fighters in Southeast Asia who participate mainly in " sexual jihad "(jihad al-nikah), offering themselves to radical Islamists to"maintain their morale."

However, in general, the number of fighters who came to fight in the ranks of the "Islamic State" from Southeast Asia is incomparably less than those from Western countries. According to Sydney Jones, director of the Institute for Political Analysis of Conflicts mentioned above, this fact can be explained by the fact that, unlike "Europeans" who are representatives of the Muslim minority in the European West and feel isolated there, Indonesians living in the largest Muslim country in the world do not have such sentiments. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the territorial remoteness of the Southeast Asian countries from the Middle East, as opposed to Europe [5].

Nevertheless, it is clear that ISIL's actions in Southeast Asia are aimed at strengthening its influence there and increasing the recruitment of new fighters. The latter is carried out in various ways: preaching in mosques and processing students in madrasas and religious boarding schools (for example, Ngruki Islamic) funded by radical Islamist organizations (in particular, Jemaah Islamiyah); distributing jihadist religious literature; engaging local radical circles and appropriately oriented groups in joint activities on social networks. Today, 10 thousand extremist websites are registered in the countries of the region.

In Malaysia, ISIS recruits future soldiers through Islamic educational circles known as usrah. In turn, these recruits recruit jihadists in Singapore. According to Professor L. M. Efimova of MGIMO, a well-known expert on Islam, graduates of religious schools "as a rule, not only maintain a spiritual connection with their mentors, but also maintain corporate contacts among themselves. Often, kinship and business relationships develop between them. Thus, adherents of radical and extremist ideological trends form something like an extensive family clan and a broad corporation, practically covering the country up to the most remote corners" [6, pp. 119-1120].

According to scientists at the Setara Institute for Peace and Democracy in Jakarta, radical youth groups are "incubators" for potential jihadists who later become terrorists. Members of these radical organizations will not hesitate to use violence to achieve their political goals, including the main one-the creation of a Sharia state [7].

Fighters from Southeast Asia usually enter ISIL units through Turkey, where they come on tourist or student visas or as part of humanitarian missions, which, in particular, are organized by the Indonesian Hilal Ahmar society (HASI), associated with Jemaah Islamiyah and Jamaat Ansharut Tauhid [8]. And then illegally, through organized channels, they are transferred to the territory occupied by ISIS. Many of the participants in these "humanitarian" missions come to Syria to provide "purely charitable" assistance to fellow Sunnis, but once in the lands controlled by ISIS, they cannot resist the ideological pressure of this organization. Such fighters are sent to conflict zones to take part in battles in Syria and Iraq and then migrate to the so-called Islamic State. And although the religious factor is the main reason for their joining a terrorist group, one should not be forced to do so. -

⁸ Renamed in early 2015 to Majmuah al Arkabiliy to emphasize its Arabic roots.

⁹ The majority of Malay fighters fighting for ISIL are middle-class, including architects, businessmen, and rock musicians.

deduct from the account and the economic aspect. For participating in combat operations, terrorists receive up to $ 600. per month, and if they come to Syria with their family (a very common phenomenon), the reward increases in proportion to the number of family members. ISIS is the richest terrorist organization in the world, with enough cash ($2 billion) to buy not only weapons, but also manpower.

The threat of the spread of ISIL influence in some countries of Southeast Asia and the strengthening of radical Islamism positions are explained both by the presence of well-equipped terrorist bases, strong leaders who are ready to swear allegiance to the caliphate, and a social base that is receptive to this idea, numbering several thousand people so far (approximately 3 thousand Indonesians have expressed their loyalty to the ISIL cause online). However, this social base can quickly expand if the militants who fought on the side of the "Islamic State" show activity on their return to their homeland.

The Indonesian ideologue of radical Islamism, Abu Bakar Bashir, noted in 2012 that Syria is a new university for jihad. The Islamic fighters from Southeast Asia who fought there have received military training, increased morale, and developed international connections that can provide them with access to considerable financial resources, which would allow them to strengthen the extremist underground and carry out successful terrorist acts aimed at overthrowing existing regimes and creating an Islamic caliphate.

As the head of the Indonesian national counterterrorism agency, Ansyad Mbai, frankly admitted, "our main concern is that we do not know what those who are currently fighting on the side of ISIS will do when they return to their homeland" [9]. His opinion is shared by the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, who believes that the influx of militants from the Middle East can cause an increase in terrorist attacks prepared by "lone wolves" inspired by the ideology of the "Islamic State". These "lone wolves" are able to strike at any time, using all the means at their disposal [10].

And such fears were not unfounded. In February and April 2015, explosions occurred in central Jakarta, which, according to the head of the metropolitan Police, Ungung Kahyono, were responsible for terrorists who returned from Syria. And in Malaysia, the country's security forces discovered a new terrorist group Majmu'ah al-Arkhabiliy, consisting of Indonesians and Malaysians, under the command of ISIL militants. According to S. Jones, even a small handful of people can lead a modest scale (but not specific results) terrorist movement [11]. The probability of this is confirmed by statistical data. According to a public opinion poll, 39% of Malaysian Muslims justify the use of violence against the enemies of Islam (in Indonesia -18%) [12].

For the first time since the 1980s and 1990s, when Islamic extremists from Southeast Asia fought in Afghanistan, there was a real threat of involvement of local Islamists in the global terrorist movement with dangerous consequences for the stability of the region. Jihadists are fighting not only for the creation of an Islamic caliphate in the Middle East, but are also ready to implement this idea in Southeast Asia, establishing a caliphate called Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, southern Thailand and the Philippines, where there are already enclaves of adherents of the caliphate. In Indonesia, these are primarily West, Central and East Java, Sumatra and the Sulawesi Archipelago. In Malaysia - the states of Perak and Salangor, Sarawak and Savah (according to Malaysian Defense Minister Datuk Sen Hishamuddin Hussein, they are the most vulnerable to attacks by Islamic terrorists). The mentioned states, located on the island of Borneo, are located near the southern borders of the Philippines, where radical Islamists from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front operate, who have long been actively calling for the creation of a caliphate on the island of Mindanao with the annexation of the territories of the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, as well as Brunei and all of Indonesia.

Although these terrorist Islamic organizations operate independently of each other, they maintain active ties based on the unity of long-cherished ideas for creating a caliphate in Southeast Asia. And strengthening the position of ISIS in the Middle East only gives these organizations strength and determination.

There is no doubt that the greater success ISIS achieves in the Middle East, the more insistent will be the calls of radical Islamists in Southeast Asia to support this movement, which also has an economic component. The leaders of local terrorist groups are not without reason counting on the success of the United States.-

Access to ISIL's myriad financial resources, based on previous experience with al-Qaeda, ¹⁰ which would allow them to raise their profile in the local jihadist community. According to S. Jones, supporters of ISIS are even more radical than those who staged bombings on the island of Bali, speaking out in support of terror in their countries [13].

THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

Thailand occupies a special place among the Southeast Asian countries that are vulnerable to the spread of the jihadist movement. There, for half a century, the security threat has been posed by separatists and radical Islamists who advocate the creation of an independent Islamic state of Patani in the South, in the areas bordering Malaysia. This small Islamic sultanate, which existed for more than 500 years, was incorporated into the Kingdom of Siam at the beginning of the 20th century. However, Muslim Malays, who make up 85% of the region's population, have not come to terms with the historic loss of independence, retaining hope and faith in its revival, which provokes an ongoing conflict with the central government. It keeps 60,000 soldiers in the area - one for every 30 residents. But this, as Abu Imad, the leader of the separatist Patani United Liberation Organization, or PULO, created in the late 60s, noted, will not stop the jihad [14].

Thai jihadists act like ghosts. They are organized in a network of underground organizations, suddenly appear out of nowhere, commit attacks and then hide in the jungle. Unlike Al-Qaeda and ISIS fighters, these fighters prefer to remain mysterious, adhering to a" code of silence " and fearing to attract the attention of the international community. According to their tactics, a jihadist should never "work for the public."

Today, a peculiar situation is emerging: Islamist radicals in southern Thailand openly speak out on social networks with extremist slogans, publicly calling on Muslims to wage war on their oppressors and drawing parallels between what is happening in Thailand and in the rest of the Muslim world. They perceive Thais as colonialists who exercise strict control over their territory with the help of martial law imposed there.

Hatred of Thais was the driving force behind the creation of a secret network of jihadist underground organizations with no common name and no single leader. But unlike other southeastern Islamic extremists, they are not involved in international jihad and are not affiliated with ISIS or al-Qaeda, saying they do not need them. At the same time, their struggle for independence, which takes violent forms, does not weaken. Mostly we are talking about young people who think they are Mujahideen. Many representatives of the older generation of the separatist movement are watching with concern the shift in the consciousness and mood of their younger "colleagues": nationalism with Islamic overtones is being replaced by wild jihad, accompanied by open terror.

Sporadic closed-door talks between the Thai authorities and the separatist old guard failed to bring success. Whenever a cease-fire was called for, the jihadists, who followed a hard-line tactic, detonated bombs to show that they did not share the position of their "older comrades", who were less militant. In the minds of jihadist fighters, the search for peace with Thailand is akin to surrender, and the older generation of separatists are deserters who have fled the battlefield; according to the Koran, they will be punished.

Nevertheless, there is no serious split in the movement. The older generation recognizes the leadership of the young, generally appreciating their militant attitude. As one of the older generation of separatists noted in an interview with the Global Post, "the new fighters who have replaced them are better in many ways: they are more courageous than their predecessors, and they are more determined. They have only one goal - to fight; they are not afraid of death "[15].

According to the US State Department, Muslim extremists operating in southern Thailand currently commit more terrorist attacks per year than jihadists in Yemen or Somalia - from January 2006 to April 2014, the Mujahideen wing of PULO carried out 17,000 attacks. The independent organization Deep South Watch estimates that 280 bombs explode a year. The armed struggle of Muslim extremists for independence, which has intensified in the last ten years, has claimed the lives of 6,200 people, which is more than half of the total number of victims.

¹⁰ Bin Laden gave the terrorist organizations Abu Sayyaf and JI tens of millions of dollars to deploy their operations in the 1990s.

death toll in the Gaza Strip during the same period.

Under the slogan of restoring Patani, the jihadists kill not only soldiers, but also Buddhist monks, teachers (according to Human Rights Watch, 170 people were killed), tourists and moderate Muslims, whom the militants consider "collaborators and traitors" [16]. The latter, according to Deep South Watch estimates, account for 60% of terror victims. The rebels are hiding in every village. Murders happen every day.

The main terrorist groups operating in southern Thailand are BRN-Coordinate Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi, its military unit Runda Kumpulan Kecil, affiliated with BRN Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani (Patani Freedom Fighter), as well as GMIP and PULO.

BRN-Coordinate is currently considered the most powerful group, which plans to unite in its ranks 400 thousand people who profess the Islamic teaching of the Salafi sense. It recruits supporters through mosques and Islamic schools, preaching the idea of creating a territory that is not controlled by the central government. To achieve this goal, BRN uses well-trained fighters to kill soldiers and civilians. The armed fighters of the Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani (Patani Freedom Fighters), although affiliated with the BRN-Coordinate, operate independently and represent the younger generation of separatists.

Runda Kumpulan Kecil is one of the main military units of the BRN, whose fighters are particularly cruel. Militants (mostly young people) carry out daring attacks on soldiers and civilians, set fires, and set explosive devices on roads and in crowded places. And after the terrorist act, they hide in Malaysia. The secrecy of this group and its high mobility complicate the conduct of anti-terrorist operations.

Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani, like BRN, began to carry out terrorist activities after 2001. The goal of this organization is to create a transnational Islamic caliphate, ideologically it is close to Al-Qaeda.

Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani, also known as "Bersatu", was established in 1989. It was supposed to become the main organization for coordinating the insurgency in the south. But after the arrest of its leaders in 2004, this structure ceased to exist as a coalition, although it remained as a terrorist group.

The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) is a nationalist movement formed with the goal of creating an independent state of Patani by any means, including armed struggle. The dominance of the Salafists also determines the movement's strategic shift from achieving the purely nationalistic goal of reviving Patani to embodying the idea of an Islamic caliphate. This is also facilitated by the predominance of the younger generation in the organization, which has links with more radical terrorist Islamist groups that have taken over PULO. In recent years, its leaders have lost much of their influence over the insurgency in southern Thailand.

The police and army were unable to stop acts of terrorism and suppress the separatists. Most experts agree that the insurgency in the south is fueled by the fact that Thailand's Malay-Muslim minority is unhappy with government policies on forced assimilation. The lack of respect for the national identity, culture and language of the Malays, not to mention the brutal treatment of them by the army, all this creates the basis for the expansion of the conflict, which takes the form of armed struggle.

A report by the International Crisis Group, prepared in December 2013, states that " the insurgents have become bolder and stronger against the background of unsuccessful attempts to curb their activities by successive governments of the country "[17]. According to Srisompob Titpiromsri, director of the independent organization Deep South Watch, " if you set aside Iraq and Afghanistan, Thailand is the hottest point in the world in terms of the expansion of violent armed struggle. And the situation can only get worse" [18].

There is a real threat of Islamization of the south of Thailand, which would meet the interests of radical Islamists operating in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines with the support of Al-Qaeda, and now ISIL. The problem ceases to be purely internal and turns into a factor that threatens the security of the entire region.

ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

The fight against radical Islamists in the Southeast Asian countries is conducted today in various directions, including cooperation with leading Muslim organizations. Speaking at the White House on the issue of combating religious extremism in February 2015, Singapore's Interior Minister, Teo Chi Hin, emphasized the key role of Muslim communities and religious organizations, as well as religious scholars, in countering the spread of extremist ideologies.

Indonesia's largest Muslim organizations-the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), Nahdlatul Ulama, and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia-have banned Muslims from fighting for ISIS and denounced extremism, saying that the Islamic State is acting in its own interests and pursuing its own benefits, and not the goal of creating a caliphate. Describing ISIS as "an inhumane and brutal movement far removed from the religious norms of Islam," they called on local clergy to fight its ideological onslaught. Muslim organizations in Malaysia have also expressed similar condemnation. The National Fatwa Council issued an edict stating that participation in armed actions on the side of ISIS, providing assistance to its fighters is prohibited for Muslims.

The common ideological positions of leading Muslim organizations in Southeast Asia inspire some optimism about the possibility of mass counteraction to the threat of the spread of radical Islam in Southeast Asia. The authorities are primarily counting on the help and assistance of these organizations, trying to deprive ISIS supporters of social support in society. According to Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, "we will work together with the Muslim community, because ISIL does not represent Islam, distorts it and does not benefit it" [19].

As for the regional authorities, they reacted with some delay to the threat of the spread of ISIL influence. In particular, the outgoing Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono imposed a ban on the movement's activities in the country and on the dissemination of its teachings only after a popular video message posted on YouTube in July 2014 by an Indonesian ISIS fighter calling on his compatriots to join the battle for the caliphate. This was followed by arrests of individuals suspected of having links to the movement. And Malaysian President R. Najib even had to explain to the public his eulogies for ISIS in the Middle East. But the authorities, concerned about the possibility of a deterioration in the international image of Malaysia as the fiefdom of supporters of the "Islamic State", who actively use the country as a transit point for transferring terrorists to the battle zone, have moved to active counter-terrorism actions.

In the period from April to June 2014 alone, the police arrested 19 people who planned to organize explosions of cafes, discos and the Carlsberg brewery. In total, by January 2015, 120 people who sympathized with ISIL and intended to join the ranks of this organization were detained. In February 2015, Malaysian Interior Minister Zahid Hamili warned that ISIS members in Malaysia were planning to kidnap rich people and rob banks in order to obtain funds for terrorist attacks. And in March of the same year, a new law on countering the threat of terrorism came into force, which allows you to detain suspects in organizing acts of terror without any sanctions.

In turn, the security authorities of Indonesia, in particular, the elite counter-terrorism unit Detachment 88, complain about the lack of laws similar to those in force in Malaysia and Singapore. While in these countries, ISIS supporters can be detained while being transported to a war zone, in Indonesia, the authorities are not allowed to arrest and bring such individuals to justice. Today, the mission of national counter-terrorism structures is limited to monitoring the activities of terrorist organizations. According to some experts, maintaining a soft institutional and legal framework in the fight against terrorism limits the ability to counter the activation of its supporters in Indonesia. But President Joko Widodo may have trouble creating a tougher legal framework, as the parliament is controlled by antagonistic parties, including Muslim ones, who seek to remove the head of state's influence by calling him a hidden Christian.

Indonesia is currently considering alternative measures to counter the threat of spreading the influence of the Muslim extra-

mizma - both legal and organizational, as well as propaganda. Among the legal issues, in particular, the issue of depriving Indonesians fighting on the side of another state of citizenship. In January 2015, Widodo agreed to revoke the passports of ISIS supporters. This partially compensates for the shortcomings of the existing law. Organizational measures include tougher visa requirements and control over prisons, from which convicted terrorists can now more or less freely transmit video messages, as well as over mosques, where future militants are being religiously processed. Propaganda measures include, for example, the use of mass media to counter-propagandize the teachings of radical jihadists (about 80% of the country's Internet users are active in social networks, which are the main channel for recruiting ISIS supporters; interestingly, Indonesia has the largest number of Facebook users in the world). Awareness-raising activities are also being conducted among the population, during which it is pointed out that the teachings of the "Islamic State" are hostile and contrary to the values of Indonesian society.

The threat of the spread of ISIL influence in Indonesia is determined not only by the loss of life as a result of terrorist acts and not even by the desire to create a caliphate. The main danger lies in the possible split of the Muslim community, the spread of religious discord, and undermining the foundations of the Panchasila ideology, which ensures the unity of Indonesia and, accordingly, its stability. As former President S. Yudhoyono said, "Indonesia is not an Islamic state. We respect all religions. The actions of the Islamic State are not only "inconvenient", but also humiliating for Islam. ISIL's philosophy runs counter to the fundamental values of Indonesian society. " [20]

A similar position regarding the destabilizing influence of ISIL on the situation in the country is taken by the ruling elite of Malaysia, which is concerned that radicalism and violence inspired by the movement pose a threat to the peaceful coexistence of various religions and concessions, especially given the "Malaysia in Unity" program announced by President N. Razak back in 2009 [21]. According to President Razak, "all citizens, regardless of race, religion or political views, should reject extremist ideology and believe that moderation is the key to ensuring peace and harmony in the country" [22].

As for the Philippines, the prospects for a successful fight against Islamic radicalism and the spread of the jihadist movement in the country are linked to overcoming the long-standing conflict between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, in accordance with the peace agreement signed in 2014. The document provides for granting more power to the local communities of Bangsamoro and the creation of an autonomous region on the Muslim island of Mindanao, which may weaken the social base of extremists fighting for the creation of an Islamic state there. However, despite the support of the President of the country, the passage of the" Bangsamoro Basic Law " in Congress meets with opposition from a number of politicians. There are doubts that this law will bring peace and tranquility to the region, as many armed groups in Mindanao openly oppose the peace process, insisting on obtaining full independence from the Philippines. Extremist groups such as BIFF (a breakaway from MILF) and Abu Sayyaf Group are the most determined. According to experts, peace in Mindanao can only be established if the bandit and terrorist groups are generally disarmed [23].

Thailand's political leaders also spoke about granting greater autonomy to the Malay population of the southern regions of the state as part of the creation of a "special administrative zone". Public opinion polls have shown that local residents support self-government as a condition for overcoming the conflict with the central government. Today, the country's military leadership recognizes the need to continue peace talks with the rebels. These talks were initiated by former Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra with the mediation of Malaysia back in February 2013. But in December of the same year, they were interrupted due to the destabilization of the political situation. However, reaching a peaceful compromise with the Islamists in the south is unlikely in an environment where most of them continue to believe that gaining autonomy will not help the cause of full independence, following the example of Palestine. "We want peace," the Islamists say. "But to get peace, you need violence to attract attention." [24]

However successful the counterterrorism efforts of Southeast Asian governments may be, much will depend on the coordination of their efforts at the regional and international levels, as the strengthening of the position of ISIL in the Middle East can become a factor inspiring local Islamic extremists to create a caliphate in the region. Of course, this goal is unlikely to be achievable in the short and even medium term. But the fact that it is now on the agenda makes us think about the looming threat of increased violence.

REFERENCES

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2. Chan A. The Call of ISIS: The Medium and the Message Attracting Southeast Asians. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis. Singapore, RSIS, NTU, May 2015, vol. 7, issue 4, pp. 4 - 9.

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ISIS-A THREAT TO SECURITY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA COUNTRIES

(World Economy and International Relations, 2016, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 5 - 14)

Received 20.07.2015.

ROGOZHINA Nataliya Grigor'evna (ngrogozhina@mail.ru),

Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation.

ISIS poses a real threat to security and stability of South-East Asia countries, inspiring local Islamic extremists to conduct jihad for the purpose of creating a pan-regional caliphate "Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara " comprising the territories of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Southern Philippines and Thailand, where the Muslim population exceeds 250 millions. The author assumes that ISIS has potential for increasing its influence on these countries, taking into consideration 1) the presence of longstanding terrorist organizations, which have established contacts with international terrorists, such as Al Qaeda, and are now ready to swear their allegiance to ISIS; 2) the existence of social base - receptive to the ideology of international jihad - that can increase in number in case of engagement of former ISIS fighters from South-East Asia in the battle for the Islamic State creation in the region. This struggle will lead to terror and violence. And strengthening of the ISIS power in the Middle East gives the militants force and determination in achieving this goal. Now the number of the ISIS fighters from South-East Asia exceeds 800 people, but the flow of new supporters can increase, because there is a well-established basis for their recruiting through: preaching in mosques; indoctrination of students in madrasahs and religious boarding schools, funded by radical Islamic organizations; circulating of religious literature of jihad orientation; local radical groups; social networks. To counter the threat of the Islamic community radicalization, the governments rely on the leading Islam organizations and take actions in different directions. But their outcome will depend on whether the Muslim majority of population preserves the inherent religious tolerance.

Keywords: ISIS, South-East Asia, jihadists, radical Islamic extremism, terrorist organizations.

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