After the fall of the military-authoritarian regime of the "new order" in Indonesia in May 1998, the country implemented important reforms in the field of constitutional law and adopted laws designed to democratize the political system. However, the political culture of the society and, in particular, its elite carries a significant legacy of previous decades of authoritarianism. There is considerable disunity in the elite, which reduces the effectiveness of democratic reforms, hinders the real provision of law and order, and the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. Under these conditions, radical Islamists are becoming more active, advocating the introduction of Sharia law at the state level. This is fraught with increasing centrifugal tendencies in a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country. This threat, in turn, may lead to the promotion of the army to the political forefront as a force capable of countering this trend, combined with a palpable nostalgia of a part of society for the times of authoritarianism.

Key words: Indonesia, reforms, Islam, radicalism, power, elite, society.

Shortly after the military-repressive regime of the new order (1966-1998) fell in Indonesia in May 1998 and its permanent head, General Suharto, resigned, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, based in Sweden, identified the following areas that should be addressed in the future: Indonesia should be reformed: 1) the constitutional and legal system as a whole; 2) the status of regions; 3) the position of the army in society; 4) the creation of civil society; 5) the system of governance and socio-economic development; 6) gender equality; 7) pluralism in the field of religion [Tempo, No. 12, 25.05.2003, Hal. 38]. None of these provisions is objectionable. However, when in 2011 the Indonesian press actively wrote that reforms in Indonesia could become a model for Egypt, one of the participants of the 1998 events in an interview with a Jakarta newspaper remarked:: "Our biggest mistake was that we thought it was enough to get Suharto removed" [The Jakarta Globe, 25.02.2011].

The meaning of these words, in my opinion, lies primarily in the fact that one more point should be added to the seven listed points-the transformation of the political culture of society, which can be understood primarily not so much the relationship between the individual, society and government, but rather the vision and perception of these relations by each of the vertices of this triangle, the perception and their demand for their own and mutual rights, obligations and responsibilities. The most prominent poet and playwright of modern Indonesia, B. C. Rendra, then called for the implementation of a cultural revolution that would lead to the rejection of feudal-agrarian political culture in favor of a more modern one, and these changes should occur both in horizontal and vertical dimensions [Suara Pembaruan, 24.05.1998].

The fall of the military regime in 1998 was not a revolution in the literal sense of the word - the same bureaucracy that the fallen regime relied on along with the army was established on the shoulders of a democratically motivated movement of young people and students. A significant part of it was dissatisfied not so much with the regime as with its subordinate position and its prospects within this regime. Nevertheless, the need for changes in the political system and state structure was obvious to everyone — the severe economic and political crisis of 1997-1998, which followed a long period of quite successful development.

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economic development, showed that Indonesian society can no longer exist within the rigid framework of authoritarianism.

The doctrine of the so-called dual function of the armed forces, which gave the army the status of a sovereign subject of the country's internal political life, was rejected. Based on this doctrine, the army effectively ruled Indonesia undivided for 32 years and had guaranteed representation in the legislature. The de facto ban on the creation of new political parties, which had existed until mid-1998, was lifted. The principle of appointing a significant part of legislative deputies has been abolished.

For the first time since the adoption of the country's basic Law in August 1945, four sets of amendments were introduced in 1999-2002 to provide a legal framework for democratic change.

The President, also known as the Head of Government, who was previously appointed by the supreme legislative body, the People's Consultative Congress, has been elected by popular vote for a five-year term since 2004 and can be re-elected no more than once. Its prerogatives were partially restricted in favor of the Parliament-the Council of People's Representatives.

The second chamber of Parliament, the Council of Representatives of the Regions, was established, where all provinces have an equal number of deputies, along with a significant expansion of the prerogatives of local authorities.

A very important amendment was the introduction of a separate chapter on basic human rights in the Constitution. In it, all the rights of citizens are spelled out in detail, at a modern level. One of the articles (28E) states that everyone is free to choose a religion and perform appropriate rituals, which is very relevant in modern Indonesia.1 At the same time, the article stating that the Indonesian state is based on faith in one God is preserved, and this, strictly speaking, does not imply complete freedom of conscience.

Laws and regulations that actually discriminated against the Chinese ethnic minority were repealed, and legislative support for employees was expanded.

Five election campaigns (parliamentary elections in 1999, 2004 and 2009 and presidential elections in 2004 and 2009) were generally conducted in fairly free conditions, without significant violations.

The state practically does not restrict the activities of mass media. Criticism of the government and its bearers, including the head of state, takes the most acute forms. In fact, censorship remains in two areas: criticism or belittling of the role of religion, as well as propaganda of atheism, are not allowed, and the ban on propaganda of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, adopted in 1966 at the dawn of the "new order", remains.

Nevertheless, public opinion polls in recent years have demonstrated nostalgia for a significant part of society for the times of the military-repressive "new order", which came to power in the wake of the most brutal mass terror. In a survey conducted in 2011, Suharto was the most popular of the six presidents of independent Indonesia - 36.5% of respondents voted for him, acting President S. B. Yudhoyono received 20.9% of the vote, and the founding father of the Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno, received 9.8% [The Jakarta Globe, 16.05.2011]. These results do not necessarily have to be taken as absolutely reliable, but they indicate the general trend quite accurately.

At the same time, 40.9% of respondents believed that the situation was better under the previous regime, against 22.8% who held a different opinion [The Jakarta Post, 21.05.2011].

1 In 2005, in Indonesia, Muslims (mainly Sunnis) accounted for 88.6% of the population, Protestants-5.8%, Catholics-3.1%, Hindus-1.7%, Buddhists-0.6%, Confucians-0.1%, and others-0.11% [Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan..., 2010, Hal. 13, 16-17].

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And this is despite the fact that the survey was conducted at a time when economic processes in Indonesia were developing quite favorably. GDP growth for several years exceeded 6% against the background of a very difficult economic situation in the world. At the end of 2011, its volume exceeded $ 1 trillion, and as predicted by the Minister of Commerce Geeta Viryavan, it will reach $ 9.3 trillion by 2030. [The Straits Times, 18.01.2012]. The foreign exchange rate remained fairly stable. Foreign investors viewed the investment climate in the country as quite favorable, although they pointed out the lack of infrastructure development, not always an adequate level of legal support, and ubiquitous corruption. In 2011, the volume of foreign capital investments reached $ 19.3 billion, 20% higher than in the previous year. Approximately half of the investments were made in Jakarta and the surrounding provinces of West Java and Banten. At the same time, 20% of investments were made in transport, warehousing and communications, the rest - in the mining industry [The Straits Times, 20.01.2012]. In 2012, foreign companies invested $ 21 billion in Indonesia, and the economic growth rate was 6.3% [The Straits Times, 14.01.2013].

In recent years, the government has issued a series of regulations restricting the export of raw materials in favor of goods with a higher share of added value - a sign of growing economic nationalism, although some experts fear that on-site processing of raw materials produced by foreign companies may be unprofitable at current production volumes.

Less impressive but significant progress has been made in the fight against poverty. In 2004, 16.7% of the population lived below the poverty line, compared to 11.66% in 2012, with the majority of the poor living in rural areas. By the beginning of 2013, monthly income for 28.6 million people did not exceed 260 thousand rupees per month (about $ 1 per day). per person [Kompas.com, 08.01.2013; The Straits Times, 27.02.2013]. In mid-2013, the Government Minister and Chairman of the National Planning Committee, Armida Alishahbana, estimated the number of poor people at 10.5%, but predicted that this figure would increase to 12.1% due to the reduction in subsidizing energy prices [The Jakarta Post, 26.01.2013]. The life expectancy of Indonesians has increased to 70 years from 50 years in the 1970s, and in large cities it reaches 75 years [Suara Karya Online, 01.06.2012]. The Government in 2013 launched a program of transition to universal full secondary (12-year) education [The Jakarta Post, 26.06.2013]. Although Indonesia's standards for defining poverty do not always match those of the world, these gains appear to be significant.

What is the reason for the longing for an authoritarian regime, the end of which was marked by a serious drop in living standards? Let us return to the recognition that the biggest mistake of the participants of the "Indonesian spring" of 1998 was the assumption that it is enough to get President Suharto's resignation, and then a wide path to democracy will open up.

The change of power in May 1998 in Indonesia was not a revolution in the sense that neither the social goals of the state, nor the class character and interests of the bureaucracy, which generally carried the political and cultural legacy of decades of authoritarianism and did not always understand that the entire regime, and not just Suharto, had outlived its usefulness, had changed. After three decades, when the country was effectively led by the army, the civilian elite was not sufficiently prepared to take over the management of a huge and extremely complex state. The many dozens of parties that emerged immediately after the lifting of the relevant restrictions testified not only to the heterogeneity of Indonesian society, but also to the disunity of the political elite - secular and Muslim. What is the legacy of the Indonesian political elite?

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- a generally viable economy, which recovered fairly quickly from the effects of the 1997-1998 crisis.;

- demographic, economic and social disparities, uneven development of regions and different strata of society, imposed on religious and ethnic differences, and these latter, in turn, often coincided. Under the previous regime, these contradictions were driven deep, and their discussion was prohibited by law;

- the period of the "new order" can only be called with reservations the era of the introduction of market relations. Favoritism, which was based on the Presidential Palace ("family"), permeated the entire Indonesian economy and was an essential element of the culture and ethics of entrepreneurship;

- corruption, which has become a way of getting rich for some, survival for others;

- lack of modern concepts of social justice, democracy, and human rights. Formally, these principles are laid down in the state ideology of Pancha Sila, which is included in the preamble of the country's constitution. But they are very concise, subject to a wide range of interpretations and were actively used by the "new order" as the only permitted national ideology in the interpretation of the executive branch, and therefore significantly compromised in public opinion.;

- the impact of globalization, a process in which Westerners perceive themselves as its subjects, and Easterners as objects, hence the very significant anti-Western sentiment, which was not mitigated, but aggravated by the active participation of Western monopolies in the development of the Indonesian economy;

- Political culture-in Indonesia, with its colonial past and largely authoritarian history of independence, the majority of the population has inflated demands and expectations for power. By overthrowing and humiliating the country's first President, Sukarno, in 1967, the army unwittingly removed the aura of sacredness from state power in the eyes of a significant part of the citizens. This phenomenon, however, was not accompanied, for obvious reasons, by an increase in political participation. Most Indonesians do not yet feel that they are sovereign subjects of the political and social process. We cannot expect that the modernization of the political culture that has developed over the centuries will take place within 15 years. At the same time, the success of the reforms launched in 1998 depends not only on formal legal norms, but also on the extent to which these changes are demanded by society.

In these circumstances, political parties play an important role. But as Juwono Sudarsono, one of the most prominent political scientists in modern Indonesia, noted in a speech at the US-Indonesia Center in Washington in April 2000, the country's middle class, traditionally considered the backbone of democratization, was 10% of the population before the 1997 crisis, and this share declined as a result of the crisis. According to him, parties in Indonesia are created to serve the interests of their leaders [Kompas (Jakarta), 26.04.2000]. Ten years later, Mohammad Mustafa, a professor at the capital's Indonesia University, said something similar: "Political activity in parties has become more of an occupation than a channel through which people can express their aspirations. The position of legislators has strengthened in comparison with the executive branch and other structures. They dominate political life, and eventually the dictatorship of Suharto was replaced by the tyranny of the reform-era legislature" [Muhammad Mustafa, 2010, p. 30]. It should be noted, however, that the word "tyranny" here does not mean unity of goals and will to achieve them, but rather the ability of legislators to block or delay the adoption of decisions proposed by the government. In some cases, even parties that are part of the government coalition vote against the initiatives of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers headed by him. Relative value

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The unity that emerged in 1999-2002 when the Constitution was amended reflected, first of all, the understanding that these changes open up new opportunities for each individual party.

Public opinion polls indicate a decline in public confidence in political parties as an institution. In May 2013, almost 43% of respondents expressed confidence in them, and more than 53% expressed distrust (about 4% found it difficult to answer). For comparison, 59% expressed confidence in mass organizations, and 65.1% in mass media [Kompas.com, 17.07.2013]. It seems that the gap in the assessment of parties and mass organizations is explained by the fact that the latter are less involved in practical politics and, more importantly, are not part of government structures and therefore do not appear or appear less in corruption scandals and are not associated with unpopular actions of the authorities.

Accordingly, the state of the elite as a whole is assessed by public opinion. In mid-2013, 51.5% of respondents did not trust representatives of the elite, compared to 37.5% who expressed confidence, and 11% who found it difficult to answer. In 2005 and 2009, 34.6% and 39.6% expressed distrust, respectively. Among the reasons that aroused distrust, it was pointed out that politicians cannot serve as a positive example, that their word is at odds with their deed. At the same time, 37.5% said that the actions of politicians contradict religious canons [Media Indonesia, 08.07.2013].

The dynamics of Indonesian electoral participation is also indicative. According to Indonesian Interior Minister Gamawan Fawzi, 92.7% of voters participated in the 1999 election, 84.07% in 2004, and 71% in 2009. In local elections, this figure can be up to 50% [Suara Retbariap, 26.08.2013]. Several factors seem to be at work here: the fear of the authorities that previously held abstainers has disappeared, there is a certain individualization of citizens who now, when making a decision to participate in elections, do not make it dependent on the opinion of neighbors and the community, and there is some disappointment in the immediate results of reforms.

The prestige of the Indonesian elite, in my opinion, is also undermined by the lack of the necessary sense of a unified team in the government. Yusuf Kalla, who became vice-president in the first presidential term of S. B. Yudhoyono (2004-2009), distanced himself from the head of state before the term expired and announced his intention to run against him in 2009. However, S. B. Yudhoyono did the same when, as a minister in the cabinet of M. Sukarnoputri, he announced his plans to compete with the head of state. he won the next presidential election in 2004 (and won these elections).

Liberation from authoritarianism came to people who largely combined an archaic view of power with a lack of traditions of political participation, inflated expectations in relation to those in power, expectations that are replaced by explosions of violence that are not always adequately directed.

Under these conditions, the problems that the previous regime had driven deep into Indonesia broke out. Already in 1998, bloody conflicts broke out on Ambon Island between indigenous people, mostly Christians, and immigrants from Java, mostly Muslims. This was followed by similar clashes in Central Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi. With some particular differences, the overall picture of the situation in these regions coincided. In general, conflicts were generated by the short-sighted policies of previous regimes, which encouraged the migration of residents of overpopulated Java to the "outer islands", which led to the political and social marginalization of indigenous people, who mostly belonged to other faiths, cultures and ethnic groups - hence the ethno-religious coloring of conflicts.

As Heru Chahyono, a researcher at the Indonesian Academy of Sciences, wrote, after the fall of the "new order", additional factors came into force. On the one hand, there was a fierce rivalry between the army and the police, which was very strong.

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withdrawn from the armed forces. On the other hand, the army generals were interested in a certain destabilization of the situation in order to demonstrate the helplessness of those who replaced them at the helm of power [Heru Cahyono, 2004, Hal. 69].

There was not enough unity among the elite in opposing the centrifugal tendencies that were particularly pronounced in Ambon, and only the deep sense of national unity inherent in the vast majority of Indonesians allowed them to be overcome, if not completely, then reduced to a less dangerous level. But the lack of efficiency of the government, the lack of unity in it, gave an impetus to the development of a phenomenon that was not previously so clearly visible - the growth of the influence of radical political Islam. Even the position of the systemic Muslim sub-elite in relation to ethno-confessional conflicts was heterogeneous, in some cases a sense of Muslim solidarity prevailed. (The word "systemic" here refers to the upper strata of the Muslim clergy, politicians and intellectuals, some of whom do not aim to turn the country into an Islamic state, while the other part, wishing to officially introduce Sharia law, intends to achieve this using existing constitutional norms.)

In Aceh province on the northern tip of Sumatra, where separatism has perhaps the longest history in Indonesia, the government made unprecedented concessions, allowing Sharia law to be imposed there as mandatory for all Muslims. From the very beginning, there was concern that this concession could have a far-reaching demonstration effect and encourage radical Islamists on the ground to seek the same concessions in their regions.

Secession from the Republic in 2000 East Timor, a former Portuguese colony with a predominantly Christian population, annexed by Indonesia in 1975, has served as another impetus for the development of anti-Christian xenophobia. Many Indonesians saw the loss of East Timor as a blow to national prestige - one of the highest values in the eyes of the majority of the country's inhabitants.

In Papua, on the western tip of the island of New Guinea, where the indigenous secessionists are mostly Christians, the authorities are much less tolerant of them than of their co-religionists in Aceh. But its opponent, the Movement for a Free Papua, is also showing no tolerance, and as these lines are being written, clashes and terrorist attacks are continuing. At the same time, even systemic Muslim leaders in some cases oppose the search for a compromise with the separatists and condemn human rights activists who point out the "double standards" of the authorities in their approach to Aceh and Papua.

The terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2001 stimulated the growth of Islamism. First, President M. Sukarnoputri expressed her sincere sympathy to the American people and condemned the terror. But then she discovered that the sympathies of most Indonesian Muslims are not on the side of Washington. The US counterterrorism campaign launched after these events was almost unequivocally perceived as a war against Islam, which was perceived as the only force with which the arrogant superpower was considered. U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan played a similar role.

With the granting of broad powers to local authorities, among other consequences, two negative ones were identified - the decentralization of corruption and "creeping" Islamization, which is understood as the introduction of Sharia law by local authorities as mandatory for the population. Disillusioned with the prospects of achieving their goals at the national level (in the central parliament, Muslim parties have never received even a cumulative half of the mandates in the history of independent Indonesia), Islamists in some cases achieved their goals on the ground. At the same time, they often enjoy the support of secular parties that do not dare to oppose the introduction of religious canons, fearing to scare off voters and ignoring the fact that those freedoms and freedoms are being attacked.

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human rights that are established in the Constitution and laws at the national level.

It seems that the Indonesian elite at the beginning of the reforms missed a favorable opportunity to solve, if not solve, at least mitigate the problem of political Islam. Abdurrahman Wahid, who became president in 1999, was a hereditary theologian and grandson of Nahdatul Ulam Hashim Ashari, the founder of one of the country's two largest Muslim organizations. But at the same time, he was a supporter of preserving Indonesia as a state where no religion would enjoy special privileges, a champion of introducing democratic norms, religious and ethnic tolerance into the life of Indonesian society. He consistently pursued the policy of eliminating the special status of the army, asserted the equality of all ethnic groups, including ethnic Chinese, and took the unprecedented step of expressing regret for the loss of innocent lives in the late 1960s.

The Chairman of the Commission for Missing Persons and Assistance to Victims of Violence, Munir (who later died under unclear circumstances), said in 2000 that as a carrier of the democratic idea, A. Wahid is above everyone in Indonesia. "He is ready for democracy, but he cannot act surrounded by conservatives. Almost the entire civil bureaucracy remains under the control of the forces of the "new order", and they perceive all problems of human rights violations as attacks on themselves " [Inside Indonesia, No. 63, July-September 2000].

The greatest merit of A. Wahid was that his work proved that there is no insurmountable boundary between Islam, on the one hand, and the ideas of modernizing and democratizing society, on the other. But it was precisely this radical democratism of A. Vahid that aroused the intrigues and attacks of a significant part of the military and bureaucratic elite against him. In this, and not in the peculiarities of his character, tendency to shocking, lack of managerial skills, we need to look for the reason for the impeachment to which he was subjected in 2001. The fate of A. Vahid seems to have given an easy-to-read signal to his successors to be "more careful" in implementing democratic reforms. But a study conducted in 2013 by a Jakarta think tank showed that, at least in the eyes of certain segments of society, he remains perhaps the most popular president in the country's history (after the founding father of the Republic of Sukarno), primarily due to his calls for religious and ethnic tolerance [Republika Online, 20.07.2013].

In the early 2000s, the country faced a new phenomenon-Islamic terrorism. In 2002, on the island of Bali, near tourist sites, explosions occurred that killed more than 200 people. This was followed by several bombings in Jakarta and other cities, initially directed against foreigners, and in the next stage against the authorities and their representatives, especially the police. The Indonesian government has long avoided internationalizing the issue, denying the external links of Islamic terrorists in order to avoid accusations of complicity in the "US war on Islam"when conducting counterterrorism operations. In the end, however, the authorities had to admit that the Islamist group "Jama'a Islamiya" was behind the bombings, advocating the creation of a caliphate in Southeast Asia, which in addition to Indonesia would include Brunei, Malaysia and Muslim areas of Thailand and the Philippines. I believe that terrorist attacks, no matter who they are directed against, cannot attract any significant part of the population to the side of terrorists. Rather, their goal is to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of secular power, so that the creation of a theocratic Islamist state becomes the only path to stability and security in the eyes of the population.

The Government, understanding the threat posed by terrorism, takes measures to combat this danger. However, these measures, including legislative ones, and the use of military structures for these purposes are generally viewed with suspicion.-

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They are often seen as dangerous to return to the methods of the "new order". Nevertheless, in early September 2013, Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro announced the creation of a special operational anti-terrorist command in the structure of the armed forces [Antara News.com, 03.09.2013]. As of the second half of 2013, there is no reason to say that the threat of terror has been completely eliminated, and its orientation against government officials, in particular the police, has been quite clearly identified.

But while terrorism as an extreme form of religious extremism is still relatively limited, Islamist radicalism, including organized ones, causes significant damage to both society and the authority of the authorities. After 1998, radical groups became very active, the most active of which is the Front of Defenders of Islam (FZI). Created under the patronage of the army to fight against democratic movements, the Front soon became an independent semi-criminal group that assumed the right to control the observance of Islamic norms by the population, without limiting itself to using violence against parties, organizations, enterprises suspected of corresponding violations. Even the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was vandalized by thugs from among the members of the FZI for allegedly insufficient control over the sale of alcoholic beverages. There are attacks by Front fighters on rallies of Muslim organizations in defense of religious tolerance. Fanatics obstruct the activities of Christian communities. Thus, despite the relevant decision of the Supreme Court of Indonesia, the authorities of the city of Bogora near Jakarta, under pressure from Islamists, has not allowed the construction of a Protestant church for several years. Militants attack participants in Christian gatherings and celebrations, including in schools, resulting in human casualties.

Contradictions within the Muslim community itself have also sharply escalated. For a number of years, members of the Ahmadiyya sect, who believe that Mohammed was not the last prophet in Islam, have been targets of violence. In 2012, members of the Shia community in the town of Sampang on Madura Island were subjected to pogroms, and for more than a year they were forced to live in temporary housing to escape persecution.

According to the Institute A. Wahida, the number of manifestations of religious intolerance is steadily increasing. In 2009, there were 121 such cases, in 2010 - 184, in 2011 - 267, in 2012-274 [The Jakarta Post, 11.07.2013]. At the same time, it is safe to say that not all such manifestations are made public.

When law enforcement intervenes, they most often find themselves on the side of the persecutors of minorities, under the pretext that these latter undermine political stability by their activity. At the same time, attention is drawn to the disunity of the authorities in their approach to radicals. If President S. B. Yudhoyono, in a very mild form, called on the leaders of the FFI to think about why in some cases their activities are unacceptable [Kompas.com, 15.02.2012], then the Ministry of Religious Affairs adopted a conciliatory position. Minister Suryadarma Ali, commenting on the criticism of the government in connection with violations of the rights of religious minorities, said that the principle of religious tolerance has always been observed in Indonesia. As for the Shiites and members of the Ahmadiyya sect, in his opinion, it is permissible to ask whether they themselves violate the rights of Muslims with their "deviant" views. "Freedom has its limits," he said, effectively siding with the extremists against the president [The Jakarta Post, 11.07.2012]. Shiites were able to return to their homes only by signing an agreement with the local Sunni community, in which, in particular, they promised not to demand compensation for the damage caused to them [The Jakarta Post, 25.09.2013].

The religious situation in Indonesia deserves close attention, as it clearly reflects many of the fundamental difficulties of the reform process. But there is

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another problem that is present in the political life of the country. All elite groups-the civilian bureaucracy, the military establishment, and Muslim leaders-are fiercely resisting any attempt to revise the official version of the Suharto regime's fabricated version of the causes of the bloody terror of the late 1960s. Although since then many facts have become public, the authorities, under various pretexts, refuse to name the true culprit of the tragedy - the generals, who, relying on Islamist groups, then carried out a coup d'etat, overthrowing the legitimate president and forcibly changing the composition of legislative and executive bodies. There are no more direct participants in those events in the political arena. But the modern military elite is linked by caste and sometimes blood ties to that generation of generals. The same applies to Islamic leaders. (Note that A. Wahid was abroad during those tragic years, and this, in particular, allowed him to take a more humane and democratic position towards the victims of the events of the 1960s and their descendants. As for the authorities, on the one hand, all this often applies to their representatives, and, on the other, even the most reform-minded figures do not risk complicating relations with the army and Islamists. In general, as John Macbeth, a columnist for the Singapore Straits Times (18.10.2011), noted, "the Indonesian elite is united in opposing the proper disclosure of Suharto's crimes, in which it was involved."

At the same time, attacks are intensifying on President S. B. Yudhoyono, who is accused of being soft and too tolerant towards Islamists and his own ministers. A controversial reaction in the country was caused by the decision of the American organization Appeal of Conscience Foundation (Appeal to Conscience Foundation) to award him an annual award as an outstanding statesman in 2013. Critics of the president argued that the situation in Indonesia, the persecution of religious minorities deprive the head of state of the moral right to this award. Prominent Muslim figure Ahmad Shafi'i maarif said that the country needs a leader who has the integrity and morals necessary to protect pluralism, whereas current leaders should not be expected to do so. At the same time, however, he stated that the nation should not lie prostrate before the authorities and every person should contribute to the promotion of religious tolerance [Sinar Harapan News, 08.08.2013].

The latter phrase seems to be the key one, since it implies the creation of a civil society in the country, which is still in its infancy. The fact remains that the political activity of Islamist radicals is much more demonstrative than that of their opponents. Until recently, speeches in defense of the rights of religious minorities were extremely rare. Radicals are mostly active in the lower and middle classes. There are different ways to assess the leadership style of President S. B. Yudhoyono and his reformist predecessors in this post, as well as the degree of their consistency in promoting confessional and ethnic tolerance in society. But it is fair to admit that society itself tends to place all responsibility on the leader, without taking it on itself. In fact, those who miss the times of the military regime, which are perceived as more well-fed and calm, want to return to the era when the main decisions were made without their political participation and, accordingly, they were not responsible for them.

The statements of the President of the Security Council on this subject deserve attention. Yudhoyono. Speaking to journalists on July 16, 2013, he called on them to instill democratic thinking in the country's citizens and complained that Indonesians still see the government, the state, as a kind of policeman who must interfere in everything, restore order everywhere, and impose bans. This, the President pointed out, means a desire to return to authoritarian methods, including in the settlement of interethnic and interfaith conflicts. He urged to abandon such thinking, which frees from consciousness and responsibility [Antara News.com, 16.07.2013].

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This is probably due to several factors-the events in Egypt, where the activation of Islamists led to a destabilization of the situation, the criticism that the president was subjected to for lack of determination in relation to extremists, and the well-known spontaneous rise in civil activity in recent years. Characteristic in this regard were the events in Central Kalimantan province, where the population and the authorities prevented the establishment of a branch of the Front of Defenders of Islam there. The radicalism of the Front was perceived there as a threat to stability and security in the province, where representatives of various faiths and ethnic groups — autochthonous and migrants-coexist. In June 2013, the problem of the FFI became even more acute in Central Java, where a group of Front activists set out to raid entertainment venues in order to check how restrictions related to the Muslim fast were being observed. The reaction of local residents was so fierce that the inspectors had to take shelter in the mosque, from where they were evacuated under the protection of the police and military. At the same time, one local resident was killed [Tetro.co, 21.07.2013].

The President was more categorical this time, saying that the FZI, resorting to violence and arbitrariness, denigrates Islam. He gave instructions to the police not to allow violations of law and order by any organization [Ibid.; The Jakarta Post, 23.07.2013]. The Front's actions were condemned by a group of prominent Muslim clerics in Central Java. Syed Akil Siraj, the head of one of the two largest Muslim organizations in Nahdatul Ulam, called on the government to disband the Front, whose activities compromise the Muslim religion. The leaders of the Muslim Justice and Prosperity Party took a more streamlined stance, advocating punishing the perpetrators rather than the organization as a whole [Suara Pembaruan, 15.08]. Once again, the president was actually opposed by the Minister of Religious Affairs, who called on the public to show tolerance towards the FZI and promised that he himself would maintain close contacts with its leaders [Tetro.co, 23.07.2013].

But the events in Central Java provoked a broad and negative response to the Front, including demands for its dissolution. Just at this time, on July 2, 2013, the Indonesian Parliament passed the law on public organizations. The law requires these organizations to protect the unity of the country, their activities must not contradict the state ideology, they cannot preach the ideas of communism and atheism. It is prohibited to denigrate any of the officially recognized religions in Indonesia, promote separatism, and engage in activities that lead to violations of public peace. Tighter control is being established over the activities of foreign civil society organizations, some of which are suspected of aiding the separatists in Papua and Aceh. All non-profit organizations are required to publish the sources of funds they receive.

The law was passed by 311 votes to 50, with almost all Muslim parties voting in favor. Control over its implementation is actually assigned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Leaders of one of the two largest Muslim organizations of Muhammadya, the Catholic and Protestant communities, however, said that they intend to appeal the law to the Constitutional Court [The Jakarta Post, 03.07.2013; The Straits Times, 03.07.2013, 13.07.2013]. Leaders of another Muslim organization, Nahdatul Ulama, trade unions, and human rights activists also spoke critically about the new law. Their criticism came down to the fact that the law restricts freedom of speech, freedom of opinion and the right to associate in organizations. A number of provisions of the law are indeed subject to a wide range of interpretations, and in the memory of current generations of Indonesians, the experience of the authoritarian period is still fresh, when the state ideology was used to strictly regulate political, intellectual and social life, and its only interpreter was a repressive power beyond the control of society.

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The role of the new law may indeed be ambiguous, and, as often happens, it will be determined by political development and the balance of power in the country. In its direct application, the new law is clearly directed against the Islamist threat. This does not say, but it means that Islamists, if they were able to take over the country as a result of the destabilization of the existing system, would rely on laws that are beyond the control of society, and would become their sole interpreters. Their credo is the rejection of democracy as a power that originates in society.2 In a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country, this is fraught with its collapse. And in this situation, there is a real threat of a return to the authoritarian past. It was expressed in the words of the Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Admiral Agus Suhartono, who stated in September 2012 that it was necessary to activate the territorial structures of the army, as well as its special services. He pointed out that the army should be ready to act as a force that unites the nation, to help create conditions conducive to the revival of the national dignity of Indonesia as a peace-loving and religious country [Antara News.com, 17.09.2012].

Rarely in recent years have the generals expressed so openly their self-assessment of the army as a force designed to unite the nation. It confirms the validity of concerns that in the event of further aggravation of interethnic and inter-confessional contradictions, the armed forces are likely to claim the role of the savior of the nation, with all the ensuing consequences for democratic reforms. Back in 2011, there were reports in the Indonesian and foreign press that among retired Indonesian generals there is an opposition group that interacts with the Front of Defenders of Islam in order to destabilize the situation in the country in order to prepare for the subsequent overthrow of President S. B. Yudhoyono [The Jakarta Globe, 02.05.2011]. It should be noted that in the circles of army officers and generals, there is dissatisfaction with the current president, who, being a retired general, does not show caste solidarity with the army. In the view of the military, there are no former generals and officers.

It is no coincidence that on July 8, 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Muldoko, said that military coups are not in the tradition of the Indonesian army, which remains the forward bulwark of the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. "We will not do what happened in Egypt, and let no one count on it," he said. со.id., 09.07.2013]. As for the lack of tradition, this is inaccurate-just remember the fate of the country's first president, Sukarno. But once again, there is an emphasis on the exclusive role of the army in Indonesia. When General Muldoko addressed a parliamentary commission discussing his candidacy for the post of commander - in-chief of the country's armed forces a month later, he called for a review of the concept of national security in connection with the emergence of new threats-terrorism and inter-communal (inter-ethnic and inter-religious) conflicts. He said:

"The Armed Forces are concerned about the possibility of asymmetric forms of warfare due to Indonesia's position as an archipelago, which makes it vulnerable to outside penetration. Democratization, the pluralistic nature of society and globalization have had a mixed impact on our country. The armed forces must be prepared for asymmetric forms of warfare, unusual, unexpected and unconventional" [The Jakarta Post, 22.08.2013].

General Suryadi, head of the Union of Retired Army Soldiers, was even more outspoken. It stated on 11 September 2013 that in its current version

2 As M. F. Vidyasova and T. I. Hasanbskova rightly note in their book " The Two-faced Janus of Moderate Islamism "(Moscow, 2013, p. 58), "today's moderate Islamists are willing to accept the procedural side of democracy, but not its values, which Western politicians usually turn a blind eye to."

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The Constitution of Indonesia, after being amended, has ceased to protect the interests of the people and is imbued with liberalism. The General expressed hope that in the future the country will gain progressive leadership and will be led by the best sons of the people belonging to the new generation. He was supported by the former commander-in-chief of the armed forces, General Joko Santoso: "We are all concerned about the current state of affairs in the country." He suggested that the military should be given an appropriate role, so that the future national leadership can effectively lead the country forward [Suara Kagua Online, 12.09.2013].

It follows from this that the army foresees the complication of the internal political situation and its active role in eliminating internal conflicts. President S. B. Yudhoyono indirectly expressed his concern in this regard. who, in July 2013, called for maximum lessons to be learned from recent events in Egypt, pointing out that big changes cannot be made in a short time and many nations are experiencing a lot of difficulties in such situations [Ibid., 12.07.2013]3. In general, in connection with the situation in Egypt, the Indonesian president was in a difficult situation - to speak in support of Morsi, who was overthrown by the army, would mean indirect support for Islamists. The opposite position would have raised suspicions that he favored a military coup as a method of solving domestic political problems. And here you need to go back to the beginning of the article. In 2011, we discussed the example of Indonesia for post-Mubarak Egypt. It seems that Indonesia's most forward-thinking leaders are now learning the lessons of Egypt themselves.

A survey conducted in July 2013 showed that just over 18% of voters intend to vote for five Muslim-leaning parties in the upcoming 2014 elections, compared to more than 60% of supporters of secular-leaning parties [Kompas, 17.07.2013]. It seems that the low level of popularity of systemic Muslim parties is primarily due to the fact that the voter does not always see a fundamental difference between them and other parties, especially in the context of the general decline in the authority of systemic parties, as mentioned above. Religious symbols and rhetoric are still combined with corruption and sometimes unprincipled pursuit of seats in parliament and the government. The difference, and a significant one in Indonesia, is that Muslim parties do not have popular leaders. Here, most often, the popularity of the leader determines the success of the party, and not vice versa. The authoritarianism of the" new order " in general was a natural obstacle to the emergence of political leaders on a national scale. The exception was M. Sukarnoputri, who combined her father's charisma with her own charisma as a victim of the regime. An important phenomenon in recent years has been the emergence of figures who go from business to power (and not through power to money, as under Suharto). They are former Vice-President Yusuf Kalla, one of the leaders of Golkar Aburizal Bakri, leader of the National Democratic Party Surya Paloh. However, in Indonesian, especially Javanese, psychology, entrepreneurial success has not yet become a decisive factor in assessing a particular person.

In general, assessing the results of more than a decade and a half of democratic transformation, it should be concluded that all the listed shortcomings of the reform process do not mean that the chosen path was wrong or premature. Rolling back or stopping this process would have the most negative consequences. The apocalyptic predictions of the Balkanization of Indonesia in the late 1990s were not fulfilled. The sense of national unity inherent in the vast majority of Indonesians remains the dominant factor, and there is no reason to say,

3 The President returned to this topic in his speech on 5 October 2013 on the occasion of Armed Forces Day. He called on the military to remain neutral during the upcoming 2014 elections and behave in accordance with the highest interests of the state [The Jakarta Post, 05.10.2013].

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that radical Islamists are winning the hearts and minds of the majority of the Muslim community. But the situation may change, for example, in the event of a new economic crisis, a further deepening of social inequality, which is steadily increasing — in 2004, the 20% of the population with the highest incomes appropriated 42.07% of all incomes, and the poorest 40% got 20.80%. In September 2012, the corresponding figures were 48.94% and 16.88%, respectively [Suara Karya Online, 29.08.2013].

In these circumstances, the speech of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ulema of Indonesia, Dean Shamsuddin, in September 2013, is alarming. D. Shamsuddin, who enjoys a reputation as a fairly moderate figure, called on Muslim public organizations and all Muslims to turn Islam into a force that will determine the future of Indonesia. He said that the current liberal system could threaten the role of the Muslim religion in the country and called on the Ummah not to allow a split in its ranks [Antara News.com, 13.09.2013].

There are relatively few active Islamists in Indonesia, but in the event of a crisis, they and the army can come to the fore, and the bureaucracy and elite will join the one who will be the strongest in the confrontation between them.

The further development of the Indonesian state and society largely depends on the strengthening of civil society, combined with a decisive increase in the effectiveness of the authorities in the fight against corruption, 4 poverty, relative impoverishment, landless peasants, and unemployment, so that Islamization is not perceived by the grassroots as an attractive alternative. A little over 15 years have passed since the collapse of authoritarianism in Indonesia. This is not even a single generation period. A new social consciousness is just being formed, with difficulty overcoming genetically inherited ailments. It's a difficult process, but it's coming.

LIST OF LITERARY TEXTS

Antara News.com.

Hcru Cahyono. Konflik di Kalbar dan Kaltcng. Scbuah Pcrbandingan Masyarakat Inndoncsia // Majalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial Indonesia. Jakarta, jilid XXX. No. 2, 2004.

Inside Indonesia.

Kompas (Jakarta).

Laporan Tahunan Kehidupan Beragama di Indonesia, 2009. Univcrsitas Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta, 2010. Tempo (Jakarta).

Media Indonesia.

Muhammad Mustafa. Legal Pluralism and Political Reform in Indonesia // Indonesian Social Science Review. Vol. 1. No. 1. Jakarta, 2010.

Republika Online.

Sinar Ilarapan News.

The Straits Times (Singapore).

Suara Karya Online.

Suara Pembaruan (Jakarta).

Tempo. co.

The Jakarta Globe.

The Jakarta Post.

4 Indonesia retains its reputation as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, but it must be acknowledged that the fight against this evil is growing. Established in 2004, the Corruption Eradication Commission had opened 385 cases by September 2013, including 72 against parliamentarians and members of local legislative assemblies, nine against heads of ministries and departments, four against ambassadors, nine against provincial governors, and 34 against heads of local municipalities [Rcpublika.co.id, 26.09.2013]. On October 2, 2013, the Commission arrested the President of the Constitutional Court while accepting a bribe [Antara Ncws.com, 03.10.2013]. Senior leaders of political parties, including the presidential Democrat Party, as well as relatives of high-ranking figures are involved. These facts, in my opinion, indicate not only the prevalence of corruption, but also that the authorities are taking this problem quite seriously. Transparency in its coverage by official bodies and mass media is also noteworthy.

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