In 2014, two election campaigns were held in Indonesia: the parliamentary campaign (April 9 vote) and the presidential campaign (July 9 vote). Their results showed a greater fragmentation of society and the political elite than the 2009 elections. Joko Widodo became president, while Prabowo Subianto was his main rival; both were nominated by party coalitions, as none of the political organizations could get the necessary number of votes in the parliamentary elections. The results of the vote reflected the desire of the majority of Indonesians to see a new person at the head of the country, not connected with either the authoritarian past or the corrupt elite.

Keywords: Indonesia, elections, president, parliament, elite, parties, coalitions.

The election result has a twofold meaning. On the one hand, their outcome should determine the course of political development for the next five years, and on the other hand, the political culture of Indonesian society in general and the elite in particular was revealed during the campaigns.

Parliamentary and presidential elections are held every five years in the same year. Parties that have received at least 3.5% of the vote of the electorate participating in the elections are eligible to enter Parliament. At the same time, parties should have branches in all 33 provinces, 75% of 398 districts (kabupatens) and 98 cities, as well as 50% of 5,400 counties. Each local branch must have at least one thousand members.

The right to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President running together belongs to a party or coalition of parties with a total of at least 20% of the seats in Parliament or 25% of the vote in the country (the difference is due to the fact that electoral quotas for a number of districts have been increased to avoid the dominance of representatives of Java, which is home to almost 2/3 of the country's population). To be elected, candidates had to win more than 50% of the votes in the country as a whole and more than 20% of the votes in more than half of the country's provinces. In 2014, voting was limited to one round, as only two pairs of candidates participated in the election. The President and Vice-President are elected for a five-year term with the right of one-time re-election.

In 2004, 2009 and 2014, parliamentary and presidential elections were held with a time gap, so that the candidacy of the head of state was put forward taking into account the new balance of power in the Parliament (Council of People's Representatives). However, in January 2014, the Constitutional Court decided that the division of campaigns by time contradicts the basic law, and this procedure will be changed from 2019. Strictly speaking, Chapter VIIB of the Constitution does not define the voting procedure. More importantly, the court pointed out that under the current circumstances, candidates for the posts of President and Vice-President are forced to enter into tactical coalitions with political parties represented in the new Parliament [The Straits Times, 21.01.2014], and joining coalitions is determined not by common goals, but by the possibility of obtaining more votes.

When Suhardi, chairman of the Movement for a Greater Indonesia (Indonesian acronym - Gerindra) party, was asked who his party would enter into a coalition with, he replied: "Let's wait for the results of the parliamentary elections" [Kompas.com, 16.04.2014]. But coalitions are created by party leaders, and their agreements do not determine the behavior of voters in presidential elections.

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A special feature of the political situation in Indonesia after the collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 remains a large fragmentation of political forces. In 2009, the Democratic Party, led by then - President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, received 20.4% of the vote, while the rest received between 3.7% and 14.5%. Australian academic Jamie McKee believes that the multi-party system in Indonesia is not sufficiently ingrained in the public consciousness and voters remain the same "drifting mass" as they were before 1998, when they were called to come to the polls once every five years [The Straits Times, 22.01.2013].

The changes made to the country's Constitution in 1999-2002 significantly expanded the powers of elected bodies and, consequently, the capabilities of parties that are not always ready for these changes after 40 years of authoritarian rule.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

As a result of the parliamentary elections on April 9, 2014, the opposition Democratic Party of Struggle of Indonesia (DPBI) led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of the first President of Indonesia, Sukarno, came out on top. The DPBI won about 19% of the vote and 109 (out of 560) seats in Parliament. The second place was taken by the party of the Indonesian bureaucracy Golkar (91 seats), followed by Gerindra (73 seats), the Presidential Party of Democrats (PD, 61 seats) and others-only ten parties.

Commenting on his party's electoral failure, President Yudhoyono mostly blamed the media, which inflated the facts of corruption in the highest echelons of the PD, although there were no more of them than in other organizations [The Jakarta Post, 18.05.2014]. Corruption scandals did occur, but the analysis of Indonesian political analyst Aji Alfarabi seems more accurate, who even before the elections pointed out four main problems of the PD-ideological weakness, corruption, internal party conflicts and the excessive role of the personality of its leader Yudhoyono. That is why none of the candidates received more than 3% of the votes at the PD conference, which was supposed to determine the candidates for the posts of president and Vice-president [Gatra.com, 02.09.2014].

In turn, the relative success of the DPBI is partly due to the fact that for 10 years the party was in opposition and did not participate in the largest corruption scandals, while opposing unpopular government decisions (for example, reducing energy subsidies).

What was surprising was the success of the five Islamic parties, which received a total of 32% of the vote in 2014, compared to 26% in 2009, although none of them received even 10% of the vote. Perhaps the reason for their success lies in the fact that secular parties were compromised by their involvement in corruption, although this vice was not alien to the Ministry of Religious Affairs headed by the leader of the Muslim Unity and Development Party, Suryadarma Ali.

Researchers are not inclined to associate these results with the Islamization of society. According to Nurhaidi Hassan, the differences between Islamic and secular parties are blurred, as the former appeal to nationalist, and the latter - to religious feelings of Indonesians [The Jakarta Post, 11.04.2014]. The success of the Islamic parties did not lead to the formation of an Islamic coalition, but gave them weight as likely partners in future blocs.

Azyumardi Arza, a well-known Indonesian Islamic scholar, believes that Muslim voters are becoming more rational, ideological considerations do not dominate their choice, and they rarely follow the advice of religious mentors [Suara Pembaruan.com, 16.03.2014].

During the discussion of the results of the parliamentary elections, it was pointed out that up to 30% of deputies "bought" their posts. The distribution of envelopes to individual voters was mentioned

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with amounts of 20-100 thousand rupees, and entire villages - 50-100 million. Rs. As a result, the Parliament received the image of one of the most corrupt state institutions [Kompas, 26.04.2014].

Individual candidates ' spending on the 2014 campaign averaged 1,180 million rupees (about $ 100,000), three times more than in 2009. This amount is approximately equal to the annual income of a parliamentarian: hence the desire to cover expenses through corruption [The Straits Times, 20.03.2013; Kompas, 25.01.2014].

A defeat in an election results in financial ruin for candidates who have invested both their wealth and borrowed funds in the campaign. There is a well-known case when a candidate who lost an election to the local assembly demanded the return of contributions made by him for the needs of the mosque and distributed to the poor [http://www.republika.co.id./berita/kolom/resonansi/].

A survey among the population conducted in July 2013 showed that 51.5% of respondents did not believe that the political elite has high moral qualities (only 37.7% expressed confidence in it). For comparison, in 2005 and 2009, 34.6% and 39.6%, respectively, had a negative attitude towards the elite [Kompas, 08.07.2013]. The Indonesian press criticizes parliamentarians for wastefulness, poor discipline and low efficiency: in 2011, only 18 out of 93 bills were passed, in 2012 out of 64-10, in 2013 out of 75-10 [Sinar Harapan.co, 03.03.2014].

The electoral campaign was accompanied by criticism of the political system and the practice of granting ministerial posts by the President depending not on the candidate's professional achievements and experience, but on the number of mandates held by a particular party, which gave it almost unlimited power over this ministry.

After the 2014 parliamentary elections, votes began to be heard in favor of raising the threshold for entering Parliament to 10% of the vote. Parties that did not reach this level would have the opportunity to merge with more successful ones.

During the pre-election years, posters began to spread in the capital with the image of a smiling Suharto and a question in Javanese: "Well, how are you? Was it better when I was there?". The fact that Suharto's authoritarian rule ended in a deep economic and political crisis in 1998 was fading into the background.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Under these circumstances, the presidential election took on a special significance. No party received enough votes in the parliamentary elections to nominate its candidate without forming a coalition with other parties. The first pair (in the order in which they were registered by the Central Election Commission) was headed by the leader of the Gerindra party, retired Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, who spoke in conjunction with one of the leaders of the Muslim National Mandate Party (MHP), Hatta Rajasa.

Subianto (born 1951) has a vivid biography. His father, Sumitro Joyohadikusumo, a well-known economist and politician in the 1950s, was the Finance minister of independent Indonesia in the early 1950s, then joined the anti-Sukarno opposition. After being in exile in 1958-1967, he held a ministerial post in the Government of Suharto. Interestingly, P. Subianto himself is a Muslim, while his mother and younger brother, a major entrepreneur Hashim Joyohadikusumo, who mainly sponsored his election campaign, are Christians.

The success of P. Subianto's military career was attributed by detractors to his marriage to the daughter of President Suharto. He took part in almost all operations to suppress the separatists, in particular in Irian Jaya (now Papua) and East Timor, which was annexed by Indonesia in 1975. During the crisis in March 1998, he was appointed

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commander of the most efficient unit of the Indonesian Army - the Strategic Reserve of the Ground Forces.

After the fall of the military regime in 1998, he was dismissed from military service on the recommendation of the officer's honor court for human rights violations (this was recalled during the 2014 presidential campaign). After returning to the country after several years of emigration to Jordan, in 2008 he founded the Gerindra party and in 2009 participated in the elections as an independent candidate. candidate for the position of vice-president in conjunction with M. Sukarnoputri. In 2013, Subianto put forward his candidacy for the post of head of state. Perhaps he was inspired to take this step by the nostalgic sentiments of a part of society and the support of certain groups in the army.

In turn, the candidate for the post of Vice-President, Hatta Rajasa, after 1998 headed several economic ministries in several cabinets, in particular, since 2009 he was the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs in the cabinet of S. B. Yudhoyono.

Another presidential candidate, Joko Widodo, 10 years younger than Subianto, was born into a poor family, worked as a craftsman, and after receiving a university degree, achieved notable success in the furniture business. In 2005, he was elected mayor of the city of Surakarta in the province of Central Java, and in 2012 he won the election of the governor of the capital Jakarta, where his name, in accordance with local tradition, began to sound abbreviated-Jokowi.

In 2013, DPBI leader M. Sukarnoputri decided to nominate Widodo for president; opponents of this decision argued that if elected, he would only become a tool in her hands [Republika.co.id, 01.05.2014, 13.05.2014]. Sukarnoputri actually reinforced these concerns by stating that Widodo's task would be to implement the DPBI program [The Jakarta Post, 16.05.2014]. However, the previous activity of the candidate did not give grounds to deny him independence. So, running for the post of governor, he spoke in conjunction with Basuki Chahaya Purnama, an ethnic Chinese and Protestant, thus contrasting himself with radical Islamists. He ignored the protests of Islamists against the appointment of a Christian woman to the post of head of one of the districts of the capital and pressure from the Interior Minister to cancel this appointment in order "not to disturb the peace in society." It is also characteristic of this fact: knowing about the very difficult relationship between M. Sukarnoputri and the fourth President of Indonesia A. Wahid, he visited the house where the late head of state was born and called him a mentor (guru) of the Indonesian nation, at least as far as political pluralism is concerned [Antara News.com, 28.06.2014]. This statement was significant because Wahid, a prominent hereditary Muslim figure, implemented important democratic reforms in 1999-2001 and limited the political role of the army.

Widodo was supported by President Yudhoyono, who urged the public not to jump to conclusions and advised Widodo to express his vision of the problems facing the country and ways to solve them more often and in more detail in the press [http://setkab.go.id / berita-12674-sby-bicara-soal-keraguan-rakyat-pa].

The candidate for the post of vice-president in conjunction with Widodo was Yusuf Kalla, a major political figure and entrepreneur, almost 20 years older than D. Widodo, a native of South Sulawesi. In 1992-1997. He was a member of the highest legislative body , the People's Consultative Assembly, and later served as Minister of Industry and Trade in the Cabinet of a. Wahida, the Coordinating Minister for Public Welfare under M. Sukarnoputri, played an important role in resolving ethnic and religious conflicts in Sulawesi, Ambon and the Moluccas. In 2004, he defected to the side of S. B. Yudhoyono, who was running for the post of head of state, and became Vice - president. In this tandem, he openly claimed an independent role, which gave rise to talk about rivalry between the two top officials of the republic. In 2009, Kalla ran against his patron in the presidential race,

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but I lost. During the 2014 campaign, many observers expressed concern about how relations would develop in the new tandem, if won.

Neither P. Subianto nor M. Sukarnoputri, whose parties received 11.4% and 18.9% of the vote respectively, could independently nominate candidates for the post of President. The creation of coalitions has begun. In support of Subianto-Rajasa, along with Gerindra, Golkar and the Islamic National Mandate Party, one of the leaders of which is Kh. Rajas Party, Justice and Prosperity Party( PSP), Unity and Development Party (PER) and Crescent and Star Party (PPP). The support of these parties was probably due to Rajasa's speech in conjunction with Subianto, and partly to Widodo's reputation as a supporter of religious pluralism. This coalition was named "red - white" after the colors of the national flag. Initially, the decision of the leader of PER Suryadarma Ali to support P. Subianto was met with hostility by other party leaders, but he managed to turn the situation in his favor. In the midst of the campaign, S.'s resignation followed. Ali resigned from the post of Minister of Religious Affairs in connection with accusations of extortion in the distribution of funds for pilgrims to Mecca.

The Presidential Party of Democrats tried to act together with the DPBI. Pramono Eddy Wibowo (brother of Yudhoyono's wife) and Puan Maharani (daughter of M. Sukarnoputri), or Joko Widodo and Pramono were considered as candidates [Suara Karya Online, 06.02.2014]. But these initiatives have not been developed. In May 2014, the PD leadership decided to refrain from joining the coalition. According to the president, it was more worthy to be in the parliamentary opposition than to seek seats by undermining their authority [Suara Pembaruan.com, 19.05.2014]. However, on June 30, 2014, the PD leadership decided to support P. Subianto and X in the elections. Rajasu. Perhaps the president was pressured by his party colleagues not to be left without portfolios in the new cabinet if the pair won.

In a coalition with the DPBI (for D. Widodo and Yu. The National Democratic Party (NDP), the Muslim National Revival Party (PNV) and the People's Conscience Party (PNC) joined, led by retired General Wiranto, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces and Defense Minister in Suharto's last cabinet. Widodo, explaining why Golkar did not support him, said that the party's leaders showed excessively high ambitions for future cabinet posts (Golkar leaders denied this) [Kompas.com, 20.05.2014].

Religious issues have taken an important place in the election controversy. P. Subianto did not skimp on promises. The first version of his party's election document stated that the state should guarantee the purity of recognized religious teachings and protect them from all types of heresy and bias [Ibid., 05.06.2014].

Criticism of the program was so intense that Subianto's brother, X. Joyoha-dikusumo, one of the leaders of his campaign, stated in June 2014 that the controversial provisions were removed and that in case of religious or racial discrimination, the party would adhere to the laws [The Jakarta Post, 13.06.2014]. Nevertheless, P. Subianto appealed to Muslim leaders, promising to turn to them for advice. As a result, the leaders of the Central Java branch of the Radical Front for the Defense of Islam declared that they would vote for the Subianto-Rajasu, who promised not to interfere with the implementation of Sharia law, and therefore, if they won, it would be easier for the Front to restore order in the "nests of vice" [Suara Pembaruan.com, 07.06.2014]. The Indonesian Ulema Forum banned Muslims from voting for Widodo and Kallu because they supported Shiites, the Ahmadiyya sect, liberal Islam, and the abolition of Sharia law, and all this indicates "their hatred of Islam" [Republika. co.id, 01.07.2014].

Supporters of religious pluralism in Widodo-Kalla's program were attracted by the very points that repelled the radicals. In addition, they were satisfied with the policy of D. Widodo as the governor of the capital. It was assumed that in the event of a victory, his

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The Government will not allow local adoption of sharia law in the interests of preserving the unity of the country, state ideology and constitutional norms. The exception will be Aceh-due to the peculiarities of the historical past of this province [Republika Online, 04.06.2014]. At the same time, Y. Kalla assured the voters that the column "religion"will not be removed from their identity cards: this issue has long been controversial. Of course, the presence of this column worsened inter-religious contradictions and contributed to discrimination against members of minorities when applying for jobs [Kompas.com, 19.06.2014, Antara News.com, 19.06.2014].

P. Subianto tried to exploit popular discontent with some of the results of Yudhoyono's rule. In particular, he pointed out that if Indonesia continues to have high levels of inequality, corruption and poor governance, it will face the same chaos and unrest that has occurred in the Middle East over the past two years. A turn towards openness, equality and transparency of leadership is needed [The Jakarta Post, 18.09.2013]. Subianto argued that the principle of "one person, one vote" is a direct imitation of the West and does not correspond to national traditions [Kompas, 28.06.2014], but that he himself is a true democrat and does not intend to return to pre - reform methods, that the traditional Indonesian political culture based on consultation, consent and representation is quite consistent with the principles of Western democracy. democracy [Ibid., 01.07.2014]. Subianto's supporters compared him to Lee Kuan Yew, who in the 1950s made Singapore the least corrupt country in the world [The Jakarta Post, 18.09.2013].

P. Subianto's position on economic issues was complicated by the fact that he spoke in conjunction with X. Rajasa, who was responsible for them in the government of S. B. Yudhoyono, and any criticism of this area would have turned against this tandem. Subianto promised, if elected, to nationalize everything that belongs to foreigners who control the country's natural resources. He promised to increase the role of the state and expand its cooperation with the private sector. Special importance was attached to agriculture, which can provide many jobs [Ibid., 16.06.2014]. The Gerindra party's election manifesto rejected the privatization of state-owned enterprises, as well as increased trade liberalization. The party intended to pursue a strict protectionist policy in relation to locally produced goods and maintain the ban on the export of unprocessed ore [Ibid., 20.05.2014].

Yudhoyono, concerned about Subianto's rhetoric, opposed his arguments, pointing out that such promises harm society and threaten the stability, investment climate and economic growth of the country [Tempo.co, 05/08/2014]. Perhaps Yudhoyono's displeasure prompted Subianto to soften his accents. Speaking to the leaders of the PD, he assured them that he did not plan to nationalize the industry and that all previous commitments would be respected in accordance with national interests. Recognizing the need for foreign investment, he promised to maintain continuity with the policies of the previous government [Antara News.com, 01.06.2014].

Widodo promised to ensure economic growth of more than 7% of GDP, remove obstacles for local investors and promote export-oriented sectors of the economy. According to his election program, infrastructure, including railway transport and seaports, required special attention. According to him, Indonesia should take measures to protect the local market from massive penetration from outside, to develop human resources by improving the education system. Widodo promised to introduce special programs to combat poverty, raise the minimum wage, etc. [The Jakarta Post, 16.06.2014], achieve self-sufficiency in food and energy, and get rid of excessive dependence on foreign investment.

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investments that are made mainly in the extractive industries and do not create a sufficient number of new jobs [Kompas, 10.05.2014].

In turn, Y. Kalla spoke about the abolition of subsidies for energy carriers, in particular for automobile fuel, which, burdening the budget, benefit only wealthy people [The Jakarta Post, 20.05.2014].

The press noted that Widodo is freer than his rival Subianto, feels at home in the economic sphere, and is better versed in the functioning of the market. Tempo magazine noted that during the debates between the candidates, the second Widodo-Kalla pair was also more successful in discussing the development of democracy [Tempo.co, 14.06.2014].

In the sphere of foreign policy, differences between the applicants arose in connection with the problem of the South China Sea. P. Subianto pointed out certain rights of Indonesia in this area of the world, and D. Widodo argued that Indonesia should not claim any territories in the South China Sea and is not one of the parties to the conflict [The Jakarta Post, 24.06.2014]. Widodo also said that Indonesia should become one of the great Asian powers, able to compete with any country on land and at sea. To do this, he promised to strengthen the country's defense capability in every possible way [Antara News.com, 22.06.2014].

The election campaign was accompanied by fierce controversy. Facts of human rights violations were actively used against P. Subianto. He was blamed for the abduction of 22 activists of anti-regime protests in 1998. The press raised the question of whether a person dismissed from military service for offenses can become the head of state and, accordingly, the supreme commander of the armed forces. The toughest position was taken by General Wiranto, who was Subianto's direct superior in 1998. (Interestingly, the member of the Officer's Honor Council who recommended Subianto's dismissal was Lieutenant General S. B. Yudhoyono, the future President of Indonesia and head of the party that supported the dismissed general's candidacy in 2014.)

Noteworthy is the argument in defense of Subianto by the head of his election campaign, former chairman of the Constitutional Court M. D. Mahfoud, who pointed out that the general was only one of the cogs in a big machine, and suggested refraining from mutual accusations [http://www.republika.co.id/berita/kolom/ resonansi/14/11/12/nexo2r-suatu-hari-di-kampung-tatar].

In response, Subianto's supporters threatened to reveal the names of those who ordered the scorched-earth transformation of East Timor in 1994 - a clear reference to General Wiranto, who supported Widodo [http://www.antaranews.com/berita/440064/dalang-pembakaran-timor-timur-akan-diungkap-eks-pejuang]. The candidate himself called for forgetting the mistakes of statesmen and focusing on their legacy. He compared the critics to football fans who, being present at the stadium, think that they would have played better than the athletes. About himself, he said that he always consistently defended human rights, and in 1998 he only carried out the orders of President Suharto [The Jakarta Post, 2.05.2014].

The former head of the State Intelligence Agency, General A. M. Hendroiriyono, even released data on Subianto's mental disability [Suara Pembaruan.com., 04.06.2014].

The validity of the charges against P. Subianto was beyond doubt. However, more than 15 years have passed since the commission of the offenses incriminated to him, and this topic was in demand only in the context of the struggle for the post of president.

Another topic did not attract attention: in May 2014, among the circumstances that prevented the nomination of a candidate for the post of president, the election commission pointed out membership in the Communist Party of Indonesia (CPI), banned in 1966, and involvement in the events of September 30, 1965, when a group of officers mutinied

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against the generals. The press recalled that as early as February 24, 2004, the Constitutional Court had declared Article 60 of the law on general elections, which deprived former members of the CPI of their voting rights, null and void. But the ban remained in place and did not provoke controversy, although almost half a century had passed since the 1965 riots blamed on the Communists, and there was considerable evidence that the accusations were false.

Washington intervened in the election campaign. According to the Wall Street Journal, US Ambassador to Indonesia Robert Blake called on the Indonesian government to investigate the allegations against Subianto (cit. by: [Republika.co.id, 24.06.2014]). In addition, he said that none of the candidates is the American favorite and that the United States is only concerned with the development of the democratic process. At the same time, the press recalled that in 2000 P. Subianto was refused an entry visa to the United States [Antara News.com, 24.06.2014]. At the end of June, Morgan Stanley predicted an outflow of capital from Indonesia if P. Subianto wins - because of his nationalist orientation [The Jakarta Post, 22.06.2014].

Not finding any really incriminating facts in Widodo's biography, his opponents resorted to direct slander. The Obor Rakyat tabloid accused the candidate of secretly practicing Christianity and having Chinese blood in his veins. In refutation, Widodo presented documents confirming his pilgrimage to Mecca in 2003 and 2012. The press accused President Yudhoyono of not taking action against these attacks, but the irony was that the tabloid was owned by an employee of his administration, while the presidential PD supported P. Subianto [Ibid., 13.06.2014; Kompas, 03.07.2014].

A remarkable explanation for the "dirty" methods in the election campaign was given by Professor R. Kasali, who noted that in Indonesia there is no "healthy competition" in the fields of politics, economics, science and others. Hence-slander, vilification, etc. "For more than 30 years, we have not known competition. All public posts were distributed by the president or his superiors. The latter also received them not because of their abilities, but on someone's recommendation or out of the kindness of their heart " [<url>, 11.07.2014].

The 2014 election campaign has once again shown that the military elite has not fully come to terms with the loss of political power in 1998. Military personnel not only do not enjoy active and passive suffrage, but also cannot support one of the parties in any form. The Constitutional Court proposed to lift these restrictions in 2014, but at the request of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces, General Muldoko, postponed this step until 2019 [Antara News.com., 12.05.2014]. But on June 2, 2014, when President Yudhoyono assembled the army and police command staff, he said in unusually harsh terms that a number of senior officers supported certain presidential candidates against the law. He stressed that he remains the supreme commander of the armed forces, and condemned those who viewed him as "the captain of a sinking ship." He recalled that even during his first campaign in 2004, some military leaders directly opposed him and his party. "I have forgiven them, but I have not forgotten anything," he said, adding that he did not take revenge on his opponents [The Jakarta Post, 02.06.2014; Tempo.co, 02.06.2014].

The so-called sergeants-mentors, who had remained in the villages since pre-reform times, joined the election campaign. The head of the information service of the armed forces, Major General Fuad Basha, actually acknowledged this fact, saying that their task is to provide the command with information about the situation in the areas of defense and security on the ground. At the same time, the sergeants set up voters in favor of certain candidates [Tempo.co, 09.06.2014]. General Muldoko denied this fact [Antara News. com, 08.06.2014], but the episode mentioned below showed a certain level of politicization of the army.

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On the eve of the election, General Kiki Shahnakri, head of the research department of the Union of Retired Army Soldiers, published an article in which he argued that the liberal principle of "one person , one vote" does not correspond to either the traditional collectivist culture of Indonesia or the level of maturity of the political elite. He complained that the amendments made to the Constitution in 1999-2002 gave rise to liberalism and almost unlimited freedom, which led to conflicts in the political sphere, and called for their revision [Kompas, 17.02.2014]. This is not an isolated case when generals, including those in active service, oppose democratic reforms.

Yudhoyono has been repeatedly accused of driving the country on autopilot. At the same time, critics recognized the undoubted achievements of his regime - high economic growth rates, changing the ratio of public debt to GDP in favor of the latter, reducing the budget deficit and the number of Indonesians living below the poverty level, etc. However, in 2012, the survey showed that 34% of respondents considered the political situation "bad" or "very bad", while only 23% considered it "good" or"very good". The difference of 11 percentage points was markedly different from 4% in 2004, when Yudhoyono's first presidential term began [The Straits Times, 28.02.2012]. There was an impression that many Indonesians, accustomed to the rigor of the military regime for 30 years, were not able to completely change the self-consciousness of their subjects to the self-respect of citizens during the 15 years of the rule of civilian leaders.

RESULTS AND PROSPECTS

Although P. Subianto's rhetoric was more offensive, D. Widodo and Yu. Calla who received 53.15% of the vote. The absence of a strong correlation between the party and personal preferences of the electorate was confirmed. In the three months that have passed since the parliamentary elections, the orientation of a significant part of the electorate has not changed.

According to the results of the April parliamentary elections, the parties that subsequently formed a coalition in support of P. Subianto won 353 parliamentary seats against 207 from the supporters of D. Widodo. The gap in favor of the latter in the presidential election was not as large as in the case of the parliament, but still significant. It is noteworthy that the" red-white " coalition won in regions with relatively strong Islamic sentiments - Aceh, West Java, Banten and some others.

Having been defeated, P. Subianto said that his opponent is "a product of a PR campaign, not a man of the people, and only pretends to be modest" [The Jakarta Post, 14.07.2914]. On July 22, even before the official announcement of the results of the vote, he called a press conference at which he announced that he and X. Rajas leave the campaign due to the criminal actions of the election organizers and outside interference [Antara News. com, 22.07.2014]. However, he later appealed the results to the Constitutional Court, which rejected his claim.

P. Subianto's claims that his defeat was due to numerous irregularities in the voting process seem untenable, since during the election period 79% of governors, heads of districts and mayors of cities came from parties that later joined the "red-white" coalition. [Kompas, 02.07.2014].

Although a day later the legitimately elected president and Vice-president began receiving congratulations from the leaders of the party coalition P. Subianto [The Jakarta Post, 24.07.2014], he himself posted a statement on the Internet in which he claimed that the Indonesian nation is in a state of spiritual destruction, the state is in danger of collapse, and the presidential election failed. According to him, there was evidence of foreign interference in the elections [Ibid.].

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Unlike Subianto X. Rajasa behaved quite correctly, calling on the people to look to the future, maintain unity and thank God that the elections were held peacefully [Kompas, 25.07.2014]. But only on September 2 P. Subianto and X. Rajasa at a meeting with S. B. Yudoyono recognized the victory of their rivals.

According to some analysts, Joko Widodo's victory marks Indonesia's complete break with the Suharto era. Indeed, its success, at least in the first approximation, shows that the nostalgia of Indonesians for authoritarian power, which has been much discussed recently, is noticeably exaggerated. Choosing between a general with a reputation for authoritarianism and a successful manager who favored religious pluralism, they preferred the latter, although the difference in mass support for the candidates was not impressive; in addition, most Indonesians wanted to see a new face at the head of the country.

Widodo's success was also largely determined by the fact that he did not belong to the corrupt establishment. We can assume, although this requires a more detailed analysis, that the Indonesian middle class had its say when it saw Widodo as the first president who made his way to the highest state post almost from the bottom.

Life will show whether the choice of citizens was an accident or whether Indonesian society really entered a new stage of development. However, after some time, it will start demanding that the new government effectively fight corruption, social inequality, religious extremism and solve long-standing problems related to human rights violations. D. Widodo will find himself in no less difficult situation than his predecessor, as he will not have a sufficiently strong base in parliament, even if part of the government is not able to do so."the" red-white " coalition will go over to the winning side. In general, he will have to work with the same elite and bureaucracy as Yudhoyono.

The new government will have to deal with the problems inherited from its predecessors - the slowdown in economic growth, the budget deficit, which will have to be extinguished by raising energy prices (a very unpopular measure), the growth of Islamic extremism, which has found its most radical manifestation in the activation of supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which worries not only the authorities, but also organizations. At the same time, the coalition that brought Widodo to power has only 37% of parliamentary mandates. However, the newly elected Vice-president Yu. Kalla pointed out that none of the parliamentary majority parties was created "to be in opposition. They ended up in it because they lost, and therefore it is likely that their position will change" [Kompas, 04.09.2014]. He may be right, but the only question is whether these parties will be reliable allies. In case of complications, the same people who voted for Widodo as a new person may return to traditional thinking and decide that he does not have charisma, "the grace of heaven". Even before his election, he wrote in the article "Spiritual Revolution" that the reforms carried out after 1998 were not crowned with proper success, because at the same time they did not change the thinking of people, that many vices that flourished before - corruption, intolerance towards minorities, greed, selfishness, and a tendency to use force-remained. violations of laws, etc. He noted that the country needs politicians who rely on their knowledge, not on money or proximity to power, and that to achieve success, the country needs a spiritual revolution [Kompas, 10.05.2014].

A difficult problem for the new president may be building relations with the army, which even in the era of S. B. Yudhoyono, who came from a military background, distanced itself from the civilian government. Widodo's position is more complicated than that of his predecessors. Indonesian political scientist Juwono Sudarsono notes: "There is a clear difference between the army's non-participation in everyday politics and its understanding of its role in state affairs. And when it comes to state interests, the army should

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intervene to prevent changes in the state ideology. Even the most fervent Democrats understand that in the worst situations, the army will be the final arbiter " [The Straits Times, 17.12.2013]. There is an opinion that there is a generational change in the army and new people come to it with a new mindset. The question, however, is whether the pre-1998 generals will allow them to implement their thinking. One way or another, everything will depend on the development of the domestic political situation. The events of the first months of Joko Widodo's rule demonstrated its inconsistency. On the one hand, the tough confrontation between the two coalitions in the parliament by the second half of November was replaced by some consensus. It was caused by the weakening of the "red-white" coalition due to splits in the Golkar Party and the Unity and Development Party, caused by the discontent of the party's elites that the defeat in the presidential election deprived them of government posts. On the other hand, the President became embroiled in a protracted conflict between the state police and the anti-corruption commission, appointing a person against whom the commission had complaints as chief of Police on the recommendation of M. Sukarnoputri. All this distracts the country from solving urgent problems.

list of literature

Antara News.com (Jakarta).

Gatra.com (Jakarta).

The Jakarta Post.

Kompas (Jakarta).

Kompas.com.

Republika.co.id (Jakarta).

Republika Online.

Sinar Harapan.co (Jakarta).

The Straits Times (Singapore).

Suara Karya Online (Jakarta).

Suara Pembaruan.com (Jakarta).

Tempo.co (Jakarta).

http://www.an taranews.com/berita/440064/dalang-pembakaran-timor-timur-akan-diungkap-eks-pejuang.

http://setkab.go.id/berita-12674-sby-bicara-soal-keraguan-rakyat-pa.

http://www.republika.co.id/berita/kolom/resonansi/14/1 1/12/nexo2r-suatu-hari-di-kampung- tatar.

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