In the US military ,the "pivot to Asia" has already begun. By 2020, the Navy and Air Force plan to deploy 60% of their forces in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the Pentagon is investing a significant portion of its dwindling resources in new strategic bombers and nuclear submarines designed to operate in high-risk environments.

These changes are clearly aimed at deterring an increasingly aggressive China. And with good reason: Beijing's growing territorial claims threaten virtually all countries along the so-called "first island chain", which includes parts of Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan, and Washington has committed itself to protecting these states. But to reliably deter Chinese aggression, the Pentagon will have to go even further. China's growing capabilities call into question Washington's ability to provide military support to its allies and partners. While deterrence through the prospect of punishing airstrikes and naval blockades may play a role in forcing China to refrain from adventurism, the challenge for Washington and its allies and partners is to achieve deterrence through denial of access-to convince Beijing that it simply cannot achieve its goals by force.

Using the hidden potential of the US ground forces, as well as its allies and partners, Washington will be able to achieve this task by creating a system of interconnected defense lines along the border of the Russian Federation.

Andrew Krepiniewicz is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Published in Foreign Affairs Magazine, No. 2, 2015. © Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

a "first island chain" - an "archipelagic defense" - and thus would make it impossible for Beijing to achieve its revisionist goals through aggression or pressure.

RISKS OF REVISIONISM

China claims that its rise is for peaceful purposes, but its actions tell a very different story - a revisionist power seeking to dominate the Western Pacific. Beijing claims not only Taiwan, but also the Japanese Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese) and most of the 1.7 million square miles that make up the East China Sea and South China Sea, where six other countries have various territorial claims. Beijing makes no excuses or apologies for its position. Thus, in 2010, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi dismissed all concerns about Beijing's expansionism in one fell swoop, saying: "China is a big country, and other countries are small, and this is a fact."

Consider Beijing's recent actions in the South China Sea. In March 2014, the Chinese Coast Guard denied the Philippines access to the Spratly Islands. Two months later, China tried to install a drilling rig in Vietnam's exclusive economic zone, and there were clashes with Vietnamese fishing vessels. Earlier, there were a number of incidents in the East China Sea. In September 2010, in response to the detention of the captain of a Chinese fishing boat that rammed two Japanese Coast Guard ships, Beijing suspended exports to Japan of rare earth metals needed for the production of mobile phones and computers. In November 2013, Beijing unilaterally imposed an "air defense identification zone" over the disputed Senkaku Islands and other areas of the East China Sea, where its own air traffic regulations apply. Chinese authorities have warned that military measures will be taken against the offending aircraft.

Some believed that with the rise of military power, Chinese leaders would feel more secure and their behavior would become more restrained. But it seems more likely

a completely different scenario. In fact, the provocations coincided with a sharp build-up of military muscle. Beijing is investing in new opportunities that pose a direct threat to regional stability. For example, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is expanding its anti-access/area-denial capabilities to prevent other countries ' armies from occupying or crossing significant territory, but the ultimate goal is obviously to make the western Pacific a no - go zone for United States troops. For this purpose, means are being developed to block the Pentagon's command and control systems, the coordination of operations and logistics of which depend on the operation of satellites and the Internet. In recent years, the PLA has made significant progress in this direction: anti-satellite missiles and lasers are being tested to block American satellites, and US defense networks are being subjected to large-scale cyber attacks.

China is also expanding its ability to counter military forces and limit U.S. Navy maneuvers in international waters. The PLA already has conventional ballistic and cruise missiles capable of attacking major United States military installations in the region, including Kadena Air Force Base on the Japanese island of Okinawa, and is developing stealth aircraft to strike targets along the "first island chain." To detect warships over long distances, the PLA has deployed powerful radars and tracking satellites, and uses drones for long-range reconnaissance flights. To counter American aircraft carriers and escort ships, the Chinese Navy receives submarines equipped with modern torpedoes and high-speed cruise missiles for long-range strikes.

Beijing's actions cannot be explained as a reaction to the US arms buildup. Over the past 10 years, Washington has focused maximum efforts and resources on supporting its ground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States ' defense budget, which until recently exceeded 4% of the country's GDP, is projected to fall below 3% by the end of the decade.

Simply put, the Pentagon is reducing its military capabilities, while the PLA is increasing them.

However, if we assume that the origins of the current policy are rooted in the past, then the PRC will not seek to achieve expansionist goals through open aggression. Adhering to its own strategic culture, Beijing wants to slowly but inexorably change the military balance in the region in its favor, so that other countries have no choice but to accept China's power. Most maritime neighbors are convinced that diplomatic and economic engagement will not change this fundamental fact. Some of them, including Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, focus on countering Beijing's ambitions. However, they are well aware that acting alone will not prevent China from moving towards its goal. Only with the material support of the United States can a united front be formed to deter Beijing from aggression or pressure.

EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE

If Washington wants to change Beijing's calculations, it needs to deprive China of the ability to control the air and sea space around the "first chain of islands", since only by dominating the air and sea, the PLA will be able to isolate the archipelago. The United States also needs to integrate its allies ' combat systems and improve their arsenals to counter the PLA's efforts to destabilize the military balance in the region. These goals can be achieved with the help of ground forces, which will not replace the existing Air Force and Navy, but complement them.

As for air defense, states located along the "first chain of islands" can strengthen their ability to deny China access to airspace by deploying army units equipped with mobile and relatively simple short-range interceptor missiles (for example, the Evolved Sea Sparrow, supported by the Giraffe radar to detect targets). At the same time, the US army, together with allies such as Japan, could use advanced systems with a longer range, capable of

intercept Chinese cruise missiles and destroy the latest aircraft. Not being part of the "first island chain", Vietnam has already begun to expand its airspace capabilities, and this can contribute to joint defense efforts.

There is also the task of depriving the PLA of maritime control, which it must build up to conduct offensive operations against the islands. Senior members of Congress have suggested that the U.S. Army should consider reviving coastal defense artillery units that were abandoned after World War II. The idea is simple and seems convincing. Instead of risking warships within range of the PLA or diverting submarines from priority areas, the Americans and their allies could use ground forces based along the "first island chain" and armed with mobile launchers and anti-ship cruise missiles to carry out the same tasks. This is exactly what Japan did when it deployed anti-ship cruise missile launchers on the Ryukyu Islands during a military exercise. Vietnam has deployed similar systems. Other countries could follow suit, either on their own or with financial, training, and technical support from the United States.

Another task that the US and Allied ground forces could tackle is sea mines. Traditionally, warships lay mines or defuse them to restrict or secure passage through narrow straits. While mine clearance will remain primarily the function of the Navy, ground forces, especially if deployed near key straits linking the East and South China Seas to the ocean, can play a more prominent role in laying mines. With the ability to lay sea mines from land bases using short-range missiles, helicopters, and barges, ground forces can make significant sea areas inaccessible to the Chinese Navy. Minefields in the "narrow necks" along the "first island chain" will seriously hinder the progress of Chinese warships and interference-

don't bother the Allied Navy. At the same time, coastal batteries of anti-ship missiles will make mine clearance operations very risky for PLA ships.

In the long run, the ground forces will also be able to support operations against the PLA's growing submarine fleet. The main thing for a submarine is to remain undetected; if detected, it must avoid contact, otherwise it will be destroyed. By installing low-frequency and acoustic sensors in the waters around the "first island chain", the United States and its allies will improve the ability to detect PLA submarines. Then coastal artillery units use torpedo missiles to force the submarines to stop the campaign and leave.

If China attacks an ally or partner of the United States, even a small contingent of American ground forces will help local forces put up a determined resistance. Modern conflicts in Southeast Asia and the Middle East have shown what small irregular ground units can achieve with modern weapons and competent advisers. Thanks to American advisers and air power, the South Vietnamese army was able to withstand a full-scale offensive by the outnumbered North Vietnamese forces in 1972. Almost 30 years later, in 2001, a small contingent of US special forces, assisted by ground-attack aircraft, helped the Northern Alliance defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. In 2006, Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon, backed by Iranian advisers, fought the Israeli army, and a month later the situation reached a stalemate.

Similar actions by U.S. ground forces in the Pacific region could make seizing and occupying territory an extremely costly undertaking for China, especially if the local forces have advanced training and weapons. Availability of high-precision rockets and ra-

short-range missile defense systems, as well as MANPADS, will maximize the effectiveness of partisan resistance units.

By taking more responsibility for depriving the PLA of control in the air and at sea, which is essential for offensive operations, the ground forces will allow the US and allied Air Forces and Navies to focus on tasks that only they can perform - such as long-range surveillance and airstrikes. If deterrence fails, air and naval forces will be vital to protect the "first island chain" and deprive the PLA of an advantage. For example, the PLA can concentrate forces at any point along the "first chain of islands" much faster than the Americans and their allies, whose troops are dispersed over a large area. In addition, China does not need to compromise between conflicting national interests. (In the event of an attack on one of the "first chain islands", other countries are likely to want to keep troops in place to protect their territory.) By freeing the United States Air Force and Navy from participating in China's withdrawal of control in the air and at sea, the ground forces will allow them to remain in reserve and be ready for rapid redeployment to protection of a vulnerable link in the chain.

For deterrence to be successful, a real threat of retaliation is also necessary, and in this, the ground forces can also help. Currently, American weapons designed to deliver a precise retaliatory strike are located on vulnerable advanced air bases and aircraft carriers. The Pentagon plans to solve the problem by building new submarines and stealth strategic bombers, but the cost of these projects is very high, especially given the relatively small combat load. Ground forces, by contrast, offer a cheaper way to increase firepower. Unlike the Air Force and Navy, ground forces do not need to return to distant bases to replenish their ammunition. They have more ammunition than any bomber or warship, and are ready to place weapons in bunkers that are more protected from attacks.

In addition, in the event of a conflict, the PLA is able to take advantage of an asymmetric advantage-a significant arce-

ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range ballistic missiles. The United States, a signatory to the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, cannot use such weapons. However, by equipping the ground forces with relatively inexpensive long-range missiles and deploying them on the "first chain islands" to reduce the cost of delivering missiles over long distances, Washington, together with its allies, will be able to solve the imbalance problem at a relatively low cost. And if the ground forces are unable to respond quickly to a break in the defense of one of the chain's islands, units on neighboring islands will quickly redirect missiles to the area that is in danger.

Perhaps the main vulnerability of the "first island chain" is related to the US army networks - the most important systems that control everything from the direction and tracking of troops and their supplies to the guidance of weapons. Currently, the operation of these systems is largely dependent on satellites and drones without stealth technology, which can become targets for the PLA. The best way to reduce risks is to create a communication network made of fiber-optic cable, laid underground and on the seabed. This will allow disparate units to safely transmit and receive data from fortified command centers on land. Island-based air defense and maritime control units, as well as anti-ship minefields, will provide protection for cables laid between the islands.

THE ART OF THE Possible

Like any operational concept, archipelago defense can face several obstacles. The two main ones are finance and geopolitics, i.e. the estimated costs and willingness of the countries of the "first island chain" to cooperate. Despite the cost of the new project, military experts in the United States are beginning to understand that the planned reduction in the Pentagon budget does not correspond to the current increasingly dangerous situation. The National Defense Commission, which includes military experts from both parties, recently recommended that the Obama administration and Congress return military spending to its original level.

announced in the Pentagon budget for fiscal year 2012. If these recommendations are adopted, the Pentagon's resources will increase significantly over the next 10 years.

The Pentagon can make the following argument: investing in archipelago defense in the future will bear fruit beyond the western Pacific. For example, the so-called "air-ground operation" doctrine, developed in the 1970s to deter Warsaw Pact attacks on NATO, proved effective not only in Central Europe, but also in a modified form used by America and its allies during the Gulf War in 1990-1991. Similarly, the Pentagon will be able to use many of its archipelago defense capabilities to protect other key regions, including its allies and partners in the Persian Gulf and Baltic.

If the Department of Defense does not achieve an increase in the budget, it will still be able to make changes to better match the current situation in the world. To give an example, the Pentagon still allocates a significant contingent of ground troops to protect South Korea from attacks by the DPRK. However, a large-scale invasion is unlikely; the main threat is that Pyongyang is capable of launching a missile strike using nuclear or chemical warheads. In any case, the population of South Korea is twice as large as the population of the enemy country, and the per capita income is more than 15 times higher. Seoul can and should bear most of the cost of its own defense against a traditional ground invasion.

Even with the necessary resources, dealing with a whole group of regional allies is certainly a serious challenge. American ground forces will have to perform different tasks depending on the country. Japan has significant military capabilities and can strengthen its land defenses without US support. In the Philippines, by contrast, American troops will likely have to take on a more substantial role. In both countries, an increase in the number of United States army units will provide a certain level of trust that the Air Force and Navy do not create, since

they can be quickly withdrawn. Taiwan, given its lack of diplomatic relations with Washington, will have to do almost without American assistance.

Some countries, such as Japan and Vietnam, have already shown serious intentions to strengthen their borders, which will be required for archipelago defense. Other countries outside the "first island chain", including Australia and Singapore, seem ready to provide logistical support. It took more than 10 years for NATO to provide an effective non-nuclear deterrent to the Warsaw Pact countries. Obviously, the United States and its allies will not be able to create an archipelago defense in one day.

By adopting this strategy now, Washington and its friends will be able to share the cost of building such defenses. In the meantime, given the ongoing military rivalry in the region, the United States and its allies must make every effort to preserve regional stability and prosperity. Of course, archipelago defense is not a panacea for all forms of Chinese aggression, just as the NATO doctrine of non-nuclear deterrence did not remove all the threats posed by the national liberation wars and the build-up of Moscow's nuclear arsenal. But creating such a system is a crucial - and long overdue-first step in countering China's revisionist ambitions.

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