The ratio of the (capitalized) part of the product (GDP) invested in the expansion of production to its total volume is called the accumulation rate. As the results of the industrial revolution spread in the 19th century, this indicator increased in Western countries, and very gradually. From 6-11% at the beginning of the century, it reached 15% of GDP by the end of the century (the rate of accumulation in Great Britain and France, which exported capital, was significantly lower). At the level of about 20% reached in the 1920s, the rate of accumulation in the West remained unchanged throughout the XX century.

With the exception of Japan, the currently developed industrial countries did not have to carry out large-scale industrialization in a short historical period (in this regard, in relation to Western countries, it would be more accurate to speak not about the industrial revolution, but about industrial evolution). Therefore, the ratio between accumulation and consumption was fairly stable, only slightly decreasing during periods of crises (depressions) and increasing during recovery periods or years of rapid economic growth. Only some examples of increased and prolonged investment activity are known. So, in the USA in 1890-1913 the average annual rate of accumulation was 23.4%, in Germany in 1951-1973-25.8%, in Italy in 1951-1973 - 28.5%. Today, a relatively high accumulation rate (more than 25%) is observed in Australia.

Among the currently developed countries, the highest level of accumulation has long been demonstrated by post-war Japan. In 1951-1973, the capital investment rate there reached 31.7%, and in 1974-1990 - 35%.3% OF GDP. The Japanese experience has had a major impact on developing Asian countries.

ACCUMULATION AND MODERNIZATION

The study of modernization processes shows a close relationship between the rate of accumulation and economic dynamics. Suffice it to say that most of the newly industrialized countries reached the accumulation rate of 25-35% already in the 70s of the last century, which largely determined their success. It should also be noted that, despite the crisis of 1997 - 1998, the accumulation rates in Asian countries in the second half of the 90s were higher than in the second half of the 70s (Table 1).

In other words, the last 20 years of the last century, which turned Asia into the" workshop of the world", were largely a period of intensive accumulation, and the earlier individual states and territories reached a high rate of accumulation, the earlier they became leaders of economic and technological progress.

Despite the dramatic nature of the 1997-1998 monetary and financial crisis, the overall economic growth rate in Asia increased significantly in the last quarter of the twentieth century. At the same time, the accumulation rate by the end of the century in most countries of this part of the world stabilized at a level that exceeded the indicators of the late 70s. A noticeable increase in this indicator in the 80 - 90s was observed in India and Pakistan-up to 17-24% of GDP, in Iran (from 15% in 1995 to 27% in 2000). The share of investment in GDP increased in Turkey, but in 2000 - 2001 the financial crisis in this country reset the accumulation rate from 25% to 16%. In Vietnam, the updated economic course has helped to increase the share of capital investment in GDP from 10% in 1985 to 30% at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

It is no exaggeration to say that the main danger posed by financial crises is a decrease in the rate of accumulation. Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines were particularly hard hit by the 1997-1998 crisis (see Tables 2-4).

Before the 1997 - 1998 financial crisis, the rate of accumulation in developing countries in Eastern Europe

TATSIY Vladimir Vitalievich, Candidate of IMEMO RAS (v.tatsiy@gazprombank.ru).

Table 1. Savings rate in selected developing countries, average over the period, %

Calculated by: Bolotin B. M., Sheinis V. L. Economy of developing countries in figures. Experience in reference and statistical research. 1950-1985. Moscow, 1988. pp. 488-493. Data rounded up.

Table 2. Capital inflows and selected macro indicators of the G-⁵ countries1, billion US dollars

¹ Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand.

² In %, arithmetic mean, data rounded.

Source: Goryunova N. P., Minakir P. A. Financial crises in emerging markets, Moscow, 2006, p. 159.

Table 3. GDP growth rates in the Top Five countries, %

Источник: Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2008. ADB. Manila, 2008. P. 146.

Table 4. Accumulation rate in the "Five" countries, %

Источник: Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2008. ADB. Manila, 2008. P. 146.

Asia showed an upward movement. For example, it grew steadily in Malaysia, reaching a record high of 43% in 1997 (although in 1999, it was not the same). it dropped to 22%). In Indonesia, the savings rate has fallen from 32% to 22% over the same years. In Thailand, the currency and financial crisis also interrupted a long investment boom. The share of investment in GDP decreased there from 42% in 1996 to 20% in 1998. In the Republic of Korea, the savings rate decreased from 39% to 25% during this period.

To prevent the negative impact of financial turmoil on the real sector, governments usually reduce the interest rate and take other measures, including even stopping the exchange of national currency on capital accounts. But much more often (usually under pressure from the IMF), the national currency is devalued. As a result, the volume of GDP in terms of the exchange rate is significantly reduced. In addition, there is a significant outflow of capital, often as a result of speculation.

"Profitable speculation is made by money coming from the coffers of states supported by the IMF... In general, speculators win an amount equal to the losses of the state. In this sense, it is the IMF that keeps the speculative business afloat." Stiglitz and, continuing this thought, writes: "The billions of dollars that it (the IMF - Ed.) provides are used to support exchange rates for a short time at clearly unstable levels. During this time, foreigners and local rich people manage to withdraw their money from the country on more favorable terms... Billions of dollars were spent on payments to foreign creditors even when the debt was private... This resulted in the actual nationalization of private obligations. During the Asian crisis, this was beneficial only to American and European creditors. " ¹

The data in Tables 1-3 clearly illustrate the fact that modernization and high growth rates are unattainable without a relatively high savings rate. To begin with, it should reach 25-30%). The decline in the indicator may be due to the completion of the industrialization phase (Malaysia), the beginning of active export of capital abroad. Other external and internal reasons that hinder the progress of modernization also play a negative role. However, generally speaking, and taking into account the huge economic mass of China and India, it is safe to say that modernization and industrialization in Asian countries continued with the end of the 1997-1998 crisis.

Statistical indicators allow you to calculate another important macro indicator. This is the marginal (incremental) capital intensity - the ratio of the rate of accumulation to GDP growth. It shows what investments are needed to increase GDP growth by one percent or unit of value. In the global economy taken as a whole, marginal capital intensity has tended to increase over the past three decades, mainly due to a decline in annual GDP growth rates (in developed countries, they fell from 5% in 1961-1970 to 2.2% in 1991-2000). As a result, on average for developed countries, the growth rate of GDP in the developed world has increased significantly. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the capital intensity was about 10, meaning that a $ 1 increase in GDP required $ 10 of capital investment - the highest rate in the history of these countries.

In Asian countries, this ratio is significantly lower, does not have a pronounced upward trend, and indicates a higher overall performance of capital investments. According to our calculations, Kazakhstan (2.5), Pakistan (3.4), the Philippines (3.6), Uzbekistan (4.0), India (4.1), Indonesia (4.2), and China (4.4) were the most effective in this indicator in the first five years of this century. Next up are Bangladesh (4.5), Vietnam (4.6), Malaysia (5.0), Thailand (5.2), Hong Kong (5.5), Turkey and Singapore (5.7 each). The largest investments in GDP growth were required in Sri Lanka (6.0), Mongolia (6.2), Iran (6.3), Taiwan (6.4) and the Republic of Korea (6.7).

In the fall of 2008, China adopted a giant investment plan. It has a clearly pronounced anti-crisis character already because the interests of the real sector and employment are at the forefront. An amount equivalent to $ 300 billion has been allocated for the financing of railway transport in 2009-2010 alone. Of course, we are not talking about the completion of modernization.

COMPLETING INTERNATIONALIZATION?

Will the current turmoil in Western financial markets negatively affect the volume and quality of savings in Asian countries? This question, of course, concerns not only local economists. It is no exaggeration to say that the very modern organization of economic life on the planet has caused a flurry of questions. Seemingly unshakable truths are being destroyed, and the conflict is being exposed with particular acuteness

^{Stiglitz J.} 1 Globalizatsiya: oborozhnye tendentsii [Globalization: Disturbing Trends], Moscow, 2003, p. 126.

between the financial sector and the real economy. How to get out of the crisis? What measures should be taken and what should be done with huge price collapses on stock and commodity exchanges? Who should I help out-producers of real goods or financiers?

The first thing that comes to mind is to try to mitigate the consequences of the crisis as much as possible for those who are directly engaged in providing humanity with the most necessary things. It is more important to radically change the way things are viewed than to calculate the losses from the crisis - the economy is not only about making money, but also - mainly-producing affordable goods for the population. Although, of course, one does not exclude the other, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the goal and the means. Only by agreeing on this, you can start restorative and protective measures.

China and other non-Western countries are already demonstrating their options for this kind of policy, which are also faced with the problem of realizing excess reserves of so-called hard currencies. Many of the measures taken are aimed at stimulating production or are clearly anti-inflationary in nature. Here are some examples.

State-owned banks that actively finance production at a relatively low interest rate are additionally capitalized (receive additional funds) at the expense of reserves , so that this process continues without deterioration in the terms of lending to borrowers. To overcome monopolism in the market and reduce prices, private retail chains and entire industries are bought out and transferred to state ownership on the principle of "no profit, no loss". Foreign acquisitions of large national companies are subsidized, with the latter obligated to maintain or even reduce the price level in the domestic market. State commodity funds are created from the reserves, allowing for commodity interventions in the event of a sharp increase in prices for vital goods for the population.

After the currency and financial crisis in South-East and East Asia (SEEA) in 1997-1998, the Chinese economy showed high stability in relation to it. The Indian economy also suffered shocks quite easily. This signified a major shift in the balance of power on the world stage. Many familiar ideas about the factors underlying the economic success of nations have also changed dramatically. The shift in their understanding after the crisis was often more like a return to the values of the past than a breakthrough into the future.

"An open economy is necessarily an economy in which domestic prices are close to the prices of the world market. An open economy also implies the free movement of not only goods, but also services, capital, and labor... The world is moving towards open economies. The countries of South-East and East Asia are also moving in this direction, " Professor S. A. Bylinyak2 ^noted in 1998. However, China's development over the past decade, and especially its current position in the global economy, is significantly different from this trajectory.

This country, unlike its East Asian neighbors, does not quite fit into the well-known scheme of gradual transfer of specialized labor-intensive production stages and processes from the outside to successive waves of "new industrialism". The PRC is dominated by a focus on the domestic market, the creation of its own production with a relatively closed cycle within national borders. In addition, during the 1997-1998 crisis in Pacific Asia, major changes occurred in the usual division of labor associated with the special role of Japan, and in the course, as it seemed to some researchers, of steady liberalization in ASEAN. However, until recently, these mechanisms and trends were regarded by many as the most important conditions for deepening international cooperation in the entire "integrating" Asia-Pacific region.

Statistical data also do not confirm the common perception of rapidly growing imbalances in the economic development of the PRC. ³ First, the so-called old economic centers remain quite competitive. Second, there has been accelerated economic growth in a number of inland provinces, and in some coastal regions, the long-term trend of growth in their share of GDP has reversed.

In recent years, China has successfully digested a huge mass of entrepreneurial capital, comparable to the volume received by the rest of the countries of the South, East and Latin America combined. Capital development in the PRC is significantly different from the usual schemes: it is mainly in the form of greenfield investment (that is, the construction of new production facilities from scratch).-

^{Bylinyak S. A.} 2 Adaptatsiya k mirovom khozyaistvu: opyt Azii i rossiiskie problemy [Adaptation to World Economy: Asian Experience and Russian Problems]. Moscow, 1998, p. 94.

³ See: Salitsky A.M., Fisyukov V. I. Kitai i krizisy 90-kh godov [China and the Crises of the 90s], Moscow, 1999.

and other economic objects). Joint entrepreneurship is carried out under strict control of enterprises from within and from outside; foreign investments, including during localization ("gochanhua" - a modernized version of "self-reliance"), seem to dissolve in the national economy of a giant country. It stops the "free movement" of a significant part of the capital and services represented by the world economy. They are being Sinicized and adapted to the conditions of the PRC.

It is unlikely that the term "integration"should be widely used when talking about China's interaction with the global economy. This term is more likely to describe the PRC's relations with Hong Kong and Macao (with which integration has largely taken place), and if we talk about the future, perhaps with Taiwan (although here a high degree of integration of the two farms is optional).

The Chinese economy is becoming increasingly selective about foreign direct investment , including due to opposition from China's national enterprises, as well as joint ventures that have long established a foothold in the local market. It seems that the current phase of interaction with foreign business capital can be described as saturation.

By the way, the attitude towards new foreign direct investment is changing not only in China. Back in 1999, some research organizations noted an increase in discrimination against foreign business capital in most countries and territories of the SEEA, including China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, compared to the previous year. Only Japan, South Korea,and Thailand showed the opposite trend. ⁴

It is possible that such phenomena also characterize the well-known exhaustion of the process of internationalization of the world economy. By the way, it is not quite legitimate to deduct "foreign" investments from Hong Kong to China from their total volume received in developing and" transition " countries. Then the decline of globalization in this indicator will become even more pronounced.

Western TNCs may no longer be making the same profits as they were during the internationalization of production. Because of the difference in intra-country price bases, they lose out to national enterprises where this base is at a relatively low level, and especially if the latter have (and the Chinese case is particularly illustrative) relatively complete production cycle. In addition, national producers (including small and medium-sized ones) benefit from all kinds of substitutes, imitations and fakes of popular international brands. Therefore, we should not exclude that the world will soon say goodbye for a while to the rhetoric about globalization, moralizing on the principles of free trade, etc. Perhaps it will be recognized that "mature" financial markets are over-ripe, and the more conservative financial systems of large developing countries are healthier.

Interestingly, China still has little involvement in global finance. The domestic price base of the country also shows no tendency to converge with the level of developed countries; moreover, in 1997-1999, China experienced a long decline in domestic prices, and later on, inflation was lower than in the United States. Given that China represents the most dynamic part of the modern world economy, the growth prospects of the latter again have to be linked to the production of finished products entirely within national economies, with a possible relative strengthening of the role of intersectoral exchanges in the world market.

A characteristic detail is a significant decrease in the share of goods produced on a tolling basis in China's exports. This indicator decreased from 57% in 2007 to 48% in the first half of 2008.

ROLE OF THE STATE

Development strategies and financial reform policies in large countries (China, India, and partly Brazil) followed the natural growth needs of national productive forces (rather than the global economy as a whole), and were also accompanied by a careful study of the experience of neighboring countries (otherwise they would hardly have been so successful). Therefore, we can assume that similar strategies will become even more popular and will continue to lead to the formation of complexes in large countries that are relatively isolated from the world economy with significantly different price, consumer, structural and intra-system characteristics. Perhaps this, in turn, will contribute to the decline of globalization, and the next cycle of world development will be more focused on domestic markets.

In this regard, there are already many forecasts for developed countries, including-

⁴ См.: Far Eastern Economic Review. 30.12.1999 - 06.01.2000. P. 110 - 111.

based on empirical observations of the course of cyclical processes in the world economy, the change of extroverted and introverted stages in the politics of individual countries. It is also worth mentioning that in the last decade, all possible scenarios of self-sufficiency have been constantly studied by developed countries.

The commonality of approaches of large non-Western countries to various political and economic problems of the modern world is growing. In the years of the last crisis and overcoming its consequences in many Asian countries, in particular, various economic programs and individual mobilization measures became widespread. Some of them were already used at earlier stages of post-war economic development, while others were used for the first time.

In the new conditions, such tools were developed and put into operation taking into account the changed social structure of society, its psychology, new value orientations and modern capabilities of communication and mass media. Campaigns were organized to raise public funds for specific purposes, to improve the external balance of payments. Budgets were replenished by collecting tax arrears for previous years (India), "national" repayment of debts of the largest national manufacturers (South Korea), accelerating national projects in the automotive industry (Malaysia, Indonesia) or acquiring shares of local enterprises in order to increase investment, as well as mandatory sale of government bonds issued at all levels to managers of all levels. development goals (China). Such campaigns were accompanied by explanations of the need for certain restrictive or unpopular measures, major changes in the parameters of macro-regulation.

A special place was taken by the campaign "buy domestic", the fight against excessive consumption of imported luxury goods. In addition, ongoing programs to support education, health, culture, the environment, and the repatriation of qualified personnel were strengthened at the national, regional, and local levels with the help of mobilization funds. A significant role was assigned to relations with foreign diasporas and the use of their opportunities. Public works, activities of voluntary organizations, etc. were widely used. Various types of mobilization strategies were also generated at the micro level. Despite the significant difference in the effectiveness of certain measures in individual countries, the post-crisis experience was generally successful, having a positive impact on gradually overcoming some of the consequences of the crisis - economic, social and, most importantly, psychological.

China is slowly beginning an industrial revival of some areas outside its territory. A number of African countries are already moving production facilities that do not fully meet the current level of technical armament of its economy. However, China's main trading partners and sales markets remain developed countries. And the interaction with them, due to significant differences in the levels of domestic prices, cannot yet be formed on the basis of the theories of free trade, comparative costs and derivatives. As a result, all the prerequisites for the leading role of the state in the country's foreign economic relations are preserved.

The paradox of the situation is that the increased state intervention in the foreign economic sphere, which is now being observed in Asia (and not only in it), surprisingly turns to another benefit of China, which has retained state monopolies. The fact is that the growing sales crisis in the global economy can lead to an unexpected situation: an increasingly protectionist West will be opposed by an increasingly "free-trading" China; the strategic initiative of free trade and related rhetoric will be transferred and in some cases is already transferred to it. On the other hand, it is worth repeating that the PRC has always been more important to protect the domestic market, since it has more dynamic growth than in foreign countries.

For other BRIC countries (India, Russia, Brazil), China's success in self - sufficiency is a challenge that makes us think about the optimal measure of its own involvement in the global economy. The expediency of a number of points in national strategies is called into question, including a high degree of openness of domestic financial markets, a low level of state control over foreign economic relations, an emphasis on attracting foreign investment, and a continuous improvement of the investment climate.

It seems that in the medium term, the idea of "moderate isolationism" or "metered-dose liberalism"could serve Russia's interests. The promotion of collective support does not contradict such a strategy

in the framework of bilateral, multilateral and regional associations, priority is given to relations with Asia. Within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community and the SCO, special emphasis should be placed on collective programs of self-sufficiency, including strategic goods-hydrocarbons, fresh water, and food-and, if possible, reducing the impact of external price shocks on this trade. The size of farms and, most importantly, the incompleteness of the industrial stage of evolution in the SCO countries objectively contribute to the convergence of their approaches to the main problems of the modern world.

The withdrawal of the state from the foreign economic sphere and the wide opening of the domestic market of Russia at the turn of the 80-90s was, in the fair opinion of many domestic experts, one of the main reasons for the subsequent decline of its economy. Accordingly, the question of how to preserve the integrity of the latter and prevent it from becoming just a passive appendage of the world economy is deservedly among the topics constantly discussed by economists. With some degree of convention, participants in this controversy can be designated as free traders and protectionists. It should be noted that recently the positions of the latter tend to strengthen.

In these circumstances, it may be worthwhile to once again refer to the Chinese foreign economic experience of the last three decades, primarily bearing in mind the mechanisms for ensuring the interests of domestic producers and protecting the domestic market. It is especially important for Russia to sharply increase the rate of accumulation: in this century, despite the significant influx of petrodollars and the rapid growth of capitalization in the stock market, it did not reach even 20%.

Despite all the differences in economic structures, Russia and China are united by the need for high rates of normal growth, that is, growth in the production of industrial and agricultural products, and a rather vague prospect of expanding sales in developed countries. The likely strengthening of China's orientation towards the continental domestic market looks like a powerful incentive for bilateral cooperation in the future, which may become an important element in reviving the productive forces of a number of Russian regions, which have historically been formed in the paradigm of "development", "scale", "groundwork for the future", etc.

Strategic partnership with China will remain an empty slogan without putting an adequate economic base under it, which could include working out measures for collective self-sufficiency, jointly strengthening the economic and military security of small Asian partners, increasing individual technological independence, and organizing various forms of interaction on a multilateral commodity exchange (mixed) basis. This suggests, in particular, the idea of resuming the use - this time in relations with the PRC, and possibly with other Asian states - of such an economic instrument as a special unit of account (transferable ruble or yuan).

In addition to major interstate programs that promote internal territorial and economic integration in both countries, in addition to creating large joint analogues of TNCs (for example, in the civil aircraft industry, the extractive industry, etc.), cooperation with China could also revive some "archaic" forms. In particular, in conditions of low liquidity in Asia, the well-known barter can become widespread. There are already working organizational forms for this purpose. For example, back in 1997, the company Pacific Barter (PB) was established in Hong Kong, which deals with the exchange of goods and services based on a computer network. For exchange participants, conditional dollars are charged to their accounts for the delivery of their products before the appearance of the product they are interested in (if the latter is not available at the moment). The average volume of transactions is $ 25 thousand. Among the clients of RV are quite large companies, for example, Acer (a Taiwanese computer manufacturer), Hertz International, etc.

Exchange trade in commodities within the SCO has a good future. And here the PRC is a clear leader: it is enough to note that 4 thousand exchanges engaged only in agricultural products account for more than 70% of all trade in them.

The recent growth of political factors in the global economy, which has been noticed by many leading scientists, has been beneficial for China, which has paid extremely great attention to them. The restoration of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong - the largest and most pronounced post - industrial enclave in Asia-with the preservation and even strengthening of all its information, marketing and financial functions in the Chinese economy is a vivid illustration of the acquisitions based on an accurate analysis of the international situation and painstaking and active foreign policy activities. As a result, the country's economy is systematic

it acquired an even more complete look after 1997.

It was the PRC's foreign economic policy, its timely adjustment after the first years of opening in the framework of the general refinement of the updated development paradigm in the mid-80s, that provided Beijing with extensive, relatively cheap and, in addition, constantly expanding channels for obtaining the real fruits of globalization.

It should be noted that globalization is not recognized in Chinese politics as the main, exclusive or constantly increasing feature of the modern Western world. But technological and informational progress is perceived in today's China as one of the usual features of developed countries and, significantly, as a completely achievable stage of their own development. The importance of scientific and technical issues, problems related to technology transfer, etc., over the past 20 years, formally even somewhat decreased in Beijing's dialogues with developed countries - as its own technological independence grew and practical development of various ways to acquire foreign technical experience.

* * *

The Chinese experience clearly shows the illegitimacy or frankly opportunistic nature of the thesis about the weakening economic role of the state in the course of globalization. This trend is often presented in an exaggerated form, but it is by no means universal and covers only the developed world (and much more-the "transition" countries), and even then with certain reservations due to regionalization and partial replacement of national institutions by regional, supranational ones. In other countries, the problematic nature of full-fledged world economic integration for the national economy still leaves too many external economic problems to speak of an objective need to weaken the role of the state.

In addition, the regional integration that has developed in Asia and Latin America is still very far from being completed, and it is now experiencing enormous difficulties, which in turn require significant intervention from national Governments in the course of events. Regionalization in the Chinese case (integration of an array and territories) it clearly demonstrates the gigantic role of State power in this process. With the possible decline of globalization in the world economy and in other countries, the economic role of the state has and is likely to continue to strengthen.

The strategy of self-sufficiency is in principle quite compatible with the policy of intensifying foreign economic relations, with large scientific, technical and information acquisitions. Adaptation to the external market may be more important than integration into it. The latter is probably no longer very possible for large countries in the near future, including due to the depressed state of the world economy as a whole.

Key words: financial crisis, globalization, internationalization, accumulation, modernization, growth rate, accumulation rate, Japan, China, Southeast Asian countries.

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