FAILED VISIT OF PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER LIAQUAT ALI KHAN TO THE SOVIET UNION IN 1949.1

In 1949, Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was expected to pay his first official visit to Moscow. The whole world froze in anticipation of this event: what agreements will the "Pakistan Crescent" and "Red Star" come to? How will the Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement affect geopolitics in the post-war world? However, Liaqat Ali Khan never came to the USSR. Moreover, in the spring of 1950, he went on an official visit to Washington, which marked the beginning of long-term cooperation between Pakistan and the United States.

:Key words South Asia, Liaquat Ali Khan, I. V. Stalin, Pakistan, USSR, India, British Commonwealth of Nations, USA.

Pakistan and the Indian Union emerged on August 14-15, 1947, as a result of the partition of British India , the most important colony of Great Britain. The difficult economic situation and post-war devastation in the metropolis, the rise of the national liberation movement in the East, the shifting of world public opinion, and the growing authority of the Soviet Union led to the victory of the liberal approach to solving the problems of colonial policy in London. The transfer of power in India was organized on the basis of a compromise of political forces reached during negotiations between Viceroy Louis Mountbatten and the leading parties.: The Indian National Congress (led by Jawaharlal Nehru), the All India Muslim League (led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah) and others. L. Mountbatten became Governor-General of the Union of India, at the invitation of the Congress, and J. R. R. Tolkien became Prime Minister. Nehru. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and General Secretary of the League Liaqat Ali Khan, respectively, held similar posts in Pakistan (see Chereshneva, 2012).

The difference between the potentials of the two states of Hindustan after the partition on religious principle, which was achieved by the Muslim League, was obvious. By population (320 million people) India was 5 times larger than Pakistan, in terms of area (3,288 thousand square kilometers) - almost 3.5 times. Physical assets and economic resources were distributed in a ratio of 6: 1 in favor of India [ibid., p. 291].

Independence was accompanied by a deterioration in relations between the dominions, primarily due to their territorial claims to each other. Thus, the dispute over who should join the principality of Jammu and Kashmir led to the outbreak of hostilities in October 1947 [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, chapter 2; Shaumyan, 2002, pp. 61-76; Yurlov and Yurlova, 2010, pp. 292-295]. In May 1949, one part of the territory of the principality (Jammu, Kashmir Valley, Ladakh) was occupied by the Indian army, the other-by Pakistani troops (Gilgit, Mirpur, Baltistan). In fact, power in the region belonged to the military authorities of the respective dominions. The government of Liaquat Ali Khan sought to divide it into two parts: north (Kashmir proper) give Pakistan, south (Jammu) - India. The Nehru government was inclined to split Kashmir along the line that divided the Dominion forces after January 1, 1949.

With the outbreak of the Cold War, Hindustan quickly turned into a zone of clash of strategic interests and rivalry between the United States and the USSR for spheres of influence.

1 This article was prepared with the financial support of the Russian Humanitarian Science Foundation, project No. 13-01-00184.

page 55
The United States, as well as the former metropolis of Great Britain, represented by their representatives in the Commission on India and Pakistan, established within the framework of the United Nations in January 1947, did not object to the division of Jammu and Kashmir, but into three parts: the already occupied by Pakistani troops to give to Pakistan, Jammu to India, and the Kashmir Valley, controlled by Indian army, - to allocate to an independent unit and hold a plebiscite there.

The calculation was that as a result of the plebiscite, it would go to Pakistan. This decision was opposed by both dominions. The USSR and the Ukrainian SSR abstained from voting on the Kashmir issue in the UN Security Council in 1948. According to the Indian historian S. K. Gunta, the Soviet Union could support India in this matter if " Nehru decided to change the foreign policy of his state to a pro-Soviet one. But the USSR did not intend to help India, which followed the American course" [Gupta, 1988, p. 99].

The Indo-Pakistani military conflict over Jammu and Kashmir led to the de facto division of the principality, with the most important military-strategic areas located near the territory of the Soviet Union remaining in the hands of Pakistan. The United States infiltrated the principality by using its decisive voice in the relevant UN Commission and sending a group of military observers to the region. The British, having secured the annexation of Gilgit, their main military base in northern Kashmir, to Pakistan, tried to gain a foothold there. In addition, given the success of the people's liberation movement in China, the United Kingdom and the United States sought to counter it by forming a bloc of Southeast Asian countries.

PAKISTAN'S POSITION

As a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, which united the largest dominions and colonies of the empire, Pakistan maintained close relations with Great Britain. Karachi counted on military supplies from England, financial and technical assistance from the former metropolis, and its support in the Kashmir issue. It remained a dominion even when India was already a republic.

A major problem for Karachi was its contradictions with neighboring Afghanistan, which supported the separatist demands of the Pashtun leaders of the Northwestern Border Province of Pakistan to create their own independent state [Ray, 1975, p.16-17]. The situation was aggravated by the fact that Moscow was actively developing relations with Kabul. The Soviet-Afghan trade agreement of 1947, followed by the 4-year agreement of 1948, was the best proof of this. It is clear that the Pakistani authorities were initially cool towards the USSR.

Pakistan did not start its activities in the international arena under favorable conditions. The United States, which opposed the partition of Hindustan as a potential sphere of influence, made it clear to the government in Karachi that Pakistan, which emerged against its will, could not do without the patronage of the West [Kazimi, 2003, p.291; Kih, 2001, p. 11]. Understanding of the strategic importance of Pakistan adjacent to the USSR as the likely leader of the Islamic world, a society with a traditionally anti-communist orientation, grew rapidly. A Pakistani embassy was opened in Washington, and the first head of the mission, Mirza A. H. Ispahani, presented his credentials to the US President in October 1947. To Truman.

At the same time, M. A. Jinnah negotiated with the US State Department for a short-term loan of $ 4 million for the "rehabilitation and rehabilitation of refugees from India" and a 5-year loan for military needs [Malik, 1994, p. 96; U.S.-South Asia Relations, 1983, vol. II]. However, in December 1947, the State Department rejected the Pakistani "military project" on the grounds that such a grandiose program could not be funded without prior approval from Congress, to which the State Department was not prepared to recommend it [Kazimi, 2003, p.291-293].

page 56
In October 1947, in Delhi, the Government of J. R. R. Tolkien Nehru discussed "borrowing issues for India"with US Ambassador G. Grady. Grady, without referring the request to the State Department, refused the Indian Prime Minister, fearing that Pakistan would regard this as "partisan actions" [Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, p. 165-166]. In the late 1940s, India's strategic importance to the United States was no greater than that of Pakistan. However, it was Nehru who first received an invitation to pay an official visit to the United States. During a trip that took place in October 1949, Nehru invited American entrepreneurs to invest in the Indian economy [Yurlov, Yurlova, 2010, pp. 616-617]. The visit of J. R. R. Tolkien Nehru came as an unpleasant surprise to Pakistan's leaders.

The death of M. A. Jinnah in the autumn of 1948 changed the status of Liaqat Ali Khan. A prominent associate of Jinnah, a professional politician, and a member of the Muslim League, he retained the post of Prime Minister, but changed the hierarchy of the two main posts-head of state and government. New Governor-General X. Nazimuddin was inferior to him in terms of influence. In official documents and vocabulary, Liaqat became known as "Qaid-i-Millat", which meant"leader of the nation-community". The main tasks of the new government were the territorial consolidation of the country and the solution of the Kashmir issue [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, pp. 92-93].

USSR - INDIA

The USSR established diplomatic relations with India and exchanged ambassadors in 1947. He was skeptical of its division into two states, considering them both as Anglo-American colonies. The presence of foreign capital there and membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations, according to Soviet leaders, served as evidence of the vassal status of India and Pakistan. Moreover, the British remained Governor-General of the Indian Union, army commanders of both dominions, and provincial governors for some time [Yurlov and Yurlova, 2010, pp. 611-615].

J. Nehru was one of the first leaders of the non-communist world to realize the possibility of peaceful coexistence with socialist countries. He distinguished between strict anti-communism in his domestic policy and cooperation with the communist world in foreign policy, and advocated the development of friendly relations with the Soviet Union [ibid.]. The USSR signed trade agreements with India in 1948 and 1949, agreeing to supply wheat in exchange for tea, tobacco, jute and other goods. However, the volume of trade turnover between the two countries remained insignificant at first. In the late 1940s, the communist movement began to develop in many countries of South and Southeast Asia. Nehru regarded this "surge" as the "hand of Moscow", launched persecution of communists in the country, and expressed dissatisfaction with the work of the first Soviet ambassador to India, K. V. Novikov, who "did not establish serious contacts with the Indian government, but communicated, often secretly, with the Communists of India "(Gupta, 1988, pp. 104-105)..

While Delhi was quite resolute in its relations with the USSR, Karachi moved cautiously in this direction. None of the Pakistani leaders were interested in socialism or admired the Soviet Union. Of course, some of them showed interest in the USSR because of the common religion in Pakistan and the Central Asian republics, so the ideas of Islamic socialism were discussed in certain circles.

The Soviet Union's attitude towards Pakistan was also ambiguous. Soviet leaders did not hold back in their assessments. They considered Jinnah's appointment as Governor-General of Pakistan to be "demagoguery in contrast to Mountbatten's appointment as governor-General of India", a "clever trick of the Muslim League" [Ray, 1975, p. 16]. Information about Anglo-American "intrigues" in Pakistan regularly appeared in the Soviet press,

page 57
In particular, a secret pact was mentioned, but in which Pakistan allowed the creation of Anglo-American military bases on its territory in exchange for military supplies [Novoe Vremya, 24.05.1950, No. 21, p.22].

At the same time, Moscow understood that the Central Asian part of the USSR was predominantly Muslim and could contact the co-religionists of Kashmir. The USSR sought to influence the entire Muslim world, and watched developments in Jammu and Kashmir. US actions threatened the security of the Soviet Union from the territory of Northern Kashmir, and this is largely why Moscow made contact with Karachi.

Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Pakistan were established on May 2, 1948 as a result of an exchange of letters between the Soviet representative to the UN A. A. Gromyko and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Zafrulla Khan. In the Pakistani press, it was stated that the Government of the country intended to open an embassy in Moscow by the end of 1948. The USSR also came up with the idea of establishing a Soviet consulate in Peshawar (in the northwestern part of Pakistan) [AVPRF, f. 0117, op. 3, p.2, d. 6, l. 1-2].

On October 30, 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan told the USSR Foreign Minister A. Y. Vyshinsky in Paris that it would be desirable to exchange trade delegations. The idea was to bring economic relations between the USSR and Pakistan to a higher level. At the beginning of February 1949, the Soviet Union purchased 6 thousand tons of jute and 2 thousand tons of cotton in Pakistan (for a total of 20 million rubles), and sold 60 thousand tons of wheat for 37 million rubles to Pakistan [ibid., l. 4].

As a result of negotiations held in Delhi between the USSR Ambassador to India K. V. Novikov and the High Commissioner of Pakistan, it was decided that the Soviet Union would send a trade delegation to Pakistan [ibid., l. 2-3]. On November 14, 1948, the High Commissioner sent Novikov a letter saying: "The Government of Pakistan will be pleased to welcome your Government's trade mission to Karachi. It is hoped that this mission will kindly plan its arrival after March 15, 1949, so that it does not coincide with the upcoming session of the Pakistan Legislative Assembly." Moscow decided to send a government trade delegation to Pakistan headed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR [ibid., l. 4].

EVENTS ON THE EVE OF AND EXPECTED VISIT

After the London Conference of Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth of Nations in October 1948, Pakistan, apparently under British pressure, was forced to stop military operations in Kashmir on the basis of the status quo. Another landmark event was Liaquat Ali Khan's trip to the Middle East. On May 11, speaking at a press conference in Cairo, Liaquat said: "Pakistan is conducting a socialist experiment based on economic and spiritual revival, which will help to combat the penetration of communism in Southeast Asia" [AWPRF, f. 07, op. 22-a, p. 16, d. 249, l. 1]. From Egypt, the Pakistani Prime Minister went to Baghdad, then to Tehran, where the Iraqi regent Abdul Illah, King Abdullah of Transjordan and other Arab figures also arrived to create the union of Muslim countries [ibid., l. 2].

The Beirut newspaper Al Hayat wrote on May 13, 1949:: "Liaquat Ali Khan's trip to the Arab countries is not accidental. In London, a new political project has been drawn up to create a bloc that will include the Arab states, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran" [ibid., l. 2-4]. On June 1, a Reuters report from Karachi was published in London under the headline "Pakistan is creating a system of bilateral treaties with the countries of the Middle East" [ibid.]. In the USSR, this " mis-

page 58
siyu Liaquata " as a double-purpose assignment for London: to prevent the United States from driving Great Britain out of this vast region, and the USSR from driving both of them out.

On May 16, 1949, at a reception in Tehran, Liaqat Ali Khan, in an interview with the Soviet charge d'affaires in Iran, Ali oglu Aliyev, expressed gratitude to the USSR, which "sold bread to Pakistan during a difficult and poor harvest year and thereby helped the Pakistanis get out of a difficult situation." Liaquat noted that he had visited a number of countries at the invitation of governments and would have been very happy to visit the Soviet Union if the USSR government had invited him [AVPRF, f. 0117, op. 3, p. 2, d. 6, l. 1-2]. Later, Liaquat told reporters that Pakistan aspires to have friendly relations with all countries of the world and that "the decision to exchange ambassadors with Russia is in line with this policy" [Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat, 1967, p. 145].

J. V. Stalin's invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan is dated June 2, 1949. Liaquat was supposed to arrive in Moscow on August 14. It was Pakistan's first Independence Day since Jinnah's death. Due to the absence of the Pakistani embassy in Moscow and the Soviet embassy in Karachi by that time, communication between the parties was provided by their diplomatic representatives in Iran. The invitation was conveyed by Aliyev through Pakistani Ambassador Ghazzanfar Ali Khan when Liaqat was in Tehran. This was followed by an announcement from the Pakistani side that the Prime Minister and Mrs. Liaquat Ali Khan had received an invitation to visit the USSR and that it had been accepted [NAI, L. 4].

Indian Ambassador to Iran Saeed Ali Zahir said: "The invitation to Liaquat was made through the Russian Embassy in Tehran. At the reception in honor of Liaqat and his wife, arranged by the Russian side, they talked with Aliyev for about three hours. This caught everyone's eye and was undoubtedly connected with the invitation that followed just a few days later" [Ibid., l.33].

On July 9, 1949, Vyshinsky informed Stalin that Gazzanfar Ali Khan had handed Aliyev a written message stating that Liaqat Ali Khan intended to leave Karachi around August 20 to stay in the USSR for ten days to two weeks. In addition to meetings with leaders and statesmen of the Soviet Union, he was interested in getting acquainted with the issues of economic planning, industrial development, agriculture, education and culture of the USSR. Liaqat would also like to visit one or two Muslim republics [AWPRF, f. 07, op. 22-a, p. 16, d. 249, l. 19]. Gazzanfar also made it clear to Aliyev: Liaquat hopes that " the Soviet government will send a plane for him to Karachi or Tehran... he himself considers it convenient to fly through Tehran" [ibid.].

Vyshinsky expressed to Stalin his opinion on what should be handed over to the Pakistani side: "The Soviet government is ready to receive Liaquat Ali Khan in Moscow in late August or early September, provide him with two planes to Tehran or Karachi, at his discretion, and fulfill all his wishes" [ibid., l. 19-20]. It was decided to place Liakat with his wife and some of the people accompanying him in the mansion on Ostrovsky Street, 8, and all the other members of the delegation - in the National Hotel [ibid., p. 22]. It was planned to send F. F. Molochkov, head of the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to Baku to meet the distinguished Pakistani guests, so that together with the leaders of the Azerbaijan SSR, he would welcome Liaqat Ali Khan there. In Moscow, he was expected to meet Stalin in person, receive a grand reception in the Kremlin, and attend events that corresponded to his status. Among the Muslim republics, the Uzbek SSR was chosen for his visit ([ibid., l. 24]; see also: [AVPRF, f. 0117, op. 3, p. 2, d. 6, l. 13-15]). However, no documents have yet been found indicating that Liaquat was given a satisfactory answer at that time regarding the dates of his visit.

On July 21, 1949, Vyshinsky again reported to Stalin: "According to our Charge d'affaires in Tehran, Liaqat Ali Khan, on the occasion of the PA's Independence Day-

page 59
Kistana - August 14 and the ceremony associated with this date, at which the presence of the prime minister is mandatory, can fly from Karachi only on August 18 and arrive in Moscow by August 20 " [AVPRF, f. 07, on. 22-a, p. 16, d. 249, l. 25].

On July 23, Vyshinsky added the following to the text of this memo to Stalin:: "T. Gromyko. Set aside until early October. Signature-A. Vyshinsky" [ibid.]. Then, on a separate blank page, he added in pencil: "Pakistan. All this can be done, but better... Do this, after the exchange of ambassadors. Approved by T. Stalin" [ibid., l. 27].

Thus, on 23 July, Pakistan was essentially denied its first request for a visit date. August 4, 1949 Pakistan announced the Prime Minister's readiness to fly from Karachi on November 7 and arrive in Moscow on November 9-10, and asked the Soviet government to respond in this regard.

The USSR Foreign Ministry was informed through Aliev that " the government of Pakistan is earlier than November... he is not going to appoint his own ambassador to the USSR." The Pakistanis were in no hurry to accept the Soviet proposal to appoint an ambassador before Liaquat Ali Khan arrived, and Moscow decided to "wait a little longer to answer the Pakistanis" about the dates of the visit. Vyshinsky's office decided that "the answer can be given in the first half of September. Aliev will tell the Pakistani ambassador in Tehran that the USSR considers it desirable that the establishment of normal de facto, and not nominal, diplomatic relations between the USSR and Pakistan precede the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow " [AVPRF, f. 0117, on. 3, p. 2, d. 6, l. 27-28].

Thus, the issue of appointing the Pakistani ambassador to Moscow became a matter of principle during the preparation of Liaquat's visit to the USSR, and the final agreement on the date of his arrival did not take place.

SESSION GOALS

Of course, each of the parties participating in this "project" pursued its own goals in preparing the visit. It seems that it was important for Pakistan to gain the support of the USSR in resolving the Kashmir issue. Moreover, in the first months of 1949 there was a noticeable cooling of relations between Karachi and Western countries. Invitation from J. R. R. Tolkien Nehru in the US, India's admission to the Commonwealth of Nations decided the outcome of the case. Liaquat Ali Khan went all in: "Pakistan is not allowed to wait. He must make friends wherever he finds them" [Pakistan News, 11.06.1949]. A similar point of view is shared by many modern Pakistani researchers, for example, Shahid Amin [Amin, 2000, p.41]. At the same time, some of them suggest that Liaquat used the Soviet invitation only in order to receive an offer from the United States to come on a visit [Ibid.; Dawn, 16.01.1994].

The Soviet official point of view under Stalin was that Pakistan was forced to establish contacts with the USSR in connection with the changes in London's policy towards Karachi and Delhi that took place in 1948 - early 1949. Domestic and foreign policy of the Government of J. R. R. Tolkien Nehru, who left no doubt about his pro-Western sympathies, and the intensification of Anglo-American efforts to create a bloc of South and Southeast Asian states hostile to the USSR, prompted the British to focus more on India as the leading force in this region and make some concessions to it in resolving disputes between the two dominions.

Moscow believed that the United States also supported Delhi to a greater extent, since they clearly preferred India to Pakistan when it came to providing loans. The United States also negotiated friendship, trade, and maritime agreements with New Delhi. Apparently, the Americans did not offer this to Pakistan. Finally, Mr. Truman invited J. R. R. Tolkien to join him. Nehru to Washington. Such an invitation from Liaquat was not known at the beginning of 1949 [AVPRF, f. 0117, op. 3, p. 2, d. 6, l. 5-6].

page 60
Modern domestic Pakistani scholars emphasize that " Liaquat, following the example of Jinnah, jealously followed India's actions in the international arena. Having learned that Nehru had been invited to the United States, he hastened to accept the roundabout invitation to come to the USSR " [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, p. 98].

Official Delhi also analyzed the goals of Liaquat's visit to the USSR. The country's Foreign Ministry noted: "If the United Kingdom and the United States have shown a willingness to be friends with India, then Pakistan will become an ally of another great power. If the Indian Prime Minister goes to Washington, Liaquat will go to Moscow "[NAI, L. 4]. On July 14, 1949, the Charge d'affaires of India in Moscow reported in Delhi that "Liaquat intends to take military experts with him to Moscow in order to conclude a non-aggression treaty with Russia" and that and Stalin is planning "negotiations on Gilgit" [AVPRF, f. 07, op. 22, p. 35, d. 200, l. 5-6; f. 0117, op. 3, p. 2, d. 6, l. 29].

The assumptions of not only official Delhi, but also, for example, the Indian socialists, who played the role of opposition to Nehru, attract attention. In the second half of July 1949, their newspaper Blitz published two articles entitled " Why did Stalin invite Liaqat Ali Khan to Moscow?" and "Liaquat's Trip to Moscow". The socialists argued that "a few years ago, no one would have believed that the 'socialist' Nehru would be courted by capitalist America, and the 'reactionary' Liaquat would be received in the Kremlin as a guest of honor... The "reactionary" beat the "socialist" in the field of international diplomacy " [Blitz, 18.07.1949]. Asking why Stalin invited the Pakistani prime minister and not the Indian one, Blitz itself gives the answer: "Did Delhi give a reason for this development? Unfortunately, Nehru, in his enthusiasm for the Western way of life, almost forgot that the security of a nation is guaranteed not by alliance with distant countries, but by friendship with its surrounding neighbors "[Ibid.].

Modern Indian historians have suggested that " Pakistan hoped... win Stalin's heart for a confrontation with India "[Sumangal, 2007, p. 66].

It seems that Liaquat Ali Khan really sought to capitalize on such an open interest of the USSR in establishing and developing bilateral relations and to encourage Great Britain and the United States to cooperate more actively with Pakistan than with India.

The Soviet leadership made contact with Pakistan based on its own vision of the far from rosy prospects for this rapprochement. Karachi's failure to comply with the Kremlin's fundamental procedural issues with the appointment of the ambassador, it saw signs of a certain ambivalence in his behavior. In Moscow, they believed that

"if the Government of Pakistan was headed by people who really care about the national interests of their country, and not the government of Liaquat Ali Khan, known for its pro-English orientation, then we would expect that the Government of Pakistan would take urgent and decisive steps towards the practical establishment and normalization of bilateral ties. In particular, it could be expected that, having established diplomatic relations with us on May 2, 1948, the Government of Pakistan would not delay the issue of appointing its ambassador to Moscow" [AVPRF, f. 0117, op. 3, p. 2, d. 6, l. 30].

Moscow did not rule out the most seemingly implausible scenario - that "Liaqat Ali Khan, declaring his intention to come to the USSR, in reality did not have this intention" [ibid., l. 6].

Among the many goals of the Soviet Union, according to which this visit would help "strengthen our ties with Pakistan, identify the real needs of Pakistan, and speed up the exchange of ambassadors between our countries," I would like to highlight another one: the Kremlin hoped that " after this visit of Liaquat Ali Khan to Moscow, Jawaharlal Nehru, of course, was forced to I would also like to come to the USSR" [ibid.].

page 61
The announcement of Liaquat's Soviet invitation created a festive atmosphere in Pakistan's political circles. For a while, he was perceived as a "man of destiny" who had already gained the recognition and friendship of all Muslim countries in the Middle East. The Pakistani press often published articles about the grandiose achievements of the Soviet people, their heroism during World War II, the development of industry, breakthroughs in agriculture and the education system [NAI, L. 4]. On July 20, 1949, the Deputy High Commissioner of India to Pakistan reported from Dhaka that " anti-communist sentiments are strangely expressed here they were quickly replaced by friendly relations with the USSR... Pakistanis have developed a sense of their own importance in the international arena" [Ibid., L. 15].

Meanwhile, Nehru's visit to the United States in 1949, with all the "Pakistani hype" surrounding it, was unsuccessful. The United States expected India to support its cold war course with the USSR, China, and Eastern European countries [Yurlov and Yurlova, 2010, p. 617]. The refusal of the Indian leader to join the bloc disappointed the American leadership (for recent Indian studies on this topic, see [Dixit, 2003]). However, Washington understood that the need for economic aid and military technology would force India, like many other countries, to turn to the great powers, primarily the United States.

For their part, India's leaders were aware that the great Powers were engaged in a fierce battle for spheres of influence in the world. In its context, the British and Americans feared the spread of communism from the USSR and China to Asia and were interested in controlling Hindustan. However, at that time, the West was able to use its "trump cards" - providing political, financial and military assistance, patronage in the Kashmir issue - to "play both the Indian and Pakistani cards." The Soviet Union also created a system of checks and balances, spreading its influence, recruiting possible allies, including in Asia, and getting them interested in its guarantees of economic and military-political assistance. In this regard, New Delhi could not but react negatively to attempts to bring both the West and the USSR closer to Pakistan, because in any case this would have led to the strengthening of its main rival in resolving the controversial issues that arose after the partition of 1947.

On June 10, 1949, an urgent secret telegram was sent from the Indian Embassy in Moscow to the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India, K. P. S. Menon. Charge d'affaires R. Dayal requested instructions from New Delhi on "the degree of hospitality to the Pakistani Prime Minister", namely, should the Indian Embassy respond in the same way as other Commonwealth missions, or should it show "much more friendliness"? In his opinion, something like a buffet should have been organized, if the Liaquat program had allowed it. "I believe that a number of foreign missions and, of course, representatives of the Commonwealth should be present at the ceremony when the Prime Minister arrives and leaves," Dayal concluded his dispatch [NAI, L. 1].

Menon responded immediately: "We are very interested in Moscow's reaction to this visit. We do not think that we should show any special cordiality to Liaquat Ali Khan. No more than other missions of the Commonwealth countries. There is no need to hold a reception in his honor" [Ibid., L. 2].

On August 30, India's Deputy High Commissioner to Pakistan reported in New Delhi: "It was announced that Liaquat will arrive in Russia in the first half of November. A Soviet plane will go to Pakistan and deliver the delegation to Moscow. The Prime Minister's Viking is operated by a British crew, which the Russians do not want to let into the country. Liaquat does not trust the Pakistani crew to carry out such a long journey" [Ibid., l. 32]. In this secret message, there was a postscript stating that in Sindhi political circles they believe that "Liaquat will not go to the USSR this year" [Ibid.].

page 62
India's interest in the visit was growing. The press spread rumors that in the Soviet Union "the weakest and most explosive part of the population is the Muslims of Central Asia, who have not yet completely reconciled [with the Soviet government]", and that "the Soviets need Pakistan - at least for a while - to prevent British pan - Islamist experiments. The USSR wants to play on the anti-British sentiments that have recently spread in Pakistan in connection with its problems in the British Commonwealth of Nations" [Ibid., l.38-39]. The Indian Foreign Ministry was confident that Stalin would offer Liaquat technical assistance, tractor supplies, and oil. They did not rule out the possibility of military supplies from the USSR, "if Pakistan refuses British personnel and replaces them with Soviet military advisers," although this would be "a very dangerous game" [Ibid.].

The upcoming visit of the Pakistani Prime Minister caused a very strong reaction in the embassies of different countries in Moscow. The Americans tried to find out the circumstances of the invitation, first of all-by whom it was initiated; or offered to wait for the development of events so that it became clear "who orders the music"; or predicted: "Everything can be against Liaquat, because he is a neophyte in international politics" [Ibid., l. 11-12].

There was a rumor among diplomats that the Middle Eastern countries were outraged by what was happening, and the Turkish and Iranian ambassadors in Karachi even presented the Pakistani government with a memorandum against Liaquat's visit to Moscow [Dawn, 10.06.1949, vol. VIII, No. 158, p. 1]. However, the embassies of these countries categorically denied such information. Turkish Charge d'affaires Galaat Vendar stated: "This is a lie, a product of the purest imagination. We didn't do anything like that." Syed Ali Nasr, the Iranian ambassador, claimed :" I am not aware of any protest made by my Government to Pakistan... When my Government invited Liaquat Ali Khan to Iran, Russia did not protest. Why should we protest when Russia invites Pakistan?". El-Sayed-Abdel-Qadir-el-Geilani, Charge d'affaires of Iran: "I don't know anything about this. If my government had done this, I would have been informed." El-Sayed-Abdel-Hamid-el-Khatib, Saudi Envoy: "We didn't protest. These reports are unsubstantiated" [Ibid.].

An investigation conducted by Pakistan led to the discovery of the source of these rumors - the English Globe news agency and its Delhi branch [NAI, L. 18].

Britain's reaction to the barely visible Soviet-Pakistani rapprochement was more painful than that of the Middle East. London feared that Pakistan might indeed withdraw from the Commonwealth of Nations and gain the support of the powerful Soviet Union. The magazine "Socialist Weekly" developed the idea of "the effect that the Pakistani Crescent and Red Star can achieve together", for example, about allowing Russia to have "a strong point in the Indian Ocean" [Ibid., L. 16, 47]. This thesis was refuted in conservative political circles, who warned Pakistan that it "will still see what the Russians are like - very strange and uncouth." Great Britain also hoped that pan-Islamism and communism were antipodes, and that "this cherished marriage" between the USSR and Pakistan, with Liaquat's invitation for collusion, would at best be very short-lived [Ibid.].

On 15 June 1949, the British High Commissioner in Delhi received a letter from the Secretary General of India for Foreign Affairs, G. S. Bajpai. "Russia," he wrote, " may seek to create a new pro-Soviet union of Muslims and Arabs in the Middle East." He was concerned about the possibility of Liaquat discussing the "Afghan question" with Stalin and the threat of a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Riaz, 1985, p. 1; Kazimi, 2003, p. 299). Bajpai may have been referring to Liaquat's statements in May 1949, made a month before the Soviet invitation: "Communism cannot have influence in Pakistan until it takes root in Afghanistan" (Kazimi, 2003, p.299). However, Bajpai's warning seriously disturbed the British.

page 63
London kept track of all the nuances of Liaquat's upcoming visit. In the diplomatic circles of the Commonwealth countries, information spread that it would be held in November and that the candidate for the ambassador of Pakistan to the USSR had finally been selected: "we have already discussed this with His Majesty." London also noticed that Pakistan did make sure that the ambassador arrived in Moscow "earlier or at the same time as the Prime Minister" [NAI, L. 40].

The British government was surprised to learn that "Russia has already delivered heavy weapons to Pakistan with a promise to send even more" [Ibid., L. 41]. There was no doubt in London that an offer of military supplies would be made to Liaquat during his visit, but the news that such supplies were already being implemented came as a shock. After repeatedly double-checking these data, the British "completely ruled out any agreements already reached between the USSR and Pakistan, and did not find any evidence of at least one case of deliveries of military materials" [Ibid.]. Nevertheless, it was clear to everyone that if the Liaquat mission in Moscow was successful, the Soviet military supplies would begin it was only a matter of time.

On October 18, the British Embassy in Moscow informed the Commonwealth countries that Liaquat would arrive "on the eve of the October Revolution celebrations and parade, which are taking place on November 6 and 7, and the Pakistani ambassador will almost certainly be in Moscow by the end of this month" [Ibid., L.42].

The UK was concerned with "saving face" and the principles of the Commonwealth. The heads of mission of the member states and their staff regularly met at the British Embassy in Moscow to discuss common issues. London intended to continue this tradition after the arrival of the Pakistani ambassador, despite its outright distrust of Pakistan's policies. Ambassador D. Kelly personally spoke with representatives of the Commonwealth, claiming that " Pakistan is in a tense relationship with the UK. He insisted that it encourage India to liberate Jammu and Kashmir, and also intervene on his side in the conflict with Afghanistan. We replied that we could not do so" [Ibid., L. 43].

In the reports to the Prime Minister K. Attlee's Commonwealth Secretary, P. Noel Baker, assured him that Liaquat's acceptance of Stalin's invitation did not mean that Pakistan was going to join the communist camp. However, Attlee was not convinced by these arguments. As a result, P. N. Baker's office began to actively contact the US Embassy in London, making it clear that the UK was waiting for the US to officially invite Liaquat to visit Washington [Riaz, 1985, p. 1; Kazimi, 2003, p.300].

WAITING FOR A SESSION

November 1949 arrived, the month of the long-planned visit of the Pakistani Prime Minister to Moscow. However, day after day passed, and nothing significant happened in this regard.

On November 15, the Indian Foreign Ministry, represented by Bajpai, made an urgent request to its representative Kripalani in Karachi: "Liaquat Ali Khan has probably postponed his visit to Moscow. We would be grateful for any reliable information about the reasons for the postponement and the date of his possible visit " [NAI, L. 44]. Kripalani replied: "The latest information received from the British Ambassador and confirmed by American sources is that the Pakistani press Department issued a release marked 'internal use only' that the visit would not take place until next spring, but the release was removed a day later without any clear explanation "[Ibid., L. 47].

Analyzing the reason for the postponement of the visit, Kripalani pointed out "the slowness with which the Soviets corresponded with Pakistan about the program and even on the issue of visas."

page 64
The fact that this was a postponement was proved by the appointment of the Pakistani ambassador to the USSR, who was to study the situation and clarify the plans for the visit upon arrival in Moscow. However, Kripalani pointedly concluded: "The winter months are not the best time to travel to this country... Everything will be postponed until spring... Until then, a lot of water will flow down the Moskva River" [Ibid.].

The situation around Liaquat's visit was becoming uncertain. Pakistani Ambassador S. Qureshi, appointed on October 30, 1949, arrived in the USSR in December. In the West, it was noted that the Soviet leadership was surprised by this unexpected turn of events, since Pakistan had long found it difficult to indicate even the name of the possible head of the mission, and the USSR had not yet named its ambassador to Karachi [New York Times, 11.02.1950]. (February 13, 1950 The Soviet government appointed Alexander Stetsenko as Ambassador to Pakistan. He arrived in Karachi on March 18 and presented his credentials to the Governor-General of Pakistan on March 22.)

On December 28, 1949, Vyshinsky received Qureshi in connection with the presentation of his credentials. The Pakistani Ambassador first noted that he was instructed to convey to the Government and people of the Soviet Union "greetings and best wishes from the Government and people of Pakistan." Qureshi then pointed out that he had arrived accompanied only by a small staff "in view of the rush associated with the upcoming arrival of the Prime Minister of Pakistan in Moscow" [AVPRF, f. 0117, op. 3, p.2, d. 2, l. 1]. The protocol was kept. The ambassador arrived in Moscow earlier than the Prime Minister. However, the question of the arrival time of Liaquat himself remained open.

WHAT HAPPENED NEXT

Further events began to snowball, with the apparent absence of any connection between them. Thus, the Soviet trade delegation, which had been in Karachi since the summer of 1949 at the invitation of the government to negotiate with Pakistani business circles, spent three months there, but the trade agreement was never signed [Ray, 1975, p. 21]. Moreover, when the Soviet guests were still in Pakistan, with the government's approval, a delegation of the Karachi Cotton Association went to the UK to conduct similar negotiations [Observer, 7.10.1949]. The trade delegation of the USSR had no choice but to return home with nothing. No steps were taken to establish a Soviet consulate in Peshawar, which was supposed to be an initial step towards bilateral cooperation (it was never opened. - L. Ch.). In the fall of 1949, Great Britain established a military base there, and American prospectors tried to find oil [Christian Science Monitor, 27.05.1948]. Finally, in December 1949, it was announced that Liaquat Ali Khan had been invited to pay an official visit to the United States on May 4-26, 1950.

The British Observer immediately responded: On the surface, President Truman's invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan seems like a natural consequence of Nehru's trip - a polite hint that the United States is equally a friend of both Pakistan and India. However, it is not difficult to catch something more in this invitation. Washington wants guarantees that none of these dominions will provide even passive support for the spread of Russian influence in Central Asia " [Observer, 12/16/1949].

How did Pakistan react? Liaquat postponed his visit to the USSR and went on a two-month tour of the United States and Canada. His visit to the United States took place from May 2 to 31, 1950, and, according to the Pakistani researcher M. R. Kazimi, served to reduce, not increase, his admiration for the West. The Soviet invitation was indeed behind the American invitation, but this was not the result of Liaquat's policy, but a consequence of the hype raised by India [Kazimi, 2003, p. 299].

page 65
During his visit to Washington, Liaquat Ali Khan met with Truman and delivered speeches before the House of Representatives and the Senate. He emphasized the geographical and strategic position of Pakistan and, counting on American support, explained the need to build up "the high combat capability of its anti-communist army", primarily in order to "ensure the impregnability of the Khyber Pass, through which the conquest of Hindustan was carried out in the past" [Dawn, 3.05.1950].

The result was President Truman's program for Pakistan, approved by Congress on June 5, 1950, which provided for the allocation of $ 34.5 million to Karachi [Kazimi, 2003, p. 299]. According to the Pakistani researcher Hafiz Malik, Liaquat offered the United States everything they wanted: an alternative to "Indian neutrality", an offer to provide their troops on the side of the United States in the event of a conflict with the USSR, and a rejection of the policy of non-alignment [Malik, 1994, p. 96].

However, during these months Liaquat repeatedly recalled the Soviet Union (Liaquat Ali Khan, 1976, p. 24). So, just before leaving for Washington, he told American journalists: "I can visit the Soviet Union and learn something useful for our people there. Russia has done a lot to spread literacy, and Russians have impressive achievements in agriculture... We can use their technologies without adopting the system as a whole" [Kazimi, 2003, p.296]. In the US, when asked about his visit to the USSR, Liaquat replied:: "No exact date was set for this. As soon as this happens, I will inform the press" [Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat, 1967, p. 374].

Apparently, Liaquat was constantly waiting for a gesture from the USSR. His press conference on his return to his homeland, held on August 23, 1950, showed that he did not stop thinking about the Soviet Union and, undoubtedly, held him responsible for the disrupted visit. The Prime Minister of Pakistan himself made no attempt to resume preparations for a visit to the USSR.

Why didn't Liaquat visit the USSR? Russian researchers have identified the reason as follows:" Under pressure from the British and Americans, Liaquat soon changed his mind, and his visit to Moscow did not take place " [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, pp. 98-99].

Pakistani authors put forward a number of their own versions. One of them: the invitation of the USSR was allegedly canceled due to the intervention of India. When Liaquat Ali Khan was on a visit to the United States, J. Nehru even asked the American authorities for information about his actions, and the State Department replied that it had not received any complaints or comments from the Pakistani government during Nehru's visit to the United States [Kazimi, 2003, p. 297]. Pakistanis believe it is quite possible that Nehru also expressed dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union, but, unlike the United States, the USSR could have listened to his words. Another Pakistani version boils down to the fact that Moscow abandoned the idea of accepting Liaquat, because they learned about the plans of the Communist Party of Pakistan to carry out a coup against him [Ibid.].

Walid Iqbal, grandson of the Pakistani poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, calls Liaquat's failed visit "a public insult to the Soviet Union" (Iqbal, 2004, p.89). He sees the reason as the fact that the situation was used by Pakistan "as a lever of pressure on the American administration of President Truman" and allowed Liaquat to "literally wrest from it an invitation to pay an official visit to the United States" by December 1949 [ibid.].

Shahid Amin, who does not identify Liaquat's goals with the reasons for his failed tour to the USSR, calls the version that the root of evil lies in the Pakistani Prime Minister's agreement to accept the US invitation and in "betraying the agreements with Stalin" a "myth". He is sure that "Liaquat Ali Khan is not personally responsible for the disruption of the visit to Moscow," and blames the USSR exclusively for this. Amin writes: "For reasons that are up to

page 66
They still remain shrouded in secrecy, and the Soviets were unable to agree on a mutually acceptable date for the visit. Liaquat has repeatedly stressed that he did not give up the idea of going to Moscow. Even while on a visit to the United States, he stated that he would visit the USSR as soon as the issue of timing was resolved. However, no progress was made, and in 1951 he tragically died" [Amin, 2000, p. 41-42].

Indian researchers are also looking for reasons, trying to comprehensively address the problem. In their opinion, the visit did not take place because of Pakistan's desire to become a leader of pan-Islamic forces, and this was a stumbling block for the development of relations with the USSR [Kaushik, 1971, p.38]. Pakistan's growing pro-Western orientation also increased Soviet suspicion. American visits to Pakistan, including in its northern regions adjacent to the border with the Soviet Union, could not but irritate the Kremlin.

The common approach of the authors of various national schools is the mention of Pakistan's attitude to the Korean War (1950-1953), which prevented the warming of relations with the USSR. For closer cooperation with the United States on this issue, the White House was ready not only to provide economic and military assistance to Pakistan, but also to actively support it in the Kashmir issue. Liaquat Ali Khan publicly expressed support for the UN position on this war and called North Korea's actions an act of aggression [Kaushik, 1971, p. 38-39; Kazimi, 2003, p. 296]. He offered the UN 5 thousand tons of wheat for the needs of the organization in South Korea. By the way, Novoe Vremya described this as Liaquat's "slavish zeal" [Novoe Vremya, 12.07.1950, No. 28, p. 19-20].

As for the consequences of Liaquat's failed visit to the USSR, in my opinion, they cannot be assessed unambiguously. On the one hand, Shahid Amin (formerly a diplomat of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, ambassador to the USSR, Libya, Saudi Arabia, France, and Nigeria) seems to have a convincing vision of them. He claims that in 1949-1953 there were no sudden aggravations in the bilateral relations between Moscow and Karachi. The USSR-and this was especially important for Pakistan-did not veto UN Security Council resolutions on the Kashmir issue. The states exchanged ambassadors. Until 1951-1952 and later, Pakistan had a favorable trade balance with Russia. Amin is also right when he states: "The relationship deteriorated not because of the failed visit in 1949, but somewhere in 1954, after Pakistan joined the pro-American military blocs" [Amin, 2000, p. 42]. Indeed, invitations are often promising, but not always justified. But a visit that failed to take place in response to an invitation rarely caused a long-term cooling of interstate relations.

On the other hand, it is impossible not to notice that Liaquat, willingly or unwittingly, with the help of a Soviet invitation, whetted the West's interest in Pakistan and his own person, and then, having appreciated the more tempting prospects of American assistance, decided to visit Washington instead of Moscow. The American position on the communist threat and on the Kashmir issue proved more attractive than the Soviet one. The main consequence of the failed visit to the USSR was the impetus for the development of US-Pakistani economic, political and military cooperation, which marked a turn in the development of the political history of Hindustan. Pakistan began to turn into a zone of influence of the United States.

It makes no sense to "put on a good face when playing a bad game" and ignore the fact that the choice that Liaquat was pushed to make partly by the Soviet Union's somewhat justified diplomatic bureaucracy destroyed the Kremlin's hopes for control in the Muslim world, in particular in Jammu and Kashmir. The Americans were more successful in bringing Pakistan to their side and, despite Moscow's best efforts, gained military bases in Northern Kashmir aimed at the USSR.

page 67
But that's not all. In the changed circumstances, Stalin decided to abandon the passive position on the Kashmir issue. The change in Soviet behavior at the UN was obvious and occurred solely in the interests of the Soviet Union, but it led to a new round of events. Politically, the most important of these was the correspondence between Nehru and Stalin on the Korean War. The Indian Prime Minister, who initially sided with the United States, changed his mind and called for the unification of Korea. Stalin truly "honored" Nehru by sharing his "point of view and peaceful intentions." Another manifestation of Soviet interest in India was Stalin's conversations with Indian diplomats, with Ambassador Radhakrishnan. He spoke respectfully of India's efforts to maintain peace, despite the differences in Moscow's and New Delhi's approaches to many international issues. From 1950 until his death, Stalin held only five meetings with foreign diplomats, including three with Indian ones [USSR and India, 1985; Yurlov and Yurlova, 2010, p. 615-616; Kaushik, 1974, p. 44-45]. This could not but mean a gesture of friendship to India. The first Indian ambassador, Lakshmi Pandit, never saw Stalin. However, after her departure, the ice broke in Indo-Soviet bilateral relations. Ahead of Jawaharlal Nehru's fruitful visit to the Soviet Union in 1955, the struggle for South Asia continued.

list of literature

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AWPRF).

Bslokrsnitsky V. Ya., Moskalenko V. N. Istoriya Pakistanii [History of Pakistan]. XX century. Moscow, 2008.

Pakistan, the countries of South Asia and the Middle East: history and Modernity. Collection of articles in memory of Yu. V. Gankovsky / Bslokrsnitsky, S. N. Kamenev, and V. N. Moskalenko, Moscow, 2004.

New time.

USSR and India / Edited by P. V. Kutsobin, Moscow, 1985.

USSR and Pakistan / Ed. by I. V. Khalsvinsky, Moscow, 1984.

Chsrssnsva L. A. Rainbow over the Red Fort: The Partition of Colonial India in 1947, Moscow, 2012.

Shaumyan T. L. The Kashmir dispute: the origins of the conflict // India. Achievements and Problems, Moscow, 2002.
Yurlov F. N., Yurlova E. S. Istoriya Indii [History of India]. XX century. Moscow, 2010.

America-Pakistan Relations: Documents / Ed. by K. Arif. 2 vols. Vol. I. Lahore, 1984.

Amin S.M. Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal. Oxford, 2000.

Blitz (Delhi).

Christian Science Monitor.

Dawn (Karachi).

Dixit J.N. India 'a Foreign Policy 1947-2003. New Delhi, 2003.

Gupta S.K. Stalin's Policy Towards India 1946-1953. New Delhi, 1988.

Foreign Relations of the United States: 1947: The British Commonwealth: Europe. Vol. III. Washington, 1947.

Kaushik D. Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan. Delhi, 1971.

Kazimi M.R. Liaquat Ali Khan: His Life and Work. Karachi, 2003.

Kux D. Disenchanted Allies: The United States and Pakistan 1945-2000. Karachi, 2001.

Liaquat Ali Khan. Pakistan, the Heart of Asia. Karachi, 1976.

Malik H. Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post-war Dynamics: 1947-1992. Handimills, 1994.

The National Archives of India (NAI). Government of India. Europe II. Branch, File No. 1 (66), Eur. II/1949. Ministry of External Affairs.

New York Times.

Observer. L.

Pakistan News. Karachi.

Rafiquc Afzal M. Pakistan: History and Politics 1947-1951. Karachi, 2001.

Ray A.K. Domestic Compulsions and Foreign Policy: Pakistan and Indo-Soviet Relations 1947-1958. New Delhi, 1975.

Riaz M. Who Secured to US Invitation // Dawn. 1985, 1 February.

Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat. Liaquat Ali Khan / Ed. by M. Rafiquc Afzal. Lahore, 1967.

Sumangal P. A Study of India's Bilateral Relations with USSR and Its Impact on Indo-US Relations during Nehru's Premiership. Mccrut, 2007.

U.S. South Asia Relations / Ed. by R.K. Jain. Vol. II (Pakistan). N.Y., 1983.

page 68

Permanent link to this publication: