A selection of articles on the half-century history, current stage and prospects of regionalism in Southeast Asia (SE), published in this issue of "International Processes", was prepared by a group of Russian experts working at the ASEAN Center at MGIMO of the Russian Foreign Ministry or working closely with it. Since its official opening in June 2010, the Center has not only disseminated information about various aspects of cooperation between Russia and ASEAN, but has also been an active participant in them. Together with its ASEAN partners, it repeatedly initiates projects aimed at promoting dialogue on political and security issues, as well as developing trade, economic and humanitarian ties. Every step along this path - whether it is a joint scientific and practical conference, a presentation of a Russian company successfully operating in one of the Association's member countries, or the holding of the Russia-ASEAN Youth Forum-leads to the expansion of the Center's circle of friends both in our country and abroad. There is also a deeper understanding of how ASEAN really functions, and what motivations it is guided by when verifying its course towards partnership with Russia.

As fate would have it, the 50th anniversary of the Association came at a turning point in international relations, when both the success of ASEAN and the new challenges it faces are clearly visible, as they say, in full growth. Virtually all of the articles in the" Asean selection " offered to the readers of the magazine feature both of these topics in varying proportions. As for this article, both are equally central to it.

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On August 8, 2017, it was exactly 50 years since the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia signed the declaration on the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Bangkok. In negotiating the establishment of ASEAN, its founding fathers sought to silence mutual contradictions and disputes (including territorial ones) in order to achieve the most important common goal - to repel the "communist threat", both internal and external, especially from neighboring areas where the endless Indochina war was going on, and "red China". At that time, it was hard to imagine that at the beginning of the XXI century, the People's Republic of China would top the list of key trade and investment partners of the Association, and the Socialist Republic of China would become part of ASEAN itself.-

To contact the author / Corresponding author: Email: victor.sumsky@gmail.com

At the regional and global levels, ASEAN will become a model for regional cooperation among developing countries. While the achievements of ASEAN and its members are undeniable, success has not been easy for them. Well-coordinated cooperation was hindered either by internal political complications in individual countries, or by systemic failures of a transnational nature in several of them at once. Coordinated pressure from outside also had to be resisted. The more obvious it is that the ASEAN phenomenon is not the fruit of a happy combination of circumstances, but the result of meaningful, consistent efforts, and the higher the assessment of what has been achieved. This article analyzes the success achieved by the Association in overcoming intra-regional divisions, the challenges it faces at the present stage, and the areas of overlapping strategic interests of Russia and ASEAN. It is noted that cooperation in these areas could help partners find a joint response to numerous global and regional challenges.

Keywords:

ASEAN; Russia-ASEAN Dialogue Partnership; Asia-Pacific Region; the ASEAN Way.

On August 8, 2017, it was exactly fifty years since four Foreign Ministers-Adam Malik (Indonesia), Sinnatambi Rajaratnam (Singapore), Tanat Koman (Thailand), Narciso Ramos (Philippines) and Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak-signed the Declaration on the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Bangkok.East Asia (ASEAN).

It is unlikely that any of them could have imagined at that time how the development of the Association would go and what it would come to after half a century. When the founding fathers negotiated the establishment of ASEAN, they were most concerned with silencing mutual contradictions and disputes (including territorial ones) in order to achieve the most important common goal - to repel the communist threat, which had both internal and external origins. It came both from the adjacent areas, where the endless Indochina war was going on, and from "red China", in which the rhetoric of the "cultural revolution"thundered. Who would have imagined that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the People's Republic of China would top the list of trade and investment partners of the Association, and the latter-at the end of the twentieth century-would open its arms to a united, socialist Vietnam, increase the number of its members to ten and become a model of regional cooperation of developing countries?

While the achievements of ASEAN and its member countries are undeniable, their success has not been easy. Well-coordinated cooperation was hindered either by internal political complications in individual states, or by systemic failures of a transnational nature in several of them at once (as in the case of the Asian financial crisis of the late XX - early XXI century). It was also necessary to resist concerted pressure from outside (in particular, when the US and the EU did not want to put up with the admission of Myanmar to the Association, in which the military regime remained). The ASEAN phenomenon is not the fruit of a happy combination of circumstances, but the result of meaningful, consistent efforts, and the higher the assessment of what has been achieved.

1

At the time of the creation of ASEAN, each of the five countries had more than enough unresolved problems in the field of national-state construction (or, in other words, national-state integration). As for regional integration (which involves the creation of supranational institutions), it seemed, at best, to be a matter of the distant future. By joining forces, the neighbors in Southeast Asia (SE) sought to compensate for each other's weaknesses, including the lack of managerial experience, which is natural in the conditions of recently declared independence. In their circle, they sought to gain the sense of security and historical perspective that they lacked at the height of the cold War.

The benevolence of the West, which is vitally interested, worked to achieve their goals.-

There is no need for an inter-state union to emerge in the Asian south-east, where the participants made a choice in favor of capitalism and countering the "red expansion". As a result, from the very beginning, ASEAN's activities assumed more or less simultaneous strengthening of states, their cooperation at the regional level, and their inclusion in the system of global relations - with the priority given to national-state integration.

Already at the early stages of the Association's existence, its members "fenced off" a sub-regional space within Southeast Asia, separated from the problem zone of Indochina. Together, it was possible to ensure such a measure of political control and stability, such a quality of state regulation of economic life, which, together with a steady influx of foreign investment, significantly accelerated socio-economic modernization. Following Singapore, which was ranked among the newly industrialized countries earlier than other ASEAN members, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia were awarded this honor (and even before the Asian crisis of 1997-1998). Each of them (and indeed the Philippines) has experienced periods when the economy grew at a rate exceeding 8% per year. This success story made an impression on the ruling circles of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, and encouraged them to pursue their own market reforms, engage in political dialogue with ASEAN in the interests of an early resolution of the conflict in Indochina, and, by and large, join the Association.

2

In the early 1990s, the prevailing view was that a real rapprochement between the former adversaries would require a historical era. In fact, everything turned out differently: ASEAN as an association of ten Southeast Asian countries became a reality even before the beginning of the XXI century.

In parallel, the EU's expansion took place, and the differences between this process and that of ASEAN are very instructive. Whereas in the first case, applicants for membership representing post-communist Eastern Europe were presented with long lists of requirements that they had to fulfill in order to get an entrance ticket to the integration association, the founders of the Association showed incomparably greater loyalty to Indochina candidates. When Vietnam was admitted to ASEAN in 1995, no one insisted that it abandon its ideology and dismantle the system of power built around the Communist Party. We were satisfied with the fact that market relations were being revived in it, and within the framework of the" renewal course " (doi moi) The transformation of the Vietnamese economy has already begun. Today, after this course allowed Vietnam to enter the category of middle-level countries and turned it into one of the reliable pillars of ASEAN, at a time when similar processes are gaining momentum in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, it is impossible not to pay tribute to the founders of the Association (as well as Brunei, which joined the "five" back in 1984) for their generosity.

A wise, respectful approach to recent opponents who were becoming members of the ASEAN family was natural for them. In the Association itself, the search for a common view on regional and global problems has always been based on the principles of non-interference in each other's internal affairs, unconditional respect for national sovereignty, and consensus in decision-making. Soft manner of negotiation communication; patient willingness to "go quieter in order to go further"; refusal of arrogant moralizing, from imposing one's point of view on anyone; search for such a pace of movement towards the goal that would be optimal for all participants in the process; care about saving not only one's own, but also someone else's "persons" - all these are elements of political and diplomatic practice, for many years.-

noi as the "ASEAN Way". By the standards of the four Indochina states that have endured so much adversity in the era of bipolar confrontation and now need, like few others, a comfortable niche in the foreign policy arena, the attractiveness of ASEAN was determined not only by the economic success of its participants, but also by the norms of communication that developed between them.

3

At the end of the 20th century, the processes of ASEAN expansion, diversification of its external relations and strengthening of its moral and political prestige at the level of the entire Asia-Pacific region (APR) overlapped with each other.

Back in the 1970s, guided by both geopolitical and geo-economic considerations, the Association began to form dialogue partnerships with non-regional (in relation to Southeast Asia) powers. If during the Cold War it was the United States, Japan and other representatives of the Western bloc, then in the 1990s the Russian Federation, China and India joined their circle.

With the establishment and institutionalization of the communication system, the ground was being prepared for consolidating the principle of ASEAN Centrality in multilateral initiatives aimed at deepening economic cooperation and maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. In accordance with it, the Association, which did not threaten anyone and did not have the power to force anyone to do anything, received the right to determine the agenda and coordinate the activities of the relevant institutions. Recognition of the central role of ASEAN allowed, in particular, to convene the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, which has been functioning for more than a quarter of a century. Later, the same principle formed the basis for the work of the ASEAN Regional Security Forum (ARF, 1994), the East Asia Summits (EAC, 2005), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers ' Meeting with Colleagues from 8 Partner Countries (SMOA+, 2010). A significant part of the expert community regarded the creation of these three multilateral dialogue platforms as a sign of movement towards the new security architecture that could be formed in the Asia-Pacific region in the foreseeable future.

According to the plan of ASEAN, the economic foundation of this system was to be formed by another "Asean-centric" structure - the Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership (RCEP). According to the project, announced in 2012, the Association was to link its own free trade area (AFTA) with five other similar agreements that it either already created or agreed to create with China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, as well as Australia and New Zealand (with the last two ASEAN signed a general agreement). It was expected that this process would be completed by the end of 2015, but until now, the question of the timing of the launch of the RCEP remains open.

The organization has come to its fiftieth anniversary with another landmark achievement-the official creation of the triune ASEAN Community, with specialized divisions focused on cooperation in the fields of politics and security, economy, and socio-cultural development. From now on, investment and production activities, the supply of goods and services, and the movement of labor are regulated within the Association through uniform rules.

Meanwhile, the demographic and economic potential of the ASEAN member States continues to grow. Their total population has significantly exceeded 600 million people, and their combined GDP is approaching $ 3 trillion in the second half of this decade. If economic statistics considered the Association as a single entity, it would have the sixth indicator in the world. ASEAN's contribution to maintaining the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region-as well as to the multilateral dialogue on

security concerns in this part of the world are unmistakable. Given the specifics of the Asia-Pacific region as a region with a pronounced global dimension, it is legitimate to consider ASEAN not only as a regional, but also as a global player - and, therefore, as a contender for an independent role in the emerging multipolar world.

At the same time, there are signs that the Association and its members are facing unexpected and increasingly alarming challenges at the turn of the half-century.

4

If we compare the situation developing in the second half of the 2010s in the Asia-Pacific region with the events and processes unfolding at the same time in the Middle East or North Africa, the situation in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole looks much better. Nevertheless, there are reasons for concern, and they have been multiplying over the past few years. When discussing the nature and direction of change, experts and diplomats often use the metaphor of the " Asian paradox." It characterizes the situation when, while maintaining a favorable economic environment in the Asia-Pacific region and in the ASEAN area in particular (the GDP growth rates of Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos fluctuated in the middle of the current decade in the range from 5 to 8% or even higher), there are signs of a systemic increase in political tension in the region. It is also noticeable in the internal affairs of a number of countries, and not the most backward ones, as well as in the bilateral relations between them, in the framework of regional subsystems, and, finally, at the level of the entire Asia-Pacific space.

In the sphere of interstate relations, the steadily escalating contradictions between the United States and China and the landslide degradation of Russian-American cooperation hurt the eye. In the North Asian triangle of Japan-China-South Korea, everyone's unyielding polemics - both on current and historical issues-break out at the slightest provocation. The enmity between the two Koreas continues unabated. Mutual distrust between Beijing and Delhi is growing stronger rather than waning. In the Greater Mekong basin, several Southeast Asian countries seem to want to, but all cannot agree among themselves and with China on the acceptable (from the point of view of ecology) scale and forms of exploitation of water resources. The multilateral dispute over the state ownership of island territories in the South China Sea, which until the early 1990s was interesting only to specialists, is turning-to a large extent through Washington's efforts-into a subject of universal concern and a potential detonator of a dangerous conflict. In addition, there is a rise in religious radicalism in the countries of traditional Islam and, consequently, an increase in cross - border terrorist threats.

What does all this mean? First of all, the fact that the political climate of the Asia-Pacific region is changing not for the better, blurring the prospect of further progressive movement along the path of economic development, increasing trade exchanges, and searching for optimal directions and forms of regional economic integration. It is characteristic that neither the repeatedly voiced intentions to restart APEC, nor attempts to revive integration processes through the launch of alternative initiatives such as the RCEP and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (which was so enthusiastically promoted by the United States during the presidency of Barack Obama and so strongly rejected by the administration of Donald Trump) have yet yielded tangible results.

Recalling the indissoluble ties between politics and the economy in the Asia-Pacific region, these contradictions (coupled with the UK's exit from the EU and other acute contradictions in the European integration association) point to the crisis of regionalism as a global trend. They are also becoming manifestations of the crisis of the neoliberal model of globalization, which is currently developing in the United States.-

It is a system that the United States has been imposing on the world since the end of the 20th century, and which gives rise to many splits between ethnic groups and confessions, states and civilizations. Retribution for this course is its discouraging consequences for the United States itself: judging by the results of the 2016 presidential election, and then by the fierce internal political confrontation of the first half of 2017, it has shaken the foundations of their own power. And at the very moment when China, despite American attempts to quarrel with the rest of Asia, continues to strengthen its competitive position in the global economy; when Russia, instead of "repenting of its sins publicly", is looking for and finding asymmetric responses to the sanctions imposed on it by the United States and the EU; when transatlantic solidarity is weakening when the phase of evolutionary progress towards a multipolar world is replaced by a stage of open struggle between its opponents and supporters.

For ASEAN and its member countries, this is a moment of truth, the meaning and requirements of which are not yet fully understood by everyone. This is a moment of farewell to the illusions that with the end of the Soviet-American confrontation, the era that threatened humanity with great wars has also sunk into oblivion; that the guarantee of eternal peace is universal economic interdependence, which globalization will create and in which you can only fight to your own detriment. This is a moment when American-style globalization is less and less like a process that you can and should fit in with the maximum benefit for yourself. This is a moment when the intensity of the US-China rivalry raises doubts about the possibility of regional-wide economic integration and an inclusive security system worthy of the name in the Asia-Pacific region in the foreseeable future. If the future of both is problematic, then where will the central role of ASEAN be realized, and how can it be effectively maintained? And is there a future for the "ASEAN way" as a line of foreign policy behavior if the only superpower continues to play without rules both in Asia and on the global field?

* * *

Looking at the questions raised from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kazan, Vladivostok, or any other "observation post" on Russian territory, it is difficult not to notice that today both ASEAN and Russia face truly existential challenges. What, then, should be the main content of Moscow's partnership with ASEAN? Apparently, planning, coordination and joint implementation of such programs and projects, the totality of which would meet the fundamental interests of each of the partners and consolidate their positions as subjects of history.

Do they have the political will necessary to bring relations to the appropriate level? It seems that if it had not been there, it is unlikely that the leaders of the Association countries would have come to the May 2016 summit in Sochi, dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the Russian-ASEAN dialogue, demonstrating that they do not intend to follow the West's line of strangling with sanctions.

Do Russia and ASEAN share similar strategic goals? I think so, even if they don't say so directly yet. It is enough that in fact each of the partners is focused on an independent role in the emerging polycentric world. Each of them sees the other as a candidate worthy of such a role and deserving of support in their aspirations. ASEAN will only lose if Moscow, which is now at the forefront of the struggle for a polycentric world, breaks down in this struggle. Russia, which is represented at multilateral forums in the Asia-Pacific region largely due to its partnership with the Association, is by no means interested in the organization's central role in regional processes disappearing.

Can Russia and the ASEAN countries join forces with other supporters of a polycentric world to achieve a model of globalization that is better than the neoliberal one? In any case, the idea of economic dialogue, and then practical cooperation in the Eurasian Economic Union - Shanghai Cooperation Organization - ASEAN format, which was actively discussed at the Sochi summit, creates prerequisites for productive search in this direction. As for providing political conditions for the implementation of such a large-scale project, Russia, which has a unique experience in the fight against terrorism and a military-industrial complex, whose production and technological capabilities are well known, is able to provide versatile and effective support to its integration partners in Greater Eurasia - including the ASEAN countries.

RECORD AND CHALLENGES OF REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

VICTOR SUMSKY

ASEAN Centre at MGIMO University, Moscow, 119454, Russian Federation

Abstract

On August, 8^th, 2017 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) turned 50. Five decades ago on that day the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines and the Vice-Premier of Malaysia signed the Bangkok Declaration thus establishing ASEAN. In so doing, the Association's founding fathers were longing to mitigate mutual contradictions and conflicts (including territorial ones) for the sake of one common goal - repelling the ‘communist threat' emanating from within the then ASEAN member states as well as from neighbouring Indochina and China. It was hard to imagine at that time that in the early 21^st century the People's Republic of China would head the list of key trade and investment partners of ASEAN; that ASEAN would embrace Vietnam as its member and that the Association itself would turn to be a model of regional cooperation for developing countries. ASEAN's achievements are evident, though they did not come easily. Internal problems in certain Member States and transnational challenges complicated intra-ASEAN interaction. ASEAN countries had to resist external pressure, too. That only emphasizes the fact that the ASEAN phenomenon is not the result of a happy coincidence. Rather, ASEAN success stems from well-thought-out and coherent efforts. This article, thus, analyses the Association's achievements in overcoming intra-regional cleavages, then it talks about challenges ASEAN is facing today and ends up with a brief assessment of strategic goals common to both ASEAN and Russia. The article argues that cooperation in achieving these goals could help the dialogue partners to find a common response to numerous global and regional challenges.

Keywords:

ASEAN; ASEAN-Russia; dialogue partnership; Asia-Pacific; ASEAN Way.

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