There is not a single state formed on the ruins of the USSR that has not declared its desire to create a modern open society and a corresponding democratic secular state of the Western type. Nevertheless, almost all of them have established different versions of the" authoritarian " political model based on the regime of personal power of political leaders (presidents). This also applies to the republics of post-communist Central Asia, whose presidents, personifying the ideology of independence, "appropriated functions that were typical of the general secretaries of the Communist Party during the Soviet era " 1

This should also be applied, with all reservations, to modern Kyrgyzstan, which, with its multiparty system, freedom of the press, and other attributes of liberalism, really looks like an " island of democracy "in post-Soviet Central Asia. 2 At the same time, the monopolization of political power in the hands of the inner circle of Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, the closure of a number of opposition newspapers, the undemocratic mechanism for changing the current constitutional norms, and the massive scale of corruption, especially during the 1995 and 1999 election campaigns3, show that in this sense the situation in Kyrgyzstan is not much different from that in most former Soviet republics.

What is the basis of the "authoritarian transformation" of the political regime in Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian states? Are we simply witnessing a painful "transition" from the Soviet communist to the Western liberal model? Or is it a question of "rejection" by the local traditional cultural environment of liberal democratic institutions that do not correspond to it? Finally, are we dealing with one or another variant of the synthesis of local traditional (or rather non-traditional) and imported socio-political institutions? Any of these approaches requires considering the essence of "Kyrgyz" (as well as Central Asian authoritarianism in general) and the local variant of pluralism from the point of view of both post-Soviet and civilizational perspectives.

ETHNO-SOCIAL DIMENSION OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN MODERN KYRGYZSTAN

At first glance, the content of political processes in modern Kyrgyzstan lies in the relationships between the main factions of the ruling stratum: the old party - state nomenclature and the new ("liberal - democratic") elite, which moved into the political arena on the rise of Gorbachev's reforms. President of Kyrgyzstan A. Akayev views the nature of political conflicts in the country from this angle. As he stated in one of his speeches, " in you-

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We did not make a mistake in working out the course of reforms. But they are stalling because of the opposition of corrupt officials and unwillingness to work. " 4

However, the contradictions between the "old" and "new" political elites form only the external, visible layer of modern Kyrgyz politics. The real mechanism of political conflicts in the country is supplemented by a complex system of traditional and non-traditional relations, which includes several levels. At the national level, it is represented by a conflict with deep historical roots between the "aristocratic" North Kyrgyz and" less aristocratic " South Kyrgyz subethnic communities.

The political confrontation between these communities also has a socio-structural aspect. While the "northerners" have a strong tribal organization (which included the families of the aristocracy and their kul slaves), the tribal organization of the southerners is rather "loose", and their main social institution was and remains strong family-clan groups. In Soviet times, it was the "proletarian south" as opposed to the "feudal - aristocratic north" that was the source of recruitment for the Soviet party and state nomenclature.

In the Soviet and post-Soviet era, the contradictions between the" northern "and" southern "elites received another" modern " dimension: the former were more urbanized, Russified and secularized. The latter represented mainly agricultural regions that were historically under the sphere of influence of Uzbekistan, where Islamic traditions had a stronger position .5

As an additional element, this system also includes contradictions between the "titular" and "peripheral" ethnic components. First of all, we are talking about Slavic and Uzbek ethnic groups. The contradictions between Kyrgyz and Slavs are most noticeable in the almost completely secularized cities of the north of the country; between Kyrgyz and Slavs-in the agrarian regions of the south. (The first notable factor in the clash between "indigenous" and "outsiders" in the post-Soviet era was the draft Land Law of 1992, which declared the entire land fund of the republic the property of the Kyrgyz people. 6)

The regional level of traditional Kyrgyz politics is represented by subethnoregional relationships within the Kyrgyz ethnic group, which go back to the traditional contradictions between the main territorial and tribal communities (about 80 in total). Finally, the "grassroots level" of political conflicts (mainly at the level of rural villages and provincial cities) is expressed in the rivalry of the leadership of family and clan groups.

The combination of all these traditional, non-traditional and "modern" trends in Kyrgyz politics has manifested itself in the formation of regional tribalist groupings of political elites. The origin of the latter is associated with specific historical regions of the country - Issyk-Kul, Chui, Talas, Ferghana, Naryn, etc.

The conflict between the "old communist nomenclature" and the "new democratic elite"also fits very organically into this ethno-political structure. The "Democrats" mostly became partners of the modernized, urbanized and Russified elite of the northern clans.

The most striking example is A. Akayev, who belongs to the largest and most powerful northern Sary-Bagysh tribe, and whose promotion to power was also supported by the elite of the Talassans - the most "aristocratic" of the regional tribal communities of Kyrgyzstan. (A. Akayev is related to the latter through his wife Mariam, who belongs to the Jegetin clan, the traditional rulers of the Talas Valley from the Kushu tribe .7 The "Northerners" also used the" liberal - democratic " movement of 1989-1991 to push Lida out of power.-

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the moat of "southerners", who in Soviet times occupied a dominant position in the central party and state apparatus. As Dooronbek Sadyr-baev, formerly a leading Kyrgyz cinematographer and now a member of parliament, noted ," today's democrats are yesterday's communists, who cleverly used the change in government to dress up in the garb of democracy and enrich themselves in the process. " 8

In turn, the" southern elites", taking on the role of protecting the ethnic interests of the Kyrgyz, in the new Constitution in 1993, " secured a provision that disqualified presidential candidates who did not speak the Kyrgyz language. This measure was directed not against Russians and Uzbeks, but against the Russified [northern] Kyrgyz. " 9

The massive support that the former and current communist leader Masaliyev and his party received in the 1995 elections in his native south10 was thus the result of a combination of factors. Obviously, class motives (protecting the "common man" who suffered from the reforms is a problem that is more acute in the pauperized and removed from power south than in the more prosperous north of the country) are intertwined with ethno - social ones. At the same time, the slogan of the Kyrgyz communists, who demanded to stop the privatization of land and industry, meant protecting the interests of ethnic Kyrgyz, who in the new conditions are obviously losing out in competition with the Uzbeks in agriculture and with the Slavs in industry .11

Examples of such socio-political transformations took place already at the dawn of Kyrgyz independence. This includes the attempt made in the spring of 1989 by Kyrgyz youth, most of them recent migrants to the capital of the republic (then called Frunze), to solve their housing problem through land grabbing and illegal construction. Already in the process of development, this movement, not without the influence of the then communist authorities, acquired an anti-Russian orientation .12 Another example was the bloody Kyrgyz-Uzbek clashes that broke out over the Osh issue in June 199013 .

Both of these initially socio-class movements, largely due to the efforts of local political elites, moved to the ethno-social plane, taking the traditional form of "agrarian-marginal populism"for the East. Thus, there is a manifestation of ethno-cultural interests in the social-class framework and vice versa, which often forms the real content of the political process both in Kyrgyzstan and in most countries of Asia and Africa.

The reasons for the victory of the " democrat "(but most importantly, the nominee of the north) A. Akayev in the 1995 presidential election over the" communist " - southerner A. Masaliyev should also be sought in the context of the same, albeit somewhat modified, non-traditional political structure of the country. Much evidence of this could also be seen in the presidential election campaign of 2000, when the confrontation between northern and southern elites, according to observers, reflected social, economic and cultural differences in regional interests, which often became "the subject of political bargaining during decision-making at the state level" 14 .

This makes the essence of the coup that took place in the republic in the early 1990s and is usually referred to as the "transition from a communist to a liberal-democratic regime"more obvious. In practice, this coup was not so much a reflection of the struggle of the "liberals" with the "communist nomenclature", but rather a redistribution of power between sub-ethnic elites and regional political centers.

As a result, having established themselves at the levers of power after the suppression of the August coup, Akayev and his group of "liberals" took steps that testified to

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about their awareness of the role of the traditional political structure, social realities and the rules of the traditional political game adopted in Kyrgyz society. The legitimization of these rules was an integral part of the process of official legalization of traditional political norms, relations and institutions that never ceased to be legitimate at the level of "real" Kyrgyz politics, which began after Kyrgyzstan declared independence.

For example, Akayev's proposal to give official status (and pay salaries from the state treasury) to aksakals - traditional elders of villages-is significant .15 In addition, in accordance with Article 85 of the current Constitution, local communities have the right to establish so-called aksakal courts, which can make decisions on local issues. The degree of influence of this institution is evidenced at least by this fact. Some aksakal courts made decisions on the death penalty, and these decisions were implemented immediately. Although international and local human rights organizations have harshly criticized the Kyrgyz leadership for this, Akayev emphasized "the important role of aksakal courts in the country's judicial system" and called for expanding their activities not only in resolving disputes, but also in strengthening public order and the state system16 .

Other external manifestations of the process of legalizing traditional norms were the redistribution of power at various levels, in accordance with the established hierarchy of tribes and family-clan groups. In particular, representatives of the old feudal - aristocratic "Manap" families, including the President of Kyrgyzstan, are once again beginning to play an increasing role in modern Kyrgyz politics .17 It should also be noted that the seemingly symbolic title of "Supreme Khan of the Kyrgyz" given to A. Akayev in 1991 played an important role in stabilizing his power during the political crisis that followed the August putsch in Moscow .18

At the mass level, this process was accompanied by the actual legalization of the use of various factions of political elites in their struggle for power and their own system of (sub)ethnic loyalty and regional-tribal solidarity. Patronage-client relations, which ensure effective communication between "elites" and "masses" and are embedded in the current model of receiving and distributing public resources, have become the main tool for political mobilization of this loyalty.

In practice, the norms of tribal and ethnic solidarity that underlie these social relations require social "grassroots" not to fight "their ethnic superiors", but, on the contrary, to maximize the support of their tribal elite in its struggle with foreign tribal leaders.

The logic of political behavior of the "lower classes" dictated by non-traditional social norms is as follows: the higher the "political loot" (power and resources) won by the "elite", the greater their share (in the form of capital investments, subsidies, jobs, infrastructure facilities, etc.) will be transferred to the lower levels of the client-tribalist infrastructure. In other words, the socio-class conflict naturally acquires a pronounced ethno-social dimension and is transferred to the sphere of regional, ethno-confessional and ethno-communalist contradictions.

The 1995 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan provided a good illustration of this mechanism. Thus, the head of one of the presidential administration departments, Tolubek Omuraliyev, with the help of elders, received almost universal support of his native Tynymseit tribe in the fight for a deputy mandate from one of the districts of Naryn region. According to the Kyrgyz press, immediately after the first-

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Tynymseit elders gathered in order to develop a strategy for the second round of elections, and then eliminate the threat to Omuraliyev from his opponent (the latter had an equally massive support from the rival Sary-Bagysh tribe) .19 The effectiveness of the regional-tribalist mechanism of political mobilization was also evident during the 2000 parliamentary elections. Thus, in Alai electoral district No. 29, as the Kyrgyz newspaper "Kyrgyz Rukhu" wrote, voting took place strictly in accordance with the clan affiliation of candidates.

A similar situation was observed in the Kara Buura district of the Talas region. Opposition leader Felix Kulov, who had a solid lead in the first round (and was defeated in the second, many believe, due to appalling electoral irregularities and pressure from the central government), led many of his supporters to picket the local administration building in Kara Buura on the very day the election results were announced to challenge the result of the vote 20 . At the same time, residents of the neighboring districts of Bakay-Ata and Manas-Ata (inhabited by tribes opposed to the Kulov tribe) held rallies in support of the official results of the parliamentary elections .21

These and other facts confirm the decisive role of regional and tribal institutions in the political process in independent Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, it should be noted that unlike most other "pluralistic regimes" in Asia and Africa, in which such institutions exist within the framework of political parties22 , the parties of Kyrgyzstan are clearly on the periphery of the real political life of the country.

Most Kyrgyz political parties, which largely emerged from the opposition "democratic" movements of the perestroika era, unite a narrow circle of politicized personalities and rarely consist of more than a few hundred members, and consequently enjoy very limited influence. 23 (According to the former Vice-President of Kyrgyzstan, F. Kulov, "if you gather together all the activists of these organizations,they will not be able to change the situation. then they will hardly be able to fill the interior of one bus") 24 .

As a result, in the 1995 elections, less than 15% of the candidates were nominated by political movements and parties, and 92 out of 140 deputies were elected as independent candidates .25 According to a public opinion poll conducted by the independent newspaper Respublika, 45.4% of respondents said that none of the existing parties in Kyrgyzstan expressed their interests; 33% of respondents did not know how to answer the question about their attitude to political parties at all .26

Thus, during elections, clan and regional ties are more important than party affiliation, and it is ethno-tribal and regional factors that play the most prominent role in the political division and socio-political conflicts in the country.

INFORMAL POWER STRUCTURES AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION IN POST-SOVIET KYRGYZSTAN

In the conditions of the domination of various variants of state ownership and the de facto centralized distribution of public resources, the objects of conflicts in most cases are the possibilities of acquiring administrative and political power at the national, regional (oblast) or local level. Most often, this power is used to gain access to material and social benefits and opportunities for their distribution in personal, family and / or group interests.

The most important tool in the struggle for these resources and one of the main elements of their redistribution in Kyrgyzstan, as in many other countries of the East, is the following:-

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As noted, relations of ethnic and political clientelism are developing. The main institutionalized form of these relations in the political sphere is represented by informal non-traditional power structures - political clans.

The leading link of political clans is usually a relatively narrow group of representatives of the political elite at the national and regional levels. This group is closely united by a system of direct-personal (friendly, kinship, ethnic, and community) or transformed-personal (business, professional, property, administrative, etc.) relationships. The weight of each of these factors in specific clan structures may vary, but in a country where every indigenous person knows seven generations of their ancestors, in all cases family-clan and tribal relations are of fundamental value. As Kamil Bayalinov, Akayev's press secretary, admitted at the time, "it's no secret that top-ranking officials mostly come from one or another clan. This is reality. In our small republic, no matter where you turn , there is always someone else's person. " 27

Relations between members of a political clan and its leader (usually a high-ranking politician or bureaucrat) are based on the principles of absolute personal loyalty to the latter and, in accordance with traditional norms, mutual exchange of services.

The leader can count on his clients to maximize the use of their existing connections and opportunities to strengthen the patron's position in power structures. An illustrative example of this kind is given in his article by Eugene Husky. According to him, in Issyk-Kul district, local leader Jumagul Saadanbekov mobilized his akimiat (administration) of 200 people, local state-owned enterprises, the regional prosecutor's office and hooligan youth to support the candidacy of the former Prime Minister, Tursunbek Chyngyshev. Saadanbekov persuaded one candidate to withdraw from the race, promising him a lucrative sinecure. He also got the wife of Chyngyshev's main opponent fired... With the mysterious appearance of several thousand additional votes, the former Prime Minister could expect to win. Such scenarios were found all over Kyrgyzstan 28

Patron, in turn, provides its supporters with opportunities for career advancement (political, administrative and professional appointments), access to sources of material and social benefits (social privileges, housing, money, access to prestigious education, travel abroad, and in recent times - also guaranteed loans, licenses, government contracts participation in the" privatization " of profitable state-owned enterprises, tax exemption, etc.), as well as guarantees of personal security and "cover" for both legal and illegal activities.

Within specific ethnoregional communities, these relationships are usually embedded in broader systems of personal and social connections of clan members with representatives of various social elites and interest groups. We are talking about administrative-bureaucratic, power, economic, informational and traditional (tribal and religious) elites. In the post-Soviet period, they were supplemented by contacts with representatives of academic, party-political, cultural, educational, business and criminal circles.

As a result, broad "patronage-client networks" are formed, which transform political clans into more developed structures of the regional-tribalist type and give them strong stability.

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The core of these structures are the ethno-regional groupings of elites mentioned above, which are connected by a common origin from the respective regions and have a complete monopoly on power there. In this sense, we can distinguish Issyk-Kul, Chui, Talas, Naryn, and some other more peripheral clans and groups. Kyrgyzstan's informal political structures are also included in broader inter-clan associations (macro-clans), which correspond to the historical delineation noted above between the "modernized" north and the "traditional" south. In the first block, apparently, the Talas and Issyk - Kul clans alternately dominated, and in the second - the "Kipchak" clan.

Most modern political clans in Kyrgyzstan have several levels. Their central link is located at the regional level, which seems to have undergone the least "personal" changes. (According to available data, in the mid-1990s, all positions of heads of local administrations, without exception, were occupied by representatives of the former party nomenclature) 29 . In the second half of the decade, political clans practically had a monopoly on political and economic power in" their " ethnic areas.

The main "patrons" or closest clients of the "patrons" of these informal groups are usually regional governors-akims, whose influence has sharply increased after the constitutional reform of 1994. The reduction in the number and enlargement of electoral districts led to the removal of alternative groups of regional elites from power and gave akims additional levers of control over local political, bureaucratic and administrative structures. the business establishment. Almost all power resources are concentrated in the hands of clan leaders, from an informal mechanism for mobilizing ethnic and tribal loyalty to control over the electoral process and local administration.

The monopoly of political clans on power in the regions was convincingly demonstrated during the local government elections in 1998. In most cases, the authorities and human rights organizations were unable to counteract the widespread interference of "political authorities" in the activities of district election commissions. According to the report of the National Campaign for Monitoring the elections to Local Keneshes, organized by the NGO Coalition For Democracy and Civil Society, more than half (293 out of 566) of the election commissions were found to have officials, there were cases when the majority of the election commission members represented one organization, as well as the presence of a chain of "head-subordinate", and other violations. As one reviewer noted with a fair amount of cynicism, "he chooses who counts correctly." 30

It seems that a clientele of political clans also controlled the 2000 parliamentary elections. According to the Kyrgyz press, in the lists of district election commissions in Bishkek approved by the CEC, for example, only about 30% of their members are representatives of parties and independent associations. All the others are proteges of the "old and good", "proven" trade unions, local committees, labor collectives 31 . In the Jalal-Abad district, officials accounted for up to 60% of the members of election commissions, while the remaining 40% represented various public organizations and parties supporting the government.

Clan structures also managed to attract new "liberal" elites. The "Democrats", as already mentioned, were unable to" switch " the non-traditional mechanism of mass support mobilization to themselves and create their own political organizations comparable to the clans in terms of strength and authority. As a result, most of the "democrats" were forced to either leave politics or join the client-clan network of the corresponding informal groups, taking a place there that corresponds to their status.

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This can be illustrated by the political situation in Bishkek, where the distribution of "spheres of influence" took place between various ethno - regional groups, and at the same time between the traditionally nomenclatural and modernized elites. Thus, the Legislative Assembly has actually turned into a regional government body, where, according to local observers, representatives of the region and, accordingly, local and clan interests prevail .32 At the same time, members of the northern clans, the Sary-Bagysh tribal elite and their "liberal-democratic" associates are mainly concentrated around the presidential administration and government bodies. This division is, in fact, at the heart of the regularly escalating conflict between the "progressive" presidency and the "conservative" parliament .33

The events of recent years have also shown a significant regrouping of political forces in the highest echelons of power. One of the most important trends was the formation of the mechanism of A. Akayev's personal power into a kind of external "political superstructure" over the ruling northern macroclan, known by the name of Akayev's native district as the Kemin clan. Its members, in addition to A. Akayev himself, included his closest clients and "patrons" of some regional clans. Prominent members of this group, according to the Kyrgyz press, are Misir Ashikulov (State Secretary), Asatbek Abdurashitov (former head of the Administration Department under the Government); Bolot Dzhanuzakov (Secretary of the Security Council); Kanybek Akmataliyev (Akim of Osh district); K. Dzhumaliyev (akim of Jalal-Abad district) and Toichubek Kasymov (akim of Issyk-Kul district) 34 .

This "superstructure", which in some cases makes A. Akayev relatively independent of the clan structures proper, becomes an important factor in the alignment of political forces and political struggle both at the inter-clan and intra-clan levels. These trends increased significantly between the 2000 parliamentary elections and the presidential election campaign. The Kyrgyz press noted sharp clashes between the Chui and Issyk - Kul clans and the Naryn people due to their alliance with the Kemin clan.

The growing influence of the "presidential clan" has dealt a severe blow to A. Akayev's recent allies-the Talas clan, which includes such famous figures as the famous writer Chingiz Aitmatov, Dastan Sarygulov (former chairman of the state gold mining concern Kyrgyzstan), Kemelbek Nanayev (former Finance Minister, currently chairman of the Committee on Economic Issues). integration of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia), Murzakan Subanov (former Defense Minister) and some others.

One of the victims of this struggle was the former mayor of Bishkek Felix Kulov. According to Moskovsky Komsomolets, Adil Toigonbayev, the son-in-law of President Askar Akayev, played a critical role in his resignation. (Toigonbayev is believed to control leading Kyrgyz enterprises in the fields of energy, transport, communications, alcohol production and air transportation, as well as the privatization process in the sugar and cotton industries. 35) After the 2000 elections, the further removal of the Talas clan from power also became apparent.

Before and after the 2000 elections Akayev and his "administrative and political clientele" took steps to strengthen the elements of the President's personal power mechanism. One of these institutions is the Central Election Commission (CEC). In particular, the CEC exerted strong pressure on Felix Kulov, who is one of the leaders of the struggle of the Talassians for the restoration of the clan's power in Bishkek. In addition, the local electoral commission refused to register Kulov as a parliamentary candidate from the single - member electoral district of Kara-Buura (No. 44) in the Talas region.

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In addition, in November 1999, the former head of the Presidential Administration, M. Sadyrkulov, was entrusted to lead the organization of the election campaign of those socio-political forces that support the current president. At the same time, on November 10, 1999, a presidential decree was signed appointing M. Sadyrkulov as Chairman of the Accounts Chamber of the Kyrgyz Republic and Adviser to the President on local self-government issues .36

It is obvious that this "independent" position opens up significant opportunities for controlling the budgets of local authorities and administrative appointments, which suggests another attempt to "switch" some of the patronage and client networks of his political opponents to the president.

The same purpose is probably served by one of the amendments to the Constitution approved in a referendum on October 17, 1998, according to which 15 (out of a total of 105) seats were allocated to candidates nominated on national party lists. Some of the deputies elected in this way in February and March 2000 may form the core of the pro-presidential bloc in the parliament, which may also mean an attempt to "break through" into the sphere of influence of the regional authorities. It is interesting to note that on the eve of the 2000 elections, an alliance of pro-presidential parties was actually formed. It includes the Social Democratic Party, the Economic Revival Party and the Birimdik party.

It is possible, however, that the holding of elections based on party lists also forced the clans opposed to Akayev's group to pay attention to this instrument of political activity. For example, all candidates from the My Country Action Party (Ata Merken) running for local keneshes in Chui oblast received the highest number of votes 37 . On the eve of the 2000 elections, it was also possible to trace the connection of the Talas clan with the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan and the southern clans with the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan.

That is why the authorities have taken massive measures to suppress and split the opposition parties. For example, the opposition party " El " ("Bey-Bechara"), the second largest party in Kyrgyzstan, was excluded from the fight for seats in parliament on party lists. At the same time, the party's leaders were offered high government posts by President Askar Akayev.

A criminal case was reopened against the leader of another opposition party, Agrarian Labor, Uzen Sydykov (a member of parliament, an official in the former Communist Party and now president of the Kyrgyz Dan - Azyk company), which was temporarily discontinued several years ago. According to Ramazan Dyryldaev of the Human Rights Committee, Sydykov was forced not to go to the polls in exchange for the post of deputy Prime Minister. Under the threat of imprisonment, U. Sadikov agreed to accept the post offered by the presidential administration.

In general, the president's actions were marked by a clear attempt to disrupt the political base of both the leading political centers of the Southerners and the opposition to Akayev in the northernmost macro-clan (primarily among the Thalassans). Akayev's undoubted success was the promotion of his closest northern clients (Zhenish Rustenbekov, and then Temirbek Akmataliyev, the former akim of the Talas district) to the post of akim of Osh, the traditional "citadel" of the southern macro-clan (the previous southern akim, Amangeldi Muraliyev, was appointed rather to the "ceremonial" position of acting Prime minister).

In turn, the former head of the state administration of the city of Tash-Kumyr in the south-west of Jalal - Abad district, Ismail Masaitov, was appointed akim of Talas district. It is obvious that such permutations were supposed to destroy the " top " of the client pyramids of the opposition clans, as well as transform the situation in the country.-

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It is necessary to turn akims who are not closely connected with local client - clan structures into personal clients of A. Akayev.

We can agree with the opinion that at present the state "is under the complete control of one person - President Akayev. Control is not exercised through a political party, a bureaucracy, an army, or a particular social sector, or even through the Talas or Kemin clans. The President rules through staff who are appointed, dismissed and transferred by him personally. The president's people are completely dependent on him, devoted to him, and not connected to each other. " 38

The reaction of Southerners, who have not recently received any important posts, was manifested in the regrouping of local political elites in the late 1990s. The Batken group is playing an increasingly important role in the southern macroclan. This group, which holds key positions in the newly created Batken region, includes Apsamat Masaliyev, leader of the Kyrgyz Communists; Mamat Aibalayev (former director of the Kadamjai antimony plant, and now akim of the newly formed Batken region); Rakhat Achilova and Dosbol Nur Uulu (both members of Parliament), and others .39

The growth of this group's influence was facilitated by the military actions of the Kyrgyz army against rebel detachments that took place in the Batken region in the spring and summer of 1999, which also involved Uzbek troops (on the side of the Kyrgyz government) and Afghan Islamist forces (on the side of the rebels). According to Kyrgyz human rights activists, during the armed clashes, the number of dissatisfied people with Akayev increased, especially in the south. Their distrust of Kyrgyz citizens was growing, especially in the northern part of the country. It has even been argued that the enemies of the Kyrgyz are not the rebels, nor even Uzbekistan, but rather President A. Akayev .40 In addition, these events led to an increase in the political influence of the generals, including the former ally and now opponent of the president, the former Minister of Defense, the "people's general" F. Kulov. In this regard, Akayev is taking quite logical steps to strengthen his influence among the country's top military elite. Thus, in September 1999, A. Akaev appointed General Bolot Zhanuzakov, a former Komsomol leader and later an employee of the presidential administration, who never actually commanded military detachments, as Secretary of the Security Council. It is believed that he received the general's rank through patronage.

A significant transformation is also noticeable in the lower segments of clan structures. Along with representatives of the communal-tribal, religious and former nomenklatura - bureaucratic elite, representatives of the "new plutocracy" appeared in them. First of all, we are talking about representatives of private business, which, like in other CIS countries, exists in a highly monopolized state and quasi-market economy, where the bureaucratic apparatus still plays a huge role 41.

As a result, for the success of their business, entrepreneurs are forced to seek the patronage of officials and influential politicians of various ranks. These relationships, being built into the mechanism of relations between regional political clans, provide the necessary access to state contracts and other resources provided by "patrons" (politicians and bureaucrats) to their clients-entrepreneurs in exchange for appropriate economic services. At the same time, there are also signs of these latter moving to higher levels of the client-clan hierarchy. Hence the growing interest in formalizing one's status, including for reasons of personal and political security. One of the best solutions to this problem is membership in a regional or central legislative body, which, in addition to parliamentary immunity, provides broad official and unofficial opportunities.

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opportunities. As a result, about 30% of the deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh (Supreme Council) elected in 1995 were subject to prosecutor's investigations on suspicion of financial mismanagement at the time of their election .42

Thus, it can be concluded that informal political institutions perform the functions of integrating ruling groups of different origins. In this sense, Kyrgyz political clans (originally a product of the "social synthesis" of traditional feudal relations and the Soviet party - nomenclature state-bureaucratic system) demonstrated their flexibility in the post-Soviet era.

At the same time, the socio-political role of clan structures is not limited to the framework of top-level political conflicts. Performing the functions of distributing (according to the ethno-regional principle) the total social income within the ruling stratum, clan structures at the same time provide limited access to the resources of "power-property" and wider layers of "their" community through client relations.

Accordingly, at the mass level, the leaders of client - clan structures act as" ethnic patrons", personifying the entire complex of ethno-social values and interests and" closing " the majority of both formal and informal ties. In such circumstances, the social role of informal political structures in Kyrgyzstan (as in other regions of Asia and Africa) is manifested in the fact that they act as a link between socio-economic, political and ethno-cultural relations operating in both "traditional" and "modern" public spheres.

ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS: CLIENTELISM AND CORRUPTION

As you can see, political clans provide political elites (and the "social verticals" they lead) with access to public resources, their appropriation and redistribution. This role, as noted, is perceived in the local socio-cultural environment as quite legitimate and is effectively adapted to "modern" standards. At the same time, from the" Western " point of view, such informal relations in the sphere of power and property cannot be called anything other than trivial corruption. Such assessments are regularly made, for example, by experts from international organizations such as the World Bank, which recently ranked Kyrgyzstan among the three most corrupt post-Soviet states .43

However, most of the measures taken in accordance with Western recipes to combat corruption in the country were clearly ineffective. Kyrgyzstan is no exception to the majority of post-colonial and post-Soviet countries, where these "non-normative" social relations have become a kind of norm. All this suggests that corruption plays a fairly significant role in the process of economic reproduction of both the ruling groups and the broader social strata associated with them by the system of patronage and client relations.

In Kyrgyzstan, as in many other countries, there are several models of socio-economic reproduction of client-clan ties.

The first one is based on a more traditional relationship of direct administrative-command regulation and bureaucratic favoritism. A wide scope for such activities, for example, emerged during the agricultural privatization program implemented in late 1991 and early 1992. In the hands of the governors were virtually unlimited powers to determine which of the collective farms and state farms are subject to dissolution as unprofitable, to whom and how much land

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Six months later, when the negative consequences of these actions became obvious, the same officials began to restore the disbanded collective farms, while simultaneously destroying quite profitable farms .44

In the same row is the development of" nomenclature - bureaucratic capitalism", including large-scale plunder ("privatization") of state property. Already at its first stage, in 1992-1994, many former leading communists "once woke up as millionaires". As economist Sapar Orosbakov put it," communists - turned-businessmen " used their government connections to extract generous loans to buy new businesses and renovate existing ones. At this time, inflation reached about 1300% per year, but loans were offered at only 50% per annum. You don't need to do complex arithmetic calculations to understand how much these businessmen have managed to enrich themselves. But even on such favorable terms, very few of them bothered to repay the loans they received, preferring instead to bleed out the acquired businesses and fill their pockets with additional income .45

As a result, according to the then Deputy Chairman of the Kyrgyz State Property Fund, Sultan Maderov, most of the state-owned enterprises that were privatized from 1992 to 1997 (47.2%) were transferred in one form or another to their administration and/or "labor collectives". The rest were privatized through privatization tenders (26.5%) or sold to private individuals (21.2%) .46 This procedure created ideal conditions for the transfer of property to the hands of the"economic and administrative nomenclature".

Another source of reproduction of patronage-client relations is a less crude "technocratic" model of transformation of power into property. This type of activity is usually associated with manipulating government orders, privatization auctions, licenses for the supply of energy carriers and other products, as well as performing intermediary functions.

Among many examples, we mention the scandal surrounding the concessions granted to the Canadian gold mining company "Cameco", in which prominent representatives of the" northern " clans were involved .47 Another recent example of this kind is the highly publicized "petrol scam" involving a number of senior officials. It was organized by the Kyrgyz-American joint venture Vostok, which was established in early 1996 by a number of high-ranking officials to build the Kant oil refinery and create a network of firms selling fuel and lubricants. Contrary to the founding agreement, the plant was built not on private investment, but on the funds of state-owned enterprises, which provided 275.375 million soms (about 14 million US dollars) in 1996-1998. The shell companies created in parallel were engaged in illegal operations with imported Russian oil, "laundering" profits, transferring the proceeds of foreign currency funds abroad and ensuring tax evasion. The "debt" of the bankrupt state joint-stock corporation Kyrgyzgazmunayzat to one of the fictitious companies in the amount of 4.4 million soms (about 200 thousand dollars) was repaid by the transfer of the Tokmak oil depot and several gas stations to this firm48 .

The process of property redistribution has significantly accelerated due to the ongoing program of "landslide" voucher privatization and denationalization of property. A significant aspect of this process was the privatization, usually at a low price, of profitable state-owned enterprises by" favorite companies " associated with representatives or groups of the country's political and bureaucratic elite. For example, a silk factory in Osh worth 666 million rubles. som (about $ 20 million) was sold for only 1.9 million soms (50 thousand rubles).

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60.9% of the state's stake in the sugar refinery in the city of Kaindy was sold for $ 28 million. som (about 800 thousand dollars). The company's annual profit in 1998 was $ 50 million. A parliamentary investigation revealed that only two companies participated in the tender for the purchase of the refinery, and both were founded by one person, a citizen of Kazakhstan. 26.2% of the state's share in Ai-Churek, the country's largest department store, was sold "almost for nothing" - for only 3.9 million soms (about $ 110 thousand) .49

Shortly before that, under approximately the same conditions, "unknown foreign companies" registered in offshore zones acquired the most highly profitable state-owned joint-stock companies-Kaindy-Kant and Kant Cement and Slate Combine, and in both cases tenders were held formally. Everything was decided on the sidelines of the power structures.

The scope of such activities became clear when the December 1999 session of the parliament raised the issue of the scandalously low amount of funds that were supposed to be received from the privatization of large, highly profitable and strategically important enterprises for the republic's economy. It turned out that the value of state-owned shares in Kyrgyztelecom JSC, Kyrgyzenergo JSC and other boarding houses on the northern coast of Issyk-Kul and many other enterprises (estimated to have a market value of about $ 1 billion) is underestimated by tens and hundreds of times. Parliamentary and journalistic investigations conducted after the publication of these data made it possible to clarify the scale of privatization: 3801 objects of industry, consumer services, agriculture, construction, transport and trade were sold for a song. Many sales were held behind closed doors, real estate was given only to their own people, for certain bribes. As a result, in the first years of privatization alone, the country suffered more than $ 10 billion in material damage.

Finally, an important source of elite economic reproduction is the distribution and appropriation of foreign economic aid. Largely due to its "democratic image", Kyrgyzstan received three times as much money per capita as any other post-communist country in Central Asia .50

According to the report of the Chairman of the State Investment Committee of Kyrgyzstan, Urkalyi Isayev, presented to the session of the Jogorku Kenesh on November 10, 1992, for the period from 1992 to 1998, the republic received external loans totaling $ 1.3 billion from various international financial institutions and donor countries. At the same session, representatives of the opposition accused Isayev's office of conniving at the misuse of the allocated funds .51 According to the Kyrgyz press, in the late 1990s, schemes for obtaining and failing to repay foreign loans issued under government guarantees became widespread in the country. The recipients of such loans were often firms created with the participation of high-ranking civil servants and parliamentarians .52

The above facts have little to do with the process of creating a market economy in the classical sense of the word. Rather, we are talking about a more modernized version of the same mechanism for transforming power into property, in which regional tribalist structures of the patronage-client type still play a decisive role.

Corruption is an appropriate form of access to the redistribution of public resources between political groups and their clients. At the same time, it becomes a factor of political division and a convenient symbol in the intra - and inter-clan struggle for power and property.

The obvious manifestations of these conflicts were, for example, the resignation of Akayev's closest client, Prime Minister Apas Dzhumagulov. Many Kyrgyz people-

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Kyrgyz officials believed that the former prime Minister had been forced to resign in order to prevent a scandal surrounding MTAK, a firm registered in Austria in February 1997 that was supposed to sell gold to Kyrgyzstan. (Dzhumagulov, the founder of the highly profitable MTAK firm, preferred an "honorable" resignation to a parliamentary investigation.)

It is significant that the communist leader Apsamat Masaliyev, who has repeatedly accused the government of selling state property for almost nothing, has recently become one of the main critics of corruption in privatization.

* * *

Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan is experiencing a new stage of synthesis of imported and local socio-political systems and relations. A notable element of this process is the development of informal non-traditional power structures - political clans, at the level of which the main models of political development of the country are implemented.

Two complementary aspects of the evolution of political clans, as well as of Kyrgyz society as a whole, are the parallel and intertwining processes of "modernization" (borrowing civil society institutions) and "re-traditionalization" (legitimization of traditional relations) of power and property structures in the republic. In other words, informal power structures successfully serve as a communication channel between "traditional" and" modern " socio-political institutions and their mutual adaptation to each other.

Thus, in Kyrgyzstan, as in many other countries of the former USSR, and the East as a whole, the process of "democratization" proceeds in very peculiar forms and is rather a decentralization of power structures. This process corresponds to the polystructuralism of the local "quasi-modern" society, which adapts "modern" democratic institutions and fills them with a different, non-traditional content. Kyrgyz officials ' claims that their nomadic past makes "the Kyrgyz people a democratic nation by nature" fit perfectly into this system. 53

Therefore, the trend of decentralization not only does not contradict, but is quite consistent with the phenomenon of "Eastern authoritarianism" - the growing process of monopolization and personalization of power by leaders and their groups. Whether Kyrgyzstan will be able to counter these trends by ensuring effective integration of its traditional and non-traditional institutions within civil society is likely to be answered in the near future.

notes

Murzalin Zhanbolat. 1 Central Asia: Are There Limits to Authoritarian Development // The Times of Central Asia. V. 2. N 23 (66). 8.06.2000

2 См.: Brudny A. Kyrgyzstan: Island of Democracy // Contemporary Central Asia. 1998. V. 11. N 2. P. 6.

3 See: Huskey Eugene. Between Democracy and Authoritarianism: Askar Akaev. Paper, Presented at the ASN 4th Annual Convention. Columbia University, 1999. 15-17 April.

4 Evening Bishkek, 19.11.1999.

Galieva Zairash. 5 Civil Society in Kyrgyz Republic in Transition // Central Asia Monitor. 1998. N 5. P. 9.

6 This project was approved by the then parliament and blocked by the presidential veto of A. Akaev. See: Doepfner A. Kirgizstan Moves Towards Democracy / / Swiss Review of World Affairs. V. 42. N 7 (October 1992). P. 10.

7 See: Osmanalieva Raya. Tribalism in Kyrgys Society // Central Asia Monitor. 1999. N 5. P. 10-11.

8 Cit. by: Bransten Jeremy. Kyrgyzstan: A Democracy Only For the Rich. RFE/RL. 14.10.1997.

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Huskey Eugene. 9 Kyrgyzstan: the Fate of Political Liberalization // Dwisha Karen and Parrot (eds.). Conflict Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and Caucuses (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1997). P. 248-249.

10 Reuter Information Service. Bishkek. 12.23.1995.

Pryde Ian. 11 Kyrgyzstan: Secularism Vs Islam // The World Today. V. 48. N 11 (November 1992). P. 208.

Kostyukova Irina. 12 The Towns of Kyrgyzstan Change their Faces: Rural-Urban Migrante in Bishkek // Central Asian Survey. V. 13, N 3 (September, 1994). P. 428.

13 See: Tishkov Valeri. "Don't Kill Me, I'm Kirgiz": An Antropological Analyses in the Osh Ethnic Conflict // Journal of Peace Research. 1995. P. 133-149.

14 Evening Bishkek, 26.05.2000.

Hovoself Erlend. 15 Tribalism and Modernity in Kirgizia // Sabour and Viktor (eds.). Ethnic Encouter and Culture Change (Bergen-London), 1997. P. 100. A peculiar manifestation of the adaptation of the institution of family and clan elders to the "modern" political process is the widespread practice of voting by the head of the family for all its members in elections. This phenomenon was particularly noticeable in the 1995 Kyrgyz parliamentary elections.

16 According to President Askar Akayev, who together with the Prime Minister, the Speakers of both Houses of Parliament and the Chairman of the Constitutional Court attended the meeting of the Chairmen of the Aksakal Court in May 1999, a package of legislative acts on local self-government and the aksakal Court will be presented in the near future.

17. Kovalevsky V. F. 17 Kyrgyzstan: Democratic declarations and Political realities / / Post-Soviet Central Asia. Obredeniya i poteri [Acquisition and Loss], Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura Publ., 1998.

Doepfner A. 18 Kirgizstan Moves. P. 9.

19 Res Publica (Bishkek). 14.02.1995.

Burke Justin. 20 Opposition Leader Alleges Election Fraud. RFU/RL Kyrgyz Service. 15.03.2000.

21 The Times of Central Asia. Thursday, 23.03.2000.

22 See for example: Khanin Vladimir. Development of informal power structures. Institute of Political Parties in African conditions / / Modern Africa: results and prospects of development. Evolution of Political Structures, Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1990, pp. 60-73.

Dzhueupbekov A., Niyazov E. 23 Stanovlenie mnogopartiynosti v Kyrgyzstane [Formation of multiparty relations in Kyrgyzstan]. Renessans ili regress, Bishkek: Center for World Studies of Kyrgyzstan, 1996, pp. 215-230.

24 Слово Кыргызстана (Бишкек), 5.05.1996.

Namatbaeva Tolkun. 25 Democratic Kyrgystan: What Lies Ahead? // Roald Z. Sagdeev & Susav Elsenhower, et al (Eds.). Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change. Wash., DC: The Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 1995.

26 Res Publica. Bishkek. 28.12.1999.

27 Слово Кыргызстана (Бишкек). 15.07.1995.

Huskey Eugene. 28 Kyrgizstan: the Fate of Political Liberalization. P. 260.

Andreev Nikolai. 29 Kirgizstan: Grappling With Democracy // Bulletine of the Atomic Scientists. V. 50. N 1 (1994). P. 53.

30 Evening Bishkek. 30.11.1999.

Lokteva S. 31 Where does power end? // Evening Bishkek. 1.12.1999.

Abdymen K. 32 Pre-election struggle for the Parliament or what to expect from new deputies? // Argument. N 25 (25), 17-24.12.1999.

33 The biggest conflict was that which took place in the autumn of 1994, which was related to the activities of the commission to investigate corruption in the legislative and executive authorities. The result of the confrontation was the dissolution of the old Supreme Soviet of Kyrgyzstan and the holding of a referendum, which gave Akayev the authority to carry out the aforementioned constitutional reform. Kyrgyzstan's Slow Progress to Reform. P. 115.

34 A game: Power Clans and Plans. Kyrgyz Rukhu (Bishkek). 5.11.1999. P. 1.

35 Moskovsky Komsomolets. 9.12.1999.

36 Evening Bishkek. 11.11.1999,

37 Evening Bishkek. 26.10.1999.

38 Two reasons to remain president. Aki-Press, No. 6 (156), April 1998.

39 A Game: Power Clans and Plans. P. 1; also ВВС Mon CAU. 15.11.1999.

40 The Kyrgyzstan Committee for Human Rights Update: The Situation in the South. 15.09.1999.

41 See: Turchinov A. Tenevaya ekonomika i tenevaya politika [Shadow economy and shadow policy]. Social conflicts in the post-communist world. Kiev: Politichna dumka Publ., 1997, pp. 406-419.

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Pryde lan. 42 Kyrgystan's Slow Progress to Reform // The World Today. V. 51. N 6. June 1995. P. 115.

43 See: Timirbaev Vyacheslav. An octopus named Corruption // Evening Bishkek. 19.11.1999.

Volgina N., Gafarli M. 44 Kyrgyzstan: difficulties and contradictions of the transition to a modern market economy / / Post-Soviet Central Asia. Obredeniya i poterki [Acquisition and Loss], Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 1998, pp. 326-327.

45 Cit. by: Bransten Jereme. Kyrgyzstan: A Democracy Only tor the Rich.

Mederoy Sultan. 46 Analyses of Privatization in Kyrgyz Republic. Its Main Result and Further Strategies // Journal of Economic Cooperation Among Islamic Countries. V. 18, N 1-2 (1997). P. 35.

47 The Word of Kyrgyzstan, 7.05.1994; See also: Idinov Narynher. Kyrgyzstan: Politicans Wrangle Over Gold Production. RFE/RL. 6.02.1998.

Kuzmin G. 48 The Commission checked. Forget it? // Evening Bishkek. 19.11.1999.

Oruzbaev A. 49 Buy back what you "grabbed" / / Evening Bishkek. 23.03.2000.

Boehm Christian. 50 Democracy in Kyrgyzstan - Reforms, Rhetorics and Realities. Paper Presented at Conference "Postkommunismens Anthropologi", 12-14 April 1996. Copenhagen. P. 5, 8.

51 Evening Bishkek. 11.11.1999.

52 Evening Bishkek, 14.08.2000.

Boehm Christian. 53 Democracy in Kyrgyzstan - Reforms, Rhetorics and Realities. P. 1.

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