V. I. Maksimenko's very interesting theses dealing with a wide range of problems of the present and future Central Asian region did not mention the influence of the ethno-confessional composition of its traditional population on everything that happens in this part of the Old World. Meanwhile, the predecessors and contemporaries of A. E. Snesarev, who is constantly mentioned in his theses, first of all domestic military specialists, as, indeed, Andrei Yevgenyevich himself, attached the primary military importance to this component of the historical process in Asia.-

(c) 2003

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but-political significance. In their academic and "applied" works, Russian military researchers started from the classical formulation given in this regard in the middle of the XIX century by D. A. Milyutin. The future outstanding reformer of the Russian army and organizer of a first-class system of military education, then still a young professor of the Nikolaev Military Academy, Milyutin wrote in 1847: "Population: its size, distribution, degree of material well-being, moral situation-determine not only the number of armed forces, but also their essential properties, and also indicate to what extent in the event of war, the Government can rely on the cooperation of the people and on the reliability of the troops themselves. " ¹

Milyutin's works, under his leadership as Minister of War in 1861-1881, formed the personality of one of the most significant "organizers" of Asian Russia in the late XIX - early XX centuries, General N. I. Grodekov ². In 1879, exactly one hundred years before the start of the Soviet "action" south of Panj, a young colonel Grodekov rode on horseback through northern Afghanistan and Eastern Persia to "investigate the situation in neighboring countries." ³ Three years later, in his handwritten "Report on the state of affairs in Central Asia" (1882), unfortunately little used by modern researchers, he accurately predicted the response of the Afghan society to attempts by external, including Russian, interference in its affairs ^.4 Grodekov wrote: "In all likelihood, our government expects to meet... friends in Afghanistan. What is the basis of this assumption? There are many indications that we will be accepted like other" kafirs " who eat pork, not as friends... Afghanistan should be viewed more as a federation than as an organic whole. The Kabul Government can make treaties with foreign Powers, and the people will act in their own way. This, however, has always been the case in Asia. That is why the great Asian generals, when they conquered countries, either slaughtered the entire population, or resettled the conquered in the core of their states... Asian states are not something indivisible. Almost all of them include elements that are subject to the central authority as much as it is beneficial for them... The power of the Kabul government is not valid for the entire territory of Afghanistan; there are Afghan tribes that recognize only (formally ) the hegemony of Kabul... The Afghans, a brave and warlike people, have always been of the opinion that they do not need any allies, that they will cope with any enemy on their own." ⁵

The last Russian Field Marshal D. A. Milyutin gave a frankly harsh description of the state and prospects of "diversity" in the Asian part of Russia and around it in his handwritten notes of 1909-1912 ^.6 In an unpublished article "On diversity in the population of States", he wrote: "Among the modern states of all parts of the world, experiencing the hardships of the diversity of their populations, the first place is occupied by our Fatherland... Population... on the territory of the vast Turkestan region and steppe regions attached to Asian Russia... It is a cluster of the most diverse tribes under many local names... Islam summarizes them... The question is: is it possible to recognize such an acquisition as beneficial for the state? Has it strengthened or weakened Russia's political and military position in Asia? - The basis of such a question is, of course, distrust of the foreign composition of the population in general, a distrust which in the present case is justified to some extent by the glorified belligerence and daring of the Turkmens and the rest of the population, combined with the general vacillation of the Asiatics. It would be risky to completely deny any doubts about the mood and behavior of the population of the newly united region in the future, under any circumstances that may occur. Distribution... the Russians

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the main purpose, the main motive, was to eliminate the danger that would threaten Russia if the countries adjacent to its borders in Asia fell into other hands than Russia. ⁷ In reflections on our Asian outskirts... first place... the state of affairs in the Far East, the question of a pan - European, world-wide rebirth of China and the growing strength of Japan-the question of the danger that threatens (Russia-D. A. ) from the yellow race" ⁸.

D. A. Milyutin was categorically opposed to granting even minimal autonomy to anyone, considering it "positively harmful to the state, the first step to separatism and then to complete separation from the state" ⁹ . In his firm conviction, the entire present and future of Russia in Asia (as in Europe) ultimately depended "on a skilful and honest administration." Milyutin saw the main way forward for Russia, first of all, not in the use of force (the importance of which the Field Marshal naturally never denied), but in the development of the national education system. He wrote on this occasion: "It is the school and only the school that can have a beneficial effect on the entire population in the sense of bringing the tribes closer together and uniting the state. Our government needs to pay special attention to this task, not sparing the necessary financial resources " ¹⁰ .

A. E. Snesarev, a brilliant expert on Eastern and Afghan realities, expressed full solidarity with the views of his predecessors on the situation in Central Asia that were devoid of any optimism. Of particular importance here was his book "Afghanistan", published in 1921 and now just reprinted. Snesarev is deeply convinced that any Kabul government will be able to stay in power only by trying to ensure the country's full "independence", give it " chances of successful development in line with religious and national interests "and get" sympathy... the dominant ethnic group" of Afghanistan - the Pashtuns. Andrei Yevgenyevich believed that the" stubborn and proud " Pashtun tribes, despite all the internal strife between them, "no matter how much gold was poured on them by the" infidels "who wanted to bribe them, would merge in the" fateful moment of the great war", defending "the same national interests", into one "unanimous family" and they will firmly oppose all "non-believers" ¹¹ . Analyzing possible "vulnerable" aspects of the Afghan world order, Snesarev noted the undoubted "hostility" between Pashtuns and Uzbeks in the northern provinces, the well-known conflicts of interests of various local "Muslims" (Sunnism, Shiism, Ismailism), which noticeably undermine Islamic "religious unity" ¹² . At the same time, the scholar was far from overestimating the significance of these factors and ultimately concluded that for all their "diversity of tribes" and intra-confessional differences, the Muslims of Afghanistan are integrated by "deep distrust" and "indomitable hostility" to Europeans ^.13 According to Snesarev, any hopes of the" outside world "to seriously involve the Afghans in their affairs are illusory and utopian, since" political calculations can lead Afghanistan (always temporarily) to one side or another, but feelings will remain equally hostile to any European state " ¹⁴ .

Our assessments of prominent Russian military figures show quite convincingly that they lacked any illusions and faith in the" bright future " of relations between European countries, including Russia, and the Central Asian world. In the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Russian state began to introduce "capitalism along the line of railways" in Turkestan; in 1917-1991, a more significant round of local industrial development followed; without railways, but still the primary elements of industrial society began to take shape in Afghanistan ¹⁵ . However, all this, as well as various "socialist" or "democratic" external forms, did not change the inner essence of Central Asian society. A kind of "tribal socialism"

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It was combined, "tribalist democracy" is combined and will continue to be combined here with a tendency to traditional "archaization" (A. P. Novoseltsev), with the preservation of the usual "communal-despotic" foundations (S. P. Polyakov). Religion and ideology, as well as Islamic, quasi-socialist or liberal-democratic rhetoric, very often only covered up, cover up and will continue to cover up the quite natural desire of the indigenous population of Central Asia to exist within the framework of their centuries-old, historically established way of life, regardless of the discontent of representatives of other countries of the Old or New World. The trends noted by Russian military researchers, in my opinion, have been clearly manifested and are being manifested in the reaction of the indigenous population of Afghanistan to the interference of the "outside world" in its life in recent years. Let's try to compare the course of the Afghan" actions " of the USSR and the United States in the following table:

Due to the current economic and military weakness of our country, the possibilities of Russia's real influence on the events taking place in this part of Asia are very limited now and in the coming decades. The degree of its influence on the local elite, in my opinion, may largely depend on the preservation of old scientific and educational ties that have not yet completely disappeared in the southern regions of the post-Soviet space. Unfortunately, the ongoing reform of the national school, the rejection of the system of organizing education bequeathed by Peter the Great and Mikhail Lomonosov, not only deprives Russia of this opportunity, but can also have the most sad consequences for the national security of our Fatherland.

notes

^{Milyutin D. A.} 1 First experiments in military statistics. St. Petersburg, 1847. Book 1. P. 60.

² For many years, Nikolai Ivanovich Grodekov was the military governor of the Syr-Darya region, then the Governor-General of the Amur Region and Turkestan. For more information, see: Source. 2002. N 5.

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³ The literary fruit of Grodekov's trip was his essays "Through Afghanistan" (St. Petersburg, 1880), which were immediately translated into English, German and French.

⁴ A copy of this document, which was kept in the Central Archive of the Turkmen SSR, was partially reproduced in the book: "The Annexation of Turkmenistan to Russia "(Ashgabat, 1960, pp. 664-666).

⁵ RGVIA. F. 400 " Main headquarters. The Asian part". Op. 1. Unit x. 749. l. 6 vol. - 8 vol.

⁶ Milyutin was promoted to General Field Marshal on August 16, 1898, and was the last Russian to receive this rank.

⁷ This meant, first of all, Russia's then main rival in the East, the British Empire.

⁸ Milyutin D. A. O raznoplemennosti v naselenii gosudarstv (1911 g.) [On diversity in the population of states (1911)]. Cardboard 82. Ed. kh. 31. l. 4-4 vol., 13-14. See also: Milyutin D. A. Note on revolutionary events in China (January 1912) / / OR RSL. f. 169. Cardboard 82. Unit x 32.

^{Milyutin D. A. O} 9 raznoplemennosti v naselenii gosudarstv [On the role of diversity in the population of States].

¹⁰ Ibid., l. 24. This note by Milyutin has just been published. See: Source. 2003. N 1. pp. 50-65.

^{Snesarev A. E.} 11 Afghanistan. Moscow, 2002, p. 94.

¹² Ibid., p. 126.

¹³ Ibid., p. 105.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁵ For more details, see: Arapov D. Yu. Russia and Central Asia in the XVIII-early XX centuries / / Collection of the Russian Historical Society, Moscow, 2002, vol. 5 (153).

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