CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. review

In recent years, a number of publications have been published, the authors of which, on the one hand, analyze the current situation of Russia on its Far Eastern borders, summarize the interim results of its political, diplomatic and economic activities in the Asia-Pacific region, and on the other-look to the future, set out their vision of optimal solutions from Moscow, Khabarovsk or Vladivostok. options and ways of Russian integration into the Pacific economic zone, the country's participation, especially in its Far Eastern regions and territories, in the interregional division of labor. For most of the past decade, the Russian Far East (RDV) has been dealing with the problems of providing basic life support. Without getting closer to the Pacific economic community, in the form in which it has actually been formed, the WFD has distanced itself from the more settled and developed areas of the country - due to the collapse of the centralized supply and guaranteed sales system, repeatedly increased transport tariffs (which reminded of the "tyranny of distance" that persists even in the context of globalization), a sharp reduction in paid state orders for military-industrial complex enterprises that formed a disproportionately large part of the regional economy.

Something similar has already been observed, however, in other historical periods. Our Far East "hung up" both during the First World War and in the civil war that followed it, but nevertheless remained Russian. At the same time, the geographical factor is associated with more than just disadvantages. In the early 1990s, at the end of the era of comprehensive scarcity, essential goods came from nearby countries, especially cheap Chinese consumer goods that fit the impoverished population. The Chinese and Koreans made up for the lack of a hardy and unpretentious labor force, and the growing economy of the PRC demanded a number of Russian export goods. Chinese orders have kept afloat the activities of a number of the largest military-industrial complex enterprises, which form a significant part of local budgets (for example, the aircraft building complex in Komsomolsk-on-Amur). However, at the same time, in the conditions of divergent development vectors of the PRC and Russia (in one case, there was a powerful economic upswing, in the other - decline and degradation), with a very unfavorable demographic situation for the Far East, the prospect of "Chinese colonization" of the Far East, the displacement of Russia from the Far East lands, was extremely painful.

Now that the low point of the crisis seems to have passed, the position of both Russia and its Far Eastern suburbs has strengthened, and the mood of catastrophism has disappeared, there is an opportunity to work out a number of issues related to Russia's place in the interregional division of labor, choosing the best ways to enter the Pacific economy, and taking into account the changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. Some of the views previously expressed are still relevant, while others seem controversial.

From the pages of the book "The Russian Far East: Real Opportunities for Economic Development" V. Ishaev and P. Minakir, a governor and scientist, argue that " Russia and its Far East historically, ethnically, culturally, and economically still remain an alien element in the Asia-Pacific region and especially in its Asian part"¹ . Well, this statement still seems medically accurate four years later. In addition, membership in APEC itself - an organization that has not outgrown the framework of an advisory body with a low level of legal capacity-has not changed the unfavorable situation in the region for the Russian Federation. Knowing the ip-

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This makes it easier to determine the direction of subsequent actions. And history offers a variety of options to choose from.

During the Soviet era, the Russian Far East was almost exclusively focused on the domestic economy, serving as a military outpost: its ties to the European part of the country were subsidized from the Center. This model has collapsed and cannot be restored. Since the early 1990s, when the RDW was essentially left to its own devices, there has been a "replacement of the national market with an external one". This happened until the August 1998 crisis, which "dramatically increased the importance of internal factors and domestic aggregate demand by reducing the share of external relations" ² . But it was still nothing more than an adjustment, and not a fundamental rejection of the predominantly export orientation in favor of import substitution. Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the FEZ Nakhodka N. Fedorov noted:"...The availability of high-quality imports increases the competitiveness of the entire Far East and forces Russian producers to catch up to a competitive level. The absence of a competitor and the unpretentiousness of the Russian consumer will push the Russian manufacturer back to the position of 10 years ago. " ³ This conclusion is quite consistent with such factors as the narrowness of the domestic DDW market, its remoteness from Central Russia and proximity to the countries of Northeast Asia.

However, the question remains open: which export industries and enterprises should we rely on to develop? You can't change the raw material orientation overnight. The creation of processing capacities was largely hindered by non-payments (including from processors - suppliers of raw materials), which forced the latter to resort primarily to exports as the only way to "extract money" necessary for simple reproduction, and only secondarily - as a solution to the problem of marketing ^.4 It is also known that there is not always a reason to increase the degree of processing of raw materials, especially when there is no sufficiently large market for them or their transportation is more expensive.

One of the directions is the search for free product niches in the Asia-Pacific markets, a bet on mass production and export of individual competitive products. Some researchers, however, consider such a path unsuitable for Russia "in the light of the Japanese and South Korean experience." It is hard not to argue that for quite a long period of time, this strategy was quite justified, allowing the Japanese and South Korean economies to accelerate and take off before, having worked out their own, turning into a brake on further development. Many Russian enterprises have already been able to increase their level of competitiveness in the domestic market to begin with. It is difficult for them, and it does not make sense to challenge, for example, East Asian manufacturers of household appliances, but it is likely that the production of individual components and components with the correct formulation of the case and all the required business processes can be established at some Far Eastern enterprises.

It is important not only to choose a promising model of export behavior, but also to catch the moment when it should be abandoned in time. As Mark Hong wrote, analyzing the Singapore experience: "Success... it can turn into a trap, creating the ground for complacency and complacency, losing the ability to notice the emergence of new problems and situations that require response. " ⁵ However, where are the successes that could lull the vigilance of Russian managers and owners?

We are encouraged by the fact that today the problem is being solved not by scientists and academics, but by the largest Russian corporations that came to the RDW only recently (after the change of administration and the arrival of a new generation of regional leaders). YUKOS, for example, is going to export not only oil, but also increase the export of petroleum products, for which it is creating the appropriate pipeline and port infrastructure in the Far East and Eastern Siberia, specifying the passage of export routes so that they do not end up in China alone. Other Russian companies that are becoming transnational also have their own export programs and guidelines, as well as plans for investment and production activities in the Pacific abroad.

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Expansion into the Asia-Pacific markets requires, of course, first of all the creation of a solid base in Russia itself, taking into account the fact that domestic effective demand has increased here since August 1998, the share of barter operations has decreased, the political situation has stabilized, and the economy of most regions has entered the growth trajectory. However, there are still problems with the institutional and business environment. "In reality, natural resources are very firmly anchored in inefficient users and producers who lack both the means and the desire to change the situation." ⁶ The situation is aggravated by the patronage often provided to such " users "by those in power, who try to block access for" outsiders " - both of domestic and non-national origin.

When looking for the optimal place for Russia in the interregional and international division of labor, the question arises about our actual capabilities in the field of high technologies and innovation. In certain segments (scientific and technical developments, creation of new materials) Obviously, we still have a competitive position. But are we capable of going beyond a simple statement of this fact? Specialists of the Khabarovsk Institute of Economic Research mentioned in their work the innovative program "Technopolis CAS" (Komsomolsk - Amursk - Solnechny), which was designed to "sanitize" and create a growth pole in one of the most depressed regions of ^the Far East7 . Its implementation was provided for by the Federal Target Program for the Economic and Social Development of the Far East and Transbaikalia for the period 1996-2005. Development programs were drawn up, and with the best intentions, in many ways, both at the federal and local levels. The vast majority of them have remained on paper, which happens when the decisive bet is made on state financing. The state of the budget is well known, as is the level of preparation of projects, even the largest ones. They often look like cost estimates, rather than detailed justifications for the commercial viability of projects, feasibility, and cost recovery.

Thus, the need to allocate large funds for the construction of a bridge crossing from the mainland to Sakhalin (and the subsequent connection of Sakhalin with Hokkaido) was justified by the then head of the Ministry of Transport and Siberian scientists mainly for "geopolitical considerations". The latter, however, will not make up for the lack of economic reasoning and the practical lack of prospects for obtaining financing from Japan, which knows all too well what Russian risks and "guarantees"are. At one time, it was for geostrategic reasons that the BAM was built, and we know what happened from all this - the road is unprofitable and unfinished to this day. While we are being offered to launch new grandiose construction projects, numerous infrastructure facilities of varying degrees of readiness, which are vital for the WFD, are required and waiting for completion.

You can be sure that corporate and private capital calculate their investment projects more carefully. It is the fulfillment of orders from Russian and international corporations involved, for example, in the development of Sakhalin oil and gas fields that ensures the workload of a number of enterprises in the CAS zone mentioned above, and not their prescription in various state programs.

Another manifestation of excessive reliance on the state is the projects and concepts of special or special economic zones, where participants in economic activity are granted certain customs, tax or other benefits. In the reviewed literature, one can find various judgments about the place that the concept of special economic zones should be assigned in the regional economic strategy. One of them states that "the entire territory of the WFD will not be able to compete at the proper level due to the underdeveloped infrastructure and lack of an adequate legislative framework", and therefore one should patiently wait for "multiplying impact (FEZ) on the regional economy", taking into account that "it is unrealistic to hope for progress only at the expense of special zones" ⁸ . The opponents ' objections, however, are also not without reason. They argue that it is necessary to create conditions not in some individual points and enclaves, but throughout the entire economic space, not allowing FEZs to simply redistribute income from foreign trade activities, without creating new value and new production capacities.

Unfortunately, so far Russia has not given a single example of the successful functioning of special zones, which tend to invariably turn into internal offshore companies or channels for duty-free imports. The most notorious was acquired by the FEZ "Nakhod-

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ka " under its former leadership. Here, in Nakhodka, as you know, it is planned to create a Russian-Korean technopark, but the process is slowed down due to the lack of development of the legislative framework-due to the fault of the Russian Federation. After a series of setbacks, South Korea itself is not inclined to force its projects on the WFD. Experts wonder if the Nakhodka zone is anything more than just a conglomerate of ports that are developing without a single plan.

The hopes placed on the creation of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Magadan were also not fulfilled. However, they tried to take into account the experience of other zones, requiring enterprises registered in the zone to conduct business without fail and place at least three-quarters of their assets on the territory of the zone. However, either the benefits provided were insufficient (preferences were covered by a high registration fee), or the complex procedure of customs clearance was affected. As a result, new production facilities in Magadan for significant processing of imported materials imported to the SEZ territory with the expectation of supplying products for sale on the "mainland" did not arise.

The Magadan region is poorly suited for the role of an industrial site for the production of products intended for sale in other regions due to geographical isolation, severe climate, high transport and other costs. The question is: did the creators of the zone really pursue this goal? The latter may have had to think more about survival, about the urgent search for additional income, than about creating a long-term mechanism that ensures real and sustainable economic growth. As of 01.06.2001, 398 economic entities were participants in the Special Economic Zone, less than 2% of the total number in the Magadan region. Even from this point of view, the local initiative is not considered a success. In addition, changes in federal tax legislation have minimized even the benefits that the zone's participants might otherwise claim. Direct revenues to the regional budget from the operation of the zone are small. According to some sources, they amounted to 2-3 million dollars a year9 .

The opening of the zone did not attract the attention of foreign investors and did not give an impetus to the development of economic and transport links between Magadan and the Pacific coast of the United States. It turns out that the development of their foreign economic relations in the Far Eastern countries is most likely and primarily "under China". The ongoing economic growth here creates additional demand for the products of Far Eastern enterprises in the PRC (cement and construction materials, products of wood processing enterprises, soybeans), and new opportunities are opening up in the field of non-business tourism.

V. Ishaev and P. Minakir consider the "Greater China" market to be the most promising for the Russian Far East in the foreseeable future, calling for "the most serious attention to issues of economic rapprochement with the PRC, which may create additional levers of influence on other partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan and the United States." ¹⁰ Agreeing with the first part of this statement, I just did not want to associate myself with the slightly veiled ideology of "cooperation against" someone. Should we also exaggerate the role of Russian-Chinese cooperation, taking into account the scale of investment and other cooperation between the United States and Japan with China? Investors and trade operators are still private companies that have little interest in politics, if such a policy does not actively interfere with them. However, they are subject to the" herd instinct", when the entry of one corporation into a new market pushes others to do the same. But I will not dispute that it is Russia that is required to take certain steps to encourage China to cooperate more closely and fruitfully with it.

The Ishayev-Minakir tandem advocates a preferential (simplified) border and customs regime in areas adjacent to the PRC, Japan, and the United States11 . It is clear that this will benefit local firms that will be able to move imports to the interior of Russia. As for the customs regime, in many areas smuggling actually reduces it to zero. There is also a widespread practice of "contractual" customs rates applied, for example, to the entire cargo of an aircraft. This is where the state can prove itself. Strengthening the effectiveness of customs control (without overextending it) is the most effective way to support Russian producers.

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Khabarovsk authors note that " the broad involvement of Chinese labor in the labor-deficient Far East... it will create prerequisites for the transition of industry to a new technological level, freeing up scarce resources of local labor for new industries " ¹² . At the same time, the Far Eastern Federal District as a region is both labor-deficient and labor-surplus at the same time, depending on the professional categories. It was the lack of jobs in the right profile that previously prompted many to leave the RDV. Poor living conditions also pushed the exodus. The poor quality of the remaining workforce leaves employers, as they admit, no choice but to hire either Chinese or newcomers, represented by former citizens of the USSR. The advantages of the Chinese labor force seem quite obvious: it is distinguished by exceptional hard work and endurance, unpretentiousness, willingness to take on any job. The number of Chinese currently employed in the WFD seems to be roughly sufficient to meet current demands and needs, but economic growth is likely to soon bring additional demand for this resource.

Until recently, the debate in Russia was not about how many Chinese would be needed to maintain favorable economic dynamics (the local authorities know this better and resolve the issue in a working manner), but how many of them are already present in the territory of the Far East and Siberia. Fortunately, more reliable data on the actual number of Chinese of various categories residing in the Russian Federation have recently become available (thanks to "field research" undertaken by V. G. Gelbras and other scientists). They dispel the myths about the "Chinese colonization" that is already taking place. The maximum number of Chinese citizens in Russia is about 400 thousand, and the vast majority of them are seasonal workers and employees who are contracted for a 10-month period, that is, people who are temporarily on the territory of the Russian Federation. Many were frightened by "non-returnees" and other illegal immigrants. So, when they were carefully counted in Primorye, in 1999 they turned out to be 105 people. There are reasons to talk about both more effective border control and a reduction in the number of visitors from China to Primorye.

However, the practical approach to using such a factor as" business tourists " from the PRC is not yet fully ingrained. Thus, the head of the Pacific regional department of the Federal Border Service of Russia, Lieutenant-General P. Tarasenko, stated in his report: "The next danger is for them (small traders from the PRC. - E. G.) activities are investing the proceeds from commerce in real estate, securities, and the purchase of contraband objects (including samples of secret weapons)" ¹³ . Here, alas, both completely legal and illegal, criminal activities are mixed. Needless to say, both residents and non-residents should be held accountable for actual crimes and offenses committed. Investment of funds (trade proceeds) in the development of real estate should only be welcomed, since this means reducing the outflow of capital from the RDV, its productive use in Russia, creating infrastructure, jobs,paying taxes and other favorable consequences that the recipient country usually reaps.

In recent years, there has also been an increase in the scale of non-weekly tourism of Chinese citizens, as evidenced by the frequent trips of tour operators from China to Vladivostok and other cities, where they are studying the conditions for receiving a new, still small, but claiming to be a comfortable stay category of Chinese tourists.

Here is a new reason for fears that "the Chinese will buy up everything" and "crush" and displace the Russian-speaking population by economic methods. There was a time when a more prosperous and balanced Australia was afraid of turning the country into a" gerontological colony " of Japan. However, the investment potential of China in the part of it that can be projected to foreign countries is not so significant, and the PRC itself remains one of the largest net importers of capital. In addition, not every initiative of the Chinese is successful for them and promises a refund. Let us not forget that in addition to purely market-based barriers and constraints, there is also a wide range of administrative and economic protective measures.

When some fears subside, others are born. Some venerable political scientists, having plunged into the Far Eastern issues, asked themselves: will corporations import Chinese labor en masse to their enterprises, aggravating the demographic situation in the Far East ¹⁴ ? Let's try to figure it out. With all the complaints about it, a large business like

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As a rule, it operates in the spirit of economic feasibility and responsibility, and from a long-term perspective. It seems obvious that he has no need to displace the inhabitants from the territories where they settled more than a century ago. These people are its employees, its consumers, and its customers. The first commandment of large corporations is to establish constructive relations with regional authorities, which are responsible for the social situation.

Oil corporations operating on the Sakhalin shelf will not attract Chinese labor to perform well-paid and highly qualified operations. Russia has enough of its own oil and gas workers. The Amur Shipyard, which is being rebuilt for peaceful products, also does not seem to need guest workers, when there are their own. I have never heard anything about Chinese participation in the construction of the railway to the Elga coal deposit, which is led by a team of thousands of builders. There is also no information that Chinese workers will be involved in the construction of gas pipeline branches from Russia to China. Definitely not on Russian territory. On the contrary, Gazprom's specialists will participate in the construction of the West - East domestic gas pipeline as part of an international consortium.

The vast majority of Chinese workers work within a reserved segment, as it were, for them: agricultural and construction work, public catering enterprises, and small-scale trade. By the way, the Government of the People's Republic of China raises the question of organizing the export of more qualified labor for the future. And for us, the problem may turn into a new facet: we will deal not with those whom we are ready to let in to work, but with those who are ready to come and face the Russian realities. So far, of course, the PRC is an immense reservoir of labor, which is fueled by the reorganization and reduction of public sector enterprises there.

Other sources are also used to replenish labor resources in the Far East and Eastern Siberia. For example, the import of labor from the CIS countries; there are also Koreans from the DPRK, who are not inferior to the Chinese in terms of hard work. There are also Russian Koreans who were brought up in the same Russian cultural and linguistic environment and do not cause geopolitical concerns in addition. In general, about 30 thousand Koreans already live in Primorye. Collective agricultural enterprises have been set up to attract mainly Koreans returning to Primorye from Stalin's exile in Central Asia. These farms (which, by the way, also use the labor of immigrants from the DPRK) will be able to compete strongly with the Chinese, especially if they succeed in using advanced agricultural technologies of South Korea.

Be that as it may, today the level of Chinese business activity in Russia is such that the question is not about curbing it, but about removing it from the shadows, decriminalizing Chinese business in Russia (which requires efforts from both the Russian and Chinese sides), including through the self-organization of legal Chinese merchants.

With sustained production growth, an organized import of additional Chinese labor may be required, and a sober and calm consideration of this problem is necessary. Some authors are ready to go further and eventually even raise the question of "forming a single economic space between the Russian Far East and China" ¹⁵ . This implies the gradual lifting of restrictions on the free movement of capital, services, technologies and labor, gradual integration of the transport and energy systems, etc. For Russia, the implementation of projects to transfer its energy resources to the PRC would be of exceptional importance, since the construction of power transmission lines and gas pipelines from Eastern Siberia to the PRC would not only increase our export potential, but also to solve some internal problems along the way, including those related to the sustainable energy supply of vast internal regions and the reintegration of the infrastructure of the Russian regions proper. In the meantime, we have to state the following: the Chinese side is not ready or able to finance the implementation of these projects, and the balance of energy resources in China itself does not look so tense. There is an intensive search for access to the energy markets of the Asia-Pacific region, bypassing the PRC.

In publications on Pacific issues, it is impossible to avoid such a topic as the tendency to create a single, unified or, when they mean not only Taiwan and Gon-

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Hong Kong, "Greater China "(including Singapore along with the vast Chinese diaspora). "The process of forming a" Greater China "is becoming more than relevant for Russia," says the article "China in World and Regional Politics. History and modernity". - In addition to historical claims to Russia... China is currently experiencing a hunger for raw materials, and the "Big China" that has formed is undoubtedly right away (why is it suddenly "right away" when there is a huge inertia in economic ties and what does "formed" mean? - E. G.) will be on the verge of a commodity crisis. Even now, there is a quiet expansion of the Chinese to the Far East ... " ¹⁶ . For me, this assessment is far from obvious, as is the question of access to sources of raw materials. The struggle today is not so much for the supply of raw materials, but for their marketing, for promising access to the promising Chinese market, to the Chinese consumer, and both the countries of Southeast Asia and the former Soviet republics-Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan - participate in this competition.

As for the emerging movement towards a "Greater China", it is largely objective in nature, fitting into both global and regional trends, because the Asia-Pacific region, which covers almost half of the globe, is already global in itself. At the same time, any super - large entity (not necessarily institutionalized and formalized) will experience a growing pressure of centrifugal tendencies, from which China has never been free, and the hypothetical "Big China" even more so. Further, a purely ethnic basis, as history shows, is not a solid basis for interstate unions. There seems to be no particular reason for alarmism, but the concepts and ideas that revolve around the concept of "Greater China "still cause some concern, especially in the southern" underbelly " of the PRC and in Japan.

Both the degree of global integration of Chinese entities and the ability of the PRC to manipulate them are sometimes exaggerated. "In fact, China controls one of the most powerful transcontinental national corporations, even if it has not yet acquired its complete form," writes M. L. Titarenko. - It was made up of cooperatives of banks in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, which have only free foreign exchange funds in excess of $ 370 billion. To these, we should add the support of the Chinese diaspora scattered all over the world. The highest structures of the CPC and the Chinese government have long established a very specific, effective mechanism that coordinates and directs all efforts in this area. " ¹⁷

From the history of the development of civilization, it is well known not only about the voice of "blood" and the right of" blood", but also about the right of" land " on which people live, including those engaged in entrepreneurial activities. The country, sphere of residence and immediate environment have a profound impact on the psychological behavior and business relationships of representatives of all nationalities, including the Chinese, who have several generations of roots in foreign countries. Sentimental feelings about the homeland of one's ancestors are one thing, but specific business interests are another. I will refer to the German philosopher Walter Schubart, who emphasized the "spirit of the landscape or the earth", claiming that "the forces of the earth are more influential than the forces of blood".

The global scale of corporate activity is incompatible with ethnic homogeneity. It can be preserved, as a rule, by small and medium-sized enterprises, which almost exclusively consist of the business of overseas Chinese. In addition, even the divisions of a single TNK - and these are structured according to more or less uniform patterns-do not have all the same interests. The largest Chinese banks, even if they retain their "Chinese identity", are guided by considerations of profit, economic feasibility, and their own strategic development plans, but not by the directives of the special department of the CPC Central Committee. Many events inside the tightly controlled PRC also suggest that even CCP members and ordinary Chinese are not such a pliable object for manipulation.

Now from Chinese stories to Japanese ones. Despite the difficulties experienced by Japan and the record-breaking period of economic stagnation, some authors pin exceptional hopes on it in terms of solving the problem of integrating the Russian economy with the regional one. V. V. Mikheev suggests betting not on the Chinese, but on the Japanese factor. It proves the expediency of developing a two-level economic strategy for Russia, dictated by its very geographical disunity, separately for Europe and the United States.

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separately for the ATP, he considers Siberia economically facing Europe ¹⁹ . It is proposed to allocate additional financial resources for the RDW and establish new ministries dealing with the affairs of this region. (We recognize the old Soviet approach: if there is a problem, create a ministry for it; there was, for example, a ministry for construction in the eastern regions.) But then something is absolutely not trivial - not only to introduce its own customs regime for the region (this was also suggested by others, as mentioned above), but also to form a second Central Bank here (or a branch of the first), tying the ruble to the yen in order to more effectively use external integration factors. The author refers to the experience of the People's Republic of China, which implements the formula "one state, two systems". In the Chinese case, however, the movement went from two entities (state and territory)to a single state, and we are offered the opposite direction of the vector. In addition, the economic systems of China and Hong Kong are converging (thanks to the policy of "deepening market reforms" in mainland China), rather than splitting them. This makes references to the Chinese example unconvincing.

The creation of the Far Eastern Federal District, endowed with considerable powers, promises to be a more effective response to the problems that the author of the idea guessed and outlined, and without encroaching on the integrity of Russia. In my opinion, the WFD's belonging to a single state space and its status as an integral part of the Russian Federation strengthen the zone's position in relations with its neighbors. A semi-independent Far Eastern republic will differ from the rest of Russia not by a high level of economic freedom and integration into the world economy, but above all by a higher level of criminalization of various aspects of life. In addition, within the framework of such a formation, centrifugal tendencies will inevitably develop, when relatively prosperous regions will move away from those in distress (for example, Sakhalin Island with its oil - bearing and already developed shelf-from Primorye). An uncertain legal status with its quasi-independence will further alienate solid foreign investors and, on the contrary, attract all sorts of international adventurers.

At a forum in Shanghai in 2000, V. V. Mikheev argued that the "Russian-Japanese monetary and economic union "implies" an exchange of Russia's readiness to become a pioneer in creating an international non-tax zone for Japanese assistance to the revival of Russia's eastern regions. " ²⁰ It seems to us that the author greatly exaggerates Japan's interest in Russia. In reality, the problems of internationalization of the yen will be solved by Tokyo together with those countries of Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region that have a significant volume of foreign economic relations and a significant share in world trade.

Unfortunately (or fortunately), we will mostly have to solve our own problems, without relying on any extraordinary recipes. At the same time, despite the importance of Russia's bilateral relations with China and Japan, it makes sense to introduce economic ties with them more and more into the context of multilateral cooperation. By the way, it is precisely this "syndicated" approach that the Japanese side insists on, fearing to be left alone with Russian problems that tend to arise completely unexpectedly. Projects of the Trans-Asian gas pipeline network, which originates in Russia, acquire a multilateral character. This is where the pooling principle should work.

When analyzing the Far Eastern issues, the role of the state and state bodies, the activities of regional and municipal authorities are often given priority, almost without noticing such a powerful factor as the activities of multinational corporations. At best, the "territorial-corporate" form of development of the Far East is mentioned, which reduces entrepreneurs almost to the role of a simple appendage of the territory ^.21 You can feel the handwriting of the "owners of the region"... It is important to emphasize that only large corporations are able to attract financial and human resources for the development of the Far East, to cope with the challenge of criminality, which is the most frightening feature of the business environment of the Far East. It is also necessary to recognize that such giants of international business as British Petroleum-Amoco and Shell, pursuing, no doubt, their own interests, in reality do much more to integrate Russia with the NEA and the Asia-Pacific region than many state commissions and state bodies. In recent years, the role of such integrators has also been taken up by the largest Russian energy companies.

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What other resources and reserves are available to improve the economic situation in the Russian Far East and boost the region's participation in international economic processes? Representatives of the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation call for using the opportunities of the Asia-Pacific Forum (APEC) to develop the regions of the Far East and Siberia ²² . It is known that APEC, which does not have its own financial resources, can nevertheless provide expert support for the implementation of particularly complex projects. The most developed and capital-intensive projects (energy transfer) will be implemented mainly at the expense of major international corporations, which also provide expert support. Perhaps it will be very difficult to find others for APEC expertise. A more urgent task so far is to remove a number of acute problems of internal origin (non - payments, power outages, incomplete legislative framework). Against the background of these mundane problems, calls to come up with some new loud programmatic and conceptual statements about Russia's goals in the Asia-Pacific region are fading. A sufficient number of correct words have already been pronounced in this regard. Russia's best and most useful contribution to Pan-Pacific cooperation would be to restore at least relative order at home, for example, by eliminating the inconsistency between federal and regional authorities.

In response to our appeals and appeals, foreign investors offer to speed up the resolution of the remaining issues that prevent them from launching activities in Russia on a scale comparable to other countries. The main wish for today is not to fall back on the issues of the PSA (Production Sharing Agreement) ²³ . Something has already been done: the PSA regime for the Kovykta gas field has been granted; tax schemes have been clarified or optimized; some property disputes have been settled. The new authorities of the most problematic region, Primorye, have opened up access for the largest Russian corporations, which marks the transition to a more open and rational economic policy, and encourages the influx of highly scarce resources - financial, technological, and human.

Only those countries of the North-East Asia and the Asia - Pacific region bordering our borders have made tangible, to say the least, economic and social progress, raised their level of well-being, which consciously chose the path of active participation in the international and regional division of labor, the path of market reforms, openness, which stimulated the attraction of investment, managerial know-how, etc.know-how. The same can be said for another sub-region adjacent to NEA , namely South-East Asia. It seems too categorical to say that " Moscow, for all its Eurasianism, will never become its own in this region, will feel it... certain Asian racism " ²⁴ . This is an unproductive angle, which again gives unjustifiably high weight to the ethnic moment. The leaders of the ASEAN countries are primarily pragmatists who are more committed to globalism than to East Asian regionalism in its closed version. They find a common language with the United States much faster than with " civilizationally close China." Offer competitive products, projects, and services and you will be accepted into the local community.

The program of action for the Russian Federation in Southeast Asia is not to mourn the departure from the Cam Ranh base (the rent for its use would have to be paid-directly or indirectly-at the expense of our Far Easterners), but to ensure the effective promotion of Russian economic interests in this region. It is known that the latter are mainly concentrated in Vietnam, where Zarubezhneft, the largest state operator, is successfully operating. There are also a few small Russian companies operating in the Southeast Asian countries that are mainly focused on serving Russian tourists and shuttles, but their turnover is not such that they become the subject of a comprehensive analysis.

Investment and political risks in Russia are decreasing, while in a number of Southeast Asian countries they are increasing. Russia and Southeast Asia increasingly appear as communicating vessels of the global economic system. Major investments in the Russian economy were made by the Singapore-based multi-profile international concern Amtel. The most successful countries in East Asia follow the slogan: either globalize or marginalize. Because the line between regionalism and globalism is increasingly blurred these days. The Russian Far East is located on the periphery of the Pacific Economic Zone. But the region may well put itself in a position where it will be able to recharge here with energy and energy efficiency.-

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the dynamism of cross-border business. Rejecting harmful stereotypes and unnecessary fears, exploring new areas of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

notes

^{Ishaev V., Minakir P.} 1 The Russian Far East: Real opportunities for economic development. Vladivostok, Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1998, p. 107.

² Russia in APEC. New features in new environments. Editor's note. Ivanov I. D., Titarenko M. L. M., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, IDV RAS, 2000, p. 99.

³ Ibid., p. 108.

^{Ishaev V., Minakir P.} 4 Decree. soch. P. 106.

^{Hong Mark.} 5 Perestroyaya Singapura [Rebuilding Singapore], Moscow, 2001, P. 107.

^{Ishaev V., Minakir P.} 6 Edict. op. p. 107.

⁷ The Russian Far East. Ekonomicheskiy potentsial [Economic potential]. Minakir P., Mikheeva N. Vladivostok, "Dalnauka", 1999. p. 419.

^{Ishaev V., Minakir P.} 8 Decree. soch. P. 138.

⁹ Novaya kamchatskaya pravda, 26.04.2001.

^{Ishaev V., Minakir P.} 10 Decree. op. P. 115.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 116.

¹² Ibid., p. 117.

¹³ ME and MO. 2000. N 11. P. 101.

^{Piontkovsky A.} 14 China is unavoidable // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14.08.2001.

^{Ishaev V., Minakir P.} 15 Decree. op. P. 123.

¹⁶ China in world and regional politics. History and modernity. IDV RAS, Moscow, 2000, p. 99,101.

^{Titarenko M.} 17 China. Civilizatsiya i reforma, Moscow: Respublika Publ., 1999, p. 63.

^{Shubart V.} 18 Europe and the Soul of the East, Moscow, 2000, p. 17.

¹⁹ Russia in APEC. New opportunities in new conditions ... pp. 31-33.

²⁰ Materials on topics for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in 2001, Moscow-Shanghai, 2000, p. 15.

^{Ishaev V., Minakir P.} 21 Decree. op. P. 139.

²² Russia in APEC. New opportunities in new conditions... p. 117.

²³ Ibid., pp. 117, 118.

²⁴ South-East Asia in 2000 Actual problems of development. Editorial Board: Maletin N. P. et al., Moscow, IV RAS, 2001, pp. 15, 16.

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