Moscow: Nauka-Vostochny lit., 2014, 343 p.

It seems to me that the whole world is watching the fate of India. Or at least he should have kept a close eye on her fate. She is constantly in a situation of choice, in the position of Odysseus, who must swim between Scylla and Charybdis.

Since the beginning of independent development, in 1947, the global liberal community has been asking itself the question: will democracy hold in India? It held out - and thus gave an important argument to supporters of democracy around the world. India has proved that a democratic system (and not "Western", but its own) can exist outside of Western Europe and North America, in countries that, according to all political science calculations, are "not ready" to live in conditions of political freedom.

Then the world watched to see if this huge agricultural country could "feed itself". I could do it. It even became a net grain exporter. However, a new and profound agrarian crisis is looming on the horizon [Rastyannikov, 2010]. Let's see how India copes with it.

But now it is time for a different crisis, which is also growing with the "second edition". During the liberation movement, the question was: is this country united? Is her people united? Is the liberation movement united? Several times it seemed that Indian leaders - intellectuals and outstanding thinkers M. K. Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru and others - would be able to cope with this task, the task of uniting forces against a common enemy, and would be able to lead a united and powerful Indian people. No, it failed. The nation split before it was formed. Two hostile States have emerged, and there is no end to their confrontation.

And now another boil is brewing, another dramatic dilemma: now that the bulk of South Asian Muslims have split out to Pakistan and Bangladesh, can the remaining 360 million Indians in India, now 1,200 million, become a nation? Or is India facing a new split and now a real civil war, because Muslims cannot be "separated", they live all over the country?

The answer to this question can and should be sought in various spheres of the country's social life in recent decades: in the economy, in the domestic and foreign policy of the state, and in cultural life (art, literature, etc.), but also in the state of historical consciousness, historical culture.

The author of the reviewed book quite rightly reminds us of E. Hobsbawm's opinion that a nation should have a "historical foundation". Without history, there is no nation (pp. 114-115). That is why historical problems are so acute. The book is important for understanding modern India. But the issues raised in it can not be more relevant for our country. The ongoing processes of clericalization of the intelligentsia in Russia and the government's struggle against " distortions of history "would be nice to see" from the outside " in order to understand to what extent they are not original. We often write in our works that the experience of the Eastern countries should be studied more carefully in order to take advantage of their best practices and try to avoid their mistakes. This experience is valuable both in the field of economic policy, in the field of building a political system, and in the field of building a national state. What kind of history do people need? Does a nation need a single interpretation of its history, or are different interpretations possible and legitimate? And if it is quite acute: is history a science or an ideological tool for rallying the nation?

The author examines the status of history (both in the meaning of the process and in the sense of studying this process) in India at different stages of its history. In the first chapter, she tries to prove that in ancient and early medieval India, historical thinking existed, at least no less than in other countries of approximately the same level of development. In the second chapter, she assesses the contribution that British scholars made to understanding and studying India during the colonial period. The third chapter describes the main directions of historical science in independent India. Finally, in the fourth chapter, he examines in detail the modern battles (sometimes in the most literal sense) on the" front " of history between rational-minded and confessionally blinded writers (not all of them can be called scientists).

The book is extremely rich in material, the author is passionate about the problem, its concept is built, the book is written in excellent language and is easy to read. Thus, without any exaggeration, we can say that it will be useful not only for specialists, but also for everyone interested in history and its role in life. But that is why a number of issues raised by E. Y. Vanina are worth discussing.

Of course, the first problem is crucial: the attitude of the Indians (namely, the Hindus) back to the story. My work convinces me that I am right in our long-standing dispute on this issue [Alaev, 2008]. E. Yu. Vanina is convinced that the Indians had a historical consciousness and recorded their history, but she honestly admits some facts that contradict this belief of hers. This recognition is remarkable: "... there are few societies that are in such a complex and contradictory relationship with their own past as India" (p. 9). In her opinion, the "main component" of the picture of history, which was "part of a learned, "Brahmin" culture, but in its fundamental elements... It was also shared by the mass consciousness of Hindus", "there was an idea that time practically "stands still" " (p. 20). You can't say better.

I will not list all the techniques by which Vanina tries to refute these own formulations and prove that the ancient and early medieval Indians had an understanding of the sequence of events, accepted the linear flow of time, and that their cultural monuments contained elements of historical knowledge. But all this does not refute the fact that the Indians were not interested in their history, did not record it, and did not leave us enough material to restore it in more or less full.

The invasion of Alexander the Great, according to E. Yu. Vanina, was "almost unnoticed by its (India's) historical tradition" (p. 86, see also p. 124). The thing is, there was no tradition of memorizing anything. Ajanta was discovered by a group of British officers hunting a tiger in those remote places. Khajuraho was discovered by a British topographer who plotted the area on a map. The attention of the Marathas to the desolate site of Shivaji's cremation was drawn by the English traveler James Douglas in 1883 (p. 141). If it hadn't been for James Douglas, Tilak might not have remembered Shivaji, and there would not be an all-India hero now.

The author frankly observes that "India' forgot 'a considerable part of its historical heritage and then 'remembered' it with outside help" (p. 9). "This history really had to be reconstructed, because in a significant part it was almost 'forgotten' by Indian society" (p. 82)." Thanks to the writings of orientalists, educated people were able to find a way out of it." for the first time in thousands of years, the Indians "remembered" their glorious Aryan origin, which had hitherto been safely forgotten " (p. 136). It is mentioned that "epigraphy of the Mauryan era" was "forgotten by India" (p. 77, footnote), but all other epigraphy and much more were forgotten (without any quotation marks). I agree with E. Y. Vanina that "in the Middle Ages, India experienced a much greater gap with its antiquity than Western Europe ..." (p.82).

It is in vain that the author defends ancient and medieval authors from allegedly demanding that they fully meet the standards of a modern professional historian. No, everyone understands and accepts the" unscientific nature " of the medieval author. That's why the science of source studies is that to extract a historical fact from a source, you need a certain technique. But if we do not find in India authors like Herodotus, or Sima Qian, or Nestor, then we are forced to admit this fact: they do not exist.

What did the Indians have by the time of the so-called Muslim conquest? "India met the beginning of the so-called Muslim period by already having a certain tradition of historical writing (emphasis added - L. A.). It was this tradition that Biruni had in mind when he criticized the Indians for "taking the sequence of events lightly... they were careless of the chronological order of the reigns of their kings and ... were forced to

in case of doubt and the need to resort to creating legends "(Biruni, 1995, p. 360) "(p. 36). These words Biruni Vanina does not refute. But if they are true, then the conclusion is that the Indian (specifically Hindu) "tradition of historical scripture" consisted in a reluctance to create a "historical scripture".

The attitude of Hindus to chronology is remarkable for its carelessness. The campaign of Alexander the Great, as we already know, did not make a special impression on the Hindus. Literally: not etched in their memory. But in Indology, it plays an exceptional role only because we know when it happened, and we also know that Alexander met Chandragupta Maurya. So we know when the Maurya dynasty ruled. And this is the basis for the entire chronology of the history of ancient India! If Chandragupta hadn't accidentally met Alexander, we still wouldn't know when the great Emperor Ashoka reigned!

Let's turn to epigraphy, dating of which is really often possible. But this dating was created by modern historians who used all the techniques of modern science and had the opportunity to compare dozens of inscriptions from different parts of the country. The originators and customers of inscriptions were the least concerned about the issue of dating. Referring to G. Kulke, Vanina writes that "in detailing the genealogy of the tsars, these inscriptions often (? - L. A.) mentioned the dates of their reigns and were, in fact, Early medieval annals" (p. 22). There is another footnote to the authoritative historian R. Thapar. I don't know who is wrong - the respected historians whom Vanina has enlisted in her support, or Vanina herself - but this is all a stretch. For example, the statement that "a significant majority of epigraphic inscriptions were dated" (p. 23). In fact, in the vast majority of cases, the inscription does not contain a date for one of the eras accepted in India. If there is a date, then it means the year of the reign of this king, and how this king chronologically interacts with his ancestors is completely unknown. Panegyrics(prashasti), which often precede the "business part" of inscriptions, cannot serve as an analogue of medieval annals. They never include dates. Thapar is right that by comparing hundreds of prasastas, "it is possible to reconstruct the history of individual dynasties with varying degrees of accuracy" (p. 22). But pay attention to this "degree of confidence", and also consider how much work all this requires!

The very existence of several eras in India indicates that there is no desire to build history in a certain chronological order. The same Thapar states that " since the fifth century, the indication of exact dates and the system of chronology ("Vikrama era"," Shaka era", etc.) becomes more common "(p. 23). But here's how: before the fifth century, there are almost no dates at all, and then they occur a little more often. And what is hidden under " etc."? The following is hidden. In addition to the more widespread eras of Vikrama (from 57/58 BCE in northern India and 55/56 BCE in southern India; the year begins in March in Eastern India and November in Western India) and Shaka (from 78/79 A.D.), many dynasties and successful rulers established their own eras that were used for a while and then forgotten. There were eras of Kali (from 3100/3101 BC), Buddha (from 544 BC), Mahavira (Jaina, from 528 BC), Licchavi (from 110 AD, in Nepal), Chedi (aka Kalachuri, aka Traikutaka, from 248/249 AD), Guptas (either from 20.12.318 AD, or from 26.02.320 AD), Ganges (from 14.03.498 AD), Kollam (from 824/825 AD), Harshi (from 606 AD), Bhatika (in Rajasthan, from 624/625 AD).Kalinga Ganga (from 877/878), Chalukya Vikrama (from 08.03.1076). In Northern Konkan, the Abhira dynasty ruled, about which nothing is known, except that its rulers dated their inscriptions to the era beginning from 249/250. Muslims adhered, of course, to their Hijra era and the lunar calendar, but the famous freethinker Akbar tried to introduce his own solar era of Ilahi ("Divine"), which began in 1584. However, it did not take root.

It is often unknown for which era the figure in the inscription is given. The dates of the beginnings of various eras are not given to us by the compilers of inscriptions, but are established by the hard work of epigraphists. I have given this list of eras so that the reader will be finally convinced that the historical consciousness of the Hindus is, to put it mildly, original, and all attempts to prove that in this respect they did not differ from other peoples are not based on a solid foundation and are wishful thinking.

"The historical memory of the people," reports E. Y. Vanina, "preserved in ballads and legends memories of kings, heroes and saints" (p. 128). Wonderful! Imagine the picture that there are no Russian chronicles, but only epics, and also "The Word about Igor's Regiment"and " Zadonshchina". And we study Russian history.

The British contribution to the study of Indian history is considered exclusively from the point of view of Edward Said [Said, 2003; Said, 2006] and his concept of orientalism. I have already expressed my attitude to this concept [Alaev 2014 (1); Alaev 2014(2)]. I will repeat the main point. His critique of Eurocentric Oriental studies must be taken into account: look back on ourselves in a self-critical way. But it is impossible to completely deny everything that Europeans have done in the field of Oriental studies. It is generally accepted that modern Oriental studies emerged as one of the "colonial projects", that it was distinguished by its Eurocentrism and ideologically served the colonial policy. But there is no other Oriental studies (as a science), except "infected" with Orientalism (in the understanding of Said), simply does not exist.

Vanina reproaches the "orientalists" for having studied "the wrong" sources: monuments of religious and philosophical thought, legal texts of the dharmashastras, puranas, linguistic works, epics, lyrical poetry, dramas, etc. - "works in which you could find anything but history" (p. 79). Right. But, first of all, we studied what was there. If there were historical writings - chronicles, annals, or something similar-they would study them. Let me clarify that there was something "similar". These are puranas-lists of numerous names of kings who ruled no one knows where and no one knows when. This is what the Hindus meant by " history."

The author repeatedly informs that recently new sources are being opened that will significantly supplement and correct the idea of Indian history inherited from the "orientalists". Where are these sources? Where are these new books based on new sources that exist somewhere?

Here is another interesting statement: "In India, any graduate student can go to a particular repository, pull out one of the piles of dusty, in many cases not researched by anyone and often not even properly cataloged documents, and get a source for his dissertation completely unknown to science" (p.74). Why haven't they been researched and cataloged yet? So why don't graduate students go to the vaults and pull something out of a pile of dusty manuscripts? Because they are not looking for new data at all, they are looking for new estimates.

"It will take a lot of time and effort," the author writes, "for the history of India to be studied at least at the same level of source studies that the history of other countries has long been studied" (p.75). So it is that this will never happen, because there are no such sources. In the pre-Muslim period, there are not only no chronicles or annals. Neither are the "population censuses" mentioned in the Arthashastra, nor in Ayin - i Akbari. And in Europe, for example, there are church books that can be used to study not only demographic processes, but also the famous "history of everyday life" - one of the relatively recent fashion trends. So, for example, "the Indian' Annals School '" is unthinkable.

From the book by E. Y. Vanina, we learn that "orientalists were actively engaged in archaeological and numismatic research, which made it possible not only to study and preserve a lot of material evidence of past eras, but also to provide scientists with invaluable material for reconstructing the ancient history of India" (p.82). British books on Indian history are biased, of course, but British Orientalists created the history of India and gave it to the Indians. The author focuses his work against "the version of the past that European orientalists created for the Indians and, with the help of various tools, for a long time, to a certain extent up to the present day, have introduced into their consciousness" (p. 59). There is a picture of criminal brainwashing of consciousness. But is there any other version of India's past that is even remotely sound?

It is on this foundation created by the colonialists that all modern concepts, including those that contradict each other, develop. Jawaharlal Nehru, after reading several orientalist " Histories of India "(see p. 200), wrote on their material his books are quite nationalistic (in the best sense patriotic), and not at all "orientalist". Modern odious authors - Hindu chauvinists-also write their own smelly pamphlets, relying (in addition to their inventions, of course) on the works of"orientalists". "After studying the works of European researchers, nationalists were able to appeal to the former "Aryan greatness" " (p. 137). Moreover, they "actively and sometimes verbatim borrowed their concepts from European authors" (p.136). This means that the works of "orientalists" contain objective facts that can be used in any interests.

¹ Why it is necessary to write dharmashastras with a hyphen, while "dharma" - in italics, and "shastras" - in a straight font, I do not understand.

By the way, why is there no Marx among the "orientalists"? Hegel is there, Alfred Weber is there (by the way, one could also mention Max Weber), and Karl Marx, a typical "orientalist" and consistent European-Centric, who relied on Hegel in his statements about India, is mentioned in the book, but is not even included in the index of names. And he had a much stronger influence on Oriental studies and Indology than both Weber and even Hegel. Indologists would have forgotten Hegel long ago if it hadn't been for Marx. Why did Vanina avoid this figure? Is she ashamed of this author? Does he think that Marx's views on Indian history should be hushed up? It's not pretty.

I don't know what can explain the author's failure to understand Marx's concept of the Asiatic mode of production, Oriental despotism, and the closed community. Apparently, lack of familiarity with this concept. "Struggling" with the phrase "Eastern despotism", she believes that it is undermined by another thesis - about a closed Eastern community, independent of the central government (p.99-100). In fact, these are two sides of a single concept. Marx and Engels believed that it was precisely the preservation of the (primitive, as they thought) rural community that allowed despotism to rise above it. And as examples, they cited many countries-from Java to Russia. This concept can (and should) be criticized, but in general, not in parts.

The author lists all sorts of distortions that" orientalists " have introduced into the history of India. They, says Vanina ironically, "told the natives many new and previously unknown things" (p. 58). Among them, there are really odious ideas (such as the fact that the cult of Krishna is borrowed from Christianity). But among such stupidities is listed, apparently "to the heap", and the fact that "the long-forgotten" Laws of Manu "(the first centuries AD) may well be the basis of"native legislation"." No, this particular idea was not brought with them by the colonialists; it was too well "previously known". It was the Bengali Brahmans who initially convinced the colonialists that India had not changed and that the "Laws of Manu" were still relevant today. The British believed and began to create a code of laws based on the dharmashastras, but soon became convinced that this was impossible, and began to build the Indian legislative system anew. "The discrepancy between the world of the studied texts and the real world of India of the XVIII-XIX centuries was striking: Indian society, as the orientalists saw it, was not like the precise, perfectly functioning mechanism that the Sastras had constructed" (p. 81). Aha, it turns out that it was the malicious "orientalists" who saw the real world, and not its image distorted by the Indian tradition.

The chapters devoted to the modern "struggle for history" are particularly interesting. The author puts the material into three "baskets": the general civil version (aptly named by her" three - color story"); the Hindu version (with its cancer - "saffronization", i.e. protrusion and exaltation of everything Hindu); the Muslim version.

The "three-color story" (meaning the colors of the Indian flag) is intended to become part of the ideology of inclusive nationalism, i.e. nationalism that seeks to reflect the interests of all religious communities in the country (all social strata, too, but this goes without saying). In fact, it is joined by historians of the materialist trend, who strive to remain on the basis of science (p. 211).

In covering their position and, most importantly, their fate in today's India, the author, it seems to me, is unnecessarily critical. Throughout this chapter, Indian material scientists refer to themselves as" distinguished historians " in quotation marks (p.210, etc.). But they are really outstanding. Many of them are personal acquaintances of Vanina, and she maintains friendly relations with them. They are indeed eminent, but their opponents have begun to use this definition in a mocking context. But Yevgenia Yurievna admits that it was the members of this group who "created the national historical school and brought it to the international level" (p. 218). But when they are called "outstanding" in quotation marks a dozen times, they get a completely distorted idea (and, I am sure, contrary to the author's intentions) that they are not so outstanding.

The designation of them as "leftists and Marxists" is also taken from the arsenal of Hindu traditionalists and also sounds like humiliation in their speeches. For them, Marxism is a Western teaching, and therefore harmful. And these prominent historians are actually leftists and Marxists. And in our vocabulary, quotation marks for these words are completely out of place. It is very common and even offensive to say that all of them "have been influenced to one degree or another by Marxism, which is often very specifically interpreted" (p.214). Irfan Khabib will undoubtedly be offended. He considers himself a real Marxist, he is a member of the CPI (M), was a long-time member of its Central Committee, is opposed not only to the latest transformations in Russia, but also to the reforms in the PRC, because he considers them revisionism, a deviation from the course of building socialism.

In addition, the question arises: who did not interpret Marxism "specifically"? In any case, it is time for us to abandon the idea that our Soviet interpretation of Marxism is the only correct one.

The underlying reason for the underestimation of the progressive branch of Indian historical science is a poor knowledge of Marxism.

The author notes some extremely clumsy attempts to apply Marxist theory to the analysis of Indian culture. But these are not individual mistakes of certain researchers, they are the consequences of holes in the theory itself.

For example, Yevgenia Yurievna quotes D. D. Kosambi with disapproval:" For the purposes of this work, history is defined as a representation in chronological order of the consistent development of the means and relations of production", But this is not Kosambi's idea, it is a formulation of the Marxist approach to history. The author complains that interest in socio-economic problems among Indian Marxists was "hypertrophied", and their works were characterized by "a noticeable disregard for the problems of culture, religion, ideas and ideologies, views and values" (p. 215). Why were they so oblivious to cultural issues? Because Marxism focused them on the study of the "basis". Marx and Engels argued that law and religion have no history of their own [Marx, Engels, vol. 3, p.64]. To reproach India's leading historians for being Marxists is somehow unfair. When Kosambi applies "class analysis" to the Subhashitaratnakosha or to the works of Bhartrihari, or when R. S. Sharma claims that the Bhakti movements strengthened feudal relations, they are the ones who firmly believe in the correctness of Marxism! It was not Kosambi who " demanded that the evaluation of literary works or processes in the religious and cultural sphere proceed from a rigid class analysis "(p. 215), but Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels:" The history of all hitherto existing societies was the history of the class struggle " [Marx and Engels, vol.4, p. 424]. "Every historical struggle, whether it takes place in the political, religious, philosophical, or any other ideological sphere, is in reality only a more or less clear expression of the struggle of social classes" [Marx, Engels, vol. 21, p.259]. Let us recall that quite recently our outstanding scholars A. M. Dyakov and K. Z. Ashrafyan searched for the class roots of the bhakti movement.

What can be blamed on Indian historians today is not due to the "level of science of the 50s and 80s" (p. 218), but to the dogmatism of the Marxist method that they adopted. It seems that it is possible to outline a certain pattern in the application of Marxism in different countries. At the first stage, it is perceived as the ultimate truth, as an indisputable dogma. Then the limitations of dogmas are realized and revisionism appears. Finally, researchers (and politicians) are moving far away from Marxism, continuing to assure everyone that they remain Marxists. In Germany, the process of revising Marxism began as early as the end of the nineteenth century, and it was none other than Engels who began it (let us recall his letters admitting that economic conditions are "decisive" only "in the final analysis" [Marx, Engels, vol. 37, pp. 370, 394-395; Vol. 39, p. 84]). He also recommended that the German Social-Democrats move from revolutionary actions to parliamentary struggle [Ibid., vol. 22, pp. 543-548].

In Russia (USSR), the letter of I. V. Stalin, S. M. Kirov and A. A. Zhdanov from 1934 about the need to study civil history (before that only the history of the class struggle was considered worthy of study) can be considered a similar milestone of departure from a primitive understanding of theory to a more common sense one). This was followed by a rather interesting evolution of Soviet "creative Marxism", when people gradually abandoned dogmas, sometimes without even admitting it to themselves.

Marxist thought came to India later and went through the same stages with a certain time lag. This allowed A. M. Osipov and I. D. Serebryakov to condescendingly note that Kosambi, they say, primitives the Marxist method [Alaev, 2013, pp. 310-311]. It was good for them, who had already experienced the peak of their passion for a straightforward class approach (not they survived, but the public around them survived). We must be sympathetic to the Marxist experiences of our Indian colleagues.

After many pages about "outstanding historians", it suddenly turns out that they are supported by the academic community, that the "professional community of historians", "the largest historians of the country, Hindus and Muslims"have taken their side. So they're not all alone? Not marginals. Not just some "Marxists and leftists"? And the textbook authors themselves,

those who were awarded the epithet "outstanding" in quotation marks above, it turns out, are "respected and highly professional scientists" (pp. 238-239).

I do not agree that these historians ' view of the Indian past was characterized by an "accusatory bias" (p. 216). The lack of idealization of the past and critical attitude towards it is not an accusatory bias. It is their opponents, not finding in the works of historians the apologetics of the past, who shout about the "accusatory bias". It's not appropriate for us to join them. "Saffron" historians see a continuous progress in the history of India (with the exception of the "Muslim" period), but this position is completely unscientific. Every country is experiencing periods of growth and decline, and all this needs to be told.

Marxist theory says that all societies after primitive times and before socialism were exploitative. It is precisely how ancient and medieval Hindu societies, if they are Marxists, were to be regarded by Indian Marxists as based on the exploitation of the masses. And this is also perceived as a" blackening " of the glorious past.

Vanina rightly notes that "a significant part of society was more willing to accept the myth than its exposure" (p. 217). But what should professional historians do now? Forget about your profession and tell the myth? The author advises "outstanding historians "(here again the quotation marks appear) not to expose "myths" (for some reason, "myths" are also in quotation marks here - are they really not myths?), but to study them (p. 244). But if someone studies a myth, it means that they don't believe in it! How can you study myths without calling them myths? How, for example, can one study the myth of vegetarianism of the ancient Aryans without providing data on their diet and, consequently, exposing this myth? You can write about Rama as a historical figure - and then take the position of communalism, or as a mythological figure - and then offend the feelings of all believers.

I am sure that the author did not mean to belittle the color of Indian historical thought. I just couldn't handle my temper.

It would be necessary to change the tone in relation to real historians. They were trapped. If they write about ancient Indian culture, they will have to write in high, enthusiastic tones. Otherwise, they will be accused of "blackening". And to praise the ancient culture, to put the Hindu culture above all others, they are not allowed by their honesty as a historian. They can't even date the Mahabharata and the Laws of Manu correctly, because that would also be an insult to Hindu saffron sensibilities. Therefore, they prefer not to write about all this at all - and thus incur even more serious (fair) accusations of ignoring culture.

In order to stifle the incitement of communalist hostility, they really cover up the barbaric acts of Muslim troops. But if they write about it in detail, their work will be used in communalist propaganda. They mention that Hindu rulers were often no less cruel to their co-religionists than the Muslim invaders, but if they cite a lot of material about the atrocities of Hindu rajas (and there is this material), they risk a lot, sometimes their lives, for denigrating the great Indian history.

Bhakti preachers in the Middle Ages could denounce fanaticism (p. 245) because they were saints. Saints in India can do anything. And modern professional historians are not saints, and you can call them whatever you want. Their cause is hopeless, but at least they deserve sympathy.

The book raises the question of the responsibility of progressive historians for "putting" history in the hands of communalists. What should they do? They write books, textbooks, but all this is overwhelmed by a wave of saffron "patriotism". Go "to the people"? Preach "how it really was"? They'll beat you up.

As for historiography, which is inspired by exclusive nationalism (i.e., the ideology of setting one's religious community against another), I think it is important to distinguish more strictly between nationalist history - the search for sources for everything that can elevate Hindus - and chauvinistic history, which is not a science at all, which does not need facts, which is capable of inventing "facts" itself."and proclaim Hindus to be the first people on Earth.

In this regard, I strongly object to combining nationalist historians like Romesh Chandra Majumdar on the one hand and charlatans like Uac on the other. There is a nationalist one, but it is generally clear, trying to stay on the ground

this is historiography, and there are charlatans for whom the historical truth does not matter.

The book ends, as it should, with the expression "hope" for the preservation of the Indian nation, for the "instinct of self-preservation of society". The book's material, as well as my own observations of the situation [Alaev, 2013, pp. 409-428], do not support this hope.

list of literature

Alaev L. B. Rec. on: E. Yu. Vanina. Medieval Thinking: The Indian version, Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura Publ., 2007 // Vostok (Oriens), 2008, No. 1.

Aktual'nye voprosy podgotovki spetsialistov mezhdunarodnogo profila: smena paradigmov: materialy nauchnoy konferentsii (Moskva, 15-16 novemberya 2013 g. V 2 chastakh v 2 chastakh [Actual issues of training international specialists: changing paradigms: materials of the scientific conference (Moscow, November 15-16, 2013 In 2 parts. Ch. 2. Moscow: MGIMO-University, 2014(1)).

Alaev L. B. Istoriografiya istorii Indii [Historiography of the History of India].

Alaev L. B. Vostokovedenie i orientalizm: analiz knigi E. Saida [Oriental studies and Orientalism: an analysis of E. Said's book]. Scientific notes of the Faculty of History. Issue 8. Lipetsk: LSPU Publ., 2014 (2).

Biruni Abu Reyhan. Moscow: Ladomir Publ., 1995.

Marx K., Engels F. Essays. 2nd ed. Vol. 1-50. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1955-1981.

Rastyannikov V. G. Agrarian India: Paradoxes of economic growth. The second half of the XX century-the beginning of the XXI century. Moscow: IV RAS, 2010.

Said Edward V. Orientalism: Western concepts of the East. Translated from English by A. Govorunova, St. Petersburg: Russian World, 2006.

Said E. Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient. L.: Penguin, 2003.

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