The article is devoted to China's actions aimed at strengthening traditionally close relations and preventing destructive influences of third countries in its relations with ASEAN. Various forms of interstate and interdepartmental cooperation, diplomatic and economic ties between China and ASEAN are considered.

Keywords: ASEAN, China, international relations, economic cooperation, security.

The Southeast Asian region has always been a priority in Chinese strategy, and now, despite its tendency towards globalism, for reasons of military security and stable economic growth, China traditionally includes it in its plans to restore its former power and return to an independent role in the international arena.

In the statements of experts and politicians in the region, there are concerns related to the hegemonic sentiments of China, which is "rising" at the expense of weaker countries. Nevertheless, the ASEAN Countries are ready to cooperate closely. This trend is supported by economic growth not only in China, but also in the entire region: it is in the mutual interest to ensure this growth through political and economic stabilization. Both sides have initiated projects to consolidate the region, such as the East Asia Summit, CAFTA, the China - ASEAN Free Trade Area, Community 2015 or the ASEAN Charter, which are designed to strengthen and stabilize the situation in the region. There are also a number of obstacles that hinder mutual relations: unresolved military and political issues, territorial disputes, transnational threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking, and corruption.

I. Areas and stages of China-ASEAN cooperation

Since the founding of the organization, there have been four distinct stages in China - ASEAN relations: ¹:

- Confrontation (from the founding of ASEAN to the mid-1970s)

- Reconciliation (late 1970s),

- Cooperation (from the beginning of the 80s to the mid-90s of the XX century)

- Post-Cold War partnership.

This article examines the post-cold War period, when, thanks to the common interests of ASEAN and China, China's policy has opened up new opportunities for cooperation with the United States.-

Petrasiak Malgorzata, Professor at the University of Lodz (Poland). E-mail: mpietrasiak@uni.lodz.pl.

that is, the space of their mutual agreement was marked. In addition, this period was characterized by integration trends that favored the creation of common institutions. In July 1991, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was invited to attend the opening ceremony of the XXIV ASEAN Conference of Foreign Ministers, and since then, China has participated in each of them. In 1994, the country participated in the conference of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and in the same year became an advisory partner of the ASEAN Dialog2. Initially skeptical of the ARF's activities and fearing Western, mainly American, influence on the organization, China became the ninth full dialogue partner in both ASEAN and the ARF by July 1996, among other states (India, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United States and the EU). The goals of ASEAN and CHINA coincided. ASEAN's ambition was to link China economically and include it in the regional security dialogue.

At the Malaysia Summit in July 1997, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen gave a speech outlining China's strategy towards ASEAN. In general, the very friendly and consensus-based nature of this strategy should be noted.

At the end of 1997, in addition to the ASEAN China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC) established in February, there were already several parallel forms of dialogue between them: political consultations at the level of the High-level Meeting of Officials (SOM), the Joint Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, and the Committee on Economic and Trade Affairs as well as a Committee in Beijing consisting of ASEAN ambassadors. China participated in the work of the ARF and the Council. Through multilateral dialogue, while strengthening bilateral contacts, China is pursuing its political and economic goals of creating favorable conditions for further stable development.

Both sides emphasize direct contacts. For example, in 2010 alone, 70 visits took place at different levels. ³ In 2010, the implementation of the plan outlined in the joint declaration of strategic partnership for 2005-2010 was completed. China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (Joint Declaration on China - ASEAN) and the next plan for 2011-2015 was formulated.

II. The process of institutionalization and the importance of China's economic cooperation with the Southeast Asian region

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 forced states to take more careful care of stabilization, regardless of the potential threat from an increasingly powerful China. The form of institutionalization of cooperation between the region's leaders and ASEAN was the form of ASEAN+3 (APT)⁴. The APT first met in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997. Japan initiated the establishment of the Asian Monetary Fund. China was initially opposed to its creation, but later began to view the initiative more favorably, actively participating in the construction of a financial structure in the region, which strengthened its position and at the same time created a better mechanism for protecting the region from subsequent crises.⁵

In May 2000, the APT made an important commitment, according to which the APT Finance Ministers decided to conclude a bilateral SWAP agreement between Asian banks in order to strengthen regional financial stability. In 2009, there were already 16 bilateral agreements within the framework of the ASEAN+3 group, and the states committed to allocate foreign exchange reserves, which in March 2010 they amounted to 120 billion rubles

United States dollars. Of these, 91.8 billion rubles. There were funds from China, Japan and Korea ⁶. The plan was to double the funds by 2012.7.

In 2001, at the ASEAN Summit held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Premier Zhu Rongji presented China's five-point position on developing cooperation in East Asia, where the PRC played an active role. In particular, they mentioned: the need to define a development goal, a framework for cooperation in regional trade and mutually beneficial investments in finance, science and technology, information, and environmental protection; development and improvement of coordination of cooperation within the framework of ASEAN+3 and ASEAN +1 - diverse and complementary forms; continuation of cooperation in the financial sector; exchanges between the two countries. social groups; dialogue and cooperation in the field of security ⁸.

Despite some instability, the beginning of the twenty-first century was undoubtedly marked by a significant rapprochement between ASEAN and China, these two international actors. A credit boom has begun, and China has turned from a recipient of aid to a donor, providing loans to ASEAN countries. Competition between China and Japan for geopolitical influence has forced both countries to pursue their own investment policies. Among the many definitions of this policy, analysts prefer to use the term "charm offensive" ⁹, which should indicate new methods of implementing the goals of China's foreign policy. The phrase "win-win cooperation", i.e. "mutually beneficial cooperation", is firmly included in the vocabulary of Chinese leaders.¹⁰

Analyzing the subsequent stages of economic relations between China and ASEAN, it is necessary to cite the decree of the leaders of the ten ASEAN and Chinese States of November 2000, in which they agreed to strengthen cooperation through the creation of the China - ASEAN Free Trade Zone. In 2002, an agreement was signed to liberalize up to 99% of trade with the founding member States of ASEAN by 2010 and with the rest of the association's members by 2015. For China, the most important goal of this step was the full integration of the Chinese economy with the global economy. The Chinese were interested in opening up more Asian markets, which had previously consumed only 8% of China's exports. Hu Angang, a Chinese expert, figuratively described China's preferred model of trade with the ASEAN countries as a semi-open model, i.e. "open to free exports, but protectionist in terms of imports." ¹¹ In turn, the aim of the ASEAN countries in this regard was to increase their competitiveness, as well as economic cooperation with the rapidly developing China, including attracting Chinese investment. The ASEAN heads of State have refuted assessments that suggest a total disparity in relations. Singapore's Minister George Yeo stated in 2002:: "We don't want to remain a citizen of China." ¹²

An interesting initiative in the framework of ASEAN-China cooperation is the establishment of the Boao Asian Forum, which has been active since 2001. It is the most prestigious non-political organization established to promote regional economic integration and the implementation of the Development goals13.

In 2006, on the 15th anniversary of cooperation, China and ASEAN lavished mutual praise to show and prove how strong their ties are. Premier Wen Jiabao said it is clear that since 1991, the two sides have been systematically striving to build mutual trust, eliminate "pitfalls" and create a good atmosphere for dialogue. As a result, China - ASEAN relations have reached the highest point in their historical development.¹⁴ In 2008, China accredited its first Ambassador to ASEAN, Ms. Xue Hanying.¹⁵ In 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao initiated the establishment of the China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund (CAF), which aims to invest in infrastructure, energy and natural resources.

On January 1, 2010, the CAFTA Free Trade Zone was opened. It took 8 years to build, and currently includes 11 states with a population of 1.9 billion people. human. Customs duties on goods between these countries decreased on average from 9.8% to 0.1%. A sub-regional Mekong River project is being successfully developed within the zone with the participation of China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. According to experts, free trade includes more than 7,000 different types of goods and will account for about 90% of all trade between China and ASEAN. The project should also include services and investment contracts ¹⁶.

In 2010, the trade turnover at CAFTA exceeded 280 billion US dollars. According to Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, trade exchange within the free trade zone increased to approximately 360 billion US dollars in 201117.

Thanks to its integration with ASEAN, China has become the last industrial consumer to use components made in ASEAN countries. While domestic trade in ASEAN increased slowly after the 1997 crisis, trade with China contributed significantly to its growth. ¹⁸ Sales of parts and components of electronic devices and mechanical engineering dominated. At the same time, trade in textiles, which represent the greatest value to the GDP of the ASEAN countries, has clearly declined.

The CAFTA integration processes have resulted in an increase in China's foreign direct investment. ASEAN investments are also being kept at a high level. Overall, over the past three years, Chinese investment in ASEAN countries has reached $ 12.426 billion. USA. Under the new rules, Chinese enterprises can invest in any ASEAN country and then enter the market with their manufactured goods in the remaining nine member states. Moreover, they can enter the free market of all those countries that have signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN - for example, Japan or South Korea. ¹⁹ So, while European and American investment in China was falling, Asian investment continued to grow, and in 2011 PPI out of ten Asian countries in the region, including Japan, Thailand and Singapore increased by 13.9%, reaching US $ 100.5 billion ²⁰. Chinese Commerce Minister Gao Huchen told a news conference that Chinese companies invested US $ 1.49 billion in the first half of 2012 alone, representing an annual growth of 34.3%^.21

The ASEAN+China strategy is not only about capital investment, but also about servicing it. Beijing is making good use of the interest of Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Malaysia in building agricultural infrastructure.

China is determined to increase its investment for various reasons. First, the number of large global Chinese enterprises is growing. In 2000, five of them were included in the UNCTAD list of the largest multinational corporations (TNCs). Fortuna Global's list included 61 Chinese TNCs in 2011, 46 a year earlier, and 20.22 In 2005.Second, Chinese companies are investing to improve production conditions. Ensuring growth abroad is associated with creating additional demand for subjects in the country. Third, Chinese state-owned enterprises have been reformed in accordance with WTO requirements, and this helps them rebuild. Fourth, both Japan and China are actively trying to create favorable conditions for the delivery of strategic natural resources and ensure economic development.

Thus, China is adept at applying various forms of economic cooperation. They also benefit the ASEAN countries, as the latter have priority conditions for access to the Chinese market and use investment capital. For its part, China expects these short-term benefits to bear fruit in the pursuit of long-term political and economic goals. Describing the importance of the region from the point of view of China's interests, it is worth pointing out-

its economic potential, including natural resources, a market of 600 million consumers, and direct capital investment.

III. China and ensuring security in the Southeast Asian region

The problem of security in Southeast Asia is interpreted broadly: it applies not only to the military sector, but also to the political, economic and social ones.

Numerous statements and official statements describe Southeast Asia as a pluralistic security community that solves problems in the "spirit of ASEAN", that is, through consensus and common values. This creates a favorable environment for stable economic growth. The implementation of China's military security goals should take into account both the achievements of ASEAN in this area, the American factor in the existing system, and unresolved conflicts: Korean and territorial disputes in the region. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)is the most important initiative that builds a dialogue on regional security. The first ARF conference was held in Singapore in 1993, and the main idea of the negotiations was to create an institutionalized system that would promote preventive diplomacy, counteract conflicts, and build mutual trust.

This decision was influenced by the end of the Cold war and the need to develop new forms of cooperation and international security.

The second Ministerial Conference in 1995 developed a three-phase process for building security by promoting and cultivating trust, developing preventive diplomacy, and finally conflict prevention.²³ The ARF website's motto is to promote peace and security through dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

In the past, China has shown little confidence in multilateral security dialogue and has preferred bilateral talks. However, over time, his attitude began to change along with the idea of security. In July 1998, the "New Concept of National Security" was published in China, where, in addition to traditional threats, non-traditional ones were also listed: piracy, drug trafficking, environmental threats, etc. This approach has received a positive response from ASEAN, and since then, the regional security dialogue has also addressed non-traditional threats.

As part of the implementation of the ASEAN 2020 program, the ASEAN Political - Security Community was founded in 2003, which, along with the Economic (ASEAN Economic Community) and Socio-Cultural (ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community) communities, constitute the three pillars of the ASEAN Community. Currently, together with the ARF, the platform for cooperation in this security sector is the ASEAN Political Security Community. The APSC official documents show that the most important policy goals are: development and mutual understanding of the political systems of the ASEAN States, their culture and history; free exchange of information between member States; support for the improvement of law and law enforcement systems; promotion of "good governance"; protection of human rights; development of research centers and monitoring of political processes; prevention of corruption; promotion of the foundations of democracy, concern for peace and stability in the region. The APSC Action Plan emphasized the importance of the rules contained in the ASEAN Charter, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and the Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ). as key documents for security in the region, as well as the significance of the Declaration on Behavior in the South China Sea. Reference was also made to maritime cooperation, and attention was drawn to the creation of means of mutual trust, and a greater share of international cooperation.

transparency of the defense and security systems of states, as well as strengthening the role of the ARF in strengthening regional security. Conflict prevention, creation of mechanisms for active search for peaceful solutions, promotion of regional cooperation, social security and guardianship, combating (preventing) non-traditional security threats were also mentioned in the context of strengthening security in the region24.

Since 2004, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of China has organized more than 60 trainings and courses on anti-drug legislation, forensic techniques, cyberterrorism and other topics related to non-traditional security threats. In the period 2006-2011 alone, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of China conducted five such trainings, which were attended by 92 intelligence officers from ASEAN countries.²⁵

In turn, the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences organized conferences (in 2008 and 2009) on military modernization and regional mutual trust, as well as security in East Asia in the context of China - ASEAN security cooperation. In 2010, the two sides organized security talks between politicians and experts. In 2011, the first meeting of the defense ministers of China and ASEAN ²⁶ was held, the next one was held in Phnom Penh in 2012, and the third one was held in Brunei in 2013. The most important achievement of China's dialogue within the framework of the ARF is considered to be the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed in November 2002.The problem, however, is that since then no steps have been taken to end the conflict.

The conflict concerns the Paracel Islands and, above all, the Spratly Islands, which are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam - all islands, and the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei-only some of them. All interested countries, except Brunei, are thinking about strengthening their military and administrative presence there, regular transport operations, etc. The islands themselves are not very valuable, but there is reason to believe that they are rich in oil, gas and other natural resources. The strategic location on the border of the Pacific and Indian Oceans is also important. More than half of maritime trade passes through the South China Sea, including more than 80% of oil shipments to Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan. The largest number of islands is administered by Vietnam-22, China has 14 islands, the Philippines - 11, Malaysia - 10, Taiwan - one, the largest-Itu-Aba, and Brunei does not have any ²⁷.

The proposals put forward in the declaration are not new, all of them were proposed in previous multilateral and bilateral documents. But the declaration contains three special proposals. First, refraining from actions in relation to currently uninhabited islands, reefs, rocks, i.e. the impossibility of a new occupation. This paragraph of the declaration also refers to the creation of confidence-building mechanisms, notification of exercises and naval maneuvers. Secondly, we are talking about continuing regular consultations on monitoring and monitoring compliance with the declaration. This is not easy, because, according to international maritime law, the rights of the parties to fish come into contact with the problem of disputed territories. Third, the parties agreed to develop a code of conduct.

The declaration is not an agreement - rather, it shows how the dispute should be resolved. In September 2004, the Philippines and China agreed to launch joint seismic surveys in the disputed waters and establish the presence of gas and oil. Vietnam joined the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in 2005. In March 2005, in Manila, Vietnam Petroleum Corporation ("PetroVietnam"), Philippines National Oil Company (PNOC) and China National Ofshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed a trilateral agreement on the joint use of oil and gas in the South China Sea. Foreign Ministers of the Philippines Alberto Romulo and Vietnam Nguyen Du Nen you-

We expressed hope that this is a step towards a settlement. After the exploration work, the three countries planned to jointly exploit oil and gas deposits by ²⁸ state-owned companies.

In late April 2006, Chinese and Vietnamese vessels patrolled the Gulf of Tonkin. According to the Chinese Foreign Minister, such joint patrols are meant to strengthen security. However, looking at the current processes, one may get the impression that the problem is being resolved outside of ASEAN and that some States are getting a better position in negotiations with China.²⁹

In 2009 - 2010, the situation around the disputed archipelagos clearly worsened between China and some participants in the dispute: the Philippines, Vietnam, and partly Malaysia. Since the deadline for submitting applications on the continental shelf around the islands has expired, in May 2009, Vietnam and the Philippines have stepped up efforts to de facto consolidate their sovereignty over them. On February 2, 2009, the Philippine Parliament passed the Philippine Archipelago Main Line Designation Act. On March 10, the law was signed by the President of the Philippines, and on May 6, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted to the UN a joint project delineating the shelf in the South China Sea beyond the 200-mile economic zone ³⁰. The Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the UN in a note addressed to the delegates suggested not to consider the project of Vietnam and Malaysia. At the same time, the UN Commission was presented with a Chinese map of the South China Sea with the designated borders of the PRC, covering 80% of the disputed territories. On May 8, Vietnam re-submitted its draft, this time individually, and there was an exchange of protest notes between Beijing and Hanoi.³¹ Two other facts added fuel to the fire: a statement about the planned return of the United States to East Asia, made by then Secretary of State X. Clinton at the ARF meeting on Phuket Island in Thailand on July 22, 2009, as well as a proposal to include the problem of archipelagos in the list of "vital interests of China"³². Although this information was not confirmed, there were doubts about the good neighborly intentions of the PRC.

Until mid-2011, China demonstrated strength in relation to the Paracel Islands. For example, on May 26, three Chinese vessels blocked the Vietnamese vessel Binh Minn 2, owned by a state-owned oil company, and on June 2, news agencies reported warning shots fired against Vietnamese fishing vessels located five nautical miles off Da Dong Island in the Spratly Archipelago.³³ Neither side wanted this conflict to continue, and during the visit of Vietnamese Communist Party leader Nguyen Phu Trong to China, a compromise was reached, and on October 11, 2011, an Agreement on the Basic Rules for Resolving Maritime Problems between the PRC and Vietnam was signed.³⁴ In the agreement, both sides pledged not to take steps that could escalate the situation. In February 2012, during the talks of the Foreign Ministers in Beijing, it was decided to set up working groups to resolve disputed issues, and the delegations agreed on a hotline between the ministries. The parties identified six principles of negotiations concerning the disputed islands ³⁵. The fifth round of negotiations will be held in the first half of 2014.

As for the Philippines, during President Aquino's visit to China, the two sides failed to reach an understanding. In addition, the Philippines 'participation in military maneuvers with the United States irritated China, which promised to punish the Philippines for wanting to" join the United States in deterring the PRC. " ³⁶ As part of the Cobra Gold joint exercise, the United States is trying to include all those states that have unresolved border disputes with China, including Thailand, although its relations with its neighbor are good.

At the beginning of 2012, tensions around the islands eased, and a meeting was held in Beijing on January 14, 2012, to discuss the implementation of the provisions of the 2002 Declaration on Security and Co-operation in Europe.-

Since the international situation shows that it is impossible to fully implement Beijing's plans, indirect options are taken into account: for example, instead of gaining sovereignty over disputed archipelagos, China agrees to control only the sea. On February 29, 2012, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that no country, including China, claims to establish its sovereignty over the entire South China Sea. Many experts argue that for the benefit of China's revival, transformation and growth, the issue of sovereignty over archipelagos should not be escalated: "China's rebirth requires strategic intelligence and strategic patience." ³⁷ However, in July 2012, another incident occurred: the Chinese side decided to establish a Sansha City military base on Phu Lam Island and hold elections there.³⁸ There is no consensus among ASEAN members on further joint action in this situation. In November 2012, they supported China's position, promising not to seek to bring the conflict over the disputed islands to the international level, which means the victory of the pro-Chinese option.

The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues in 2002 can be considered a success of China's cooperation with the countries of the region within the framework of the ARF. Susan L. Craig, in her book "Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats", lists a number of threats recognized as important by ^the Chinese side39. A book on non-traditional security threats published by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations in 2003 examined 17 threats. All of them were included in the National Defense of China - 2004 White Paper40, and in 2010 they were officially recognized as part of the security doctrine. Since then, cooperation with the ARF has influenced, among other things, the fight against terrorism, illegal emigration, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking, and opposition to separatism. This view of security issues is sometimes disputed in military circles: as the Malaysian military says, "non-traditional security threats are not our business." ⁴¹

In 2003, China joined TAS and negotiated the Protocol to the Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. ⁴² The signing of the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership in Bali was another step towards developing political cooperation in the field of security. Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity)⁴³.

The most important Chinese project was the convening of the ARF Security Policy Conference ASPC in Beijing in 2004. In 2005, the next conference was organized in Vientiane, and in 2009 it was held in Phuket, Thailand: in addition to the global financial crisis, a lot of attention was paid to non-traditional security threats. In 2010, the conference was held in Da Nang (Vietnam). In the same year, the first inter-sessional meeting on non-proliferation and disarmament was convened in Beijing. ⁴⁴ On 25 May 2012, a debate was held in Cambodia, during which ARF members drew attention to recent developments related to the disputed Spratly archipelagos and the Paracel Islands in the context of maritime security.

Maritime security is of great importance to China, especially in the Strait of Malacca. Citing the demand for peaceful growth, Chinese scientists draw attention to six principles and nine forms of cooperation between China and ASEAN in the field of regional maritime security. Among the six principles mentioned above, they include: mutual respect, mutual recognition of interests, mutual trust and mutual benefit, equality in negotiations and coordination, efficiency and continuous development. The nine forms of cooperation are: dialogue on maritime security, consultations on the safety of navigation, anti-terrorism and SPAS-

maritime operations, marine environment protection, uniform laws against international crime, joint exercises at sea, and regional peacekeeping and humanitarian operations ⁴⁵.

In the context of globalization, water areas are important for several reasons: first, as strategic trade routes. For example, the Strait of Malacca - the "maritime silk Road" - transports 80% of China's oil imports from the Middle East. Secondly, these seas are very rich in fish, gas and other natural resources. The peaceful use of the sea should play an active role in the economic development of the region.

China is interested in the ARF making a positive contribution to reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. Participants in the six-party talks were invited to the ARF meeting in 2010. (Hanoi) and in 2011 (Bali). The discussion at the Forum on the denuclearization of the peninsula is a kind of multilateral approach to the problem, while at the same time it is possible to use the preventive diplomacy already developed by the ARF.

China also takes care to maintain bilateral relations with the countries of the region, establishing strategic relations with some of them. In November 2007, China, represented by Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan, signed a strategic partnership agreement with Indonesia. This is the first agreement of this type between China and an ASEAN member. During the official visit of Myanmar President Thein Sein to China on May 26-28, 2011, the two sides defined their relationship as a strategic partnership. In 2012, they signed a memorandum on maritime cooperation. The joint statement of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand Yingluck Chinnawat dated April 19, 2012 also suggests building strategic relations between the two countries.

The improvement of ASEAN - China ties also applies to military relations and the arms trade. Until 1989, except for Thailand, only Cambodia bought weapons from the PRC. In 1991, Laos and Myanmar joined them: Laos bought two Y-12 aircraft on favorable terms, and Myanmar ordered Chinese military equipment, including military vessels and ¹² F-646 aircraft.

Military cooperation with Thailand is developing. Under the new agreement, the Institute of Defense Technology will work together with Chinese specialists on the DTI-1G multiple launch rocket systems. So far, the two sides have cooperated in the production of DTI-1 missiles with a range of 60 to 180 km, but they lacked precision. According to Thai Defense Minister Sukumopol Suwanathat, the new system should become more accurate and increase its range. The parties also agreed to hold the first joint exercises of the Air Force. Another example of strengthening military cooperation between the two countries is the participation of 130 officers of ^{the Royal Thai Navy in joint maneuvers in Guangdong in southern China, which took place on May 9-29, 2012.47}

IV. China's use of "soft power" against Southeast Asian states.

The most constructive method that brings the best results in contacts with ASEAN is to demonstrate the attractiveness of the Chinese development model, which, unlike Western states, is not a combination of a free market with liberal democracy, but a combination of a semi-market economic system and an illiberal political system based on the rule of the Communist Party. This "Beijing consensus", as opposed to the "Washington consensus", is perhaps more tempting for many countries in the region. As Ignatius Vibovo writes in the article

"China's Soft Power and Neoliberal Agenda In Southeast Asia "⁴⁸," China's soft power in Southeast Asia can include: Chinese culture, principles of cooperation and participation in the ASEAN multilateral model.

The previously described joint actions in the field of economy and security in the region were accompanied by frequently repeated statements about mutual trust and close mutually beneficial cooperation and integration. China's "soft power" is based on assurances that China is a responsible and helpful state. A special approach was shown to the Mekong Basin countries: Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, but it is Cambodia and Vietnam that have a sad historical experience in relations with China. Just mention their support for the Khmer Rouge regime or their border war with Vietnam in 1979. Contacts with other countries have improved: Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, despite their cooperation with the United States during the Indochina conflicts or their attitude towards Chinese national minorities.

In 2010, Dai Bingguo, a member of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, made a statement published on the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he assured that China does not have any secret ambitions to achieve hegemony, on the contrary, it is committed to the path of peaceful development. There is no need to be afraid of China, it is worth helping and supporting it in its development, Dai Bingo argued.

On September 6, 2011, the White Paper on China's Peaceful Development was published, which repeated some of the points of the State Council member's statement. The Chinese refer to their cultural heritage and humanistic values. A request was made for the international community to trust and believe in the sincerity of China's intentions, and to support their peaceful development, which is aimed at eliminating poverty and living in affluence.⁴⁹ The White Paper listed the following policy goals for China:: building a harmonious world, pursuing a peaceful foreign policy, promoting a new understanding of security, mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and interaction, active international responsibility, and developing regional cooperation and good-neighborly relations ⁵⁰.

This aspect has become an integral part of China's diplomacy: A course was adopted to establish a realistic and positive image of the People's Republic of China in the world-a state that is ready to take responsibility for the global situation. Its implementation should be carried out by enhancing the attractiveness of Chinese culture and popularizing it in the world. In 2011, the Chinese Government published a White Paper on the results of its cooperation with ASEAN for the period 1991-2011. The purpose of this document was to show the high dynamics of development of relations in various spheres in order to prove to the ASEAN states that China is their "good friend, good neighbor and good partner".

China began to use a wide range of tools related to cultural diplomacy. In the ASEAN countries, Chinese language training programs have been introduced, as well as Chinese volunteer teachers. The mentioned training program for security officials in the countries of the region also includes Chinese language training. "Chinese culture, cuisine, calligraphy, cinema, art, acupuncture, traditional medicine, fashion have entered the culture of the region" ⁵¹.

The most common form of teaching Chinese today is the so-called Confucius Institutes. These institutions serve two main purposes: educational and cultural diplomacy in its various forms. The first Confucius Institute appeared in 2004 in South Korea and was founded by the Office of the International Council of the Chinese Language. Since then, 353 Confucius Institutes and 473 Confucius classes have been established in 104 countries. Currently, there are 41 Confucius Institutes in the ASEAN countries, but they are located unevenly: most of them are located in Thailand (23), in Indon-

There are 7 of them in Asia, 3 in the Philippines, 2 in Malaysia, Singapore and Myanmar, and 1 in Laos and Cambodia.

In May 2012, the first meeting of the Ministers of Culture in the framework of Formula 10+1 was held. In September, the Ministers of Science met for the first time. Ten professional education centers for ASEAN countries have opened in six provinces of China, including agricultural, alternative energy, traditional medicine, culture and arts.⁵² The number of students studying in China is growing. Based on the official data of ASEAN, we can also cite other initiatives that are designed to increase the number of students traveling to China. In August 2011, the fourth China - ASEAN Education Cooperation Week was held in Guiyang (Guizhou Province, China), where the student mobility program was discussed. By 2020, the parties planned to increase to 100 thousand rubles. the number of students traveling to study in China and Chinese students coming to ASEAN countries. During the 13th ASEAN-China Summit, held in Hanoi in October 2010, China invited 10,000 young teachers, students and teachers for the next 10 years, and at the 14th Summit in Bali in November 2011, it offered 10 vocational training courses for ASEAN members.⁵³

At the 15th ASEAN - China Summit, it was decided to establish training centers in six Chinese provinces to serve the development of the humanitarian sphere in the Southeast Asian ^region54.

Conclusions

Southeast Asia is a region of particular importance and strategic importance for China, both in terms of traditional security and its economic interests. Today, China's actions are aimed at strengthening traditionally close relations and preventing the destructive influence of third countries in China - ASEAN relations.

Southeast Asia is China's immediate neighbor, covering the seas of Southeast Asia, and one of its main markets. In addition, trade itself supports the economic development of the southern provinces of China (Yunnan and Guangxi). China's improved relationship with the region means a stronger position in its trade and relations with the United States. It would be unfounded to say that China is trying to expel the United States by creating a friendly environment in the region, but it is obvious that it wants to create its own favorable zone and, for reasons of its own development, seeks to strengthen regional integration.

Not all experts are inclined to give in to the assurances of Chinese leaders. Joshua Kurlanczyk interprets these actions as follows: "Beijing does offer a' charm offensive 'that matches the charm of a lion, not a mouse: it can threaten other nations with its claws if they don't help achieve their desired goals, and it can also give them a big carrot if they do." ⁵⁵.

China uses a whole gamut of diplomatic means to address negative emotions and concerns, from strong support for regional multilateralism to strengthening cooperation with ASEAN leaders. Due to the multiplicity of forms of direct inter-state and interagency cooperation, the ties that currently exist between these entities seem to be indissoluble, especially economic cooperation within the framework of the free trade area (CAFTA). China has already overtaken the major players in the region and acts as an initiator of many events. The ASEAN countries accept this situation and want to engage with China through multilateral organizations. With their help, they

They have the opportunity to learn about China's intentions and capabilities and "socialize" it so that it becomes a more responsible power.

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2. Ibid., p. 13.

3. URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011 - 11/15/c_131248640_2.htm (15.04.2013)

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8. URL: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq/dqzzywt/2633/2634/2636/tl5559.htm (5.11.2011)

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10. Kurlantzick J. Charm Offensive. How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World // A New Republic Book. 2007. P. 43.

11. URL: http://www.tni.org/article/china-asean-free-trade-area-propaganda-and-reality (12.04. 2013)

12. Storey I. Op. cit. P. 10.

13. URL: http://english.boaoforum.org/gyltbjjsen/index.jhtml (5.08.2012)

14. Wen's speech at China-ASEAN summit. URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-10/30/content_720281_2.htm(5.11.2011)

15. China appoints female diplomat as first ASEAN ambassador. URL: http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-12/30/content_1192260.htm (5.11. 2011)

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17. URL: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyhd/t950203.htm (20.08.2012)

18. Southeast Asian Economic Outlook 2010, OECD Publishing pdf. P. 25.

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21. URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012 - 08/10/cJ31776618.htm (5.05.2013)

22. URL: http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/countries/Australia.html (20.08.2012); http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/countries/Australia.html; http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2006/countries/Chtml.

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24. ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint pdf.

25. URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-ll/15/c_131248640_3.htm (14.12. 2012)

26. Ibid.

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28. Glosy M.A. Stabilizing the back yard: Recent development In China's Policy Toward Southeast Asia / eds. J. Eisenman, E. Hegingotham D. Mitchell: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2010. P. 165.

29. Dosch J. Managing Security in ASEAN-China Relations: Liberal Peace in Hegemonistic Security // Asian Perspective. 2007. Vol. 31, N 1. P. 223.

30. URL: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm (15.12.2012)

31. Portyakov V. Ya About some of the features of China's foreign policy in 2009 - 2011 // Probl. The Far East. 2012. N 2. P. 34.

32. Ibid., p. 35.

33. URL: http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/pages/20110602115938.aspx (15. 06. 2013)

34. URL: http://www.chinausfocus.com/print/?id=27029 (24.10.2013)

35. Текст соглашения: URL: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/nsl31016150351 (24.10.2013)

36. Ibid., p. 38.

37. Ibid.

38. URL: http://www.thanhniennews.com/index/pages/20120810-us-china-in-east-sea-scrap.aspx.

39. Craig S.L. Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats. URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub765.pdf (30.05.2011)

40. URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011 - 03/31/c_13806851.htm (17.08.2012)

41. Dosch J. Op. cit. P. 217.

42. URL: http://www.nti.org/db/china/bangkok.htm (20.10. 2011)

43. URL: http://www.aseansec.org/16805.htm (20.10.2012)

44. For the report from the conference, see: ASEAN Regional Forum, Documents Series, 2006-2009. P. 314. URL: http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ARF06 -09. pdf (20.10. 2012)

45. Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, Chin Kin Wah. Op cit. P. 10.; Wang Zhongchun, Li Yaqiang. China-ASEAN Maritime Security Cooperation Situation and Proposals / / Ibid. pp. 194-198.

46. Rajasinman S. China-ASEAN Relations - Emerging Asian Security Architecture // China and its neighbours/ Ed. Srikanth Kondapall. Pentagon: Press New Delhi, 2010. P. 117.

47. URL: http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/290809/top-brass-china-visit-secures-joint-missile-d eal (3.05. 2012)

48. Wibowo I. China's Soft Power and Neoliberal Agenda In Southeast Asia // Soft Power. China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics / eds. Mingjiang Li. Lexington Books, 2011. P. 208.

49. URL: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zhongguodehepingfazhan/t856269.htm (15.08. 2012)

50. For the full text of the White Paper, see: URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/06/c_131102329_4.htm (15.05. 2013)

51. Teo Eric, Chu Cheow. ASEAN+3: The role of ASEAN and China // ASEAN-China realations, realities and Prospects / ed. Saw Swe-Hock. Singapore: ISEAS, 2005. P. 63.

52. URL: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyhd/1950203.htm (20.08.2013)

53. URL: http://www.aseansec.org/5874.htm (20.09. 2012)

54. URL: http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/asean-china-dialogue-relations (15.07.2013)

55. Kurlantzick J. Charm Offensive, How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World. London: A New Republic Book, 2007. P. 6.

Amendment

The notes to the article by P. Baklanov and M. Romanov " On the uniqueness of the geopolitical position of Pacific Russia "(PDV. 2013. N 6. pp. 33-38) are inaccurate. An electronic version of the article with corrections is available on the journal's website: http://www.ifes-ras.ru/pdv

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