In the United States ' quest for world domination, the most important role is assigned to the creation of a system of bases and facilities in foreign territories. The "basic strategy" in the arsenal of the great - power policy of capitalism is not a new phenomenon. It was held in the era of colonial empires and gained special significance during the imperialist wars for the redivision of the world. The American home-based system, which covers vast expanses of the Globe, is an important component of the military and economic potential of the United States. The" basic strategy " of the United States received a special impetus during the Second World War. While the Soviet Union devoted all its material and human resources to the task of defeating fascism, Washington's ruling circles prepared the ground for the struggle against the USSR in the post-war years.

The U.S. Government has extensively funded programs to acquire new bases, strengthen and refit existing ones. According to the clearly underestimated data of American economists, from 1938 to 1945, about $ 59 billion was spent on these purposes The creation of a global system of bases was intended, according to the plans of overseas imperialists, to contribute at first to the establishment of undivided US domination in the Western Hemisphere, then to strengthen the military potential of the West in the fight against the USSR, and also to serve as the foundation for post - war colonial expansion. The implementation of the United States ' base-building and seizure programs took place in the context of inter - imperialist and regional contradictions and required the use of the entire set of military, diplomatic and economic means of pressure.

The creation of a global system of bases has always found a "scientific" justification in the United States, presented in the form of an objectively necessary policy to ensure the "vital interests" of the American state, whose geographical borders, as stated in the book published in the United States shortly after the end of World War II, are in a state of continuous mobility, and "security zones" are almost limitless. . The geopolitical argument that seeks to justify US expansionism has been supplemented by numerous works that have questioned the notion of sovereignty of other states.-

1 Building the Navy's Bases in the World War II. Washington. Vol. I, II. 1947 (hereinafter-BNB), Vol. I, pp. 30, 53.

2 Weigert H. W. et al. New Compass of the World. Washington. 1949, p. 184.

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states, as allegedly outdated and hindering social progress 3 .

The past decades have shown that the" basic strategy " of the United States was aimed at carrying out its expansion, preparing and unleashing aggression against socialist states and developing countries. This article attempts to examine the formation of a system of US bases in strategic areas of the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific oceans during World War II.

American bases in the Atlantic. The acquisition and use of military bases was an integral part of the program to establish the undivided dominance of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Even before the outbreak of World War II, Washington began to define the practical role of Latin America in the brewing world conflict. In April 1938, the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Chief of Naval Operations, and the U.S. Secretary of State established a Standing Communications Committee to assess the capabilities of the Latin American armed forces and launch preparations for the creation of a continental military alliance. The US strategy was complex and aimed at attracting the military potential of Latin American states for "joint defense", using the sea and air bases available on the continent, and achieving "political stability"that would allow the American imperialists to implement their expansionist plans here.

Washington's diplomacy was actively focused on fulfilling these tasks. At the 8th Inter-American Conference in Lima in December 1938, the United States tried to persuade the Latin American governments to act in concert. However, the United States managed to achieve only a joint declaration on continental solidarity and develop a regional consultative mechanism in the event of a military threat. At the Lima Conference, a Consultative Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics was established, which could be convened at the initiative of one or more countries. The US plans were met with resistance by a number of statesmen on the continent. After the Lima conference, Argentina and Brazil opposed US attempts to conclude military pacts with Latin American countries and get bases on their territory at their disposal. The military circles of many states in the region were uncooperative when the United States raised the issue of using or acquiring bases. In response to Washington's harassment, the military circles of some Latin American countries demanded an increase in the supply of weapons on preferential terms. Thus, when the United States attempted to seize a naval base in Uruguay, the Government of that country stubbornly resisted American pressure and only after the United States promised a loan of $ 5 million, agreed to transfer the base to the United States4.

The outbreak of World War II created a favorable situation for the United States on the continent. They began intensive preparations for the development of the basing system. Congress has repeatedly considered the issue of new appropriations for updating and expanding existing bases. Such ports as New York, Boston, Charleston, Delaware, etc. were urgently re-equipped, and a complex of shipbuilding and repair facilities was created.-

3 See Kohn H. The Idea of Nationalism. N. Y. 1945; Whittlesey Ch. National Interest and International Cartels. N. Y. 1946; Burnham O. Cr. Struggle for the World N. Y. 1947; Hash V. The World Must be Goverened. N. Y. 1949; Ho we J. T. Multicrises Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age. Cambridge. 1971; Bell R. S. Unequall Allies. Australian-American Relations and the Pacific War. Carlton. 1977.

4 Beals C. Pan America. Boston. 1940, p. 35.

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industrial plants 5 . The deployment of major military programs was accompanied by increased US diplomatic pressure on their southern neighbors. In September 1939, a Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American republics was convened in Panama to work out a common line of conduct and proclaim a policy of neutrality in the European military conflict. The declaration adopted at this meeting announced the establishment of a 300-mile "neutral zone" around the coast of the entire continent (south of Canada). This zone was declared a "continental sea" and was to be patrolled by ships and aircraft of the countries participating in the declaration. At the same time, the United States stipulated the right to use the territory of Latin American countries for the construction of naval and air bases. At the same meeting, it was decided to convene a new Consultative Meeting in case there was a threat of transfer of a colony belonging to a non-American State to another non-American State. This decision created a "legal basis" for the expansion of the United States, which has long tried to get its hands on European colonies in the region.

The military conjuncture was used by the United States to oust competitors, establish undivided dominance on the continent and create a system of "collective economic harrows of the Western Hemisphere" under its leadership. The establishment of military ties with Latin American States was of primary importance in these strategic plans. As early as 1938, the United States began to impose military missions in the countries of the continent. As a result of increased American pressure in 1940, all Axis military missions on the continent were eliminated and replaced by US missions .6 The training of military personnel in many Latin American countries for decades focused on the European military school. Therefore, part of the American program was to attract military specialists from the region to the US military academies. Measures were also taken to reorient military training in Latin American countries.

Washington's plans for the Western Hemisphere were no secret either to Latin American countries or to US allies. On June 6, 1940, an American news agency issued a report that explicitly stated: "President Roosevelt's plan to fight Hitlerism in this hemisphere involves nothing less than the creation of the United States of the Western Hemisphere under the auspices of the United States. This information came from very close employees of the President. The United States will deploy its troops to strategic locations in Latin America, which will work with local armies to implement this project... The United States will have naval and air bases in Latin America. " 7 Thus, the war in Europe was seen as an additional incentive for implementing the US strategic line and activating its expansion in the Western Hemisphere. The issue of bases was becoming a key issue in American foreign policy.

The deterioration of the military situation in Great Britain has made, as is known, significant changes in the relations of the Atlantic partners. In June 1940, W. Churchill requested that F. Roosevelt on the possibility of transferring to Great Britain 50 destroyers needed to protect British transports. The United States agreed to provide this assistance on very enslaving terms for England. In exchange for obsolete vessels, they received

5 BNB, Vol. II, p. 1.

6 Веаls C. Op. cit., pp. 432, 446.

7 Ibid., p. 439.

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the results of British atomic energy work, the latest military inventions, a commitment to supply strategic raw materials, and eight bases in the British possessions - Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Newfoundland, Saint Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, and Guiana-"leased" to the United States for a period of 9.9 years .8 The transfer of these bases to the United States significantly increased their naval power. The subsequent large-scale military construction in the Caribbean went down in the history of the American Navy as the "iron ring strategy".

In July 1940, the Second Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers opened in Havana. The Declaration on mutual assistance and cooperation of American States for joint defense was signed, as well as the declaration on the status of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere (the"Havana Act"), according to which any attempt on any Latin American State was to be considered an act of aggression against all these countries .9 Paragraph IV of the" Havana Act " established that any transfer of the territory of European colonies to non-American States would be regarded as an encroachment on the sovereignty and security of the entire continent.

November 2, 1940 Roosevelt and the US Secretary of Defense worked out a plan for secret negotiations with the Pan-American Airline Company to strengthen US bases in Latin America. It provided for the construction of airfields, port facilities, repair shops, warehouses, etc. The basing system extended to Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, etc. In a message to Congress on March 27, 1941, the President emphasized that international events were bringing "these Western hemisphere security outposts to the forefront." 10 Washington was particularly concerned about the strengthening of the Panama Canal, whose strategic importance has increased dramatically. Until 1939, it was strengthened mainly from the Atlantic Ocean. Measures have now been taken to strengthen the entire canal zone, including from the Pacific Ocean11 . An important role was assigned to Puerto Rico, which was turned into a strategic base on the approaches to the Caribbean Sea. A base was established in the Virgin Islands (St. Thomas) for submarines, seaplanes, and shore-based aircraft. Major work was carried out in Cuba, where the United States owned the Guantanamo Bay base, which underwent reconstruction before the war 12 . Major works on the construction, re-equipment and strengthening of naval and air bases began in 1940. Several bases were built in Honduras and Colombia .13 Consultative meetings were a very effective means of creating a military-political bloc of American countries under the auspices of the United States.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in Rio de Janeiro (January 1942), the third such meeting was held. One of its most important decisions was the creation of an Inter-American Defense Council consisting of representatives of the military ministries and general staffs of all American republics. The Council's activities greatly contributed to the establishment of US control over the armies of Latin American countries and the creation of a military bloc of Western Hemisphere states under their auspices. The Meeting adopted resolutions on the accession of all countries-

8 Documents on American Foreign Relations (далее - DAFR), Vol. VI, Boston 1945, pp. 601 - 602.

9 BNB. Vol. I, p. 35.

10 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 15.

11 Ibid., pp. 15 - 20.

12 Carter, U. and Duval, E. The Invisible Service, Moscow, 1963, p. 36.

13 BNB, Vol. II, pp. 42, 43.

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to the Atlantic Charter, on the mobilization of their economic resources and vehicles for military needs, and in fact for the needs of US military production 14 .

Having entered the war, the United States began to actively seize the American colonies of European powers. They landed their troops in the Dutch possessions occupied in May 1940 by France and England. At the Washington Arcadia Conference (December 1941), it was decided that the United States would take on the task of defending Aruba and Curacao, which were previously under the protection of England, with the Venezuelan oil processing plants located on them. When deciding on the occupation of these islands, Washington's suspicions about Britain's future plans in the region played an important role. Subsequently, the islands of Aruba and Curacao were turned into strongholds of the US Navy and Air Force .15 The capture of France, Holland and Denmark by German troops was used by the United States as a pretext for the occupation of the colonies of these European states in the Atlantic. Under the pretext of ensuring the security of France's West Indian possessions, the United States gained a foothold in the territory of its colonies in the Caribbean. In April 1941, the United States occupied Greenland, and in November of the same year (together with Brazil)- Dutch Guiana 16 .

The development of the American base system in the Western Hemisphere continued throughout the war. In May 1942, the United States, with the consent of Dictator Batista, deployed a bomber training unit 17 in Cuba near San Antonio de los Banos . Much attention was paid by American strategists to Brazil, whose relations with it were established with great difficulty. In January 1941, the United States reached an agreement on the use of Brazilian bases, material and human resources in this country. Then a bomber base was built in the Recife area. During the war in Brazil, a powerful network of American naval and air bases was deployed, several dozen airfields, oil refineries, berths and docks, barracks, warehouses were built.

The creation of the American base system was accompanied by the introduction of a unified system of combat training of troops, weapons and tactical and strategic installations of Latin American countries. In March 1939, the State Department, the Military and naval departments of the United States supported in Congress a resolution on the sale of weapons at affordable prices in order to assist the countries of the continent in building up their sea and land military capabilities. The House of Representatives agreed to lift restrictions that prohibited the sale of any weapons other than obsolete ones. However, the Senate, despite pressure from the U.S. Military Command, postponed the issue until May 1940.18 . Latin American states were unable to pay for the purchase of American weapons. By the beginning of 1942, the financial side of this case had been settled by the Lend-Lease Act, under which the United States pledged to provide Latin American countries with military equipment in the amount of $ 400 million .19 The strengthening of Latin American armies and the growing influence of militaristic circles were used by the United States to strengthen its position in the region.

14 Gvozdarev B. I. Evolyutsiya i krizis mezhamericanskoi sistemy [Evolution and Crisis of the Inter-American System]. Moscow, 1963, 106 p.

15 BNB. Vol. I, pp. 31, 56, 77.

16 Foreign Relation of the United States. Diplomatic Papers (далее - FRUS) Vol II 1942, Washington, 1960. pp. 219, 224, 231, 233.

17 Ibid., Vol. VI, Washington. 1966, p. 265.

18 Beals C. Op. cit., p. 332.

19 Bemis S. The Latin American Policy of the United States. N. Y. 1943, pp. 304, 310 - 311.

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Still, the United States ' desire to expand its network of military bases was at the forefront. In total, during the war period, American naval and air bases were established in 16 countries of the continent 20 .

In the American strategy, an important place belonged to the question of including Canada in the" security system " of the Western hemisphere. This problem was closely linked to the relations in the "Atlantic triangle" - USA-Canada - Great Britain. With the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, US attempts to draw Canada into the orbit of its strategy intensified. In August 1940, an agreement was signed in Ogdensburg to establish a permanent Joint Defense Council of the two countries. He decided to coordinate the actions of their governments to create reserves of strategic raw materials, and then made recommendations on the use of the United States of Canada's territory and military-economic potential. In accordance with the "Joint Defense Plan", a recommendation was made to turn Newfoundland into an American base and provide the US armed forces with certain benefits in Canada. Even before the United States entered the war, this plan provided for the use of its territory by American aircraft. "The future development of Canada," Prime Minister Michael King said at a meeting of the Canadian military committee, " is more likely to go in the direction of its North American destiny than along the path of its traditional ties with Europe." 21 . When England's inability to defend Canada was discovered, the process of reorienting the dominion accelerated even more. Canada raised the issue of holding negotiations between the chiefs of staff of the US and Canadian armed forces, as well as the establishment of air bases in the West Indies and Newfoundland. Canada's inclusion in American strategic programs completed the construction of the Continental system building in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Monroe Doctrine, which lasted for more than a century.

In September 1940, Reuters reported that the Joint Defense Committee of the United States and Canada was discussing the defense of Iceland at a meeting in Washington. At the same time, it was announced that the governments of England and Canada consider it necessary to strengthen the defense of Iceland. In the winter, the United States began probing for the landing of American troops on this island. In the spring of 1941, the US government began to put pressure on Great Britain to transfer Iceland to the defense zone of the Western Hemisphere. On June 24, the British envoy informed the Icelandic government that British troops were needed elsewhere, and advised them to seek protection from the United States. When such a request was made, on July 7, 1941, a detachment of American ships arrived in Reykjavik 22 . Roosevelt requested congressional approval for the construction of a system of large naval and air bases in Iceland. He stressed that "the threat to communications in the North Atlantic will be significantly reduced if the United States uses Iceland for forward deployment." 23 On October 27, in a speech on the occasion of Fleet Day, the president stated :" Our army and Navy are defending the Western Hemisphere in Iceland." 24 Starting in October 1941, large-scale construction of coastal structures, communications, power plants, oil storage facilities, airfields, housing, etc.began on the island. These works reached their greatest extent in 1943 and continued until 1944. Iceland has become important-

20 Conn S., FairchiId B. The Framework of Hemisphere Defence, Washington. 1960, p. 237.

21 Chamberlin W. Canada Today and Tomorrow. Boston. 1943, pp. 52 - 53.

22 Benediktsson G. Iceland in the struggle for independence, 1940-1945. Moscow, 1958.

23 The New York Times, 11.VII.1941.

24 BNB, Vol. II. p. 56.

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The largest base for providing convoys from the United States to Europe, Reykjavik Harbor served as a transshipment point, where up to 600 ships called every month .25
Greenland also became an object of strategic basing of the United States. After the Nazi invasion of Denmark (April 9, 1940), Roosevelt began negotiations with King Christian X of Denmark about bases in Greenland. The State Department did not skimp on promises to preserve the status of this island in the post-war period. On April 9, 1941 , an agreement was signed on the so-called defense of Greenland, 26 according to which the United States began to build bases in Narsarsuak and Grondal .27
In 1941, the US government became aware that Hitler's headquarters was discussing the possibility of invading the Western Hemisphere via South America. The United States took advantage of this opportunity to obtain the consent of Great Britain in early 1942 to build its own military airfield on the Ascension Islands (a British colony near the west coast of Africa). Washington asked London to use them as an intermediate base for the flight of American bombers across the South Atlantic to the Middle East. The British government immediately agreed to give the United States every opportunity to establish an airfield and expressed its readiness to come to a "reasonable agreement" on its use after the war.

The objects of primary importance in the US plans included Liberia, which by that time was completely under the control of the British. In January 1942, the State Department instructed its charge d'affaires in Monrovia to begin negotiations on "promising strongholds for the United States". On March 31, 1942, an agreement was signed under which the United States was granted the right to build various military installations in Liberia, all of which were transferred under its full jurisdiction. American specialists poured into the country: military-technical experts, economists, financiers, agricultural specialists, geologists. The United States was vigorously pushing Great Britain out of here. The British were forced to request permission from their ally to use American air bases. The State Department instructed the US Charge d'affaires on February 9, 1943: "Despite our differences with the British, we should sometimes grant them the right to use our bases here and there." 28 Intensive American military construction in Liberia was clearly conducted in the expectation of securing the United States in this country. The State Department has instructed its Charge d'affaires in Liberia to inform the Government of Liberia that American cooperation with the British will be temporary. " 29
American bases in the Mediterranean Sea. The creation of American bases in the Mediterranean basin was a direct consequence of the US entry into World War II and the transition of the ruling circles to global strategic planning. The importance of the Mediterranean Sea in American military plans increased as events unfolded in North Africa and Southeastern Europe. In connection with Rommel's offensive in Africa and the fascist aggression in the Balkans, the issue of defending Egypt has become particularly relevant. By the end of 1941, a large number of American weapons were sent here, and in 1941-

25 Carter W., Duval E. Uk. soch., p. 52.

26 DAFR, Vol. IV. Boston. 1942, p. 445.

27 Carter W., Duval E. Uk. op., pp. 52-53,

28 DAFR, Vol. IV, pp. 699, 700, 702.

29 FRUS, 1943, Vol. IV. Washington. 1964, p. 702.

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In 1943, the Lend-lease act was extended to Egypt and most of the countries of the Near and Middle East. In October 1941, two American military missions were established in the region: a North African mission in Cairo and an Iraqi mission in Baghdad. Their tasks included inspection of lend-lease supplies, assistance in the construction of industrial facilities, ports, communications, etc .30 The issue of defense of the Middle East was discussed during the preparation and during the Atlantic Conference (August 9-12, 1941)." Full " trust between the Allies was not achieved: the struggle for British colonies and the redistribution of spheres of influence caused disagreements. Washington's growing focus on Egypt was due to the expansionist program of American imperialism in the Mediterranean basin, in which Egypt was intended to play the role of an important stronghold.

After the defeat of British troops in Libya, with the emergence of an immediate threat to Egypt, US military assistance to Great Britain increased. The deployment of American bombers to Egypt marked the beginning of the formation of US air units in the area. At the end of 1942, the headquarters of the American Air Force in the Middle East was established in Cairo. Instructing the State Department and Army leaders, Roosevelt pointed out the dangerous consequences of a possible Fascist takeover of the Middle East and informed them that a decision had been made to "send air and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, Syria, and Egypt." 31 In Egypt, a home-based system began to be created, designed not only to serve current military needs, but also designed for the post-war period. Egypt attracted the attention of Washington, among other reasons, and the fact that strategic bases on its territory gave the United States the opportunity to control sea communications leading not only to the Middle East, but also to the Far East. In an effort to take advantage of the weakening position of Great Britain, the United States in January 1943 concluded an agreement with it on the presence of its troops in Egypt, demanding for itself such a legal regime as the British used. In negotiations on the creation of a network of airfields in Egypt, Washington actively used the lend-lease system32 .

The defense of the Near and Middle East was one of the most acute strategic planning problems of the United States and Great Britain during the war years. The concentration of forces in this region was intended to prevent its capture by the fascist coalition, expand the sphere of US colonial rule and create a springboard for their subsequent advance into the Balkans and Southern Europe. On the eve of the war, the position of American imperialism in the Middle East was still relatively weak. The volume of trade of all the countries of the Near and Middle East with England in 1939 was 8 million pounds, and with the United States - only 1 million 33 . The United States was also far behind England in terms of its investment in the area. In 1941, Britain's military position here was "largely dependent on American military assistance." 34 Therefore, the United States relied primarily on its military power as a means of gradually ousting European powers, primarily Great Britain, from the countries of the Middle and Middle East. At the same time, the American ruling circles assumed that it was necessary to penetrate into this region with the help of the British.

30 FRUS, 1943, Vol. II. Washington. 1964, pp. 643, 644, 646.

31 FRUS, 1944, Vol. II. Washington. 1967, pp. 679, 683, 695, 757, 758.

32 Sherwood R. Roosevelt and Hopkins. Through the eyes of an eyewitness, vol. 2, Moscow, 1958, pp. 235-236.

33 Reitzel W. Mediterranian and Its Role in American Foreign Policy. N. Y. 1948, pp. 50 - 51.

34 Foreign Trade of the US, 1945 - 1949. Washington. 1951, pp. 40 - 45.

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The true goals of the US strategy in the Near and Middle East are clarified by a letter from US Secretary of State John Kerry. Forrestal's letter to the State Department dated December 11, 1944. "All international agreements and conferences should be based primarily on the US military-strategic plans. However, the success of naval operations in both peacetime and wartime depends on the location of fuel sources. It would therefore be foolish to use Western Hemisphere fuel sources for naval forces operating in the other hemisphere." The minister suggested that "national oil resources" should be treated sparingly and strongly encouraged to use "foreign sources" located in the countries of the Middle and Middle East. "How much oil we have, what ships we have and how many of them, what bases and where they are located, what agreements and treaties we have with other countries and peoples, where and how our armed forces are located, depends on the degree of US influence in the international arena." 35 By agreement between Washington and London, the entire Middle East was included in the zone of British strategic responsibility in the first years of the war. The policy of the United States here was to help England with weapons and gradually strengthen its own positions.

American diplomacy also showed great interest in the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean: Syria and Lebanon. After the fall of France, the struggle for influence in the area escalated. Great Britain tried to impose pro-English governments here. In July 1941, the State Department instructed American diplomats in the Middle East to get Britain and France to recognize the "independence" of these states. On November 26, 1943, the State Department issued a special statement stating that the strategic position of Syria and Lebanon required the United States to take steps to establish its military strongholds in them .36
In a letter to Roosevelt, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy also notes that "the State Department should consider using the oil wealth in Iraq, while the defense of what we conquer will be taken care of by the U.S. Navy." 37 In 1942, American diplomats informed Washington of the need to extend the lend-lease system to Iraq. The State Department has sent a mission to Iraq to find ways to "provide assistance." Iraq was supposed to provide the United States with territory for the construction of industrial and military facilities .38
When the question of extending lend-lease to Turkey arose, Secretary of State E. Stettinius, who headed this program, proposed to present a number of "specific military and political requirements"to this country. Prolonged and vigorous US pressure on the Turkish government led it to agree to provide its territory for the construction of American bases there .39
The American strategy of fighting Germany and Italy was most directly linked to the plans for the United States to achieve world domination. This explains the delay in opening a second front in Europe and the focus on operations in North Africa. An important stage on the way to the final coordination of the US and British military policy was the approval (in July 1942) of the plan for the landing of Allied troops here ("Torch"), according to which the creation of the shiro was envisaged-

35 DAFR, Vol. VII. Boston. 1947, pp. 669 - 670.

36 FRUS, 1942. Vol. IV, Washington. 1963, pp. 343. 756

37 Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1944, p 92.

38 FRUS, 1944, Vol III, Washington. 1965, pp. 756 - 757

39 FRUS, 1912, Vol. II. Washington. 1962, pp. 677 - 678, 695, 681

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coy network of bases between Port Said and Gibraltar. After the completion of Operation Torch, the Americans began to create these bases. In a speech to Congress on August 25, 1943, Roosevelt affirmed "the paramount task of providing the Navy with reliable bases in French Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and other areas of the Mediterranean basin." 40
Exceptional importance was attached to the bases in the Casablanca area. Construction of coastal structures, an oil depot, a radar station, storage facilities, a ship repair plant, etc. was launched here. In a relatively short period of time, powerful operational naval and air bases were created. A prominent place in the American plans was occupied by the port of Lyotet, which before the American occupation was used by the French as a permanent stronghold on the Atlantic coast. "Casablanca and the other Moroccan ports that are part of the home system, "The New York Times wrote," are of interest not only for military purposes, but also for civilian commercial purposes after the war." 41
The American strategy assigned a special role to special-purpose bases in the western part of the Mediterranean Sea. The United States intended to create its own Gibraltar here. In this regard, they showed interest in the Balearic Islands, the ports of Algiers, Oran, etc. In Algeria, the headquarters of the commander of the US Naval Forces in Northwest Africa was located. The construction of a large base was carried out in Bizert, where the headquarters of the naval forces of the Allied forces 42 was located .

After the landing of American troops in Morocco, Roosevelt instructed the State Department to prepare a complex diplomatic action that would ensure the construction of US bases in the Azores, as well as the neutralization of Portugal. In a report to the State Department, the American consul in Algeria said that " the use of the Azores will provide serious benefits for a strategic base designed for the future. A route from New York to these islands via Bermuda will significantly reduce transportation costs, etc. " 43 American diplomacy began to press the Salazar government. Washington demanded that Portugal cede the Azores in exchange for Macau (after defeating Japan). During the negotiations, the United States obtained the necessary concessions from Lisbon and by December 1943 already had a network of sea and air bases in the Azores. Subsequent American diplomatic activity in Portugal was aimed at expanding military construction on these islands. The US Ambassador in Lisbon, in a report to Washington in October 1944, insisted that the Azores should "be" used even more widely for strategic bases, since they would be important in the post-war period .44
At the same time, Washington put diplomatic pressure on Spain to remove the country from the influence of the Axis powers and secure a foothold on its territory. In March 1943, the American Ambassador to Spain reported to Washington that "Madrid can provide territory for the construction of airfields and ports on the terms of a mutually beneficial commercial transaction." 45 Following the relevant negotiations, the United States has begun extensive construction of military and industrial facilities in Spain, and as soon as possible

40 DAFR, Vol. VI. Boston. 1945, p. 5.

41 The New York Times, 29.XII.1942.

42 BNB. Voi. II, pp. 75 - 80.

43 FRUS, 1943, Vol. II. Washington. 1964, pp. 530 - 535.

44 DAFR, Vol. VI, p. 165.

45 FRUS, 1944, Vol. Ill, p. 31.

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the development of military operations in Europe increased its presence in this country. During the war years, several large bases were built here for the US Navy and Air Force.

In July 1943, American troops occupied Sicily and, on Roosevelt's instructions, immediately set about establishing naval bases in the Palermo and Mondello areas. As Italy was liberated, its ports were also used as bases and strongholds for American troops. Having gained a foothold on the coast of North Africa, the United States began to build up its position in the Middle East. The growth in the number of American troops in this area was determined by the objectives of the Mediterranean strategy, which the United States carried out in circumvention of the commitment to open a second front in Europe.

During World War II, American imperialism, pursuing important military and strategic goals in Africa, created a large number of its military bases and airfields on this continent. Air communication lines connecting the United States with the countries of the Near, Middle and Far East passed through Africa. By the end of the war, the United States was firmly entrenched in the forests of North Africa and the Middle East. Describing the basing system created there, the American military specialist J. R. R. Tolkien wrote: Weller wrote that " each overseas base itself includes elements of strategy and policy." 46 Here it is difficult to distinguish between policy and strategy . In the Mediterranean region, the United States sought to maximize all opportunities for expanding and strengthening its influence.

Strongholds in the Mediterranean were, according to the plan of American strategists, to become, in addition, a springboard for a breakthrough towards the Indian Ocean. Preparations for the implementation of these plans were made to involve the countries of the Arabian Peninsula in the orbit of American politics. At the end of 1943, the Pentagon decided to build an air base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which would link the Mediterranean theater of operations with the Far East. The resistance of Great Britain, which not without reason saw this project as an encroachment on its imperial interests, was overcome only at the beginning of 1945. Under the terms of the agreement with the ruler of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud, the United States received the right to use this base for up to three years after the end of the war with Japan. The Dhahran base was turned into the largest American stronghold in the Middle East. 47
American bases in the Pacific. American imperialism attached special importance to the creation of a system based in the Pacific. The efforts of the entire US foreign policy apparatus were aimed at solving this problem. In the Department of the Navy, the practical development of this problem began as early as January 1943, in direct connection with the presidential directive on "ensuring US national security" after the war. The Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral E. King, advised taking into account the experience of England, which long before the Second World War established its strong points in various parts of the world and used them for military purposes. 48 On March 15, the OKNSH made recommendations, the essence of which was to deploy "a network of naval and air bases west of the Hawaiian Islands islands that would include the Philippines and Bonin. " 49 These bases were supposed to serve not only the military needs of the United States, but also stimulate their post-war expansion.

46 Weller G. Bases Overseas. Washington. 1944, p. 233.

47 FRUS, 1944. Vol. IV. Washington. 1956, pp. 73 - 75.

48 King E. A Naval Record. N. Y. 1952, p. 18.

49 Louis W. Imperialism at Bay. Oxford. 1977, p. 264.

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On March 22, 1943, a memorandum of the Joint Council of Ministers recommended the creation of a Joint Committee on Occupation and Administration, whose tasks would include coordinating programs to assist the occupation authorities on the part of the army and Navy. 50 Military administration in the Pacific Islands area (Marshall Islands, Carolinas, Marianas, Kuril Islands, and Pescadores, as well as Bonin and Formosa) was transferred to the Navy, and in Japan, the Philippines, and mainland Asia to the Army .51 OKNSH considered the occupation of the Pacific islands primarily from the point of view of creating a chain of military bases on them from Pearl Harbor to the southern approaches to Japan. The islands of Midway and Way were to be a bridge to the Asian mainland; Guam was to be a fortress in the ocean. The island of Palau was planned to be used as an intermediate link between Guam and the Philippines .52
June 12, 1943 Roosevelt asked the Navy Department for information on the strategic importance of the islands in the southeastern Pacific Ocean, which were supposed to host US air bases. He was particularly interested in French Polynesia, the Tuamotu Islands, and the Marquesas Islands. The President believed that these territories were key to controlling the South Pacific. The Ministry's response, signed by Admiral A. Hepburn, outlined a broad program of military construction. It was about creating a global basing system that would include bases: "In the Pacific Ocean (a) southward, on the Clipperton and Galapagos Islands; (b) southwestward, to facilitate contacts with the English Dominions (11 island groups in total, including the Marquesas Islands, Samoa, New Hebrides and Solomon Islands); (c) westward for direct contacts with China India, which involved the creation of bases on such islands as the Marshall Islands, Gilberta, Guam, Formosa, Bataan, etc.; in the north-west direction to facilitate contacts with the USSR." In addition, it was proposed to annex all the mandate islands of Japan .53
By the end of the war, the campaign for the creation of overseas bases in the United States intensified as a means of expanding the spheres of influence and implementing the military-strategic interests of American imperialism. All political groups in the United States have joined the debate about the bases. In his address to Congress on January 13, 1944, Secretary W. Knox stated: "We should create fixed bases, which is a constant problem for us now; the issue of overseas bases and their strengthening is part of the overall system of future strategy." 54 On March 9, 1944, Knox defended the need to preserve the Carolinas, Marshall Islands, and Mariana Islands for the United States after the war. "No one in the Government," he said, "objects to the view that the islands needed to equip bases should be handed over to the United States, the dominant maritime and air Power in the Pacific." 55
On March 11, 1944, Admiral W. Leahy wrote to the Secretary of State on behalf of the JCS regarding the Japanese-occupied islands in the Pacific Ocean: "The Japanese mandatory Islands should be placed under full US control. The future of these islands should not be

50 Richard D. US Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Washington. 1957, p. 18.

51 Ibid., pp. 13 - 17, 20.

52 Louis W. Op. cit., pp. 260 - 261.

53 Cit. no: Louis W. Op. cit., p. 262.

54 DAFR, Vol. VI. Boston. 1945, p. 411.

55 Congressional Record. 78-th Congress,2-d Ses. HR. 4254, pp. 191, 194.

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the subject of any discussions " 56 . In the summer of 1944, in the instructions of the American delegation at the Dumbarton Oaks conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again emphasized the special interest of the United States in the fate of the Japanese mandate islands. J. Forrestal drew the attention of the head of the American delegation, E. Stettinius, to the military and strategic importance of the Pacific islands and to the fact that the issue of control of other powers over these islands did not appear in the upcoming international negotiations 57 .

In August 1945, a sub-committee of the Government's Committee on Naval Affairs prepared and presented to Congress a "study" on the future of the Pacific Territories. This document contained recommendations that completely ignored the interests of US allies. He proposed: "1) to establish dominant control over the former Japanese mandatory islands: the Marshall Islands, the Carolinas, the Marianas..., as well as over the Japanese islands of Benin and the Ryukyu Islands; 2) to consolidate special, essential rights in areas where American bases were established in the island territories of the allied nations; 3) to ensure full US control over Manus, Noumea, Espiritu Santo, Guadalcanal, and other American strongholds located in places or islands of concern or subject to claims by other nations, since (a) these nations are not capable of defending these islands; (b) these bases are linked to the United States for the purpose of joint defense." 58
In unison with representatives of the military circles, the leaders of the Republican Party also spoke. : "We must master... those points, islands and bases that will strengthen the position of the United States. The Pacific Islands, in the number and location that we need, should become our own. The Pacific Ocean should become an American lake. " 59 Republicans reproached the government for inaction and persistently demanded the occupation of the Pacific islands. Some Democrats also joined the Republicans on this issue. In August 1944, Democratic Senator McKellar introduced a draft resolution proposing "the acquisition of all islands in the Pacific, including Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands." 60
The State Department generally supported the military. A senior State Department official, W. Bullitt, wrote to Roosevelt on December 17, 1942 :" We must capture as many as possible, because every island suitable for the construction of an airfield is today an unsinkable aircraft carrier. " 61 State Department officials A. Burley and B. Long emphasized that the United States "simply should not give up the Carolinas, Marshall Islands and Mariana Islands." E. Stettinius in July 1944 supported Forrestal's position regarding the islands, which ,in his opinion,"should legally be in the possession of the United States." And even the cautious presidential adviser W. Coy, whom Mr. Stimson called "one of the guardian angels at Roosevelt's throne," said that after the war, the United States should maintain its position in Polynesia, Melanesia ,Micronesia, and Indonesia. 62
56 FRUS, 1544. Vol. I. Washington, 1965, p. 1204.

57 Ibid., pp. 699 - 700.

58 Congressional Record. 79-th Congress, Vol. 91, pp. 1010 - 1011.

59 Kellad C. The Zones of Safety Plan, American War and Peace Aims. -The Seventeenth Annual Debate Handbook 1943 - 1944, p. 201.

60 The New York Times, 15.VIII.1944.

61 For the President. Personal and Secret. Correspondence between F. D. Roosevelt and W. Bullit. Boston. 1972, pp. 574 - 575.

62 Thorne Ch. Allies of a Kind, N. Y. 1978, p. 190.

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The issue of creating a home-based system was considered at the State Department in the subcommittees on security and territories of the advisory committee on foreign policy. Of particular interest in this regard are the decisions of the sub-committee on Territories chaired by I. Bowman, whose task was to study the historical, economic and social processes in the Territories that may be affected by various international agreements, as well as to develop recommendations concerning their post-war structure .63 The sub-committees ' decisions were based on the fact that Japan's military potential should be destroyed, and American naval bases should be created around it. It was recommended that they be built for aircraft with a range of 700 miles, which would allow San Francisco to connect with Tokyo, Singapore and Sydney. Members of the sub-committees pointed out the importance of establishing bases on the islands of Clipperton, Marquesas and others, noting that after the war, the United States can use them for commercial purposes, including for the export of mineral raw materials from Southeast Asian countries.

Neither the British Empire nor any other metropolitan nation claiming the Pacific Islands was mentioned during the basing debate .64 It was about American control over Japan, and in the broadest sense of the word - over the entire Far East, for which the creation of a network of strategic bases was designed. Promising areas for creating strongholds were Korea, which was supposed to be put under international guardianship, Taiwan, and the Philippines. It was also planned to restore US positions in Guam and the Carolinas .65 When considering strategic co-ownership bases, it was noted that the United States should use economic assistance to "European countries to establish international bases in their colonies." 66 Special importance was attached to the Marshall, Carolinas, and Marquesas Islands, which, because of their strategic position, were "unsinkable aircraft carriers that control the Pacific Ocean area between Hawaii and the Philippines," according to the State Department's Adviser on the Pacific Islands, J. Blexley. 67
Having settled on these islands by the end of the war, the Americans were not going to cede them to anyone. According to S. Pomeroy, a prominent British expert on American territories in the Pacific, "no one doubted that the United States would continue to control these islands, the question was how control would be carried out" 68 . For Admiral E. King, this problem was solved simply: "The islands should be turned into American bases, since the United States conquered them." 69 The State Department believed that it should act more cautiously, hiding behind "international guardianship". However, representatives of the American military circles did not intend to be guided by the principles of the Atlantic Charter 70 when resolving post-war territorial issues .

Even before the United States entered the war, studying the possibilities of developing an American naval and air-based system in the South Pacific (Cook Islands, Samoa, Fiji, Efat.

63 Postwar Foreign Policy Preparations, 1939 - 1945. Washington. 1949, p. 103.

64 Pomeroy S. Pacific Outpost. American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia. Stanford, 1951, p. 38.

65 Louis W. Op. cit., p. 85.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid., p. 165.

68 Pomeroy S. Op. cit., p. XIX.

69 Ibid., p. 169.

70 Louis W. Op. cit., p. 169.

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Espirito Santo, New Caledonia, etc.), representatives of the military departments raised before Roosevelt the question of using English and French possessions. In this regard, the island of Bora Bora attracted the attention of the United States. In 1941, Admiral King proposed to occupy the island, and in January 1942, Admiral X proposed to occupy the island. Stark and General J. Marshall developed a detailed plan for the capture. After the landing of the expeditionary force on the island, construction of a naval base began there, which after the war could be used as an intermediate port on the way from the United States and Panama to Australia and New Zealand .71 By April 1944, the construction was completed.

At the end of 1941, it was decided to establish an advanced American stronghold on the islands of Samoa, part of which belonged to France and New Zealand. Airfields, depots, and refueling centers were built here, and by the end of the war, the entire group of islands had become a powerful US naval and air-based system, an important strategic base for their navy in the South Pacific .72 In the Fiji Islands (English possession), the construction of bases began in mid-1942. The port of Suva was expanded, a naval aviation base was located in the Lanfala Bay area ,and an airfield for heavy bombers was built in the Nareva area. 73 In mid-1942, construction work began on the island of New Caledonia, one of the largest in the Pacific Ocean. The main work was carried out in Noumea, the southern part of the island, where an extensive network of sea fortifications was soon established. 74 New Caledonia served as a stronghold in the American base system. Since November 8, 1942, it has been the headquarters of the Allied Joint Command in the South Pacific 75 .

Much attention was paid to the United States and the Solomon Islands. In October 1942, Roosevelt proposed the creation of a key naval and air base on Guadalcanal. In 1943, engineer battalions were deployed there, and the island soon became an important strategic US beachhead in the Central Pacific. Small islands (Tulagi, Roussel, Florida) were also strengthened, on which Naval strongholds were equipped. The Americans were able to start directly implementing the system of basing in the Marshall, Gilbert, Caroline and Mariana Islands only at the end of the war, since these islands were mandates of Japan. First of all, the construction of bases began on the Gilbert Islands (Tarawa, Makin and Aramam) due to their important strategic location .76 After the capture of the Marshall Islands in February 1944, the United States immediately began to create a system of bases there. On the islands of Roi and Numur, new airfields were restored, expanded and built, docks and repair shops were built. Similar structures have appeared on Kwajalein Atoll and the Majuro 77 Islands.

In the fall of 1944, the United States captured part of the Caroline Islands (Truk, Palau, Yang, Ulithi, etc.) and the Bismarck Archipelago. Immediately after the occupation, construction of airfields, ship parking areas, and equipment for the naval and air base 78 began on Ulithi . In the spring of 1944, the United States occupied New Guinea and the surrounding islands, which were also included in the American base system.-

71 BNB, Vol. II, pp. 196 - 202.

72 Ibid., pp. 209, 212.

73 Ibid., p. 221.

74 Ibid., p. 222.

75 Ibid., pp. 221, 227.

76 Ibid., p. 317.

77 Ibid., pp. 318, 320, 322.

78 Ibid., p. 314.

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the first one. Washington believed that at least 10 reliable bases should be established around Australia. "We are going to establish a monopoly on basing, we need it for high strategic goals." 79 In August 1944, after the landing of American troops on the island of Guam, Washington immediately began to develop a plan for the construction of strategic military facilities on it.

The system of American bases was created as US expansionism increased from the claims of a regional power to the claims of world domination. Just before and at the very beginning of the war, American imperialism was trying to establish military control over the Western hemisphere. The subsequent participation in the anti-Hitler coalition served as a cover for the US ruling circles to spread their influence beyond its borders. During the war, when the Soviet people won decisive victories over Hitler's Germany, American expansion began to take on an openly anti-Soviet character. The strategic meaning of the US base system was now reduced to creating the military potential of the West for confrontation with the USSR, surrounding it with military strongholds of the imperialists and preparing a new world war. In this respect, the US attempts to seize the Kuril Islands at the end of the war are indicative. "I would like to inform you," US President Vladimir Putin wrote to Stalin. Truman, August 17, 1945-that the US government wishes to obtain the right to place its air bases for conventional and naval aviation on one of the Kuril Islands, preferably in the central group, for military and commercial use. " 80
In total, during the Second World War, the American researcher D. Marion wrote, the United States regained or consolidated its power over 250,887 thousand square kilometers of the ocean and laid claims to power and domination over 36,465 thousand square kilometers of land with a population of 645,815 thousand people. If we add to this the pre-war possessions and dependent territories of the United States, it turns out that their strategic dominance in the form of military and other types of actual control extended to 38,285 thousand square kilometers and 667,815 thousand people .81 After the end of the war, the United States began to strengthen its captured positions. The US Government approved a plan that estimated the annual cost of expanding the base system at $ 400 million, including the acquisition of new bases, the replacement of temporary structures with fixed ones, and the re-equipment of bases depending on the strategic situation of the post-war period .82 It was the bases created during World War II that formed the basis of the global basing system, which is now the most important element of the military-strategic infrastructure of American imperialism.

79 Ibid.

80 Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945. Moscow, 1958, p. 264.

81 Marion D. Bases and Empire, Moscow, 1948, p. 191.

82 Cit. in: Solontsov 3, Politika voenno-morskoy expansii v gody vtoroi mirovoi voyni [The policy of naval expansion during the Second World War], Moscow, 1977, p. 34.

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