The article analyzes the recently escalated US-Chinese contradictions in the South China Sea region, including the issue of freedom of navigation and disputes over the ownership of a number of islands. To determine the legitimacy of the activities of American and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea from the point of view of international law, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 is subjected to a detailed analysis.The author examines the territorial claims of China and some ASEAN countries to the Spratly and Paracel Islands, as well as the intensification of Washington's activities in this area.

Keywords: u.s.-China relations, South China Sea, freedom of navigation, para rural islands, spratly Islands

The official assessment of current U.S.-China relations given by top leaders of the United States and China during bilateral meetings is usually kept in an optimistic, positive tone. In their public speeches, the leaders of the two countries emphasize the potential areas of bilateral cooperation, the existence of a wide range of common interests of a global and regional nature, and the readiness of both states to develop partnership relations. At the same time, the contradictions inherent in these bilateral relations are often either retouched or not mentioned at all.

It is impossible to understand the whole gamut of relations developing between the two largest powers of the world at the present stage without analyzing both traditional and emerging problems. Therefore, it is appropriate to speak not only about the ambivalence of relations between the United States and China, but also about the aggravation of a number of traditional problems in bilateral relations. With a certain degree of convention, it can even be pointed out that the systematic emergence of new problems is becoming a characteristic feature of modern US-Chinese relations.

Among the new problems, the issue of the South China Sea should be highlighted, the US-Chinese context of which includes two components - the frequent episodes of confrontation between the US and Chinese

Yana V. LEKSYUTINA-Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of American Studies, Faculty of International Relations, Saint Petersburg State University. E-mail: lexyana@yandex.ru (или lexyana@hotmail.com).

in the South China Sea and air space, and Washington's increased efforts to include in the process of settling the territorial claims of China and individual ASEAN States to a number of islands and the waters of the South China Sea.

On March 8, 2009, another major incident involving Chinese and American naval vessels occurred in the South China Sea. The pursuit by five Chinese ships of the American oceanographic vessel of the US Navy "Impeccable" (Impeccable) and the creation of obstacles to its free navigation in the waters of the South China Sea quickly became the property of the world community and entailed a series of mutual accusations and claims of the American and Chinese leadership. This incident had an international resonance, quite comparable to the resonance that followed the events of April 1, 2001, when the obstruction by Chinese fighters of the flight of an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea ended in a collision of aircraft and the death of a Chinese pilot.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982

The Chinese air and naval forces ' opposition to the air and sea navigation of American vessels in the South China Sea zone has already become a certain model of Beijing's behavior, justifying the legality of its actions by the provisions of international and national legislation in the field of maritime law. According to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which China ratified in 1996, all incidents in the South China Sea occurred in China's exclusive economic Zone, which extends 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In particular, on April 1, 2001, an American fighter jet was located 65 nautical miles southeast of the Chinese island of Hainan, and on March 8, 2009, an American research vessel was cruising in the South China Sea at a distance of 70 nautical miles south of this island.

Moreover, in addition to the two cases already mentioned, there were other cases when the Chinese side interfered with the free navigation of American vessels in its exclusive economic zone or even beyond its borders. Examples include the incidents involving the US Navy vessels Bowditch in March 2001 and Victorious in May 2009 in the Yellow Sea, as well as the John McCain in June 2009.

The different interpretations of maritime law in the exclusive economic zone by the US and Chinese sides justify the respective actions of both parties in conflict situations in the South China Sea. Washington claims that its ships and aircraft conduct "routine" activities in international waters and the international airspace located above them, which are not subject to the sovereignty of China, which it is granted within its borders.: land territory, internal waters, and a 12-mile territorial sea zone and the airspace above them.

Beijing qualifies the navigation of American vessels as illegal exploration activities of US military vessels in the exclusive economic zone of China, violating the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, the Chinese law" On the State Border of Exclusive Economic Zones and the Continental Shelf " of 1998, as well as the Regulation on Marine Scientific Research with Foreign Participation of 1996. The Chinese authorities do not specify which provisions of these documents are violated by American courts. In particular, commenting on the events of March 8, 2009, an official representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry during a press conference refused to meet the persistent requests of journalists to cite specific articles or at least parts of these documents that the American side violated. As an alternative, they were asked to study these laws independently [3].

Turning to the study of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, we can distinguish a number of provisions regulating the rights of coastal and other States in the exclusive economic zone. It is very important to analyze the existing US-Chinese contradictions on the issue under consideration that the Convention grants coastal States within the exclusive economic zone only the sovereign right to explore, develop and preserve living and non-living resources; jurisdiction over the creation and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; jurisdiction over marine scientific research and protection and conservation of the marine environment [2, p. 56]. All States in the exclusive economic zone enjoy freedom of navigation and flight, laying of underwater cables and pipelines, and other uses of the sea [2, Article 58]. No article of the Convention contains provisions prohibiting the navigation of warships in the exclusive economic zone of a coastal State. It follows that the Chinese authorities are violating the relevant provisions of the Convention to which they are a party by obstructing the free navigation of not only civilian but even military vessels of the United States in the waters outside the territorial sea and in the airspace above them.

It seems that the only possible justification for the legitimacy of the actions of the Chinese authorities in the South China Sea from the point of view of international law could be to consider the activities of American vessels as aimed at conducting marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone of China. According to article 246 of the Convention, marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone can be conducted only with the consent of the coastal State [2, Article 246]. Therefore, if the activities of American vessels are classified as marine scientific research, then the United States becomes a party in violation of the Convention. However, such an interpretation of the activities of American vessels in the South China Sea seems rather "strained".

Thus, the current international legal norms in the field of the law of the sea leave opportunities for a fairly broad interpretation and legal justification of the actions of Washington and the United States.-

kina in the South China Sea. The legality of navigation of American vessels in the exclusive economic zone of China is supported by the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which declare freedom of navigation in the exclusive economic zone for all states, and the Convention grants Beijing the right to obstruct American vessels by virtue of granting China jurisdiction over the conduct of marine scientific research.

Washington is not allowed to take a more decisive position in conflict situations in the South China Sea by one significant point - the US Senate has not yet ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accordingly, any demands from Washington to Beijing about the need to adhere to the spirit and letter of this international document, to which the United States is not a party, would sound somewhat ambiguous. Moreover, Washington cannot use the Convention's procedure for settling disputes with China concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. Thus, the signatory States have the right to seek the assistance of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, arbitration or special arbitration, whose decisions are binding, in order to settle disputes that have arisen.

At the same time, it should be noted that, although the possibility of a broad interpretation of the Convention creates prerequisites for the emergence of conflict situations, their actual occurrence largely depends on the level and nature of relations between States, on the degree of strategic trust between their leaders. So, among the 192 UN member states, in addition to China, there are several other countries that defend the principle of managing or completely prohibiting the navigation of warships in the exclusive economic zone of a coastal state. Namely, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cape Verde, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal, Uruguay and the Philippines [9, p. 30]. However, the largest incidents caused by different interpretations of the law of the sea occur between the US Navy and China.

The official rhetoric of Washington and Beijing, which focuses mainly on the continuous progressive development of US-China ties and cooperation in many areas, and on common interests in countering global and regional challenges, hides an important characteristic of modern US - China relations-the lack of mutual strategic trust. On the issue of the South China Sea, this distrust is reflected in the continued practice of the United States collecting intelligence in close proximity to China and Beijing's suspicions about the activity of American vessels near its own state borders.

It is obvious that the rapid increase in China's integrated power and, above all, the strengthening of its military potential, cannot but cause concern for the American leadership. In turn, the lack of transparency in the field of China's military construction forces the United States to resort to collecting intelligence information that allows the American leadership to get at least a general idea of the state of the armed forces.-

China's armed forces and assess the potential risks to US dominance on a global and regional scale.

Washington's interest in the South China Sea and the systematic appearance of American ships and aircraft in this area are quite natural due to the availability of information about the construction of a large Chinese naval base Yulin (Sanya) on the southern coast of Hainan Island. The US Department of Defense estimates that this naval base could host torpedo and nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles on board, as well as advanced surface warships. This base, which has underground facilities, is capable of providing the naval forces of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) with direct access to international transport communications and can serve as a hidden base for Chinese submarines in the South China Sea [8, p. 2]. So far, China's nuclear submarines have been under the command of only the PLA's Northern Fleet.

The creation of the Yulin naval base, the introduction of China's first aircraft carrier into the PLA Southern Fleet, predicted by a number of experts, along with the expansion of China's field airfields and military fortifications on the islands of the Spratly Archipelago and one of the Paracel Islands, an increase in the number of patrol vessels plying off the coast of Vietnam and the Philippines-all these are It is aimed at strengthening its military power and increasing the scale of its military presence in the South China Sea, dictated by the need to strengthen China's position in the dispute over the ownership of a number of islands in the South China Sea.

Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands and the Strait of Malacca

At the moment, China disputes not only the ownership of the Spratly Islands (the Chinese name for the islands is Nansha) and the Paracel Islands (the Chinese name is Xisha), but also almost 80% of the entire water area of the South China Sea. Beijing's implementation of its territorial claims in this part of the world, in fact, will lead to the transformation of the South China Sea into a "Chinese lake", for navigation in the waters of which other states will have to obtain appropriate permission from the Chinese authorities.

Along with China, Vietnam and Taiwan are parties to the decades-long disputes over the ownership of the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands are Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The current structure of actual control by the parties to the conflict over the disputed islands is as follows: China controls all the Paracel Islands and has military garrisons on 5 or 6 atolls of the Spratly Islands; Vietnam has military garrisons on 21 islands of the Spratly Archipelago; the Philippines controls 8 islands, Malaysia - 3, and Taiwan - one island of the Spratly Archipelago [1, p. 85].

In general, the PRC emphasizes its indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel Archipelago and the Spratly Islands in all official speeches. On the maps published on the official website of the Chinese State Administration of Geodesy and Cartography, the southern sea border of China is a U-shaped dotted line covering almost the entire water area of the South China Sea, with the exception of only the 12-mile zone of territorial waters of other coastal states [12].

The importance of securing sovereignty over these islands for the Chinese authorities goes far beyond the task of completing the process of annexing the lands once lost by China. The extension of sovereign rights to all these islands would also allow the Chinese authorities to establish control over navigation not only within the current 12-mile territorial waters of the PRC, but also over the world's second most important international sea route passing through the waters of the South China Sea. Every year, more than half of the world's merchant marine tonnage passes through the South China Sea via the Straits of Malacca, Lombok and Sunda. 21 of China's 39 sea routes pass through this sea, accounting for up to 60% of China's foreign trade. Maritime communications passing through the Strait of Malacca are particularly important for the PRC, as 80% of oil imported from the Middle East and Africa is delivered to China via them [6].

The sea route through the Strait of Malacca and further along the South China Sea is extremely important not only for China, but also for Japan and South Korea, as countries whose economic development depends to a certain extent on uninterrupted supplies of mineral raw materials and energy resources from the Middle East and Africa. In the structure of cargo transportation through the Strait of Malacca, the share of oil, liquefied natural gas, coal and iron ore is particularly high.

Preserving the right of free navigation in the South China Sea is a priority task for the United States, as a major trading power interested in unhindered access to dynamically developing Asian markets, and as a traditional ally of Japan and South Korea, whose interests Washington is called upon to defend. Through the waters of the South China Sea also pass important for the US Navy sea communications connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In particular, these sea routes were used during military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A significant motive for rivalry between the parties to territorial disputes in the South China Sea itself is also the presence of colossal fish resources in the water area of this sea. This fishing area accounts for up to 10% of the world's catch, with an annual catch of 5 million tons. In the ranking of the 19 largest fishing areas in the world, the South China Sea occupies the fourth place [10, p. 319]. The high dependence of the well-being and sometimes even just the survival of the local population of the South China Sea coastal States on the catch of fish and related economic activities raises the stakes of the member States of these territories-

legal disputes. Thus, according to some estimates, the number of fishermen in Southeast Asia reaches 10 million people, while the welfare of 100 million people depends on fishing [10, p. 319].

The discovery of significant oil and gas reserves on the continental shelf of the South China Sea islands has contributed to the intensification of disputes over the ownership of the islands. In fact, at the present stage, the substantive aspect of disputes over these islands lies in the desire of each party participating in this node of territorial claims to secure a larger section of the continental shelf. The Chinese economy's rapidly increasing energy needs are raising the stakes of the Chinese authorities in the struggle to assert sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and reducing the likelihood of any concessions from Beijing.

The most acute contradictions on this issue exist between China and Vietnam. In 1974, the Chinese Navy established control over the Vietnamese islands of the Paracel Archipelago, and in 1988, in a clash with the Vietnamese naval forces, they seized a number of islands of the Spratly Archipelago. Armed clashes have also taken place with the participation of other States involved in territorial disputes around these islands. Especially many armed conflicts occurred in the South China Sea in the second half of the 1990s between China and the Philippines. In recent years, parties to disputes have generally managed to refrain from using military force to resolve mutual contradictions.

USA, China, Vietnam

Washington's participation in the settlement of territorial disputes in the South China Sea may give an additional impetus to the rapprochement between the United States and Vietnam observed in recent years. Washington's rapidly growing interest in developing ties with Vietnam is due to the potential of this country, which, according to American estimates, may evolve into a "middle power" in the foreseeable future, capable of exerting significant influence in Southeast Asia. An important role in the foreign policy calculations of the American leadership is also played by the ambivalence of Vietnam's relations with China, whose growing regional influence causes deep concern in Hanoi. During a state visit to Vietnam in July 2010, which coincided with the 15th anniversary of the normalization of U.S.-Vietnamese diplomatic relations, Secretary of State H. Clinton stated that developing relations with Vietnam is an integral part of the US strategy to expand its presence in the Asia-Pacific region and, more narrowly, in Southeast Asia [11].

In August 2010, in the wake of escalating US-Chinese disputes over freedom of maritime navigation, the first week-long joint naval exercises in the history of US-Vietnamese relations were held in the South China Sea. Effectively exploiting the existing differences between Vietnam and China on the issue of ownership

Washington is pursuing two goals: advancing its own interests in the issue of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and gaining a potential ally in Vietnam in the latent confrontation with China.

To date, US-Vietnamese relations are developing successfully not only in the field of trade and economic relations and investment, but also in the field of defense and security. In 2005, the United States and Vietnam signed a military cooperation agreement that included, among other things, plans for Vietnamese officers to participate in American military education and training courses. Since 2008, the United States and Vietnam have held annual forums as part of the Policy, Security, and Defense Dialogue, and in 2010, the Defense Dialogue was initiated, providing for regular meetings between the defense departments of the two countries. American Navy vessels make regular calls at Vietnamese ports.

USA, China and ASEAN countries

Since the late 1990s, China's rather aggressive policy in this territorial dispute has begun to transform and acquire new, peaceful features. In line with the general policy of the Chinese leadership to normalize and strengthen relations with the ASEAN countries, Beijing has increasingly declared its openness to negotiate the settlement of disputes in the South China Sea on the basis of international law and the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Official Beijing especially drew attention to the fact that if there is no compromise between the parties in the process of settling territorial disputes, they can be postponed indefinitely, for the next generations, and start joint development of the potentially hydrocarbon-rich continental shelf.

Around the same time, the ASEAN countries were trying to develop a specific code of conduct for associated States in the South China Sea, designed to stabilize the situation in the disputed waters by regulating the activities of the parties involved. As a result of long-term, multi-year negotiations on the disputed islands, ASEAN was able in 2002 to attract China to sign the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, in which the parties pledged to resolve their territorial and legal disputes exclusively by peaceful means, through friendly consultations and negotiations between the sovereign States directly involved in these disputes, in accordance with principles of international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [7]. Until now, Beijing has categorically refused to join the code of conduct in the South China Sea, which imposes legal obligations on the parties involved in it.

The intensification of American policy on the South China Sea issue can also contribute to the rapprochement of the United States with ASEAN. Back under George W. Bush. the US administration has shown an interest in establishing,

Intensification of contacts with ASEAN , a regional organization of East Asia that has traditionally been given a very modest place in the hierarchy of American foreign policy priorities. Until recently, US administrations developed relations with the countries of Southeast Asia mainly on a bilateral basis, and ASEAN was considered as a disparate group of small passive states that followed in the wake of the great powers and depended on maintaining the balance of power between them [4, p.191].

Given the rapidly growing role of ASEAN in regional affairs, as well as the isolation of modern East Asian integration processes in ASEAN, Washington's desire to maintain and strengthen its position in East Asia is directly linked to the need to strengthen ties with this promising organization. Guided by this goal, Washington took a number of symbolic steps towards ASEAN in a fairly short time. Thus, in February 2009, the first official visit of the US Secretary of State to the ASEAN Secretariat in the history of US-ASEAN relations took place. In many ways, Washington signed the founding 1976 ASEAN Bali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 2009, which the United States has long refrained from joining. The Obama administration implemented the plan proposed by George W. Bush, but never implemented by him, to create a mechanism for regular summits of leaders of the US - ASEAN dialogue partnership states. Since October 30, 2010 The United States has become a full participant in the East Asia Summit, an auxiliary structure in the process of creating the East Asian Community.

The signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties was followed by five years of relatively stable situation in the South China Sea. There were even attempts to implement an initiative to conduct joint economic activities in the area of the disputed islands. For example, in 2005, the state-owned oil and gas companies of China, Vietnam and the Philippines documented agreements on joint seismic exploration in the agreed area of the South China Sea.

At the 17th ASEAN Regional Security Forum, held in Hanoi in mid-July 2010, US Secretary of State H. E. Clinton, by prior agreement with a number of ASEAN countries, raised the issue of the South China Sea. In addition to attributing freedom of navigation, open access to Asian maritime communications, and the need for parties to disputes to adhere to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea when making their territorial claims to the US national interests, Mrs. Clinton suggested that a multilateral approach should be used in resolving territorial claims in the South China Sea and expressed Washington's readiness to At the ministerial meeting, 11 of the 27 members of the regional security forum expressed support for the United States on the South China Sea issue, including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia, the EU, Japan and South Korea.

The atmosphere around the South China Sea issue continued to heat up when, in September 2010, information was leaked to the press regarding a draft joint statement prepared by Washington on the South China Sea issue, the possibility of publication of which was supposed to be discussed in advance with the ASEAN countries during the next, already the second in a row, meeting in the US-ASEAN format. The draft, in particular, contained the phrase that the leaders of the United States and ASEAN countries oppose the use of force and threats of its use by any party trying to realize its territorial claims in the South China Sea [5].

Due to the fact that a number of ASEAN countries expressed doubts about the need to include such a harsh statement, which could cause a rather unpredictable reaction from Beijing, this provision was not included in the final official document of the US - ASEAN dialogue meeting. Although the joint statement on the situation in the South China Sea was not made public, the very fact that Washington has put forward such an initiative indicates the intentions of the American leadership to assume a more active role as a mediator in the settlement of territorial disputes in this region.

However, since 2007, China has become increasingly active in promoting its own interests in the South China Sea, which has caused friction between stakeholders and an increase in various incidents in the sea area. In July 2007, for example, the shelling by the Chinese Navy of a Vietnamese ship engaged in geological exploration in the Spratly Islands caused a major crisis in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The situation was aggravated by the military maneuvers conducted by the Chinese Navy in the area of the Paracel Islands in the second half of November 2007.

In November 2007, the Chinese media reported on the decision taken by the State Council of China to create a new administrative unit of Hainan Island-the county city of Sansha with territorial jurisdiction over three archipelagos - Paracel, Spratly and Zhongsha (MccLesfield Bank Shoal). This news caused objections from the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry and mass protests in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

In March 2009, the situation around the South China Sea was destabilized by two events: the adoption by Manila of the State's Main Sea Line Act, which established Philippine jurisdiction over Huangyan Island and several Spratly Islands and their surrounding waters; and the visit of the Malaysian Prime Minister to Danwan Reef, part of the Spratly Archipelago. The visit was accompanied by a declaration of Malaysia's sovereignty over it and its surrounding waters. These actions, which assert rights to disputed islands and waters, have provoked public expressions of discontent and strong protests from the Chinese and Vietnamese authorities.

Since 2001. Beijing unilaterally imposes annual seasonal bans (from May 16 to August 1) on fishing in the South China Sea north of the 12th parallel (near the Paracel Islands) and, as a result,

carries out mass detentions of Vietnamese fishing vessels engaged in fishing for fish and seafood in violation of the Chinese ban. In 2009 alone, Chinese authorities detained 33 Vietnamese fishing vessels and arrested 433 crew members. The first quarter of 2010 was marked by 30 cases of detention by the Chinese authorities of Vietnamese fishing vessels, accompanied by the arrest of more than 200 fishermen [13, p. 19]. Measures against violators of the Chinese ban range from detaining a ship, arresting crew members, confiscating catch, imposing substantial fines, and even confiscating vessels.

In October 2010, the Chinese authorities announced their intention to build another 30 patrol ships within five years, whose tasks will include demonstrating China's sovereignty over the South China Sea, restoring order in the fishing industry, and protecting the interests of the Chinese fisheries and fishermen. Such actions by Beijing cause mass demonstrations of protest in Vietnam, where the authorities, classifying China's annual bans on fishing and related activities of Chinese ships as serious violations of Vietnam's sovereignty, systematically express official protests.

In January 2010 Beijing has unveiled plans for tourism development on a number of Paracel Islands in the context of a new plan to attract tourists to Hainan Island. And in May 2010, a Chinese seismic survey vessel began exploring the waters near Triton Island in the Paracel Archipelago (Chinese name-o. Zhongjiang) and Vietnam's oil and gas exploration sites. In response, the Vietnamese government expressed an official protest and demanded an immediate cessation of work.

At the same time, Beijing is exerting diverse pressure on third parties to limit Vietnam's ability to develop oil and gas fields on the continental shelf of the South China Sea. So, in July 2008, the Chinese authorities issued an ultimatum to the American oil company Exxon-Mobile, demanding that it immediately stop implementing the agreement reached with Vietnam on conducting oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea. Beijing has threatened to impose a ban on the company's activities in China otherwise.

For a long time, the United States, which is not a party to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, has taken the position of an outside observer on this issue. In mid-2010, Washington's distancing from territorial disputes in the South China Sea was replaced by increased US activity in this area. At the 9th International conference on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region "Shangri-La Dialogue" in June 2010, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted the South China Sea as an area of growing concern for Washington. Emphasizing the extreme importance of this sea not only for coastal states, but also for all states with economic and security interests in Asia, R. Gates outlined the maintenance of stability, freedom of navigation and free unhindered economic development as the foundations of American policy. In particular, the Minister of Defense-

The US Department of Defense objected to any actions that serve the purpose of intimidating American or other foreign corporations involved in legitimate economic activities. He also pointed out that Washington, not taking sides on the issue of territorial claims, opposes the use of force and actions that hinder freedom of navigation [14].

Beijing, which categorically opposes the involvement of third parties in this issue and defends the principle of holding negotiations on its settlement exclusively on a bilateral basis with each of the parties to the conflict, regarded X's speech. Clinton at the 17th ASEAN Regional Security Forum in 2010 in Hanoi as the United States seeks to once again interfere in China's purely internal affairs and promote the internationalization of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In X's speech Clinton The Chinese authorities saw a deliberate US strategy to expand its influence in the region by discrediting China among neighboring countries. The Chinese leadership's perception of X's speech is particularly acute. Clinton attached the fact of creating a kind of" united front " of the United States and the ASEAN states - private owners of this territorial dispute, which, according to Beijing, has an anti-Chinese orientation.

Overall, since mid-2010. Washington began to actively promote the idea of negotiations on the South China Sea in a multilateral format and its readiness to participate directly in this process. Washington's increased activity on the South China issue can be seen as an integral part of the overall strategy of containing China and, in a narrower sense, a manifestation of the policy of "returning to Asia", fully deployed by Barack Obama, who proclaimed himself "America's first Pacific president". At a time when the trend of shifting the center of the world economy and politics to the East Asian region is becoming more pronounced, restoring some of the positions lost during the previous two US administrations in this part of the world is considered in Washington as a priority foreign policy task.

The American policy of "returning to Asia" includes both strengthening the system of military-political alliances that have already existed for decades in the East Asian region, and forming relations of cooperation and partnership with other regional states that have a certain political weight and influence in this region. Washington's advocacy of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, which is of enduring importance to such traditional US allies in East Asia as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, will help strengthen these allied relations.

It should be noted that the manifestation of Washington's intentions to play a more active role in the affairs of the East Asian region is reflected not only in the activity of the United States in the South China Sea issue, but also in the more active pro-Japanese position of the American authorities on the issue of ownership of the Diaoyu Islands (Japanese name - Senkaku) disputed by China, Japan and Taiwan. A storm of indignation in Beijing was caused by the statement of the American side.

The parties agreed in November 2010 that the US-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Diaoyu Islands.

Thus, an important content of the ongoing transformation of US foreign policy in East Asia, due to Washington's desire to maintain and strengthen its regional positions in the new conditions of rising China, has become the diversification of forms of American involvement in the affairs of the region. The traditional approach of the United States to ensuring its presence in East Asia mainly on the basis of a system of military and political alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines was supplemented by the establishment of cooperative and partnership relations with other regional states (Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia), as well as the expansion of US participation in multilateral regional and, above all, in the work of such a promising regional organization as ASEAN.

The intensification of US foreign policy in the East Asian direction is largely due to China's rapidly gaining economic and political weight. When determining the content of modern US-China relations, it is necessary, first of all, to take into account their significant conflict potential, due to the rivalry of the only global superpower with a state capable of claiming full-fledged superpower status in the foreseeable future. The rivalry between Washington and Beijing can be traced both at the global and regional levels in East Asia.

Until recently, the conflicting nature of US-China relations was reflected in the US-China contradictions on issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, and a whole range of issues related to the observance of human rights in China. In the past few years, the severity of the Taiwan problem has significantly decreased due to the rapidly normalizing relations between the Chinese and Taiwanese administrations against the background of Ma Ying-jeou's coming to power in Taiwan. Meanwhile, the increased activity of the Chinese authorities on the South China Sea issue, coupled with Washington's growing interest in this issue and its desire to play a direct role in its settlement, indicate that in the near future, the South China Sea issue may take over the baton from the Taiwan problem and become the strongest source of US-Chinese contradictions.

List of literature

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2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 10.12.1982 (http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_r.pdf).

3. Regular press conference on March 10, 2009 at the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Ma Zhaoxu (http://saint-petersburg.china-consulate.org/rus/fyrth/t542406.htm).

4. Senin R. A. ASEAN - the United States of America / / ASEAN at the beginning of the 21st century. Current problems and prospects / Edited by K. V. Kobelev, G. M. Lokshin, and N. P. Maletin. Moscow: Forum Publishing House, 2010, pp. 190-218.

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14. 1^st Plenary Session "Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific", Dr. R. Gates. 5.06.2010 (http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2010/ple nary-session-speeches/first-plenary-session/robert-gates/).

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