Taiwan's governance policies implemented in the first decade after 1945 generally followed the Japanese model of State-directed economic development. The model of this administration, although it was colonial, made it possible to develop industry, agriculture, create infrastructure, establish foreign trade and raise the general standard of living of the population at a significant pace. It was precisely certain successes in Japan's colonial policy in Taiwan that caused the principles of Japanese governance not to be immediately replaced by Chinese ones.

In turn, the policy of the Chinese government after 1945, which largely adopted the management methods of Japan, is described by some researchers as semi-colonial or fully colonial. The Chinese authorities, especially in the period 1945-1949, following the Japanese model, practically did not invest money in the development of Taiwan and used the island's economic resources exclusively in the interests of mainland China.

The colonial methods of governance (mainly the exploitation of resources and population, preventing the accumulation of national capital, and managing the territory with the help of migrants delegated by the "mother country"), characteristic of 1945-1949, give reason to believe that the colonial administration of Taiwan ended not earlier than 1949.

Keywords: Taiwan, Republic of China (KR), Japan, colonialism, Kuomintang, China.

Taiwan's history includes various periods during which the island was ruled by both European and Asian countries. Last year

Taiwan's regions were ruled by the Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch, and it was a Japanese colony from the end of the 19th century until 1945.

Until the mid-20th century. All of Taiwan's economic resources, administration, and judicial authorities were under the control of the Japanese authorities. The island was a raw material base and a market for Japanese products, playing a supporting role in the economy of the Japanese Empire, insuring the metropolis in the event of a crisis or trade imbalance.

After the end of World War II, as a result of the "glorious revival" of Taiwan, the island once again became part of China. Nevertheless, during the first decades of Chinese rule, especially from 1945 to 1949, the authorities generally followed the Japanese model of development of the island. It is precisely certain similarities in the management of the island by the Japanese authorities and the Kuomintang that make it possible to assert that the Japanese management model, although essentially exploitative, allowed for a significant pace of economic development and an increase in the standard of living of the population. In turn, some researchers call the policy of the Kuomintang, which largely adopted the methods of governing Japan, semi-colonial or fully colonial (Kerr, 1974; Mao Jiaqi, 1988; Chen Wuzhong, 1989; Shi Ming, 1980).

It is interesting to compare the methods of Chinese and Japanese governance of Taiwan, to determine in which areas and to what extent the Kuomintang government adopted the Japanese experience of governance, and also to look at the example of Taiwan, whether Japan's colonial policy was really no less effective, and in some periods even more successful, than the policy of the Chinese authorities.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, for almost half a century, the Empire of Japan has been creating a "co-flourishing sphere" in East Asia, centered on Japan and including all the territories it occupied. An important feature of Japanese colonial policy is the maximum integration of the colonies into the system of economic relations of the empire. The geographical proximity of the controlled territories, their common cultural and civilizational base with Japan created conditions under which the economies of the colonies could be strongly connected with the economy of the mother country. Under such conditions, new enterprises, industrial plants and commercial corporations were formed, which have the closest ties with their counterparts in Japan.

Until the end of World War II, Taiwan remained one of the most developed and most integrated colonies with the mother country. The creation of a developed infrastructure, the implementation of sanitary measures and the fight against epidemics, the implementation of large - scale capital export, the construction of industrial enterprises, the transformation of Taiwan into a financially independent colony-all this primarily served the interests of Japan, but at the same time was of great importance for the development of the island itself.

Already during the colonial period, there was a tendency to increase the growth of exports in relation to imports (it was export orientation that later became the priority direction of Taiwan's economic development in the second half of the XX century): in 1911-1938, its exports increased by 6.7%, imports - by 4.9% per year. Together with Korea, Taiwan accounted for up to 30% of Japan's imports and 35% of its exports in the first half of the 1930s.¹

After the transition of Taiwan from Japan to China, the Kuomintang government, in addition to receiving many infrastructure facilities, modern enterprises, social institutions built by the Japanese, as well as equipment and military equipment, actively used the management methods of the Japanese period.

¹ For comparison, the share of all colonies in the foreign trade turnover of France in the 1930s was no more than 10-12% [Kalashnikov, 1999, p. 20].

administrative division

After the surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945, in September of the same year, the "General Program for Organizing Governance in Taiwan"was published. Chen Yi, a former chairman of the provincial government in Taiwan, was appointed head of the Taiwan Administration. Fujian, who served as the head of the Taiwan Exploration Committee established on April 17, 1944 [Shi Ming, 1980, p. 699]. The main document defining the functioning of power in Taiwan after 1945 was the 1947 Constitution of the Republic of China. It provided for the division of government bodies into 5 branches, and by 1949 the corresponding chambers (yuan) of the Kuomintang government were actually formed.

The powers vested in the President of the Republic of China (KR) were no less than those held by the Japanese Governor-General of Taiwan. The President of the Kyrgyz Republic, according to the "Provisional Rules of National Mobilization for the period of suppression of the Communist Rebellion" adopted in 1948, had emergency powers, was not limited by the terms of office, and his decisions could take effect without being approved by the legislative bodies [Gudoshnikov, 1997, p. 3]. The Decree on the State of Emergency, which was in force since 1950 Until 1986, he banned the activities of any political parties other than the Kuomintang, ² froze indefinitely the powers of the highest elected bodies (the National Assembly, the legislative and control Chambers), suppressed the organization of rallies, meetings, strikes of workers and students, and established control over the publication of printed publications and other mass media [Mao Jiaqi, 1988, pp. 17-19]. Thus, with the help of Temporary Rules and the Decree on the State of Emergency in Taiwan, in fact, an authoritarian presidential administration was carried out.

After 1945, the judicial authorities of Taiwan were completely under the control of the state, the supreme judges were appointed by the government [Shi Ming, 1980, p.809], and punishments were often carried out in a non-judicial manner. In the early 1950s, a situation developed that Mao Jiaqi in his book "Taiwan in 30 Years: 1949-1979" called "a period of murder, extermination and terror" (Mao Jiaqi, 1988, p. 19).

During the period of Japanese occupation, the Governor-General was practically the sole ruler, since his position assumed control over the civil administration and military command.³ In 1921, the principle of Taiwan's subordination to Japanese law was established. In 1928, the civil laws in force in Taiwan were completely replaced by Japanese ones, however, the laws of the colonies did not pass through the approval of the Parliament of the Japanese Empire, the right of the Governor-General to issue special orders was preserved, and criminal cases were decided according to special decrees. Thus, although the Governor-General was subordinate to the central government, he had virtually unlimited power within Taiwan (Yautihara, 1934, p. 118).

As for the elected authorities, from 1906 to 1921, Taiwan had a legislative assembly, whose members were elected by the Governor-General (in equal proportions-Japanese and Taiwanese). Since 1920, a system of local self-government has been introduced, although in terms of the scope of powers granted to the provincial level, it is still possible to use local self-government.

² In addition to the Kuomintang, there were two other parties: the Young China Party and the Party of Democratic Socialism . They were formally considered oppositional, although they were dependent on and under the control of the ruling Kuomintang party, which periodically filtered their members and prevented mutual coordination and unification [Mao Jiaqi, 1988, p.21].

³ Since 1919, the rights of the Governor-General have been somewhat restricted: the command of troops, if he was not an army officer, was removed. However, in fact, this function remained with him, since a representative of the army and navy was most often appointed to this position.

They could be considered as local self-government bodies very conditionally; the local population was also represented in them [Yautikhara, 1934, p. 120].

Legal proceedings in Taiwan under Japanese rule were entirely under the control of the Governor^-General4. After 1898, the judicial system was reformed, but unlike in Japan, in Taiwan, judicial officials were protected only from dismissal and transfer to another position, and the duties of the local judge and prosecutor were allowed to be performed "for convenience" by police officers [Yautihara, 1934, pp. 122-123].

STATE CONTROL SYSTEM

Special attention should be paid to the methods of population control, since they were adopted by Chiang Kai-shek's government almost without changes. As under Japanese rule, the Kuomintang has built a system of state control over all areas of the population's life. First of all, it is the system of mutual bail of Baojia (, Japanese - hoko), introduced in 1733 by the Qing authorities after the frequent uprisings. Under both the Chinese and Japanese governments, this system provided for the association of people into communities based on the household principle, which were assigned the responsibility of ensuring order and providing data on various aspects of the life of members of this community hoko5.

The system of state control mainly affected the activities of the party, the military and youth. The party was controlled through the National Security Directorate, and all military activities were regulated through the party. Party workers, in turn, were controlled through auxiliary organizations under the control of the Central Committee of the Party [Shi Ming, 1980, p. 893]. The activities of young people, students and teachers were controlled by special youth organizations (for example, the Anti-Communist Youth Movement for Saving the Motherland, the Movement of Resistance to Communism and Rebuff to Russia), which have branches in various educational institutions in Taiwan. Under the management and control of these organizations, youth news agencies, publishing houses, and radio stations functioned [Mao Jiaqi, 1988, p. 20].

Through the control of various spheres of life and especially the media, Chiang Kai-shek's Government formed a certain public opinion based on anti-communist ideology. Chiang Kai-shek attributed the defeat of the Kuomintang in mainland China more to a cultural and philosophical defeat, considering that the Kuomintang forces in the fight against communism lacked a "philosophical basis for revolution" and "unity of ideology" [Mao Jiaqi, 1988, p. 9]. In his works, Chiang Kai-shek paid special attention to the causes of the defeat on the mainland mainly of a cultural nature. That is why controlling the cultural and spiritual life of Taiwanese people was one of the main tasks in the management of the island.⁶ During the transition period (state of emergency), governance in Taiwan was presented in the form of "managing the country, politics and army through the party", which soon transformed into the "one doctrine, one party, one leader" system, which presupposes the supremacy of the party and its leader [Shi Ming, 1980, p.809].

⁴ In 1897, the Governor-General dismissed the head of the Supreme Court, despite the fact that the court's employees were formally protected by the Constitution.

⁵ Under this system, the control of all population movements was an important control lever. According to data for 1973, 90 thousand people were arrested due to the failure of the relevant police authorities to inform them about migration [Shi Ming, 1980, p. 895].

⁶ The program of the Reform Committee (since 1950) contained a section on literature and art [Mao Jiaqi, 1988, p. 12].

Japan's colonial policy also had an ideological basis in the form of a consolidating foreign policy program-creating a "sphere of co-prosperity of Great East Asia" and uniting the countries of East Asia and the countries of the South Seas against the "whites" [History of the war in the Pacific, 1958, p. 62; cit. by: [Molodyakov, 2007, p. 194]. Chiang Kai-shek, during his rule in Taiwan, tried to rally the people in the struggle against the common enemy-the Communists, to take revenge on the mainland and unite China. The anti-communist ideology of the Kuomintang underlayedall cultural policies based on the ideas of Sun Yat-sen and traditional Chinese values [Maojiaqi, 1988, p.9-12].

EDUCATIONAL POLICY

The ideological policy of the state is primarily manifested in the peculiarities of the education system. In both cases, during the Japanese and Chinese administration of the island, a special place was given to changing the old education system. In general, the level of education in Taiwan increased between 1945 and 1949: the number of students enrolled in primary schools increased from 92.5% to 99.2% [Shi Ming, 1980, p. 903], but the principles of educational policy remained the same. The schools were taught on the basis of "traditional Chinese education", which includes the study of ancient literature, the works of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, as well as elements of political education. Such a training program, aimed at Sinicizing and de-Japonizing the population, turned out to be out of date and did not meet real needs. Moreover, students were barely able to cope with such a program [Shi Ming, 1980, p. 905].

After 1945 , the official language of Taiwan was declared Guoyu , that is , the Beijing dialect, or Putonghua , which was not native to most of the island's population. The policy of Sinicization, which requires increased attention to the cultural and linguistic sphere, did not mean the restoration of the southern dialects that originally dominated the island. In 1952, a government decree banned teaching in Taiwanese dialects (and Japanese), and since 1954, the policy of spreading Goyu has become particularly large - special Goyu distributors were sent to Aboriginal schools, and special language courses were held for the elderly and the military (as part of the busiban network of folk supplementary training courses). [Azarenko, 2002, p. 90-95]. Until the 1980s, the monopoly position of the Guoyu hindered the promotion of people who did not speak Putonghua, and forced government employees and teachers to take courses in the state language. Fines were levied for using dialects in public places (Golovachev, 2007: 169-170).

Education policy in Taiwan during the Japanese period emphasized the spread of the Japanese language and the Japanization of the local population. Classes in schools were conducted mainly in Japanese. The language policy was implemented in three stages: using Taiwanese dialects to read Chinese characters; teaching Japanese using Taiwanese dialects; switching to the use of Japanese and banning the use of Taiwanese dialects [Golovachev, 2009, pp. 212-213]. Admission to educational institutions presupposed compliance of applicants with the Japanese system, i.e. at least knowledge of the Japanese language at the same level as the Japanese [Seryshev, 1924]. As part of the implementation of the "policy of educational and cultural assimilation" ("policy of enlightened education")-the doctrine of the first civil governor Deng Kenjiro - secondary schools, specialized schools and institutes were opened [Golovachev, 2009, pp. 213-214]. Nevertheless, education for the local population was difficult to access, both for a number of economic reasons, and because of non-compliance with the requirements of the state budget.

on receipt. Even so, the proportion of the Taiwanese population who spoke Japanese was quite large: 12.3% spoke Japanese in 1930, 37.8% in 1937, and more than 70% in 1944. Over the 50 years of Japanese rule, more than one generation of people who speak Japanese fluently grew up in Taiwan, moreover, their way of thinking was more Japanese than Chinese [Golovachev, 2009, pp. 219-220].

An active educational policy with the introduction of the Japanese language and the Japanization of the Taiwanese population gave rise to the phenomenon of split self-identification of Taiwanese. It is precisely the problem of Taiwanese identity that confirms the fact that by the middle of the 20th century, there was a cultural gap between Taiwanese and people from mainland China [Kozyrev, 1999, p.59]. Shi Ming, in his work "400 Years of Taiwanese History," attributes the problem of Taiwan's split identity to one of the main reasons why Taiwanese people, although they felt significant differences between themselves and mainland Chinese, were nevertheless unable to resist the new governance on the island after 1945 (along with the lack of a unified political position and a sense of inferiority, due to the geographical remoteness of Taiwan from the administrative center and the isolation of the island) [Shi Ming, 1980, p. 793]. This ambivalence persists even today: more than 60% of Taiwanese residents do not consider themselves Chinese, and about 33% consider themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese [Larin, 2013, p.238].

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICY

The development of Taiwan under both the Japanese and Chinese governments began with "inventory" - the redistribution of land and other private property in favor of the new" owners " of the island. Such measures mostly resulted in confiscation of property for the population. Land was often transferred to the state due to the lack of proper documents certifying the ownership of the land plot.

In the system of economic relations of the Japanese Empire, Taiwan was the main supplier of raw materials (camphor, sugar, rice, tea, salt, fruit, canned food, coal) and the market for Japanese semi-finished products (chemical fertilizers, machinery, metal products, fabrics, paper, medicines). As manufacturing progressed, Taiwan began to produce some of Japan's own exports. And by the 1920s. Taiwan not only served as an intermediary, but also independently sold goods to foreign markets. As a result, by the 1930s, Taiwan's foreign trade turnover accounted for 8.1% of Japan's total foreign trade turnover (including trade with the colonies and abroad) and 1/3 of Japan's total foreign trade turnover with the colonies. In addition, Taiwan provided about 40% of Japanese imports from the colonies (Yautihara, 1934, pp. 56-58). Taiwan's foreign trade was dominated by imports, but in trade with Japan, exports came first (they not only went to Japanese consumers, but also provided part of Japan's exports), which was so much higher than imports that it brought the overall trade balance to positive values. Thus, Taiwan's place in the supply of raw materials and food products to Japan was more important than its function as a market for Japanese goods (Yautihara, 1934, p. 67).

After 1945, following the Japanese model of development, the Kuomintang assigned Taiwan a secondary role in the Kyrgyz economy. In 1944-1945, even before the evacuation of the Government to Taiwan, the Institute for Economic Research under the Kyrgyz Republic conducted a study of the state of affairs in the occupied territories with the participation of American specialists. However, no specific programs have been developed for Taiwan's development due to a lack of statistical materials and documents. The main focus was not on Taiwan, but on Manchuria and Northern China: During the 1945 consultations with American specialists, Taiwan was not mentioned in any of the discussions,

and its ports were not mentioned among the future major port centers of China [Kozyrev, 1999, p. 50-53]. Although by 1945 plans had already been drawn up for the development of key industries in Taiwan (metallurgy, fuel industry, energy, mechanical engineering, electrical and chemical industries, transport, 11 categories of light industry), plans for Taiwan's political reconstruction were ahead of economic planning.⁷

In August 1945, government decrees "On methods of managing Japanese property in the former occupied territories", "Principles of economic development of the first stage of economic recovery" and others were adopted, according to which Taiwan was assigned a supporting role, prioritizing the development of state capital and curbing the private sector. It was planned that part of the light industry enterprises, with the mediation of the state, would eventually pass into private hands. But the intermediate stage of this process - nationalization-often took place not on the principle of expediency, but in accordance with the interests of bureaucratic capital [Kozyrev, 1999, p.54].

The development of Taiwan's economy was planned to be carried out in the context of nationalization - the Kyrgyz Republic sought to control the production of sugar, electricity, oil, non-ferrous methyls, shipbuilding, and mechanical engineering. During this process, there were disagreements between the center and the provincial authorities, since the central government not only sought to control the leading industries, but also removed equipment, raw materials and materials from the island in order to strengthen its position on the mainland [Thomas, 1986, p.50]. A compromise between the center and the provincial authorities was reached through the creation of joint ventures. ⁸

Another proof that Taiwan was given a secondary role in the Kyrgyz economy can be seen in the fact that according to the plan for Taiwan's economic recovery, not all industries were supposed to be developed. Some of the mining enterprises were not subject to restoration, first of all, the sugar industry and energy were reconstructed - the most profitable industries, and the government did not provide for large capital investments (the north of China received 20.1% of investments in the regions of China, the center-29.8%, the south of China, which included Taiwan, - 9.8%) [He Lian, 1988, p. 249; cit. by: Kozyrev, 1999, p. 56].

Taiwan's economy has been seriously affected by the breakdown in relations with Japan. The volume of agricultural and industrial production in 1945 was half of the pre-war level, by 1949 it was planned to increase sugar production by 6 times, electricity by 80%, restore the production of cement and chemical fertilizers, and thus approach the indicators of the period of Japanese occupation [Kirby, 1994, p. 5]. Due to the lack of raw materials Due to the lack of equipment, lack of capital and lack of qualified specialists, production in 1948 was only 59% of the level of 1941.At the same time, the population of Taiwan increased, mainly due to inflows from the mainland. All this led to a sharp increase in prices and a shortage of consumer goods: inflation in 1947 was 77%, in 1948-1144%, in 1949 - 1189% [Mao Jiaqi, 1988, p. 5].

In addition to inflation caused by problems in the manufacturing sector on the island itself, economic processes on the mainland also had a negative impact on the financial system of Taiwan - the lack of financing for enterprises of the Kyrgyz Republic in Taiwan affected the provincial budget, the Taiwanese Bank resorted to

⁷ In 1944, a decision was made to create a local provincial administration in Taiwan, which would concentrate all the fullness of civil and military power and which would have greater independence from the national government than the governors of other provinces [Kozyrev, 1999, p. 54].

⁸ In 1946, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Taiwanese government signed agreements "On joint management of industrial mining enterprises in Taiwan province", according to which the Kyrgyz Republic managed three out of 10 production facilities, the rest were managed jointly [Kozyrev, 1999, p.57].

The island's economy, following the mainland, was affected by inflation [Kozyrev, 1999, p. 59].

Many researchers believe that only US economic assistance helped to cope with inflation. In July 1948, according to the Sino-American Economic Assistance Treaty, a Joint Sino-American Commission for Agricultural Rehabilitation was formed. The agreement provided for the provision of economic assistance in the amount of $ 275 million. After the defeat of the Kuomintang on the mainland, aid was suspended, but after the outbreak of the Korean War, it was resumed.⁹ In the period from 1951 to 1954. Taiwan received $ 375.2 million in aid, which helped stabilize the market and reduce the financial deficit (from 271 million to 114 million yuan). [He Baoshan, 1981, p. 127; cit. by: Mao Jiaqi, 1988, p. 34].

After Chiang Kai - shek came to power, companies were managed according to the Japanese model-control and monopoly of the main areas of production were maintained. State-owned enterprises enjoyed an even greater monopoly than those companies that were run by the Japanese before 1945. Moreover, after 1949, there were many more enterprises that were directly controlled by the state. These included transportation companies, electricity generation, sugar industry, chemical production, tobacco and alcohol production, and mining industry.¹⁰ As a result, not only companies that were managed by the Japanese authorities were in the hands of the state, but also private enterprises [Shi Ming, 1980, pp. 930-933].

One of the features of the Chinese administration of Taiwan in the first years after the war was the outflow of capital from the island to the mainland, and on a scale larger than under the Japanese administration, which can be easily traced by the example of the development of the sugar industry. This industry formed the backbone of Taiwan's economy. Along with the other most profitable crops, rice and salt, sugar was produced, processed and shipped abroad in large quantities. In the first years after the war, during Chen Yi's administration, sugar and rice exports increased at a tremendous rate.¹¹ The Taiwan Trading Company, which was established in 1945 and exported processed agricultural products, was directly subordinate to Nanjing, so products were sent to the mainland in large quantities and at fixed prices. At the direction of the Nanjing government, most of the first batch of sugar (50 thousand tons out of 80 thousand tons) was sent to Shanghai, increasing the already existing shortage of sugar products in Taiwan itself (the average consumption of sugar products was 80-100 thousand tons). Due to the outflow of capital from the island and large volumes of exports, sugar prices increased by 8-10 times [Shi Ming, 1980, pp. 720-721].

The practice of concluding trade agreements was completely copied from the Japanese: according to the purchase agreement, first money was paid for sugar production, and then deliveries were made in parts, in accordance with the terms of the contract. However, unlike in the Japanese period, the proceeds were not invested in the next stage of sugar production, but were redirected to the mainland. The Japanese authorities primarily sold some of the sugar on the island in order to get money and invest it in production. Under such conditions, the Taiwanese sugar buyers were already able to distribute their products to smaller points of sale and make a profit. During Chen Yi's governorship, the rights of sugar purchasers were often directly infringed. In the event that the sugar factory, after payment of money for

⁹ As a result, Taiwan did not receive $ 275 million from the United States, but only $ 170 million. The remaining amount was spent by the US government on investments in Southeast Asian countries (Mao Jiaqi, 1988, p. 34).

¹⁰ See list of state-owned companies by industry: [Shi Ming, 1980, p. 924].

¹¹ See the increase in Taiwan's exports in the first years after the war: [Shi Ming, 1980, p. 720].

the buyer could not fulfill its obligations to the buyer (Taiwanese), the buyer received an official notification from the authorities that all agreements concluded with Japanese factories (i.e. factories that were under the control of the Japanese) were canceled, as they were considered illegal [Shi Ming, 1980, p. 722]. Thus, the factory was relieved of responsibility for timely delivery of goods to Taiwanese buyers.

With the transfer of power to the Kuomintang, along with economic indicators, Taiwan's military potential also significantly decreased. Military equipment and equipment left after the Japanese, according to their technical characteristics at the time of the end of World War II, could be considered quite modern. However, after 1945 they were not properly maintained, which resulted in a drastic reduction in resources and practical applications. In the 1950s. The Air Force already had 400 units of military equipment, but due to the lack of parts, lack of spare parts and lack of fuel, the armed forces of Taiwan in the event of an attack from the mainland could not last more than 2 months. The Navy consisted of no more than 50 vessels, of which only half were combat-ready [Mao Jiaqi, 1988, p. 6].

Taiwan's governance policies, which were implemented in the first decades after 1945, generally followed the Japanese model of state-directed economic development. It made it possible to develop industry and agriculture at a significant pace, create infrastructure, establish foreign trade and improve the overall standard of living of the population. It was precisely certain successes in Japan's colonial policy in Taiwan that caused the principles of Japanese governance not to be immediately replaced by Chinese ones.

At the same time, this model was essentially exploitative. Moreover, in the early years of Chinese rule, the siphoning off of financial resources and the exploitation of the island's economic resources (up to the removal of equipment to the mainland) occurred on an even larger scale than in the Japanese period. From the very beginning, Japan invested heavily in the economy of Taiwan - more than 70% of the island's annual income in 1896 was received in the form of subsidies from the Japanese government [Yautihara, 1934, p. 29], and the Japanese spent a significant part of the profits on developing the island's production ¹². The Chinese authorities, especially in the period 1945-1949, using Japanese management methods, pursued other goals-practically without investing money in the development of Taiwan, they used the island's economic resources exclusively in the interests of the mainland.

The period from 1945 to 1949 turned out to be an inconsistent transition from the Japanese model of development (creating internal prerequisites for the rapid development of capitalist relations) to the American one (socio-economic reconstruction along the Western model) [Nepomnin, 2000, pp. 229-230]. The Chinese (Nanking) model, implemented in the early years of Kuomintang governance in Taiwan, was based on forceful methods of influencing the economy and social sphere, which, in the presence of corruption - a traditional component of Chinese governance - aggravated the negative aspects of colonial policy and destroyed the achievements of the Japanese period.

The colonial methods of governance (mainly the exploitation of resources and the population, preventing the accumulation of national capital, and managing the territory with the help of migrants delegated by the "mother country"), which were characteristic of 1945-1949, give reason to believe that in fact the colonial administration of Taiwan ended not earlier than 1949, only after the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek-

¹² Japanese government subsidies were discontinued in 1904 when the island became self-sufficient. Up to this point, Taiwan was a loss-making colony for Japan.

In the civil war, when the Kuomintang's rule began to extend only to Taiwan, i.e., when the "mother country" moved to the "colony", the Chinese authorities were forced to redirect their resources to the development of the island: to restore agriculture (on the American model of farms), to resume production of less capital-intensive, but vital industries, to actively develop the island. develop foreign trade (on the Japanese model) and gradually bring Taiwan to the level of a developed country in the region.

list of literature

Azarsnko Yu. A. Osnovnye napravleniya deyatel'nosti kuomintangskogo pravitel'stva v yazykovoy politike v 1945-1980-kh. [The main directions of the Kuomintang government in language policy in the 1945-1980's]. Series: History, Philology, vol. 1. Vol. 2. Novosibirsk, 2002.

Golovachev V. Ts. Etapy i vekhi yazykovoy politiki Taiwana [Stages and milestones of the language policy of Taiwan]. 2007. № 5.

Golovachev V. Ts. Obrazovanie kak faktor etnicheskoi politiki v periodom yaponskogo kolonialnogo pravleniya na Taiwane (1895-1945) [Education as a factor of ethnic politics in the period of Japanese Colonial rule in Taiwan (1895-1945)]. 39th Scientific Conference, Moscow, 2009.

Gudoshnikov L. M., Kokarsv K. A. Political system of Taiwan, Moscow, 1997.

History of the War in the Pacific, vol. 3, Moscow, 1958.

Kalashnikov N. I. Taiwan and Korea under the rule of Japan: features and results of colonial policy // East (Oriens). 1999. № 6.

Kozyrev V. A. Kuomintang and the development of post-war economic policy in Taiwan (1945-1949) / / Kuomintang and Taiwan: history and modernity. Proceedings of the scientific conference April 23, 1999 Moscow, 1999.

Larin A. G. "The principle of one China" in the relationship between the shores of the Taiwan Strait / / Xinhai Revolution and Republican China: century of Revolutions, Evolution and Modernization, Moscow, 2013.

Molodyakov V. E., Molodyakova E. V., Markaryan S. B. History of Japan. XX century. Moscow, 2007.

Nspomnin O. E. Taiwanskaya model ' evolyutsii kuomintangskogo obshchestva [Taiwanese model of the evolution of the Kuomintang society]. 30th Scientific Conference, Moscow, 2000.

Ssryshsv I. N. Narodnoe obrazovanie v Jap'anii [National education in Japan]. Harbin, 1924, No. 52.

Yautihara Tadao. Formosa under the Rule of Japanese Imperialism, Moscow, 1934.

Kerr G.H. Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895-1945. L., 1974.

Kirby W.C. Planning postwar Taiwan: industrial policy and the nationalist takeover, 1943-1947. Harvard University, 1994.

Thomas B. Gold State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. N.Y., 1986.

In Chinese:

Mao Jiaqi, ed. Taiwan san shi nian 1949-1979 (Taiwan for 30 years, 1949-1979). Zhengzhou, 1988.

Chen Wuzhong, Chen Xingtang, ed. Taiwan guangfu he guangfu hou wu nian sheng qing (The return of Taiwan and the situation of the province in the first 5 years after the revival). Nanjing, 1989.

Shi Ming. Taiwan ren si bai nian shi. (400 years of Taiwanese history). Vol. 1-2. San Jose CA, 1980.

He Lian. Hui and Lu (Memories of He lian). Beijing, 1988.

He Baoshan. Taiwan dae ching ji fa zhang (Economic Development of Taiwan). Shanghai, 1981.

Permanent link to this publication: