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Southeast Asia is home not only to the world's fastest-growing economies, but also to one of the most intractable and long-simmering territorial conflicts. The controversy surrounding the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Archipelago remains a source of tension between countries in the region. At the same time, territorial claims to resource-rich areas of the South China Sea are only a partial aspect of a larger problem. The real reasons for the contradictions are much deeper. They are rooted in the geostrategic needs of States that see securing their territorial interests in the South China Sea as a long-term guarantee of their own security. Beijing's ambitions to impose its hegemony on the sub-region raise concerns from both small States-parties to the conflict and world powers. Attempts by individual countries to bring the conflict to the negotiating "plane" did not have significant success. Meanwhile, there is an understanding shared by all players that an escalation of tension will not contribute to a way out of the current situation. In such circumstances, small countries seek to internationalize the conflict and bring it into the mainstream of international law, while China insists on keeping the issue within the regional framework and relies on a real balance of power.

The article is devoted to the analysis of territorial disputes in the South China Sea involving China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, as well as prospects for their evolution. Priority is given to evaluating the goals and strategies of the parties to the conflict. It is shown that due to the discrepancy between the long-term goals of the warring parties, they practically have no areas of interests - common or parallel, on which it would be possible to reach a compromise through negotiations. In addition, the analysis of the strategies of the parties shows that the prospects for resolving the conflict are highly dependent on the position of the international community.

Keywords: territorial contradictions; South China Sea; Paracel Islands; Spratly Islands; international relations; international law; system approach.

Southeast Asia (SE) is one of the most dynamically developing regions in the world. In 2005, Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O'Neill, the author of the famous acronym "BRIC", identified a group of countries that he called "Next Eleven". In his opinion, it is these economies that have the potential to become the leading locomotives of the world economy in the XXI century [How solid... 2005: 7]. Three countries on the list are located in Southeast Asia-Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

It is noteworthy that the last two "promising" countries still have political contradictions in their relations with the current center of world economic growth - the People's Republic of China.

To contact the author / Corresponding author: Email: mikhailgarri55@gmail.com

Republic of China. Moreover, they have recently tended to escalate, leading to sporadic armed clashes. A notable event in 2014 was the massive anti-Chinese pogroms in Vietnam in May, which resulted in the destruction of businesses and the death of several people. China's growing distrust of some of its neighbors is caused by territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Due to the growing importance of the East Asian region in recent years, they have become one of the most discussed topics in both the Russian and global expert discourse and are regarded as one of the factors of possible destabilization of the regional situation, which can have devastating consequences for the global economy and politics.

1

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea are related to the separation of the Paracel Islands archipelago (claimed by China, Vietnam, and Taiwan) and the Spratly Islands (claimed by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei). Separate land areas in this vast area were captured at various times by the armed forces of adjacent States. However, the claims of the parties go far beyond the territories currently occupied by them and are based on two arguments: historical affiliation and the right to an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles provided for by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (signed by all countries of the region).

The region's countries are most concerned about the claims of Beijing, which, citing its historical rights, has declared its unconditional jurisdiction over essentially the entire South China Sea [Nong 2012]. Given the size and power of the PRC in comparison with other claimants to the islands, recently there has been a retreat into the background of mutual claims of small states and their consolidation on an anti-Chinese basis with a demonstration of mutual . In this regard, it is not a mistake to consider the territorial problem in the South China Sea as a confrontation between two sides: China and an informal coalition of a number of Southeast Asian states.

Since the beginning of the dispute, there have been numerous statements by the foreign ministries of the participating states, official protests, public campaigns of the population, the purpose of which was to confirm the determination to defend their position. However, despite the involvement of public opinion, until recently the region remained relatively stable.

In recent years, however, China has moved from a formal declaration of its rights to real actions, primarily to develop oil and gas fields on the shelf of the disputed islands2, which has contributed to the escalation of tensions. The development of events indicates a gradual transition of the conflict from the "smoldering" to the active phase. Under these circumstances, in August 2014, Chinese Leader Xi Jinping unexpectedly called for the normalization of relations with Vietnam, ³ probably seeking to break the anti-Chinese platform of small Southeast Asian states. A similar course was supported by the Vietnamese side. However, doubts remain about the feasibility of achieving a long-term normalization of China's relations with its neighbors-

¹ In Face-Offs with China, Vietnam, Philippines Grow Closer. The Diplomat [Electronic resource] 22.05.2014. URL: http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/in-face-offs-with-china-vietnam-philippines-grow-closer (accessed: 27.09.2014).

² China has started drilling wells in the South China Sea. Industry Information Portal Mortrans.ru [Electronic resource] 30.05.2014. URL: http://mortrans.info/analytics/kitaj-zapustil-burenie-skvazhin-v-yuzhno-kitajskom-more (accessed: 27.09.2014).

³ Policy: China-Vietnam-Relations-Improvement. Euronews [Electronic resource]. 27.08.2014. URL: http://ru.euronews.com/newswires/2660544-newswire (accessed: 27.09.2014).

eastern opponents and peaceful prospects for resolving the situation over the disputed islands.

2

Predicting the likely development vector of the regional situation requires understanding the goals of the parties to the conflict. Most often, the existing contradictions are explained by competition for access to the natural resources of the South China Sea, including oil and natural gas. However, this is only one aspect of the competition. Taking into account the high level of interconnectedness characteristic of the modern world, for a correct assessment of the goals of the parties, it is necessary to take into account the features and trends of the international environment, in particular, the features of changes in the structure of the world order. The modern world "is going through a transition period unprecedented by historical standards, which is accompanied by a change in the geopolitical landscape and the formation of a new balance of power"⁴. This "perelitsovka" is expressed mainly in armed conflicts in various parts of the world, primarily in the Near and Middle East, Ukraine, and Transcaucasia. At the same time, there is an increasing degree of influence of global processes on the degree of satisfaction of the interests of the main competitor of the United States for leadership in the modern world - China. In particular, the Middle East remains the main supplier of energy resources to East Asia, and the destabilization of the situation in this region poses significant risks for Beijing.

At the same time, periodic outbreaks of internal political conflicts in the territories of Ukraine and the Transcaucasian states negatively affect the foreign policy positions of China's neighbor and main ally in international affairs - the Russian Federation, whose weakening in the medium term is unprofitable for the PRC. In this regard, it is no coincidence that well-informed experts believe that the strategic goal of the West in destabilizing the situation in Ukraine and imposing economic sanctions against Moscow may be not only and not so much to weaken Russia itself, but its eastern neighbor. So, according to the former head of the Israeli intelligence service "Nativ" Yakov Kedmi, " ... now this is a continuation of the same policy (aimed at weakening Russia. - M. G.), especially in the context of strengthening relations between Russia and China and aggravating contradictions between the United States and China. And so, in order to weaken China in the confrontation with the United States, Washington is concentrating, in their opinion, on the weakest link - Russia. This is roughly similar to concentrating on Syria to weaken Iran. " ⁵

Against the background of the destructive consequences of Western policies in other regions of the world, Beijing seems to be concerned about potential destabilization near its borders. That is why the main goal of the south-eastern direction of the Chinese strategy is not so much the sole possession of the energy resources of the South China Sea, but rather ensuring the political and economic security necessary for long-term stable development. The PRC sees the solution to this problem in ousting American influence from the region and achieving its own geostrategic dominance in it on the basis of regional dominance and even superiority in resource potency6.

⁴ The world is undergoing an unprecedented period of transition. Daily electronic newspaper Morning [Electronic resource] 23.01.2013. URL: http://www.utro.ru/articles/2013/01/23/1096733.shtml (accessed: 27.09.2014).

⁵ Yakov Kedmi: The real power in Ukraine belongs to bandits. ItonTV1 [Electronic resource]. 29.06.2009. URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KH0bmolEFLA (accessed: 27.09.2014).

⁶ For more information about the differences between the terms leadership, hegemony, dominance, dominance, and primacy, see [Megatrends 2013; 19-35].

At the same time, the resource issue is, of course, instrumental and acts as an integral element of achieving a higher-order strategic goal.

This is probably related to Beijing's official demand for China's "unconditional sovereignty" not only over the island archipelagos, but also over the entire South China Sea. ⁷ Control over this water area can become a long-term guarantee for the Middle Kingdom of its positions in the south-eastern direction. The further the influence of the PRC extends from its borders, the less it will be exposed to external influences and, accordingly, the more stable its position will be.

At the same time, it is obvious that China needs to somehow justify its claims to areas located more than 1,000 km from its national territory, since their possession will provide China with a claim to strategic positions far from state borders up to the strategic Strait of Malacca [Confrontation... 2012: 103].

Despite the enormous importance of the South China Sea resource base for China's territorial opponents, their main goals also lie in the plane of long-term stability and security and are not limited to the problem of access to resources, no matter how extensive they may seem. The strategic importance of this water area for all of them is related to ensuring freedom of navigation, delivery of energy resources, movement of goods, and fishing. For Vietnam, whose coast is completely turned to the South China Sea, this is also a matter of ensuring its own defense capability.

In general, from the point of view of small countries in the region, the consequences of China's desire to dominate the South China Sea are quite clear. In addition to the oil and gas disputes, they were particularly annoyed by the publication of a new regulation by Beijing, according to which foreign vessels are required to obtain the approval of the Chinese authorities in case of fishing in the disputed water area.⁸ Apparently, in the event of further strengthening of its position in the South China Sea, Beijing's actions against its neighbors will become tougher. In this regard, their primary task is to preserve the neutral status of this space.

Small countries ' distrust of China is understandable, as is their fair desire to get stable guarantees that their interests will be taken into account in the future. The latter can only ensure legally established international recognition of their rights. That is why for small countries, the issue of official consent of the PRC to their sovereignty over part of the disputed islands is so acute. In addition to receiving a share of the resources, recognition would guarantee the preservation of the positions of these States in the South China Sea.

The above objectives are of strategic importance to both China and its opponents, as long-term sustainable development and security are at stake. However, due to their antagonism, the impossibility of mutually beneficial implementation of the tasks set by both parties to the dispute becomes obvious. It is not surprising that over the years of existence of the problem, the search for a compromise solution through the negotiation process has not brought tangible results [Kanaev 2008: 320]. Against this background, the actions of the parties involved have recently become more clearly visible in attempts to achieve the goals of-

⁷ China Tells U.S. to Stay Out of Dispute Over South China Sea's Sovereignty. Bloomberg [Electronic resource] 21.09.2010. URL: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-21/china-tells-u-s-to-stay-out-of-dispute-over-sout h-china-sea-s-sovereignty.html (accessed: 27.09.2014).

⁸ China to Foreign Fishing Boats: ‘Get Out' of South China Sea. The Diplomat [Electronic resource]. 7.03.2014. URL: http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-to-foreign-fishing-boats-get-out-of-south-china-sea (дата обращения: 27.09.2014).

a means of unilateral strategies that avoid direct confrontation.

3

Both China and small countries build their strategies based on their comparative advantages. The strongest argument in the asset of the opponents of the PRC is the international law of the sea. In contrast to Beijing's claims based on" historical precedents", for which there is no developed regulatory framework, the position of some small countries (the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei), claiming the islands on the basis of geographical proximity and the right to an" exclusive economic zone", looks more reasonable.

The Philippines is the most active country in bringing the dispute to the legal level. On January 22, 2013, they sent an official note to the Chinese side and a statement of claim to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. ⁹ On March 30, 2014, in accordance with the established rules, the Philippines provided evidence of its position in a 4,000-page document.¹⁰ This means that the arbitration, despite China's claims about its illegitimacy and refusal to participate in it, ¹¹ has a chance to take place, and Manila hopes to win it.

The Philippines is unlikely to seriously expect that the conflict will be resolved on this basis. China does not recognize the results of the arbitration. In addition, the international body does not have real mechanisms for implementing decisions, that is, the de facto decision of the arbitral tribunal will be advisory in nature. However, a legal opinion would enable the Philippines to internationalize the issue. In this situation, Manila's strategy seems to be to create a legal framework for more active involvement of the international community in resolving the territorial dispute.

Another active opponent of China - Vietnam - also relies on the internationalization of the conflict. Despite the fact that its claims do not have the same firm legal basis as Manila (its claims, with the exception of part of the Paracel Islands, are based on historical affiliation), Hanoi has another significant advantage - geographical location. Vietnam's territory is borderline, separating the mainland and island parts of Southeast Asia. Since the beginning of the Cold War, this border has remained an element of strategic containment of the influence of first the USSR, and now China [Kolotov 2008: 42]. Vietnam is trying to develop relations with stronger partners based on its geopolitical significance.

At the same time, Hanoi actively uses economic projects to strengthen political ties with non-regional partners. Currently, at the invitation of Vietnam, Russian companies Zarubezhneft and Gazprom and Indian company ONGC Limited¹² Its relations with Japan and even with the United States are actively developing [Garry 2013: 201]. All these contacts are aimed at making the above mentioned states

⁹ Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China. Press release. Permanent Court of Arbitration [Electronic resource]. 03.06.2014. URL: http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2638 (accessed: 27.09.2014).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Philippines News - China rejects arbitration over South China Sea. Visayan Business Post [Electronic resource]. 27.09.2014. URL: http://visayanbizpost.com/philippines-news-china-rejects-arbitration-over-south-china-sea-p2 42-1.htm (дата обращения: 27.09.2014).

¹² Vietnam, India to Expand Oil Exploration in Contested South China Sea. The Wall Street Journal [Electronic resource]. 15.09.2014. URL: http://online.wsj.com/articles/vietnam-india-to-expand-oil-exploration-in-contested-south-chi na-sea-1410777168 (дата обращения: 27.09.2014).

by interested parties in case of aggravation of contradictions with Beijing.

China follows a mirror strategy in its relations with its neighbors. While small countries are trying to internationalize the issue, the PRC is proposing a return to the format of directly involved negotiations13 and is aggressively boycotting attempts by some small countries to resolve the issue through international legal mechanisms. Neighbors are concerned that China's military budget has already exceeded the $ 100 billion target. $ ¹⁴, and its economy continues to grow. For its part, China, believing that time is on its side, has chosen as its main strategy to delay the issue until the balance of power reaches such a level that the claims of its opponents become completely unrealistic.

* * *

Analysis of the issue of ownership of the South China Sea islands shows that the warring parties have virtually no common ground on the basis of which the problem could be resolved through negotiations. In this regard, overcoming existing conflicts does not seem realistic in the foreseeable future.

Rather, we can talk about temporary normalization, since all parties understand that in the event of excessive pressure from one of them, there is a high risk of developing contradictions in an uncontrolled confrontational scenario that does not exclude a direct military clash. The resolution of the dispute by force is highly undesirable due to the risks of long-term destabilization of the entire region, which contradicts the main goal of all States involved in the dispute - to ensure conditions for stable economic development and growth of prosperity.

The strategy of small countries to internationalize the conflict is very logical, and if international arbitration finds in favor of these states, it has a chance to change the status quo. However, it will only be successful if their position is fully supported by major external players. That is why it seems that the prospects for the development of the situation depend not so much on the normative arguments and the balance of power of the parties to the dispute, but on what position the international community, especially the strongest Pacific powers and India, will take on the territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

In the case of a consolidated condemnation of China's claims (up to the introduction of economic and political sanctions), the situation may change in favor of small countries. At the same time, it is impossible to exclude the world community's self-withdrawal from this problem, which will lead to the fact that they will remain one-on-one with the PRC. If this scenario is implemented, over time, China will be able to achieve its strategic goals and strengthen control over the water area that is important to it.

Given the lack of involvement of the direct interests of the West and other centers of power, the economic and political power of modern China, the difficulty of developing a unified position at the global level, as well as examples of periodic violations of international law by the most influential members of the international community, the prospect of consolidated and open support for small countries by other world players is not visible. A more likely scenario is the condemnation of the claim-

¹³ Philippines News - China rejects arbitration over South China Sea. Visayan Business Post [Electronic resource]. 27.09.2014. URL: http://visayanbizpost.com/philippines-news-china-rejects-arbitration-over-south-china-sea-p2 42-1.htm (дата обращения: 27.09.2014).

¹⁴ Trends in world military expenditure, 2013. SIPRI Fact Sheet [Electronic resource]. April 2014 URL: http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1404.pdf (accessed: 27.09.2014).

only the United States and the countries most affected by it in Europe and Asia, while the other leading world powers are neutral. The long-term development of the situation will depend on the degree and direction of progress in the international community's attitude to the problem under consideration, which, in turn, will be determined by global geopolitical, international legal and macroeconomic trends.

List of literature

Garry M. I. The geopolitical significance of Vietnam in the Far Eastern Big Game and geopolitical approaches of the Great Powers to the modern Vietnamese issue // Bulletin of the Buryat Scientific Center of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. N 2 (10). 2013. pp. 196-206.

Kanaev E. A. Security based on cooperation in East Asia and the conflict over the South China Sea Islands. Diss.d.istor. N. M. 2008. 430 p.

Kolotov V. N. 2008. Vietnam's role in the security system of Greater East Asia. - International Conference on Oriental and African Studies at the universities of St. Petersburg, Russia and Europe. Current problems and prospects. St. Petersburg, pp. 233-256.

The confrontation between China and the United States in Asia: conclusions for Russia. Round table discussion. // Security Index No. 2 (101). 2012. pp. 96-116.

Megatrends: The main trajectories of the evolution of the world order in the XXI century. Shakleina T. A., Baykova A. A. M.: Aspect Press, 2013.

How Solid are the BRICs? (ed. J. O'Neill, D. Wilson, R. Purushothaman, A. Stupnytska). Goldman Sachs Economic Research. Global Economics Paper No: 134. 2005. 23 p. URL: http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/how-solid.pdf (дата обращения: 27.09.2014).

Nong H. (2012). Interpreting the U-shape Line in the South China Sea. URL: http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/interpreting-the-u-shape-line-in-the-south-china -sea (дата обращения 27.09.2014).

COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES OF BEIJING AND THE SMALL COUNTRIES OF ASEAN IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

MIKHAIL GARRI

St. Petersburg State University. St. Peterburg, 199034, Russian Federation

Abstract

Southeast Asia represents a concentration of the most promising countries from the economic point of view, and at the same time is the center of an insolvable territorial dispute that continues to poison intraregional relations. The conflict is developing over the gas- and oil-rich Paracel and Spratly Islands. However, a dispute over natural resources is only the tip of the iceberg. The true motives that move the parties to the conflict are deeper than that and stem from the geostrategic needs of the states concerned, with the latter seeing their interests ensured in the South China Sea region as a guarantee of their security. Thus, Beijing's ambitions of asserting its sole control in the region cause even more tensions not only among the smaller states participating in the dispute, but also among great powers. The attempts of some of the countries concerned to make the conflict an issue of international law are doomed to failure from the point of view of settling the dispute. At the same time, there is a general understanding that exacerbating tensions, which may lead to a military conflict, is not an option. Each of the parties

concerned practice its own strategy, meanwhile, the gap between the smaller states policies to draw international mediators and the Chinese efforts to keep the conflict within the region cannot be bridged, bringing negotiations to a stalemate.

The article examines territorial disputes in the South-China Sea between China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. In light of the lack of tangible results of the negotiation process and the recent escalation of tensions over the disputed islands, the article analyzes the prospects for the development of the situation. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the parties' goals and strategies. System analysis used in the context of the problem shows that the opposing sides, in view of the strategic differences of their objectives, have practically no common ground on which the conflict could be resolved through negotiations. Analysis of the parties' strategies reveals great dependence of the ways of the conflict's possible resolution from the position of the international community.

Keywords: territorial disputes; South-China Sea; Paracel islands; Spratly islands; international relations; international law.

References

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Kanaev E.A. (2008). Bezopasnost' na osnove sotrudnichestva v Vostochnoi Azii i konflikt iz-za ostrovov Yuzhno-Kitaiskogo morya. Diss. dokt. istor. nauk. [Cooperative security in East Asia and the conflict over the islands in the South China Sea. Doctoral thesis]. Moscow. 430 p.

Kolotov V.N. (2008). Faktor V'etnama v sisteme bezopasnosti Bol'shoi Vostochnoi Azii [Vietnamese factor in the security system of the Large East Asia] // Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya Vostokovedenie i Afrikanistika v universitetakh Sankt-Peterurga, Rossii i Evropy. Aktual'nye problemy i perspektivy. St. Petersburg: 233-256.

Nong H. (2012). Interpreting the U-shape Line in the South China Sea. URL: http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/interpreting-the-u-shape-line-in-the-south-china -sea (дата обращения 27.09.2014).

O'Neill J., Wilson D., Purushothaman R., Stupnytska S. (ed.). (2005). How Solid are the BRICs? // Goldman Sachs Economic Research. Global Economics Paper. No: 134. 23 p. URL: http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/how-solid.pdf (accessed: 27.09.2014).

Shakleina T.A., Baykov A.A. (eds.) (2013) Megatrendy: Osnovnye traektorii evolutsii mirovogo poryadka v XXI veke [Megatrends: Major Pathways of the World Order Evolution in the 21st Century]. Moscow: Aspect Press.

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