Recent events in Central Asia, due to their particular importance for the destinies of many states of the Eurasian continent, require a particularly thorough analysis, while studying the position of China, due to the closed nature of the foreign policy mechanism and the mechanism for developing decisions in the field of national security in this country, requires additional methods compared to the analysis of the policies of other states. In the case of the People's Republic of China, its specific steps in the field of foreign policy and national security are often not fully understood outside the context of Chinese history and analysis of modern ideological and historical concepts.

TRADITIONAL CHINESE IDEAS ABOUT THE ROLE OF CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN "PERIPHERY"

Researchers of China's foreign policy doctrine have come to the conclusion that there are two traditional models of its interaction with the outside world, namely the sinocentric model and the model of contractual relations. The vast body of evidence shows the relationship between these two models - they have always existed side by side, serving the same purpose: to provide Chinese diplomacy with a dominant position, but at different times, according to specific circumstances, one or the other has come first.

The sinocentric model was most clearly manifested during the heyday and rise of Chinese civilization. However, the rise of civilization also implies the simultaneous, or even advanced, strengthening of ethnic-forming factors, without the presence and relatively independent development of which such a rise is not possible, and therefore, due to this condition, the sinocentric "world order" model was fixed by official tradition.

The concept of the" four lands "lying around the" Great City of Shang "of the Yin Dynasty (XIV-XI centuries BC) served as the basis for the formation of the concept of"the center, the territory between the Four Seas (the Limits of the four seas) and the marginal lands". The Yin idea of the "Great City of Shang" lying in the center of the Middle Kingdom, the "four lands" and the various tribes surrounding them, gradually transformed and resulted already in the Zhou era (XI-III centuries BC) in opposition to the "Hua Xia" - " Man "(the ethnic community of the ancient Chinese-neighboring "barbarian "tribes), similar to the contrast of" Hellenes-barbarians " in the ancient Greek tradition. Over time, ethnocentric concepts merged with the egocentric picture of the ecumene, leading to the formation of the concept of "Jungo" - the Middle Kingdom. The reinterpretation of the term "Zhongguo" in the era of the Han Empire (III-I centuries BC) (this term was already understood as the Middle State) led to the appearance of the phrase "waigo" - external, foreign states, i.e. the language reflected the idea that there are other countries in the Middle Kingdom besides the Han Empire.

In the view of the official tradition, the Middle State (the specific territory that fell under this concept changed over time) was considered as the center of the Middle Kingdom, and the Chinese emperor-as its head, uniting the territories "between the Four Seas", i.e. the Middle State was exactly the place where, in accordance with the cosmogonic ideas of the ancient Chinese, the forces of "yin" and "yang", which generate all things, were in a harmonious correspondence with each other.-

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It was the main factor that determined the "true" course of historical development. The further away from the center and from the "cultural" influence of Chinese civilization, the more the balance of these forces was shifted, according to the Chinese tradition, and, accordingly, the lower the level of development of the peoples living in the "remote backwater". Naturally, in practice, the principle of purely nominal vassalage was implemented in relation to remote and independent states, which Chinese diplomats sought to achieve in official documents (even if only conditionally) in any way.

The egocentric concept was so convenient that the Manchus, the conquerors of China in the 17th century, readily accepted the Chinese official foreign policy doctrine, and unusually quickly moved from recognizing the equality of states (the early relations between the Manchu state of Jin and the Mongol and Central Asian principalities), to the "suzerain - vassal"model (relations between the same counterparties at a later time), becoming consistent and fanatical adherents of the traditional official Chinese concept of treating "barbarians".

In contrast to the Middle State, foreign countries in the Middle Ages and Modern Times (at an early stage) fell under the name "Waifan" ("foreign vassal"). This term ("wai" - external, "fan" - fence, fence, outskirts, vassal lands) had a wide range of meanings, which varied in sources of different times, depending on which specific group of states was being discussed. Based on the foreign policy documents of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), it is possible to distinguish at least three meanings, according to which this term was denoted by:

a) residents of subordinate, dependent possessions (a possible equivalent is a vassal, although the content of this term in the Western tradition is somewhat different). This narrow value is usually fixed by all dictionaries;

b) the peoples of States nominally subordinate to China. In this sense (a possible equivalent - foreign, literally - "external", vassals, inhabitants of outlying lands), the term was fixed as a name used by the Chinese tradition (especially in the Qing period) in relation to the inhabitants of Mongolia, Tibet, Qinghai. So were the inhabitants of the Central Asian principalities with a mixed Mongolian and Uyghur population, who were only nominally dependent on China, and in fact enjoyed complete independence.;

c) residents of independent foreign states that only maintain ties with China (the equivalent is foreigners, foreigners, a de facto synonym for the later concept of "foreigner"). In this sense, the term is synonymous with the word "vaigo "(foreign, literally" external " state).

In this ambiguity of the term "Waifan", when the official tradition in practice did not distinguish between vassal and independent states, the possibility of a subjective approach expressing the ethnocentric orientation of the foreign policy doctrine of imperial China was initially laid.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE "BIG GAME" IN CENTRAL ASIA

In the first half of the 19th century, in parallel with the active penetration of Western powers into China, rivalry between Great Britain and Russia flared up in Central Asia. The first four decades of the nineteenth century. this rivalry took place with a clear advantage of England. A change in the situation occurred only after the anti-British uprising in Kabul in 1840, which served as the final chord of the Anglo-Afghan war, after which the British were forced to slow down

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moving north. In 1843, they annexed Sindh, in 1849 - Punjab, and only after that they again closely engaged in Afghanistan. Agreements with the Emir of Afghanistan, Dost Mohammed (it is his descendant who is Zahir Shah, the former king of Afghanistan), according to which England pledged to respect the inviolability of Afghanistan, and Dost Mohammed recognized that "Britain's enemies and friends are his enemies and friends" and was entitled to its subsidies in exchange for permission to allow In addition, the Russian authorities sent English residents to a number of cities in the country, straightened out the shaky position of England and allowed it to re-activate its policy in Central Asia.

However, over the years, Russia's position in these areas has grown quite significantly and strengthened. Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand were subjected to a series of successful attacks by Russian troops, in 1854 the Verny fortress (Alma-Ata, now Almaty) was founded, and in 1865 the center of the Kokand Khanate - Tashkent-was taken, and political troubles and internecine wars both within these khanates and between them themselves greatly contributed to the impressive success of the Russian state. weapons.

Russian-English relations in Central Asia were again strained in the 70s of the XIX century. in connection with the emergence of the question of Merv, which was the last bet of England in the region. With its fall (which occurred later, in 1884), Central Asia was slipping entirely out of the hands of the British Empire. Under these conditions, the British sharply increased pressure on Afghanistan, unleashed the Anglo-Afghan war in 1879, as a result of which it turned into a state almost completely dependent on England.

For the Qing Empire, the 60s of the 19th century in Central Asia were marked by the suppression of anti-Qing protests by the Muslim rulers of Kashgaria. In 1864, the first open anti-Qing action of the inhabitants of Kuchar (Kuch) took place, in the same year, Urumqi fell under the onslaught of the rebellious Muslims, and by 1865 the Qing Empire lost control of the territory of almost the entire Urumqi district. Then the uprising spread to Yarkand, Khotan, Turfan and other cities. Seeing the impossibility of bringing the situation under control, Qing diplomacy began to look for a force that could neutralize the actions of the rebels, and decided to resort to the help of Russia. In the future, however, the situation for the Qing Empire worsened even more: as a result of the victory of the uprisings in Xinjiang, five independent states emerged there: Kuchar, Khotan and Kashgar - in East Turkestan, Urumchi and Kuljin - in Jungaria, and in 1867 the Qing Empire was divided into two independent states. they are united in a single feudal-theocratic Muslim state of Yattishaar, which is eventually headed by Yakub Bek, who begins to expand his quasi-state at the expense of China and strengthen ties with Russia's rivals - Great Britain and Turkey.

The development of events gradually led Russia to think about intensifying its policy in the region, and it decides to occupy the Ili region with troops, considering this step as a temporary measure, since preserving the integrity of China was considered much more profitable for itself than its disintegration. In 1881, after a 10-year occupation, Russia returned the Ili Region to China, effectively stabilizing its" Central Asian " periphery by using Russian weapons. However, in Beijing, the events of those years are viewed negatively, since the system of Central Asian treaties between Russia and China, which delimited their possessions in Central Asia, is seen there as imposed, unequal.

The Ili events of the late 19th century are surprisingly projected onto the stories of the first half of the 20th century related to Soviet-Chinese relations around Xinjiang and neighboring regions of Central Asia. In 1917. The Russian Empire "withdrew" from its Asian "spheres of influence", including the Chinese zones of Xinjiang and Outer Mongolia. Its place was taken by Soviet Russia, with its rigid strategy of re-integration.-

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volutionization of the East through the Comintern specially created for this purpose in 1919. During the civil war, both in China and in Russia (1919-1921), these areas became, on the one hand, the place of activity of independent "field commanders" - Bakich, Annenkov, Ungern, Semyonov and others, and on the other-the object of active policy of the Comintern, which used the current political situation to conduct national and popular revolutions. One of these was the Mongolian People's Revolution of 1921, prepared by the eastern section of the Comintern, together with a group of Mongolian revolutionaries and units of the 5th Red Army.

The situation in Xinjiang was more complicated, although the situation for the Soviet leadership was formally similar to the Mongolian model. On May 17, 1921, a special agreement was signed between the Turkestan Front command and the Xinjiang authorities on the entry of the Red Army into Chinese territory for the joint elimination of the White Guard units of Bakich and Novitsky. However, the subsequent course of events did not lead to the Xinjiang revolution according to the Mongolian version, since Moscow decided that the objective conditions for it were not yet ripe and the integrity of China for Soviet Russia from the point of view of the overall geostrategic situation was more favorable. The limiting factor for her in this case was the policy of England, which traditionally tried to use Muslim movements for its own purposes.

The anti-Chinese uprising of the Muslim peoples of Xinjiang (Uighurs, Kazakhs, Tajiks, etc.) developed with particular force in the period 1931-1934. The uprising again, as in the nineteenth century, threatened to destroy Chinese power in Xinjiang. The leadership of the rebels really counted on the creation of an independent Muslim state. The Soviet leadership considered several options when determining the position and further actions in this area of China in connection with the uprising. On the one hand, the movement of Chinese Muslims was declared by official Soviet propaganda as "part of the revolutionary process", which means that it had to be supported from the point of view of ideological and class positions. On the other hand, Moscow took into account the hidden policy of England, which is interested in splitting China and separating the north-western regions from it, as well as the possibility of sharp destabilization in the Central Asian region on the borders with the USSR in the event of creating an aggressive Muslim state that is unpredictable in its future behavior. On August 3, 1933, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) approved the "Directives on Work with Xinjiang", which clearly stated that the USSR was in favor of preserving Xinjiang as part of China. In November 1933, units of the Red Army were sent to help the Chinese government troops and the uprising was suppressed.

The second wave of the anti-Chinese Muslim movement occurred in 1944, when the establishment of the Provisional Government of the East Turkestan Republic (WTR) was announced in Xinjiang. In this situation, the Soviet leadership, unlike the uprising of 1933, provided the Muslim detachments not only with military and technical assistance, but also with political support for the movement. A number of Russian researchers even believe that the 1944 movement in Xinjiang was partly initiated by Moscow, for which purpose a special headquarters was created in Alma-Ata under the leadership of NKVD General Yegnarov and his deputy Langfang to direct military operations of BTR units against Chinese government troops.

By the end of the summer of 1944, the political situation was changing dramatically. As you know, at the Yalta Conference (February 1944), the Stalinist leadership committed itself to entering the war with Japan in exchange for allied support on the Mongolian and a number of other issues. On August 14, 1945, as a follow-up to the Yalta agreements, while the USSR was preparing for war against Japan, the well-known Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Moscow.-

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At the same time, the USSR, among other things, abandoned the tactics of supporting the rebel movement in the region and switched to the option of implementing a certain mediation mission between the rebels and the Chinese authorities.

After the defeat of Japan, the active phase of the USSR's mediation role in the settlement of the Xinjiang problem begins. On June 6, 1946, in Urumqi, a peace agreement was signed between the delegations of the WTR and the Central Government of China, according to which the WTR government was dissolved, and the East Turkestan Republic itself ceased to exist. Thus, the political and territorial status quo in the Central Asian region on the Soviet-Chinese border was preserved. On the eve of the Chinese People's Revolution, in July 1949, in Moscow, one of the leaders of the CCP, a member of the Politburo, Liu Shaoqi, was officially declared that the Soviet Union would not support the movement of Xinjiang peoples for independence and that Xinjiang should remain part of the future Soviet China. The 1950 Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance confirmed earlier agreements on Xinjiang.

Before the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations in the 1960s, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kirghizs, Tajiks, and Uzbeks who lived in Xinjiang and had extensive family ties with their fellow tribesmen in the neighboring Soviet republics of the USSR were allowed to cross the border without any visas or official passes. Special autonomous counties, districts, and parishes were created in Xinjiang for ethnic minorities originating from Central Asia. In 1962, as a result of the oppression of the Chinese authorities, these ethnic minorities moved en masse from SU AR to the USSR. Tens of thousands of refugees with children and property left their habitable places and moved to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. After the breakup of relations between the PRC and the USSR in 1963, the border was completely closed.

The second half of the twentieth century was marked by the CCP's consolidation of power in the northwestern parts of China - Tibet and Xinjiang, which, however, remained a zone of tension for Beijing and the constant growth of separatist sentiments. The general geopolitical background of this period was determined by the ebb and flow of the Cold War of 1946-1991. The main content of this phase is the confrontation between the superpowers of the USSR and the United States, mutual strategic deterrence in the context of a growing arms race. The normalization of US-China relations (1972-1978) and the confrontation in Soviet-Chinese relations (early 1960s - mid - 1980s) brought new emphasis to the strategic "triangle" of the USSR-China-USA. Beijing and Washington were much closer to each other in political terms than Moscow and Washington, which means that the Soviet-Chinese differences had an indirect impact on the Xinjiang problem. The Chinese leadership feared that Moscow would remember the history of the East Turkestan Republic and actively use the "Uyghur map" against Beijing. The normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations that began in the late 1980s and the further development of Russian-Chinese partnership in the 1990s largely removed these contradictions and concerns.

MODERN CHINESE VISION OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA

Sinocentric ideas about the periphery of the Middle Empire, especially about the "Central Asian periphery", it would seem, should have become legends of bygone days, but they continue to persist in the minds of modern Chinese, as evidenced by analytical publications in the PRC. But they are connected not only with the persistence of the" historical memory " of national psychology, but also with the very urgent ideological tasks of modern China.-

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creating a national idea and cementing the foundations of a multinational, but mostly" Chinese " (Han)language China.

A series of works in Chinese historiography of the late 1980s and early 1990s is devoted to the development of the concepts of "one multinational China" and "one Chinese nation", which are the methodological basis for many modern studies. The thesis of Chinese researchers that the history of the country was created by the peoples inhabiting it is by no means unambiguous, but this concept is objectively of great importance for Chinese social studies. In the last decade of the 20th century, the PRC has noticeably increased interest in the history of nationalities, which in most cases live on both sides of its borders with neighboring countries, primarily with the CIS countries, especially Central Asian ones. As a rule, studies of Chinese historians emphasize that these peoples were in the past under the rule or "in the sphere of influence" of the Chinese emperor, and the territories of their residence in a number of cases were subsequently lost to China. From the works of this direction, in particular, it is possible to note: "A brief history of the Orochens", "A Brief history of the Tajiks", "Notes on the History of the economic development of Inner Mongolia", "History of the Uyghurs", "Essays on the History of the Dzungars", which describe in detail and reproduce in a modern manner the ideas of traditional Chinese diplomacy regarding the "periphery" of the Middle Empire.

In the early 1980s, three major articles by researcher Su Beihai appeared, in which he outlined his position on the history of the Kazakh people. The main idea of these articles is that the Kazakhs and their historical ancestors were subjects of the Chinese emperor, being in the sphere of influence of the Middle State. These same estimates, but in a slightly different interpretation and in more detail, were repeated by the prominent Chinese scholar Ma Dazheng in the review article "Studying the borders of China in modern times, since 1978", in which the section "Studying the borders of China with Russia and the three Central Asian CIS states" was again revived by the works of Chinese researchers.- x years. Conceptually, the historical assessments of the past were confirmed in Ma Dazheng and Hua Li's book "China's Borders in the North in Ancient Times", as well as in the generalizing work of Hu Lizhong, Jin Guangyao and Chen Jishi "From the Treaty of Nerchinsk to Yeltsin's visit to China".

A contemporary Kazakh researcher of Chinese diplomacy in Central Asia, K. Sh. Khafizova, summed up the content of both the mentioned and some other works as follows: "The main ideological burden falls... on the section of history, but the historical sketch is concise, mostly devoted to the relations of the area, district, district with China. These relations are given according to one scheme: the attraction of the progressive part of the peoples, its ruling elite to China, and the divisive, separatist activities of "unpatriotic" individuals and groups that hinder the unity of multinational China... This is how a unified scheme of political, economic, and cultural ties between the peoples of Central Asia and China has been built over the centuries."

All these are scientific articles and books by Chinese researchers, which, by the way, attempted to" separate " history from today's friendly relations between Russia, China and the Central Asian states. The most important question, however, is to what extent the traditional Chinese view of Central Asia as the" sphere of influence of Chinese civilization", the" periphery "of the Chinese empire, which" foreign centers of power " in the not-so-distant past tried to either reject or bring under their control, weakening China's influence there, still exists today existing in the scientific, analytical and educational li-

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They influence today's foreign policy and foreign policy decision-making by the Chinese elite in the modern world.

CHINA'S POLICY IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA (1991-2002)

Considering the current policy of the PRC in relation to neighboring countries located in the former Soviet space of Central Asia, we will outline the main trends of this influence and the peculiarities of the Chinese approach to the young states of the region, as well as the response to Chinese initiatives of Astana, Tashkent, Dushanbe, Bishkek and Ashgabat.

Of the five newly independent Asian states, three (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) share a 3,700-kilometer border with China. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation in the Central Asian region was favorable for the PRC. Central Asia has moved out of Russia's control and has become open to the influence of China and other countries. In January 1992, the People's Republic of China established official diplomatic relations with five Central Asian States. At this stage, Beijing pursued a rather restrained and cautious policy here, without singling out anyone in particular. Nevertheless, political and economic realities, such as the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, the need to coordinate the overall policy and operational actions of Chinese special services with colleagues from neighboring countries on the problems of Uyghur separatism, Tibet, and other issues of "divided nations", and the establishment of mutual trade contacts, forced China to intensify these ties.

All official documents of the Chinese government refer to the "equal and friendly attitude" towards the new Central Asian states. Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s, Beijing's policy has tended towards a certain differentiation in relations with them: there were "priority states", which were given priority in terms of developing political and economic ties, and" second-tier " republics, with which the necessary level of official contacts was maintained. Such selectivity, of course, was not associated with any historical "grievances" or subjective sentiments in the Chinese leadership, but was due to the objective geostrategic position of the new states on the western borders of the PRC and the current difficult political situation in the region. The latter is characterized by the growing threat of Islamic extremism, the development of globalization processes and the desire of the West to take a dominant position in the center of Asia, as well as the" diversity of vectors " and ambiguity (and sometimes unpredictability) of the foreign policy of young Asian states.

This" priority " group, in our opinion, includes states connected with China by a common border (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and common problems of maintaining mutual national security in the region in the face of the growing threat of global Islamic terrorism. It is no coincidence that these states, together with Russia and China, signed the agreement on confidence-building in the military field near the border in April 1996 in Shanghai, which marked the beginning of the so-called Shanghai Five, and after the Shanghai meeting on June 16, 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

In 1991, the USSR withdrew from Central Asia. The emerging" niche " was quickly filled with ambitious foreign policy projects of the newly independent states, and the United States and its allies quickly entered the region. The process of new regionalization was quite controversial and developed spontaneously. On the one hand, Moscow tried to maintain or restore control within the framework of the created Collective Security Treaty of the CIS Countries (CSTO), and then within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union.

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Economic Union (EurAsEC). On the other hand, alternative projects to Russia have been implemented in the region, such as GUUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan - Azerbaijan-Moldova), Silk Road - TRACECA, etc. There was also a special position of Uzbekistan, which boycotted all Russian initiatives to strengthen the CSTO and distanced itself from Russia in every possible way.

In parallel to this process, Islamic extremism in the Wahhabi ideological framework gained a "second wind" in the region in the 1990s. The intra-Afghan conflict fueled the civil war in Tajikistan and stimulated Islamic militants from Xinjiang to Chechnya. It was during this period that two Russian-Chechen campaigns took place, and it was during these years that Islamic terrorism acquired a systematic and complex character, covering all the countries of the region. The transit and sale of drugs from Afghanistan through Central Asia and Russia to the West has become an inexhaustible financial base for the aggressive and harsh Islamization of the region.

At the same time, the Afghan conflict, especially after the Taliban ousted the Northern Alliance forces from Afghanistan in 1999, stimulated the search by the secular governments of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and other states for an adequate response to the challenge of fundamentalists, especially since the then existing CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization did not provide such an answer.

In 1996, the Shanghai Five organization already existed, which was established under the regime of cross-border cooperation and security in a 100-km zone of five neighboring states: Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and China. It is possible that the organizers of the "five" in 1996 did not invest in its activities a long-term concept of full-scale strategic security, limiting themselves to solving local tasks - demilitarization in border areas, catching smugglers, etc. However, the growing Islamic challenges in Russia in the North Caucasus, Central Asia and China (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region) pushed them to move closer together within the "five" and form a new regional security system-a bloc of states united in the fight against terrorism and national separatism. On June 14, 2001, at a meeting of the leaders of six states - China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan-in Shanghai, such a system was created within the SCO. After signing the establishment documents in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) On the issue of a nuclear-free zone in Central Eurasia and the inclusion of Uzbekistan in the organization as a full-fledged member, it can be stated that a new interstate security structure has appeared in the region, claiming a rather significant geopolitical role.

After the events of September 11, 2001 and the end of the US operation in Afghanistan, new political realities emerged around and within the SCO. These include: a) the creation of a unified anti-terrorist coalition under the leadership of the United States, including Russia, China and Central Asian countries; b) the completion of the Afghan phase of the anti-terrorist operation, the introduction of peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan and the formation of the interim government of Hamid Karzai; c) the aggravation of India-Pakistan relations and the emergence of this traditional conflict on the verge of nuclear balancing; d) the growth of expectations in the Muslim world in connection with the upcoming US action against Iraq and other "rogue states"; e) ideological formulation of the US strategy in the form of the concept of the main threat from the "axis of evil" countries (Iraq, Iran and North Korea); f) the process of military and political strengthening of the US position in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan, the creation of military bases and other structures there, the preparation of US military-strategic positions in Kazakhstan through its NATO ally Turkey. These factors cause serious concern for China and Russia about the emerging new system of relations in Central Asia.-

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This is a situation in Central Asia, which completely or partially "crosses out" the regional status quo that developed in 1991-2001. In this regard, the SCO faces a number of fundamentally new challenges that it needs to understand and take into account in its strategy and tactics.

First, in what direction will the SCO develop further? Will it follow the path of geographical expansion of the framework and participants (and India, Pakistan, Iran, Mongolia, and even Japan are clearly interested in it today), claiming in the future to be a kind of Asian NATO? Or will it be developed exclusively within the framework of the already established Russia - Kazakhstan - Kyrgyzstan - Uzbekistan - Tajikistan - China system, with an emphasis on the development of economic and humanitarian programs?

Secondly, how far will the SCO members go in defining the functions and tasks of law enforcement institutions, in particular the Unified Anti-Terrorist Center being created? Will the idea of using Russian - Chinese or other mixed special forces in Chechnya, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Xinjiang and other "hot spots" in the region arise over time?

Third, what will be the SCO's strategy and tactics regarding the US military presence in the region, and in particular on the territory of the organization's member countries?

As you know, the process of creating the SCO took place before September 11 and under other political conditions. In addition to the general points (countering Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, creating confidence-building measures in the 100-kilometer border zone, etc.), the organization's policy initially had a hidden anti-American subtext. Today, taking into account the results of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan and the existing Russian-American alliance to combat global terrorism, which is also supported by China, a number of points need to be rethought. It is primarily about:

1) the role of the United States in Central Asia, which, one way or another, will be present in the region in the near and middle future. Currently, there are two options for the SCO's behavior: preserving the" semi-closed " nature of the organization with a hidden anti-American orientation, or diluting its "semi-closed" character and turning it into an international regional organization. In the first case, we can expect increased pressure and criticism from Moscow and Beijing in relation to Dushanbe, Bishkek and Tashkent for the "pro-American position" of the latter. However, such a line would contradict the official position of President Vladimir Putin, who in an interview with the Wall Street Journal in March 2002 emphasized that the countries of Central Asia are independent states, and they determine their own foreign policy;

2) the nature of constructive cooperation between the United States and the SCO. This is the most difficult and delicate moment for the Russian and Chinese leaders. As you know, a part of Russian public opinion and the Russian military-political elite believe that "Vladimir Putin's team" has followed the "Gorbachev path" of surrendering Russia's national interests in Central Asia, capitulating to the United States, etc. In the PRC, there is also an opinion among some of the military and political leadership that it is necessary to tighten policy towards the United States, especially after its military access to China's western borders through the countries of Central Asia.

Since September 11, 2001, China's official assessment of Uyghur terrorism has also added new noteworthy accents. Today, Beijing believes that the Xinjiang separatists are part of international terrorism, and therefore they should appear in the list of targets of the global anti-terrorist campaign. There is an additional factor of Sino-American rapprochement in the

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this area, which the PRC previously practically did not allow anyone to enter. The first informal Sino-American consultations have begun.

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Thus, China continues to take an extremely cautious position regarding the processes in Central Asia. At first, Beijing did not support or condemn the bombing of Afghanistan. At the same time, terrorism is also a threat to China's internal stability. China's Islamic communities, especially in Xinjiang, where they represent the majority of the population, have long advocated autonomy and self-government, and radical groups have long fought the Chinese authorities using armed and terrorist methods. Therefore, very quickly, Beijing clearly and firmly declared its unconditional support for the actions of the anti-terrorist coalition, while, however, paying special attention to the need to avoid civilian casualties. In doing so, China reaffirmed its status as a great and responsible global power, while also reminding Washington of the times when Beijing was also forced to use force to subdue students in Tiananmen Square and separatists in Tibet. However, the final options for resolving the Afghan problem in the context of the overall stabilization of Central Asia directly affect China, and in the future it will have to more clearly formulate its position on the region, where its interests have long been clearly and clearly expressed.

The development of the general situation in the world shows that since the end of the XX century. For Russia, the eastern azimuth of foreign policy is becoming no less important than the Euro-Atlantic one in the future. Russia has no other way to fully integrate into the modern system of international relations, except to participate in the unfolding global geopolitical game in one way or another. It is obvious that due to the reduction of the state's foreign policy resource, no other areas of foreign policy, no matter how important they may be, can compare in their potential stakes in this geopolitical game with Central and North - East Asia, where the key players in the foreseeable future will be the United States and China.

Since the post-Soviet space is a priority for Russia due to historical and geo-economic reasons, relations with those states that have historically and geopolitically gravitated towards it have been and still are the most important for it in the Central Asian direction. Russia must determine for itself which Central Asian state can be its main strategic ally in the region. The regional role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization also needs to be rethought - expanding the scope of this organization's activities in the Afghan-Pakistani direction in the current conditions is impossible without combining its interests with those of the United States in the region. All this makes the situation in Central Asia extremely unstable and volatile. If this scenario prevails, then Russia, China, and the United States, like Russia, China, and Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, may once again start competing for influence in Central Asia. At the same time, if we draw an analogy with the events of the XIX century, Russia can take the place of China, which could then protect its interests in the region only by balancing between Great Britain and Russia.

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