Against the background of the crisis phenomena in the global economy, the markets of developed countries, their capital and lifestyle have largely lost their former role in the global economy. The Chinese experience of reforms looks more attractive and systemically significant: the country manages to practically combine capitalism and socialism, economic liberalization and concentration of resources on the cutting edge of science and technology, external expansion with the development of the domestic market and maintaining productive relations with its neighbors.

Key words: empiricism, initial stage of socialism, Kuomintang, modernization, new type of globalization, system player.

The two-plus years that have passed since the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China have brought additional clarity to the understanding of the course of the new composition of the Chinese leadership. There are no special sensations in sight: the continuity of domestic and foreign policy has been confirmed, radical proposals have once again been cut off, and the nearest and more distant development guidelines have been clarified.

The decisions of the third (2013) and fourth (2014) plenums of the CPC Central Committee indicated the commitment of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders to further liberalize the economy and politics. The creation of private banks is allowed, and restrictions on internal migration are relaxed. The strict demographic policy was partially dismantled, the number of articles of the criminal Code providing for capital punishment was reduced, labor camps were eliminated, and the rules for registering NGOs were simplified. The Fourth Plenum emphasized the priority of governing the country on the basis of legal norms, made a number of proposals aimed at strengthening the independence of the courts, which may give a more systematic character to the fight against corruption.

At the same time, the basic wording concerning the country's movement along the socialist path has been preserved. We have not forgotten the problem of income polarization, which, like corruption, is the subject of the most acute concern of society.

So where is the giant country that overtook the United States in terms of GDP calculated at purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2014 going? Does the market contradict socialism, did this tiger eat the socialist trainer, as some authors believe [Buzgalin, 2012, p. 53]? Or, to put it another way, is it only the market that is responsible for China's success [Lardy, 2014]? In the discussions about Marxism and other "isms"that have revived since the 2008 financial crisis, 1 all these questions do not seem idle.

1 These discussions are well presented in the journal Alternatives.

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DENG XIAOPING'S EMPIRICISM

Is Deng Xiaoping's "socialism with Chinese characteristics" a revision of this teaching? I don't think so, and neither does the author of a well-known book with this title [Pivovarova, 2011].

The essence of Deng Xiaoping's turnaround in the late 1970s can be briefly described as a return from the "inspiring" ideas of Mao Zedong to the Marxist position of practice as a criterion of truth. It was no longer China that had to conform to ideas, but ideas that had to conform to Chinese realities. Approximately the same thing was done by V. I. Lenin, who turned Russia towards NEP. In both cases, the need for a long transition period to the new system was recognized. In both cases, to put it somewhat conditionally, idealism was replaced by materialism - and a realistic assessment of the country's situation.

A little later, in 1982, the formula "initial stage of socialism" was established in China, which to this day remains the official self-identification of the PRC according to the formation criterion. Here we can notice a significant difference in the understanding of the duration of certain phases of social development in comparison with the late USSR, which hastened to declare "developed socialism"already in the 1970s. The initial stage of socialism not only allows, but also presupposes multi-structure, extensive use of state capitalism, concessions in the interests of developing the productive forces and gradually reaching the level of the most developed countries on the planet. China plans to reach this level only in the middle of the XXI century. So far, we can confidently talk about the PRC as a country of state capitalism and, I will add, a state-monopolistic system. The latter, according to V. I. Lenin,"...there is the most complete material preparation of socialism, there is a threshold to it, there is that rung of the historical ladder between which there are no intermediate steps and the rung called socialism." PSS, vol. 34, p. 193].

A similar idea is expressed by Mao Zedong, who believed that the bureaucratic capital under the Kuomintang "fully prepared the material conditions for the new democratic revolution" (Meliksetov, 1977, p. 278).

Applying these propositions to the modern world, one can probably see that in backward countries, "transitional" or "intermediate" socio-economic structures can dominate over a long historical period measured in decades. The rejection of the pursuit of their formational purity and of classical (Western) models is quite sufficient not only for productive modernization synthesis, but also for preserving the possibility of independent discussion and choice between "-isms"for future generations. 2
At the same time, in the age of globalization, one of the most important conditions for preserving such a choice is the introduction of a" third extra "in tedious and unproductive discussions between too zealous supporters of the" market "and"state". This not entirely correct opposition must necessarily be supplemented by a monopolistic (large corporate) sector, both domestic and foreign. Only then can the roles of the members of this trio (or quartet, if you distinguish between their own and other monopolies) show or suggest the general orientation of the country's development.

I emphasize that from the point of view of" isms", the relationship between the state and monopolies is more important. So, at a time when socialist ideas were not alien to the American establishment, a representative of one of the most influential families in the United States, Brooks Adams (great-grandson of the second and grandson of the sixth presidents), called on the country's leadership to help England in its competition with continental powers. At the beginning of the last century, he also recommended strengthening expansion into Latin America and building a channel between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to win the Atlantic world in competition for East Asia. According to B. Adams, it was important to reduce the country's administrative expenses. To do this, it was proposed either to subordinate the government to trusts, or (which is better)

2 These discussions are well presented in the journal Alternatives.

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trusts - to the government). "In this way, the western and eastern continents would compete for the most perfect project of state socialism" (Adams, 1947, p.106) .3
The balance of power and control in the "market - monopolies - state" triangle in China does not yet leave any doubts about the preservation of the socialist orientation. The quality and technical level of the products of the largest state corporations, which have become global players in the new century, are generally much higher than those of ordinary market participants. Since a few hundred or so major corporations form a "system of modern enterprises", they remain within the scope of planning and coordinating government measures.

Having softened the rigidly instrumental, mobilization understanding of socialism, Deng Xiaoping obtained a valuable algorithm for starting reforms in the industry, which soon began to replace profit deductions with taxes, using the example of a yard contract. But mitigation in rural areas, of course, was limited. In a country with a huge agricultural overpopulation, both planning and the public sector were still seen as a way to concentrate resources on key areas of modernization. At the same time, Deng Xiaoping saw a large surplus population, which, in his opinion, was "unnecessary for modern production" (Deng Xiaoping, 1985, p.197). Physically, the peasants remained locked up in the village.

In a sense, the initial stage of socialism simply left the peasants alone, but it was precisely taking into account the situation in the countryside that predetermined the rejection of haste and new, much longer, deadlines for achieving the strategic goals laid down by the reformers in party and state documents.

Only gradually did the family contract, the manufacturing of the countryside, and then (in the XXI century) rapid urbanization lead to some harmonization of relations between the city and the countryside, the policy of "returning debts to the peasants" initiated by the previous leadership of the country. From 2003 to 2007, farmers ' incomes increased by 92% [http://www.theguardian. com.../2014/oct/02]. Despite the huge outflow of young workers to the cities, the Chinese village of our days remains "alive", in particular, its energy consumption continues to grow dynamically.

Decades later, the idea expressed by A. V. Meliksetov is very valuable for understanding the essence of Chinese reforms. A well-known Chinese historian believed that the idea that China "started with the economy"was incorrect. In his opinion, in the late 1970s, the country experienced primarily a political turn (and even a coup) associated with the return of approximately 20 million citizens from rural exile to work and power [Meliksetov, 2002, p.98]. Apparently, the observations, worldview and energy of these people played a significant role in the economic transformation and further adjustments of the political course. Of the 26 current members of the politburo of the CPC Central Committee, 11 have experience of such exile, including current General Secretary Xi Jinping.

Returning to the question of"isms", I note that the attitude of the peasantry towards the market is twofold. The market is profitable for the peasant if, among other things, there is a convenient sale, relative stability of prices is ensured, which allows calculating the crop, harvest, costs of means of production, etc. Hence the desire for planning, curbing excessive market fluctuations, and hoarding, thrift.

What is also important is the scale of the impact of China's agricultural sector on the entire set of material conditions and policies in this country, and the formation of national psychology. It is no coincidence that one of the most qualified American interna --

3 I will note the characteristic connection in the United States between "socialism", on the one hand, and large infrastructure projects, on the other (it is enough to recall F. Roosevelt's "New Deal"). This connection is apparently not accidental and is now well illustrated by the stark contrast between socialist China and capitalist India.

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Rodnikov, D. Shambo, conducted a political science study in the Chinese village in the mid-1990s. Among the observations of this specialist at that time, it is worth noting the conclusion about gradualness in solving problems, a tendency to stability and peacefulness as traditional features of the peasant mentality that migrated to China's foreign policy. In recent years, however, D. Shambaugh has often been a partisan critic of Beijing, one of the apologists for containing China (Shambaugh, 2013).

Deng Xiaoping's 1979 introduction of the "modest affluence" clause (xiaokang) was also a tribute to peasant concreteness and tradition. This ancient concept (which Chiang Kai-shek also used in his works) has the meaning of "small calm" (Meliksetov, 1977, p.236), or an era separating the epochs of chaos and "great unity". Apparently, the updating of the " Xiaokang "signaled a conciliatory line towards Taiwan, the end of the period of internal political squabbles, and the prolongation of the deadlines for achieving strategic modernization goals.

What would you like to emphasize? Growing out of peasant sanity and empiricism, the reforms in the PRC were largely a generalization of observations of life. On this point, Deng Xiaoping fundamentally diverged from "Soviet-Harvard idealism (platonism)", to use the term from Nassim Taleb's acclaimed work [Taleb, 2013].

A hasty version of this idealism also turned out to be what might be briefly called "Gaidarism." It doesn't matter what we are talking about: "communist man", "developed socialism", "new political thinking" or "market - democratic transit". It is important that these are speculations, revolutionary impulses that are too detached from reality or simply destroy it. Their component parts-self-serving or short-sighted attempts to translate simplified schemes into reality-were particularly unsuccessful or traumatic in large states.

Both Deng Xiaoping and his colleague Chen Yun would have found the idea of "creating unemployment" or declaring entire sectors of public production "unreformable" wild. For this reason, they did not break the political system, modernizing it very carefully. As a result, after three and a half decades in the PRC, there is both real socialism and real capitalism (and many mixed forms, as well as a sea of individual entrepreneurs), the scale of which can be measured.

It can be confidently stated that the state in the PRC retains control over the commanding heights in the economy, takes on the solution of long-term tasks (infrastructure, scientific and technological progress, defense, protection from other external threats, including economic crises). With the belated (delayed) and very rapid urbanization, the burden on the state is growing, it has to absorb social and regional gaps, and take on the heaviest burden of environmental problems. But this now rather means that a movement towards a social state is inevitable, resembling the Western European counterparts of the post-war decades, which were partly destroyed by the neoliberal attack after the collapse of the USSR.

By producing an increasing share of GDP in a capitalist fashion, modern China clearly sets the goal of narrowing the income gap. This is partly possible: social and health insurance funds have been growing at a faster pace in recent years. And the share of government spending in GDP has been steadily increasing since the mid-1990s: in 2000, the share of government spending in GDP has been growing steadily since the mid-1990s. it was 16.3%, compared to 2.2% in 2012-24.

The decision of the Government of the People's Republic of China, adopted in May 2014, is typical. Under the auspices of the State Committee for Development and Reforms and under the chairmanship of the head of this powerful economic management body, an interdepartmental mechanism has been established to carry out income redistribution reform [http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/ 860309. shtml].

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One of the most recent decisions (October 2014) was to reduce the salaries of top managers in state - owned corporations.

The desire to compensate for "market failures" with a strong social policy as a whole has so far had a positive impact on the macroeconomic situation, expanding aggregate demand due to a more even distribution of income between individual social groups and regions of the country.

COMPLETED MODERNIZATION

I will note one important feature of Chinese empiricism. In this country, legislation followed practice: the state did not immediately approve various initiatives, often prefixing permissive decrees with the word "temporary" and only after time fixed, often with amendments, certain legal norms. In "Gaidarism", the opposite is true: "eternal laws" are hastily adopted (borrowed in bulk), the necessary clarifications of which have been waiting for the legislator for years.

The constant success of various initiatives of Chinese reformers is partly due not only to relatively moderate strategic goals, but also to the fact that the movement along empirically proven and legally proven paths is quite smooth.

China's geographical and formational sprawl, which largely determined the measured and consistent course of Chinese reforms, revealed another important advantage over time. Lagging regions can rely on the experience of leading companies and the redistribution of some of their resources through the center. At the same time, this circumstance is a long - standing and very complex conflict of interests, which determines a lot in domestic political life and, I would venture to say, is no less important than the relatively familiar interaction of the "right" and "left".

The task of modernization is considered to be the synthesis of traditional and modern, often represented by foreign ones. In the ratio between modern (a partial synonym is external), mastered modern and traditional in today's China, perhaps the already mastered (adapted) modern prevails. Moreover, the differences between regions make the problem of synthesis already largely internal.

This somewhat simplifies the problem itself, it looks fundamentally solvable - even if not immediately. One of the key prerequisites for such a decision - a modern nationwide infrastructure-has been largely created. The consolidated domestic market and increased labor mobility make it possible to take full advantage of the economies of scale and intensively develop almost a full-scale industry.

Speaking about the technical side of modernization, it is important to note the scale of the Chinese economy. They are such that the spread of obsolete borrowing throughout the economic system was often much more effective at first than the independent development of innovations. Middle-level technologies, or what was once called appropriate technology, played a special role in China's industrial rise in the twentieth century, the development of rural manufacturing, and the twin modernization challenge of employing the population and improving its technical literacy.

Until very recently, the number of students in secondary specialized institutions in the PRC exceeded the number of university students. A large layer of the average technical intelligentsia ensured successful basic industrialization.

In the future, there was a place to expand and "copy companies" that reproduced business models in the Chinese market, usually overseas, in the information and communication sector.

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Important features of the technical modernization policy were its visibility and accessibility of useful technologies. With the help of the media, everything of value (their own and others') was spread with extraordinary speed to the vast depths of the world's largest country, without much regard for intellectual property rights. "The best things on the market are not sold, they can only be stolen or invented by themselves," is an implicit and long-standing credo of the policy of acquiring foreign technologies. It is, in fact, not new - so did all countries. But Beijing also had a huge foreign diaspora at its disposal, and an excellent industrial espionage job, reinforced in the new century by almost a division of hackers. No wonder one of the leading American political analysts, F. Zakaria, once joked that there are only two types of corporations in the United States: those who know that they were robbed by the Chinese, and those who do not yet know about it.

At the same time, it is obvious that the Chinese are capable of major independent scientific breakthroughs. The country now ranks second in the world in terms of R & D investment, and its impact appears to be just around the corner. There are additional prerequisites for this: an enlightened diaspora, armies of students and researchers abroad, etc. It is clear that the giant market serves as an additional incentive for innovators from other countries. The organization of science as a whole largely retained the features of the Soviet model. In addition, in the 1980s, the foundation was laid for the first-class information and analytical base that China now has, both in the natural and social sciences. Many of the country's partners now suffer from information asymmetry.

Perhaps the PRC has another advantage. One of the reasons for the slowdown in economic growth in developed countries since the 1970s was the processes of monopolization and transnationalization. Multi-branch national concerns, which made a great contribution to scientific and technological progress in the post-war period, gave way to highly specialized TNCs. Extensive capture of foreign markets, the withdrawal of "non-core" assets from companies (outsourcing), and cost reduction by moving production abroad pushed intensive methods of fighting for the market, including the development of fundamentally new products, into corporate strategies. In China, state-owned (joint-stock) intersectoral concerns that are closely linked to research organizations remain both engines of scientific and technological progress in the national economy and agents of external expansion. It is possible that this "old" organizational form will be more capable of innovation.

Being in the middle of the list of countries ranked according to the criterion of per capita income, the PRC demonstrates to the inhabitants of the planet a way to work on modest and, I emphasize, mainly its own resources, which makes the achievements of modernization sustainable and irreversible.

China's success and achievements in the economic field, and the relative clarity of algorithms for completing modernization make radical changes in the country's political system irrelevant. Its gradual modernization is quite sufficient to adequately respond to the changing socio-economic situation in the country, make major changes in the political economy of development, solve ambitious national tasks in the socio-economic sphere, and improve the country's status in the international arena.

The country's leadership is collegial, or, in the Chinese phrase, " collective with an organized change of generations." The political system of the new authoritarianism has been built. It is described in detail by A.V. Vinogradov [Vinogradov, 2014]. I will focus only on two points. At present, three leaders, including two former presidents of the People's Republic of China, are involved in running the country in China in one way or another. And the very popular Bo Xilai, although convicted, can be considered as a reserve "peasant leader" in the most extreme case of fire.

The Chinese are increasingly responding to regular attacks on their political system and calls for its radical transformation with references to the Internet

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more effective and competent governance of one's country - against the backdrop of not only the failures of the "color" revolutions and some democratic neighbors, but also the inconsistency of the old parliamentary and presidential systems with the challenges of our time.

Decades of austerity, the structure of the economy and prices, the current specialization and the current weight of China in the global economy are evidence for further successful solutions to urgent social and environmental problems. In addition, the country has considerable structural and mobilization resources: the share of the service sector in GDP is low, so the servicization of the economy is a clear prospect; China has a powerful foreign economic machine and large financial reserves; state media operate at a very high level, etc. Crises are certainly possible, but they are unlikely to be too deep.

In the unfolding battle for a clean and green China, the state is often forced to restrict the omnivorous and untidy private trader. A very characteristic picture today in China is the environmental surveillance drones that record enterprises polluting urban air.

At the same time, the very existence of acute problems (and sometimes their exaggerated alarmist presentation by the central authorities) justifies maintaining the main features of the existing political system, which is increasingly responsive and flexible to public requests. Western pressure from the very beginning of the reforms in the late 1970s demanded that China develop appropriate tools to counteract destructive influence from outside. Therefore, the country was more prepared for the events of the 1990s and was able to overcome severe tests of strength.

The scale and high degree of economic diversification, coupled with the currently developed scientific and technical potential, not to mention the proven competitiveness of the world's largest trading power, allow us to consider the modernization of the PRC already accomplished - especially if we understand this process as a means of overcoming the dependent position in relations with more developed countries.

A NEW TYPE OF GLOBALIZATION?

Modern China looks like a fundamentally anti-feudal, truly entrepreneurial society, especially against the background of the fascination of a considerable part of the rest of humanity with the extraction of rent (including natural, military-political, trade, information, corporate and heraldic, etc.).

In globalization, China distinguishes between threats and opportunities. On the one hand, it was perceived as a "global economic war, from which there is no escape", on the other-as "interaction in which both sides benefit".

During the years of reforms, the country gradually moved from adapting to the world economy to mastering it-largely in contrast to the passive" integration into the world (Western) economy "in " Gaidarism".

China, which has always been protectionist, only succeeded in breaking up steam under the export sector of industry and becoming convinced of its ability to withstand crises, joined the WTO in 2001 and, among other things, did not fail to register its socialist status in the admission documents. At the same time, Beijing continued its selective policy towards foreign capital arriving in the country, especially strictly controlling portfolio investments. With the abolition of benefits for foreigners (2007), the matured national private owner is already confidently crowding foreign capital in the domestic market.

In the new century, the PRC has confidently moved to foreign economic expansion. Behind the battleships of state corporations, a flotilla of private capital is emerging into the world economy, the export of entrepreneurial capital has almost caught up with its import, and the country has long been a leader in the volume of contract work abroad.

After the crisis of 2008-2009, globalization along the "center-periphery" line looks complete or clearly fading: capital flows have decreased, and domestic capital flows are almost not growing.-

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in developed countries, international trade is frozen at the same level. In the West, programs of insourcing, reshoring, and in fact import substitution have been launched, which until recently was considered yesterday.

There are also more serious problems. At the international level, support for production in backward countries has been virtually eliminated, and instead their governments are entangled in debts that cannot be repaid in principle. However, even in the developed countries themselves, government debts make them practically helpless to solve the escalating social, technological and environmental problems. A fundamental revision of the relationship between Governments and creditors is looming.

The changing balance of power between the West and the East allows us to return to a number of ideas that were once included in the concept of the new international economic order (IEPO). In particular, the achievement of a capital-surplus stage of economic development by a number of Eastern countries means additional supply of this factor of production to the world market. Accordingly, the impact of host countries on foreign investors can be strengthened, and the code of conduct for TNCs can be put back on the international agenda.

The attractiveness of export orientation is decreasing, and a growing number of restrictive measures are being taken against foreign capital everywhere. National capital is more often crowded in the domestic markets by foreign TNCs. The service sector, which is growing faster than other parts of the economy, inevitably increases the share of home product sales in production and consumption.

The 2013 UNCTAD report highlights the importance of domestic markets. As if responding to this observation, China's economy grew by 7.4% in the first quarter of 2014, while foreign trade declined. The report's authors called for maintaining and increasing government spending while growth slows (which is very similar to the Chinese approach to crisis prevention). In addition, UNCTAD experts suggested that central banks should be stripped of their independent status and even move to currency restrictions if the outflow of money from emerging markets to the United States becomes threatening due to the abolition of QE-3 [UNCTAD, 2013, p.84, 133]. All this seems to be written off from Chinese practice: The People's Bank of China, as you know, is directly subordinate to the government, and currency restrictions on capital accounts in the PRC have not been lifted.

Becoming an active subject of globalization, China is in opposition to the growing sentiment of isolationism in the West. Apparently, the very stage of development of productive forces makes the PRC a "new colonialist" - this label, noticing the special interest of the giant state in natural resources, Beijing is especially willing to stick in London.

China is not averse to using the already largely built infrastructure of the global world. By adding its own important elements to it, the PRC becomes a bright and distinctive player. Often faced with blatant discrimination against Chinese companies abroad, Beijing intercepts the West's rhetoric about free trade, perhaps somewhat hypocritically complaining about the growth of protectionism in the modern world.

In China, they like to use the expression "new type". For example, China wants to build a "new type of superpower relationship"with the United States. It is possible that we are at the beginning of what the Chinese will one day call "a new type of globalization." They have certain reasons for this: Beijing's external expansion has marked differences from its Western counterpart.

Companies from China clearly gravitate to the real sector, and they build infrastructure facilities in a short time and cheaply. Fast-growing wages in China can serve, according to the former top manager of the World Bank, J. R. R. Tolkien. Lin, the beginning of the mass removal of several tens of millions of jobs to poorer countries in the coming years [http://www.theguardian.com/global-development...].

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It is also important that China does not make any political demands on the states receiving assistance, refrains from sanctions, etc.The objects being built are often aimed at increasing the self-sufficiency and economic independence of the countries receiving Chinese assistance.

In contrast to the concept of comparative advantages that preserves backwardness, the PRC has shown an example of healthy protectionism ("protect domestic producers without protecting domestic backwardness"), which allows purposefully shaping the country's future role in the world economy. This approach gives other States hope of establishing a less traumatic and more democratic system of the international division of labor. One of the practical ways to create it may be to expand mutually beneficial cooperation with the PRC, including industrial cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, as well as cooperation in ideological and scientific fields, including social sciences.

China has long made significant efforts to prioritize developing ties with neighboring countries (and privately criticizing Russia for not paying attention to them). The formula "a good neighbor is more important than a distant relative" is being implemented-in contrast to the traditional geopolitical postulate "the enemy of my neighbor is my friend".

It would seem that it is possible to erect monuments to Deng Xiaoping everywhere and elevate Chinese sound empiricism to the rank of the world ideology of the future. China's new leader Xi Jinping announces the Chinese Dream. Another utopia? We think that everything is more complicated. China, carefully observing the outside world, is becoming more and more confident in its own usefulness and is already ready to make a concrete ideological and, importantly, practical contribution to the development of world civilization, which in recent decades has become entangled in the wilds of neoliberalism, postmodernism, "Gaidarism", etc.

In my opinion, this point is partly where the real knot of contradictions between Beijing and the West lies. Grounded in practice, " communist China "(which the West, which is now pleasing Beijing, does not recall) now appears to be a much less indoctrinated society than the" free West " with its global moral pretensions.

The peculiarity of the current historical moment lies in the fact that if in the West the existing economic system is increasingly attacked from the left, then China is "criticizing"it The West uses commercial actions such as buying (not buying) or selling government debts of developed countries, appeals to WTO rules, etc.At the same time, the disadvantaged parts of the planet receive considerable assistance. What is the cost of Africa's return, which has become a major recipient of Chinese economic aid, from the position of a "forgotten" continent to an active political game on the interests of external players? Equally impressive is the recent proposal for a multibillion-dollar infrastructure assistance package for India. And by 2020, Beidou is going to provide global positioning services to all interested countries for free.

It should be noted that one of the first people to use the term "Chinese dream" was Nat Wei, a member of the House of Lords - the third Huaqiao to receive this honorary title for their work in the field of social entrepreneurship. He pointed out, among other things, that there was considerable discrimination against Chinese people in Albion. Perhaps the dream is also aimed at a wider audience, not just within China. Moreover, the situation in relations with the diaspora is rapidly changing in favor of Beijing (this was largely due to the Western aggression in Libya).

In fact in the first years of this decade one of Deng Xiaoping's precepts was revised: "keep a low profile", "keep a low profile", "don't raise the flag". I note that some veterans of Chinese diplomacy did not fully agree with the updated approach, and discussions on this issue continued for a long time. But to me, parting with practitioner Dan seems deeply symbolic: China finally invites you

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the planet shares with him a theoretical generalization of its ascent. And he shares practical secrets - with those who are ready to see them.

It is easy to assume that the Chinese view of the economy, which clearly gives preference to the real sector, the tangible, physical economy, rather than financial ratings and standard indicators of the investment climate, will play an increasingly important role in assessing the Russian reality and its prospects from the point of view of investors - and not only from China. There is no doubt that increasing confidence in Russia in a changing coordinate system will be positively influenced by those features of its policy that will be understandable to Chinese regulators, financiers and businessmen.

When discussing import substitution, we should probably recall one of the important guidelines of the third plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the twelfth convocation: "Expanding ties with the outside world implies even greater expansion of relations between different regions within the country" [Resolution of the CPC Central Committee..., 1984].

* * *

China is not so much a unique country as a representative one, since its vast territory and diverse domestic conditions do not allow it to be too specific. Chinese regions that are very different in terms of wealth and profile are also following more and more individual paths. They differ significantly in the stage of transition from a predominantly industrial to a service economy.

Without a correct understanding of the general truths and patterns of development of world civilization, China's success would not have been possible. The experience of the state, which has solved the problem of combining the market and socialism, thus has a clear universal significance.

Yes, China is still in many ways inferior to developed countries in terms of individual well-being. However, the leader, in my opinion, is determined not only by weight. Among other things, leadership implies clarity of goals and means of achieving them. The leading country is distinguished by a vision of perspective not only for itself. And in order not to lose heart before the chaos of the present and future, we need to take another look at China: we are a system player in a non-system world.

list of literature

Buzgalin A.V. SSSR: 10 uroki dlya sotsializma budushchego [USSR: 10 Lessons for Future Socialism]. 2012. N 1.

Vinogradov A.V. Vlast', biznes i korruptsiya v Kitae [Power, Business and Corruption in China]. 2014. N 1.

Deng Xiaoping. Selected works. Beijing: Publishing House of Literature in Foreign Languages, 1985.

Lenin V. I. Russkaya revolyutsiya i grazhdanskaya voina [Russian Revolution and Civil War].

Meliksetov L. V. Istoriya Kitay [History of China], Moscow: Vysshaya shkola Publ., 2002.
Meliksetov A.V. Socio-economic policy of the Kuomintang in China (1927-1949). Moscow: Nauka, 1977.

Pivovarova E. P. Sotsializm s kitayskoi osobennosti [Socialism with Chinese characteristics], Moscow: Forum Publishing House, 2011.

Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on economic system reform. Beijing: Publishing House of Literature in Foreign Languages, 1984.

Taleb N. N. The Black Swan. Under the sign of unpredictability, Moscow: Kolibri Publ., 2013.

Adams B. America's Economic Supremacy (1900). Reprint with an introduction by Marquis W. Childs. N.Y.-L., 1947.

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/860309.shtml (accessed: 20.05.2014) http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/oct/02/rural-wages - rising-asia-africa-benefits (accessed: 11.11.2014)

Lardy N. R. Markets over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. September, 2014.

Shambaugh D. China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report 2013. N.Y., Geneva, 2013.

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