Many Asian and African countries that were freed from colonial oppression in the 20th century are characterized by a much larger role that the armed forces (AF) play in socio-political life compared to Western states, which is often explained by the immaturity of civil institutions, political traditions and ideological attitudes of the local ruling elite and the population as a whole. In different countries, the scale of the army's influence on the processes taking place in the country varies. The Indonesian National Army, whose relations with the civil authorities in the post-Suharto period are discussed in this article, is an example of the Armed Forces that dominate the institutional space of their country. The time period under consideration (1998-2008), i.e. the post-Suharto period in the history of Indonesia, is marked by a rather pronounced changeable nature of the intensity of transformations in the army environment. Indonesia over the past nine years has seen both the reform push of Abdurrahman Wahid and more cautious steps to make adjustments to the paradigm of the functioning of the Armed Forces by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Baharuddin Yusuf Habibi He became President of Indonesia immediately after Suharto's departure from the political scene and was the first top-level Indonesian civilian politician to face the challenge of building military-civilian interaction in a changed historical context.

In May 1998, Vice-President B. Y. Habibi became head of state. Habibi was initially perceived as a temporary figure. Having no political base of its own and no serious political background, it was forced to rely on Golkar (the electoral machine that was one of the pillars of the New Order regime) and the army, which naturally suited the latter. ABRI / TNI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia/The Indonesian National Army) even benefited somewhat from Suharto's retirement: the country formally broke with its authoritarian past, and a civilian became the head of state. There was reason to believe that such changes would facilitate the provision of external assistance, which was needed by the country crushed by the Asian financial crisis. At the same time, the fragmentation of Indonesia's political space and some underdevelopment of its civilian institutions suggested that there was no real alternative to military dominance in national politics yet.

One of the characteristic features of Habibi's presidency was the relative calm on the front of politically motivated personnel changes in the army elite. Suffice it to say that in the Cabinet of Development and Reform, there was also a place for Wiranto, who retained the post of Minister of Defense and Security (at the same time, he is also the head of the Ministry of Defense).-

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He was also commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) and absorbed the principles and values of Suharto's New Order (a political regime that took shape in 1965-1967 and lasted until May 1998). Wiranto did not intend to part with them even after his former patron Suharto resigned. The interregnum period, i.e. the time of Habibi's presidency, was characterized by the conclusion of a kind of unspoken pact between the army and the civilian authorities. The latter did not interfere in the affairs of the military, allowing them to determine the agenda of army reforms and their intensity, and the Armed Forces provided the president with sufficient scope for carrying out reforms in other areas.

This does not mean that ABRI was not affected by the changes. In the new (at least on paper) political and economic conditions, there was a need to introduce a new ideological base for the activities of the Armed Forces. During the first few months after the change of president, events occurred that led to doctrinal shifts in the army. In the summer of 1998, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Wiranto announced the readiness of the army to build its activities in accordance with the so-called New Paradigm, which assumed that in the changed situation the army would not constantly be in the forefront when solving all issues of a national nature; the Armed Forces would move away from the practice of appointing people in uniform to civilian posts in favor of political process; influence will be exerted not directly, but indirectly; ABRI are ready to distribute roles between different national forces in decision-making [Kristiadi, 1999, p. 56].

This paradigm was not new in the full sense of the word. As Agus Wirahadikusuma, one of the reformist generals, pointed out, this is the same concept that was developed in preparation for the moment when Suharto would allow limited reforms. Wirahadikusuma noted with displeasure that after the fall of President Suharto, the army could not find anything better than to return to the old projects [Mietzner, 2006, p. 12].

The cornerstone of the justification for the role that the army played under Suharto was the concept of dwifungsi ("double function") of the Armed Forces. She assumed that the Indonesian military not only bears a historical responsibility for preserving the sovereignty of the state, but also plays an independent role in leading society and the country; the army is aimed at creating conditions favorable for the development of Indonesia, bringing stability to its political and economic life. Critics of military intervention in civilian affairs have pointed out the pernicious nature of the concept, which runs counter to democratic principles and allows certain elements in the military to parasitize the country's economic body. Some military personnel agreed with this criticism on many points, although the tone of their rhetoric was, of course, milder.

The country, which demanded changes, temporarily tipped the scales in favor of carrying out reforms in the army. In November 1998, active-duty military personnel were banned from holding positions in civilian government structures. The number of appointed deputies from the Supreme Court in the national Parliament was reduced from 75 to 38 people and to 10% of seats in regional legislative assemblies, and by 2004 the factions of the Supreme Court should have disappeared altogether. At the same time, according to Law No. 3 of 1999, the military still could not be elected to legislative bodies [Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 2001, p. 4; Mietzner, 2006, p. 12; Undang-Undang..., 1999].

One of the most significant changes was the separation of the police into an independent institution. In the 60s of the last century, the police were transferred directly to the commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. On April 1, 1999, the situation changed: the police became directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. A year later, after coming to power

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Abdurrahman Wahid, the chain of command changed again: the police became subordinate to the head of state [Instruksi..., 1999; Kompas, 31.03.1999; 19.04.1999; 02.07.2000]. Such modifications of the" power " space of the country have a number of pitfalls, which is associated with both psychological and financial and political motives. It was not easy for the Armed Forces, especially the ground forces, to accept the fact that those for whom they were "big brother" yesterday were promoted in status and out of their control. The police, in turn, have been accumulating resentment and distrust towards the SV, the Air Force and the Navy for years. The redistribution of spheres of influence in business (often dubious from the point of view of the law) can also open a crack between the police and the army. As the experience of recent years shows, such concerns were not unfounded. After the separation of the army and police, the abbreviation ABRI went down in history, and the army returned to its former name TNI (National Army of Indonesia). However, the generals did not abandon their previous thinking patterns.

During the New Order, the president was the center of political power, and the military command, especially in the last years of the Suharto era, was formed at the expense of individuals who were personally loyal to him. Under Habibi, the first president of the post-Suharto era, the situation has changed. There was no single center of power in the state, and the top rungs of the army hierarchy were occupied by people whose loyalty to the president was sometimes questionable. The distribution of spheres of influence between the army and the head of state, which took place back in 1998, could not save civilian structures and TNI from sporadic conflicts (which, upon closer examination, are systemic in nature): differences of opinion sometimes appeared between the two poles of power, when issues affecting the interests of both sides at once arose. Everyone played by their own rules, according to which they built their policies. A typical example of such conflicts in their relations was the East Timor issue, which drove a wedge into the relations between the Armed Forces and the President.

East Timor is a former Portuguese colony occupied by Indonesian troops in 1975, which was never recognized by the United Nations, but it was in the interests of a number of Western powers who feared that leftist forces would come to power in East Timor. Since May 1998, the Indonesian Government has been under increasing pressure from international non-governmental organizations to review the status of East Timor and grant it the right to self-determination. For a number of reasons, the Armed Forces could not even allow the idea that they would have to part with this territory. Often exploited by the military, the argument was that the land washed in the blood of Indonesian soldiers should not be lost. Although there was some sincerity in these words, the real background of the army's position was somewhat different.

First, to give up Timor was to admit a military defeat, an inability to bring order to a small territory in more than two decades. Secondly, Timor's independence could trigger a "domino effect", i.e., lead to increased separatist movements in other parts of the archipelago. Third, the creation and maintenance of hotbeds of tension in different parts of the country could help justify the hypertrophied role of the army in socio-political life.

And after Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and Information Minister Yunus Yosfiah sensationally announced the possibility of granting East Timor the right to self-determination in January 1999, without prior notice or public consultation, the army declared support for this idea, which was initiated by the President himself. In the bowels of the sun, however, there were other processes. A mechanism was put in place to implement a scenario in which Indonesia, even if a "people's consultation" (a referendum in a territory where a large part of the population would normally be in favor of secession), would be implemented.-

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It left behind East Timor. And the army decided to resort to already developed schemes. It was assumed that if you "put pressure" on the Timorese, the result of the vote would be in favor of the Indonesian side. But this policy did not bear the expected fruit, and as a result, East Timor chose to secede from Indonesia.

Further developments provide an opportunity to look at a cross-section of the psychology of the Indonesian army. In September 1999, after the announcement of the results of the "wrong" vote in East Timor, violent clashes broke out. Some researchers have pointed out, not without reason, that this gesture of desperation (which was also a warning to other rebellious regions of Indonesia) was the quintessence of the "culture of violence" that had been crystallized in the army for decades. Despite the categorical denial by the military of their involvement in the incident, their role in the tragedy is obvious. The army believed in its complete impunity and probably had no doubt that it would get away with it again, especially since some Western countries that pushed Jakarta to invade East Timor at the time were no less responsible for the bloodshed than the Indonesian military. September 1999 showed that the army's worldview and problem-solving methods have not changed significantly (in fairness, it should be noted that a very short period of time has passed since the fall of Suharto - a little more than a year). This could not but affect the principles of building relationships between civil authorities and TNI.

The scheme for resolving the East Timor issue proposed by the head of state was unexpected and did not fit into the general outline of interaction between the army and Habibi, especially when the president tried to enlist the support of the Armed Forces against the background of his weakening political positions. Habibi was looking for the necessary support in the run - up to the early presidential elections scheduled for autumn 1999.The choice naturally fell on the TNI, which is still the most cohesive and influential institution in the country's political arena. Khabibi was not alone in his aspirations and calculations. Such behavior - the desire to win the favor of "strong" people - has become fashionable among Indonesian politicians in a hot election year. "It is still impossible to become president in Indonesia without the support of the military," Wahid rightly noted [Mietzner, 2006, p. 17]. The main participants in the political process in the country had the opportunity to personally verify the truth of the words of the future Indonesian leader. During the parliamentary campaign, parties usually tried not to focus on reforming the army, so as not to antagonize the influential generals.

Under Habibi, the military declared a commitment to reform, but the nature and scale of the transformation was modest. Words are a tribute to the spirit of the era. The thoughts of many military personnel were focused on something else - on preserving the personal and institutional preferences they received at the time. Moreover, in the speeches of high-ranking military personnel, the idea was sometimes evident: yes, the Armed Forces will be reformed, but society should not stand still. At the same time, even Minister Sudarsono, who often warned civilian politicians that their behavior allowed the army to continue to play a significant role in politics, argued in early 2000: the process of" citizenization " of politics is irreversible, and it is almost impossible for any army commander to try to take power [The International Herald Tribune, 2000].

* * *

In October 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid became the head of state. One of the priorities of the new president was to build relations between the civil authorities and the army that would lead to a qualitative change in the institutional settings of the Armed Forces, real and legal definitions of clear professional boundaries.-

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tax activities of TNI. At first glance, it may seem that Vahid did not have much opportunities for reform activities: when initiating fundamental changes, it was important not to rock the political boat too much, as this could cause discontent among the people, destabilize the already electrified situation in the country and entail negative consequences for the authorities in the form of materializing revanchist ideas in a concrete form. some army circles are concerned about the current state of mind. Wahid's first decisions, made in his new capacity, confirmed his reputation as a politician who seeks to reform the post-Suharto Indonesian reality of his time. One got the impression that Vahid's pro-reformist orientation was sometimes explained and fueled by his tendency to shock the public, the desire to swim against the current.

It should be noted that during this period, the Indonesian Armed Forces were not monolithic in terms of their views on the need for reforms. Differences of opinion were observed both under Suharto and in the first months after his fall, but it was under Wahid that the already emerging rift widened. As many officers believed, Wahid, unlike his predecessor, unceremoniously interfered in the internal affairs of the Armed Forces. Having lost the sense of political self-preservation, the president openly relied on one of the opposing army groups - supporters of reforms. As noted above, Habibi concluded an unspoken agreement with the military elite on the division of spheres of influence, which gave consideration and resolution of internal issues of the Armed Forces to the army elite. Vahid, on the other hand, tried to concentrate all the threads of army control in his hands, not allowing the idea that any attempt to impose his will on the TNI could lead to political collapse for the initiator of such bold actions. Major General Agus Wirahadikusuma (in the spring of 2000) was one of the most prominent Indonesian reformers in uniform. received the rank of Lieutenant General), who even under Suharto pointed out the need to change the paradigm of development of the Armed Forces. Wahid was impressed by Virahadikusuma's demeanor, diatribes, and way of thinking, which caused a strong rejection among a significant part of the officer corps. Between the conservative block of the Armed Forces (the core of which was General Wiranto, Lieutenant General Jaja Suparman, etc.) and the reformist wing (which included Major General Agus Wirahadikusuma, Major General Saurip Kadi, etc.), a real conflict has matured, colored not only by ideological confrontation, but also by the struggle for state posts and the most important positions in the world. army hierarchical ladder.

One of Vahid's first steps in his new role was to change the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and form a cabinet. Wahid decided to break the tradition that had been maintained for decades and put a representative of the Navy, Admiral Widodo Adi Suchipto, as commander - in-chief. The Navy, along with the Air Force, was traditionally considered to be less dogmatically constrained and more ideologically liberated type of Armed Forces compared to the SV. The post of Defense Minister was given to a civilian. The Defense Department was headed by political scientist Yuvono Sudarsono, who already had experience in government work [Asiaweek, 1999; Indonesia, 2001]. As the first months of Vahid's presidency showed, the head of state planned to actively use the tools that fell into his hands to influence the course of transformations, including in the army. Wahid sought to play on the existing contradictions and personal hostility between prominent representatives of the reform and conservative camps in the Armed Forces. One of the most significant changes, considered by certain circles as a kind of political manifesto of the new head of state, was the removal of General Wiranto from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and his transfer from the post of Minister of Defense to the post of Minister-Coordinator for Politics and Security. In February 2000, Wiranto was temporarily removed from this position (and in May of the same year, he was appointed to the Post of President of the United States of America).-

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neral left his post), which, according to Wahid, finally prepared the field for further transformations [Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 2001, p. 21; Kompas, 14.02.2000; 17.05.2000].

On March 2, 2000, the President announced an increase in the number of police personnel in the Republic of Indonesia from 200,000 to 600,000 [Indonesia, 2001]. The point of the spear in making this decision was directed against the Armed Forces. Wahid apparently tried to create a reliable counterbalance to the army's influence in matters of internal security. On March 8, 2000, after a government meeting, the National Stability Coordination Committee (BAKORSTANAS) was dissolved and the so-called special surveillance (Penelitian husus)was terminated for civil servants [Kompas, 10.03.2000; Indonesia, 2001]. Both institutions have their roots in the New Order era, when they were used by the authorities to detect sedition and remove undesirable elements from the country's political scene.

Relying on reform-minded elements in the army, Wahid and his associates also initiated audits of financial structures close to the Armed Forces, which ultimately led to a further narrowing of the circle around supporters of transformation. It seems that it would be strange to expect that the active behavior of the new head of state, who in a matter of months managed to set himself against many representatives of the army elite with his policy, will not cause a response. And it followed in the form of an attack on a politician close to the president, Bondan Gunawan, and stormy public discussions of the so - called meetings in Bulak Rantai (a residential complex in Jakarta for senior army officers), during which they allegedly discussed the prospects of personnel changes in the army elite in favor of reformers and, accordingly, to the detriment of opponents of transformation.

Further isolation of the head of state was promoted by his eccentric behavior, which made his actions difficult to predict. The president's patriarchal authoritarianism, mixed up in messianic ideas that were not alien to him, and reinforced by his past strokes, alienated even people who initially joined his camp (or at least did not openly and consistently oppose him). Disdain for the words uttered earlier by himself, and an arrogant attitude towards other participants in the political process also did not add to his popularity and authority. Popular support, which was initially fairly broad, steadily declined, and accusations of involvement in corruption scandals made Wahid vulnerable to political opponents. Talk of impeachment began long before the president was removed from office. All this could not but lead to a change in the political landscape of the country and the seizure of the strategic initiative by the military, which, due to certain circumstances, was forced to hold the defensive and refrain from attacking in the first half of Vahid's presidency.

In late summer and autumn 2000, the situation changed dramatically. The new Chief of Staff of the SV, General Sutarto, immediately outlined his priorities. Expectations were met that he would adhere to a tough line towards Vahid. Major General Kiki Shahnakri, who was close to Sutarto in his views, was promoted to the post of Deputy Chief of Staff [Kompas, 7.11.2000]. During a meeting with the President in January 2001, the Chief of Staff made it clear that the army did not support the idea of introducing a state of emergency, expressed by the President. Sutarto repeated this later, which Wahid did not notice or tried not to notice. During the first half of 2001 he repeatedly spoke about the possibility of dissolving the Parliament and introducing a state of emergency [Indonesia, 2001]. According to the military, in particular Sutarto, this would lead to a deterioration of the already difficult situation in the country, so the army did not support the head of state in implementing his plan. This approach fit into the overall picture-

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tine of relations between the President and the Armed Forces during the specified period. The army was not going to lend a helping hand to Wahid, who was rapidly losing power, but it was also not part of the plans of the TNI command to openly drown him. This policy can be explained by the confidence that existed in the ranks of the Armed Forces that the president will not last long and no special steps should be taken to overthrow him - he himself will lose power, and in a fairly short time. It also allowed the army to outwardly distance itself somewhat from Wahid's struggle (not least with himself) to retain the presidency, so as not to cause certain associations with the past, when the army was the arbiter of political destinies. It remained so to a large extent in 2001, but in the new conditions it was necessary to change the rhetoric and style of behavior.

In May 2001, the Prosecutor General's Office dismissed the president's previous corruption charges, but the parliament decided to continue impeachment proceedings, which again aggravated the situation, and made Vahid's behavior even more nervous. Left almost completely alone, he desperately clung to power, but he was unable to reverse the unfavorable situation. On July 21, members of the Indonesian Parliament decided to hold a special session of the People's Consultative Congress (NCC) on the 23rd of the same month to discuss impeachment of the President. Despite Wahid's active opposition, the NCC met on the scheduled day and dismissed the head of state. Megawati Sukarnoputri became the new president.

* * *

The change of the head of State in July 2001 raised questions about the direction of policy development in the field of military reform over the next few years. The new President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was immeasurably more acceptable to the Armed Forces than Wahid. The nature and event content of relations between the civil authorities and the army under Megawati were more reminiscent of the times of the Habibi presidency than of Wahid: the parties tried to refrain from publicly clarifying relations and making mutual claims. The question arises: why did Megawati try (even when she was vice president) to build bridges with the generals? Because I was aware of one of the main factors of Indonesian politics: the voice of the Supreme Court decides, if not everything, then a lot? Or because of the fact that TNI is close to her in spirit and views? Apparently, both factors were at work. The idea of national unity and preserving the territorial integrity of the country was used by Sukarnoputri in order to gain additional weight in the eyes of the population. In order to realize these goals, Sukarnoputri considered it possible to compromise democratic values. Thus, it is not surprising that the army has become one of the natural allies of the new president. In 2000-2001, under the influence of Vahid's aggressive reformist activities, the Armed Forces realized the importance of internal unity and closed their ranks to protect institutional interests (as they were understood by the military elite).

Another factor in favor of rapprochement between the Armed Forces and the President was the atmosphere of mutual distrust that characterized relations between civilian politicians. The incessant petty undercover struggles and squabbles, the weaving of intrigues that are an integral part of the political process, pushed the new head of state to find support outside the civilian part of the political spectrum. The events of September 11, 2001 in the United States and the subsequent declaration of war on forces that use terrorism as a means to achieve their goals became another trump card in the hands of the army, an argument in favor of maintaining its role in the conflict.

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life of the state. The terrorist attacks that rocked Indonesia also had similar consequences.

Megawati would find it difficult to find a platform in the army to transform the military environment in the new conditions (such as for Wahid, for example, was the group of Wirahadikusuma and his associates). And she hadn't made any such attempt. This was evident first of all from her approach to solving personnel issues. Unlike Wahid, who tried to put "his" people in important positions who were ready to carry out his "revolutionary" policy, Sukarnoputri behaved much more cautiously and restrained, which paid dividends for both herself and the army. Matori Abdul Jalil, who could not play the role of a serious counterweight to the army elite, was appointed Defense Minister. Edriartono Sutarto, Chief of Staff of the SV, was promoted to the post of commander-in-chief. An unspoken tradition - a native of the NE at the head of the army-was restored after a short break. The appointment of conservative Ryamizard Ryakudu to the post of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces was also quite consistent with the overall picture of personnel changes [Mietzner, 2006, p. 34].

Territorial problems in various parts of the archipelago were in many ways a kind of barometer, indicating the mood and way of thinking of representatives of the Indonesian political elite, which undoubtedly includes the officer caste.

One of the long-standing pain points of Indonesia was Aceh, located on the northern tip of Sumatra, where fighting against the Movement for an Independent Aceh (DND) continued from the 70s of the XX century. During the 1999 election campaign, Megawati said not without pathos that she would not allow even a drop of people's blood to be shed on the land that had done so much for Indonesia's independence. But it was under Megawati in 2003 that the largest military operation in the post-Suharto era began against the Aceh rebels, which can be considered, not without reason,another step towards the army. There was also no real prosecution of individuals who were considered involved in human rights violations in the country's "hot spots". It is fair to say that the reluctance to escalate the situation around the prospect of a trial of some military commanders is more or less typical of all Indonesian presidents after Suharto. As the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections approach. It was becoming increasingly clear that the Indonesian people were tired of political chaos, economic devastation, and the accompanying talk of breaking away from the country's authoritarian past by deepening democratic transformation. Suharto's Indonesia, with a number of its shortcomings, appeared in a new, more favorable light than just a few years ago. The reformist impulse was gradually fading, which was quite natural. This was also reflected in Law No. 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Army, the approved version of which was much less radical than some democratically minded circles wanted. The final discussions of this document took place in the last days of Sukarnoputri's tenure in power. Implementation of the project has already begun under the new President - Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

* * *

The 2004 presidential election in Indonesia was seen by many as a watershed in the country's recent history: its outcome could be a litmus test of how far the Indonesian public has moved away from the era of the New Order with its categories of thinking, political culture and decision-making mechanisms. Nostalgic sentiments for the politically unfree, but quite stable and well-fed times of Suharto's rule were found

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This is also reflected in the composition of the presidential race participants: among the main contenders for victory were two politicians with an army background - retired Generals Wiranto and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The latter won a landslide victory over incumbent President Megawati Sukarnoputri in the second round.

After becoming head of state, Yudhoyono was forced to start addressing a wide range of issues of various directions. One of the most important items on the agenda was the issue of army reform, which under Yudhoyono's predecessors was not systematic and was often sacrificed to opportunistic political considerations. Having left the army, Yudhoyono was well aware of the essence of the processes taking place in the troops and the difficulties that the TNI was experiencing. The President was aware that by focusing on the need to reform the Armed Forces, he contrasts himself with the most conservative-minded representatives of the military elite, and this was reflected and is reflected in his approach to transformation: constant emphasis on commitment to reforms is combined with a sometimes noticeable desire to meet the army halfway on this or that issue. He could not help but realize that the effectiveness and pace of reforms in the Armed Forces are constrained by the small amount of funding for law enforcement agencies and a number of psychological factors.

One of the most important elements of the defense policy under the Yudhoyono can be considered the implementation of Law No. 34/2004 on TNI, aimed at professionalizing the army's activities, its gradual withdrawal from the political and economic space [Undang-Undang..., 2004]. The main stumbling block in the implementation of this document, which certainly carries a certain constructive charge, is the inability to translate many positive provisions of the law into practical terms in the conditions of modern Indonesia. Thus, by forcing the army out of business, the state must offer compensation in the form of a significant increase in the defense budget, which it will not be able to do in the foreseeable future. But in general, during the Yudhoyono presidency, the change in the legislative framework for the functioning of the Armed Forces occupied a prominent place in Indonesian politics. In 2006-2007 another catalyst for the controversy surrounding the place and role of the Armed Forces in the socio-political life of the country was the discussion of draft laws on national security and military proceedings [Antara, 07.02.2007; Kompas, 09.02.2007; 29.11.2007].

Another hot topic of discussion was the issue of granting the military the right to vote in elections. This issue has been raised quite often in recent years, especially at a time when the country was on the verge of expressing the people's will. Under Suharto, the army positioned itself as a national, supra-ethnic and supra-confessional force and, according to the official version, took a neutral position during the country's elections. ABRI representatives could not exercise their right to vote. Under the changed circumstances, when many elements of Indonesia's political heritage are being gradually abandoned, the disenfranchisement of a certain segment of the population (or, more precisely, the voluntary renunciation of this right by this group) looks somewhat archaic at first glance. Both the army command and the civilian authorities are aware that they are dealing with a rather subtle matter. In particular, it calls into question the freedom of military personnel to express their political sympathies during voting. Before the 2004 elections The Armed Forces declared their neutrality and generally observed it. Commander-in-Chief Joko Suyanto (who was appointed in December 2007). General Joko Santoso), who took office in February 2006, announced the priority areas of his work in the new capacity. Among the tasks that required the attention of the Commander-in-Chief was the issue of the right to vote of representatives of the army [Antara, 20.02.2006; 08.12.2007].

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The lively discussion about the above-mentioned bills received wide press coverage and pushed into the background the announcement that the TNI will be transferred to a new doctrinal framework in 2007. As outdated, the old doctrine of Chatur Dharma Eka Karma ("four debts - one fate") will give way to a new one-Three Dharma Eka Karma ("three debts - one fate") [Kompas, 25.01.2007]. The old one covered the SV, Air Force, Navy and police. The new one will not apply to the police, which got out of the control of the military a few years ago. The change in the doctrinal basis of the Armed Forces ' activities is associated with the transformation of their status and function in post-Suharto Indonesia. The new doctrine focuses on the refusal of the army to participate in political and economic processes, the course of which was unthinkable without the participation of the army under Suharto.

There was every reason to believe that as the presidential and parliamentary campaigns approached, the problem of reforming the army would become an object of political speculation, and the Armed Forces themselves would take a direct part in the election race, using their authority and remaining political weight. To some extent, this is how it turned out. Many analysts have pointed out that the army's caste solidarity can be disrupted during heated political battles. Even long before the election campaign began, there were signs of hostility in certain army circles. For example, the influential retired military leaders Tri Soutrisno, Wiranto and others have repeatedly criticized the president. Moreover, discontent has already begun to take shape: in December 2006, the Party of People's Conscience (PNS) was created, which included the two generals mentioned above. In general, about 30% of the party's founding fathers came from an army background [Fajar, 2006; Jawa Pos, 2007; Kompas, 22.12.2006; Koran Tempo, 2006; Republika, 2006; Sinar Harapan, 2006]. Several other retired officers, including Prabowo Subianto, who was backed by the Movement for a Greater Indonesia party formed in 2008, were also extremely active during the election campaign. Of course, we should not forget about the current President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - the main favorite of the presidential election, whose platform is the Party of Democrats. We emphasize that this article was written at a time when the results of the battle for seats in parliament and the presidential and vice-presidential seats were not yet known. However, there was no doubt that politicians with a military background were destined to play one of the most prominent roles in this battle.

To sum up, Indonesia has made significant progress in transforming various aspects of its political, economic and social existence during the first four post-Suharto Presidents. Reforms in the army are no exception. There are certain signs of the development of the Armed Forces in the direction of professionalization of its activities. This is a long and painful process, involving significant political, economic and psychological costs. The situation in the state is not quite stable, and therefore, the military will not lack for temptations to once again "save" the nation and at the same time secure an advantageous position in politics and business. Under the New Order, the Armed Forces represented the backbone of the entire political and economic process, their power was all-pervasive and comprehensive. After Suharto's departure, the situation has changed significantly, but the political infantilism of civilian structures, coupled with the nostalgic mood of many Indonesians, creates prerequisites for slowing down army reforms.

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list of literature

Antara. Jakarta.

Asiaweek. Hong Kong, 05.11.1999.

Dewi Fortuna Anwar. Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces // Politics and Security Series. East-West Center, Washington. No. 4, February 2001.

Fajar. Makassar, 22.12.2006.

Indonesia. Ithaca, N 71 (April 2001).

Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 2 Tahun 1999 tentang Langkah-Langkah Kebijakan dalam Rangka Pemisahan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia dari Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia.

The International Herald Tribune. P., 26.02.2000.

Jawa Pos. Surabaya, 26.03.07.

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